Ideology and deviance. by Sumner , Colin
IDEOLOGY AED DEVIANCE
by
Colin S.
A thesis submitted to the 
Centre for Criminological 
Studies in the University 
of Sheffield, for the 
decree of Ph.D. in August 
1976.
Sumner
LIBRARY
H
SIIIU
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH
Boston Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ.
www.bl.uk
BEST COPY AVAILABLE.
TEXT IN ORIGINAL IS 
CLOSE TO THE EDGE OF
THE PAGE
TO MY MOTHER, 
MARIAN SZYMANSKI.
CONTENTS
Acknovledgments ' j
Summary of thesis
Introduction * iii
Part Ono Deviance as ideology
1 Ifcascisn and devicncy theory
Introduction 3
The problematics of deviance G
The problematic of dominant criminology 10
The problematic of ’netr deviancy1 theory 17
The New Criminology and Marxism 30
Hirst’s critique 44
Deviance as an.ideological formation 48
2 Ideology and social practice
Introduction 53
The concept of. ideology in general 54
Ideology and the social formation: the concept of reflection 59
Ideology and Ideological state Apparatuses 70
The concept of social practice 78
Deviance and social practice 81
Part Tvo Reeding ideologies
3 Content analysis: prarrnatic and speculative
Introduction 84
Content Analysis — a case of pragmatic empiricism 87
Information theory 101
Speculative criticism 104
"’iorld vievs" and the possibility of e science of ideology 112 4
4 The analysis of form : structuralism
Introduction 120
The object of the structuralist problematic 122
A critique of structuralism 125
Consequences of the critique for a theory of reading ideolosry 134
Structuralism at -.fork 142
5 Senioior’T
Introduction jgo
The concepts of Barthesian semiology 154
A seniiological reading of press discourse on political 1G6
demonstrations
6 Nco-structuralisn
Introduction igg
De-centring the discourse 188
Critique of Derrida and Kristeva 199
Culler’s critique 202
Althusser's "lecture symptomale" 200
Ideology-detection in neo'-structuralism 222
A note on the relation betireen Altlmsser's structuralism and his 231
rending of Marx
Part Three Forms of co-operation and the corresponding 
forms of consciousness : Notes for a Marxist 
analysis of ideologies
7 Structure and ideolory : the necessity and specificity of the connection
Introduction 236
Empiricism in the reading of ideology 237
Social relations and forms of social consciousness:the connection of 24S 
necessity
Economises and idealism in Marxist'theory 257 *
The combination of social practices : Foulantzas and The German 272 *
Ideology
8 Ideology^superstructure and class
Introduction 284 1
The cell-forms of superstruetural practice 288
Political practice 301
Intellectual practice 303
Social divisions and class formation 308
Dominant ideology,class struggle and the social totality 318
Reading ideologies - a netr direction 321
9 Whither deviance ?
Introduction
Negative ideologies and social censures r>1g
The maintenance and development of negative ideologies 3>57
The direction of future research 382
BIBUOGRAPUY 36q
i
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am forever grateful to Inn Taylor,ray supervisor,for his 
constant encouragement during various personal crises of mine,for his 
valuable criticisms and comments, and for forcing mo to clarify my 
conceptions. John Buckle and John Stoddart made the research possible 
by giving me the time to begin it at Sheffield City Polytechnic in 
January 1972. The comments and criticisms of Peter Gibbon (Sheffield 
City Polytechnic), Graham Murdoch (University of Leicester), the late 
John O'Malley (University of Liverpool) and Peter Alcock (Sheffield 
City Polytechnic) stimulated much rethinking. During my stay at Sheffield, 
until 1974, the comradeship and encouragement of Peter Alcoclc,Barry Smart, 
Maurice Roche,Ian Taylor,and of several stimulating staff seminar 
groups,were invaluable. My first wife,Christine,gave mo great support 
despite the effects of the work on our social life. I am grateful to 
Judith Rigden and John Blanchfield for doing some of the typing.
Vast quantities of typing »especially the earlier drafts,wore done 
by Margaret White; I am absolutely and totally indebted to her for 
this gruelling work. Without this,her companionship,support,comment 
and valuable criticism of the theory,the task of finishing a thesis 
whilst lecturing would undoubtedly have been too much. Her encouragement 
and that of Ian Taylor have been much more important than they realise. 
Finally,various students at U.C.W.,Aberystvyth,have given me useful 
comments on lectures based on the thesis work. It only remains for 
me to thank and curse the contradictions in the social structure of 
capitalist Britain which made the research very possible,necessary 
and difficult,all at the same time. In the lonely hour of the first 
instance (which,unlike that of the last,always comes),of course, I 
am responsible for the thesis; ny determination (Althusserians, 
please note) made it all possible.
Ideology and Deviance by Colin Sumner
Stimmary of thesis
The work herein is essentially an exploration into social 
theory. This theoretical re-search was precipitated by my dissatis­
faction with a seaiological analysis of the press reporting of polit­
ical demonstrations,which I worked on for G months in 1973. liy 
critique of that analysis is presented in chapter five. A more 
fundamental driving force was my concern with the importance of 
dominant ideology. I soon discovered that Marxian analysis has 
tended to neglect ideology as an objective force in social history.
The thesis constantly refers itself to the need for historical 
research on the social origins,forms and functions of ideology. 
Initially,! tos attempting to establish a satisfactory paradigm 
in the sociology of deviance. Extant theories proved to be inadequate 
and Hirst*s critique offered little. However,. I found that Hirst 
implicitly reconceptualised deviance in a way that corresponded 
with my own nascent ideas; as a form of ideological formation.
The search for a theory of ideology and a theory of deviance thus 
became doubly important.
Hence, the thesis lias three main objects: (a.) the concept 
of deviance, (b) the concept of ideology,and (c) a theorised 
reading of ideologies in discursive materials. I have concluded that 
the essence of deviance is as a social censure (a type of ideological 
formation reflecting collisions in class practices),that ideology is, 
in Marxian analysis, the structure of consciousness, and that one can 
only rationally read nn idoology from a discursive text when one 
has a theory of its specificity and of the forms of appearance of 
its referent. In the process of the investigation I was forced to 
try to re-think the major concepts of science,class,dominant ideology, 
law,crime and social practice, and to develop the new concept of 
the ideological formation. The work can be seen as a prolegomenon 
to an historical analysis of political ideologies.
iii
Introduction
When I began the work embodied in this thesis, I intended to 
produce a description of the dominant ideology in the national press 
reports of a form of political deviance, demonstrations. T had become 
convinced of the importance of dominant ideology in Western capitalist 
societies as a feature of the current political situation. The analysis 
of the existence of that ideology in the produce of the mass media and 
its prophylactic effects on working class consciousness seemed an urgent 
task for the socialist movement. I still believe that this analysis is 
demanded, but, as a consequence of the theoretical exploration herein,
T think that it requires \is to examine in detail the development of (the now 
international) social relations in the twentieth certury. No ideology 
can grip the minds of the masses unless it is well grounded in support­
ive social relations.
In 1973, I carried out a detailed and arduous semiclogical 
reading of a month’s press reports on political demonstrations. As a 
result of that, it became very clear that (a) tlio concept of deviance 
was almost completely vague and ur.explicated, (b) the Marxist theory of 
ideology was sadly neglected and (c) there was no developed, historical 
materialist practice of reading ideology in discursive texts. In short, 
it became obvious that the whole field of enquiry was a treacherous one; 
it had hardly been mapped at all by social science. There was no 
choice, I had to engage in an investigation of the theoretical problems 
that had arisen in my research practice. Consequently, what follows is 
an exploration in the Marxist theory of ideology. It is a determined 
attempt to produce a theory of deviance, a theory of ideology and a 
theory of reading ideology. At times the work is pedantic and at tines 
it is polemical, but I make no apologies for this extremely abstract 
text. In some circumstances, social science research must examine its 
theoretical, epistemological and methodological assumptions before it 
can improve its empirical efforts. It is no use people complaining 
that it’s all too abstract and theological in Marxism these days: the 
re—oxanination of basic concepts is an irdexical practice in a very real
crisis.
To his everlasting credit, Louis Althusser has raised the 
question of ideology and attempted to restore the dialectic to Marxian 
analysis. In my view, these are two big gains for Marxist research 
today. Alongside the analysis of international social relations and 
the developments in socialist societies, they appear to be bloodless 
and irrelevant. But the fact is that a Marxism without a theory of 
ideology and a dialectical methodology is really not worth the toss, 
and, indeed, does not match with my understanding of Marx's actual work. 
Imperialism and socialist development may well be the most important 
topics for empirical analysis, but without dialectics and a theory of 
ideology Marxism would only produce work of a totally oconomistic, 
one-sided nature. If one believes that ideological formations are 
merely 'effects' and have no materiality or determining force, then that 
econonism is sufficient, of course.
■Unfortunately, I believe that Althusser's position is based on sev­
eral major errors; one can read my thesis as an ongoing debate with 
Althusser's work. Throughout the thesis there is an attempt to avoid the 
-pitfalls of humanism and anti-humanism in the belief that neither corr­
esponds to a dialectical view. Real men with definite forms of consc­
iousness, power and wealth are as important as the social structures 
within which they'exist. They are vital elements in the process of 
history. They can bo authors an well as agents. Whethor they are one 
or the other (or both) cannot, bo legislated for in theory; it depends 
on their position within tho structure of social practices. In the end,
I hope that 1 have outlined a dialectical, materialist theory which will 
enable me to do sophisticated historical analysis of social ideologies.
It is important to stress that this work was carried out in 
the spirit and heat of exploration and, there!ore, the concepts acquire 
a cumulative development. There would be little point in a render just 
absorbing one chapter and leaving the others. The thesis is a cumulat­
ive development of concepts which achieve, finally, some degree of 
rigour. Uncertainties at the beginning are often resolved as the work 
progresses; however, I make no apologies for leaving several problems 
open. It is a work of exploration, not a work which embellishes extant 
riches. Whether I have 'discovered' anything 'new' is a matter for the 
reader to decide. For myself, I feel that I have turned over enough 
ground to keep me going in revealed research issues for at least one
Vlifetime. As theoretical exploration, the thesis has thus been extremely 
rewarding for me at least. I hope that it will be of some value to 
those Marxists who feel that Marxism has neglected the realm of ideology 
and that sociological studies have not produced any startling 
contributions. The currently poptilar phenomenological philosophy, 
perhaps, has a vital place in teaching practice, but it provides no 
social explanations for the forms of consciousness. As for economistic 
Marxism , many socialists may not like its dogmas,but the need is to 
supercede then not just to scorn them.
Ideology is the key conceptual object within this work for two 
immediate reasons. Firstly,as I have said, I was concerned with the 
class nature of political consciousness. Put,secondly, the critical 
reading of criminology and the sociology of deviance I had completed, 
described in chapter 1 ,convinced ne that the 'deviancc-noss1 of deviance 
lay in its quality as an ideological matter. The fact that Hirst's 
critique of deviancy theory,and the conceptions of the various 'politicised 
deviant groups', seemed to involve a similar perception reinforced ny 
own view. I developed the concept of the ideological formation, which 
•scons a logical extension of Marx's work. The concept is elaborated 
further in chapters 8 and 9. In chapter 9, I argue that the type of 
ideological formation represented in the commonsense conception of 
'deviance' is the social censure, a product of the observation of the forms 
of appearance of a particular social practice through the eyes of a 
a determinate negative ideology. The conclusion that deviance was on 
ideological formation naturally directed my attention to the reading of 
ideology.
Chapter 2 contains initial formulations of the concept of ideology. 
Through a critique of Althusser,the integral position of ideology 
within any social practice is stressed. A dialectical conception of 
'reflection' is brought out and the notion of ideology as an external 
effect of practice is rejected. An ideology is a form of consciousness 
necessitated by a particular social relation; -this conception is 
developed in chapter 7. Chapters 3 to G focus on existing practices of 
rending ideology from its forms of appearance in discursive texts; tlicir 
weaknesses are illustrated where possible by reference to any employment 
they have had in the study of mass media accounts of political deviance. 
Chapter 3 tackles those practices which focus on the 'content' of a discourse 
which is said to show the presence of ideology in the brains of the comnran—
vi
icotors. These practices tend’ to assume that what is there to be rep­
orted or vritten up is 'obvious*, as a body of facts and that ideology 
distorts the truth perceptible by an 'objective' observer. Chapter 4 
is a critique of the very basis of structuralist thinking and acts as a 
foundation for chapters 5 and C. All the work dealt with in these 
three chapters focusses on the 'form' of a discourse, a form which is 
said to produce the content. Structuralist reading practices tend to 
assume that there is nothing in reality to bo written up in a discourse 
and that the sxibstance of a discourse is a direct effect of its ideolog­
ical structure. Chapter 5 involves a critique of semiology and of the 
seniiological reading which I did in 197.3. Chapter 0 is mainly concern­
ed with demonstrating the inadequacies of Althusser's symptomatic read­
ing. It is worth noting, finally, that nil my own readings of theoret­
ical works, discussed in this text, are, more or less, symptomatic 
readings of the relevant problematics. The only difference is that I 
have regularly tried to contextualise those problematics in their 
historical setting. My use of symptomatic reading is not contradictory 
to my evaluation of it as a method: it is simply a rigorous, 
subjective, descriptive reading and I hove used it as such.
The chapters on reading ideologies may seem awkwardly placed 
in the flow of the work. This is explained by the fact that my initial 
response-to the problems of my own reading practice was to examine the 
problematics of reading. Thus the critical work embodied in chaptors 
3 and 4 chronologically preceded that embodied in chapter 2. Yet those 
critiques themselves were revised to a certain extent by my investigat­
ion of the Marxian theory of ideology finally embodied in the later 
chapters. The preliminary formulations in chapter 2 thus introduce the 
basic conception operative in these critiques and the developments in 
the subsequent chapters are made in the light of them.
Chapter 6 concludes with a statement of the necessary direci>- 
ion for Marxian readings of ideology. Chapters 7 and 8 extend and 
develop that statement. Chapter 7 is especially concerned with the soc­
ial nature of forms of consciousness and examines some of the theses of 
Althusser, Gramsci and Poulantzas in this light. Chapter 8 is mainly 
concerned with formulating the concepts necessary for an historical 
analysis of the origins of particular ideologies. Concepts of the 
superstructural practices are produced and comments are made on the
Vii
Marxian notions of class»dominant ideology and social formation. All 
these formule,tions are seen as vital in moving from the general 
propositions on ideology towards future»empirical»historical research.
The new direction for the reading' of ideologies is outlined in principle 
and the concept of the ideological formation is clarified accordingly.
This latter concept is»perhaps,the most important - development in the 
thesis. It stands as a rejection of empiricist views which take 
observed reality as given in its appearance»and of structuralist positions 
which take the substance of observation as a complete reflection of the 
observer’s ideological structures. Chapter 9 applies the concepts of ideology 
and ideological formation to the question of deviance. In this process, 
the concepts of negative ideology and social censure are outlined as central 
for future work in this area. Finally, the notion of ’deviant behavior’ 
is rejected as inadequate and it is argued that each censured practice 
must he viewed as a sepax'nte form of social practice with its own specific 
conditions of existence.
I believe that this rcconceptualisation of deviance in terms cf 
Marxist theory collapses the existing sociology of deviance into the Marxian 
analysis of ideologies. The critique of the extant positions on crime and 
deviance,found in chapter l,was written in 1973,before the publication of 
several recent works in radical criminology. Nothing published since 1973 
has systematically addressed the question of the concept of deviance,and, 
therefore, I did not feel it necessary to update the critique. After the 
direction was set up in chapter 1 ,1  was simply concerned to get to the 
bottom of the question of ideology and its reading. That single-minded 
pursuit has also meant that the comparison of my conclusions with those 
of some unmentioned,Marxist writers (such as Habermas,Renner and various 
people at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies»Birmingham) has been 
delayed. Moreover, I have put off a detailed analysis of the works of 
Ruesche and Kirchhoimer, E.P.Thompson, Hay, Foucault, and Radzinowicz; 
all of which examine the historical contexts of law emergence (and 
possibly of censure also,although I doubt it). Comparisons with xinnantioned 
theorists, critique of recent radical criminology, programmes of political 
strategy,detailed historical research,contemporary sociological analysis: 
all these are necessary tasks still to be accomplished. However,they had to 
take second place here; it is necessary to develop a theory before one can 
elaborate all its implications.
The field of enquiry examined here is fairly modern and lacked rigorous 
development: deviance,ideology and reading were all confused concepts, 
and class,dominant ideology and science were all controversial, when 
I began this research. Further theoretical work is still required:
I am only too well aware of the limitations of this analysis. But,
I hope that I have made sufficient gains to make research(both 
historical and sociological) into social ideologies much more 
penetrating and fruitful. One thing is certain, this fantastically 
complex question of ideology will not be resolved without this kind 
of painstaking theoretical deliberation.
Colin Sumner 
Aberystwyth 
August 1076.
IDEOLOGY
AMD
DEVI ALICE
PART ONE
DEVIANCE AS IDEOLOGY
1 MARXISM AND DEVIANCY THEORY
Introduction
The questions that „rive the discussion in this chapter are 
of a fundamental nature for any Harriet »ho has worked within the field 
of the BOO d e a r  of deviance: why are the existing concepts of deviance 
incompatible with Marxian theory and what is to he put in their place*
Without an answer to these questions Marxist work in this area may find
itself caught in the dilemma of „ ,
1 01 tryine to apply a particular theoretical
system to an object conceived in the thmio-Vi+ n-rxne xnought of other opposing systems.
Such a dilemma could have several consequences, the likeliest of which 
are (a) an impasse where Marxism finds itself blocked and impotent 
confronted with the barrier created by its opposition, and (b) the
revision of Marxism in order to provide a knowledge of the alien theoret-
ical object. It would appear nece^^a-mr 4„ •».^  necessary to remove any offending
theoretical obstacle and. within i + o .— ’ within its destruction, create the appropriate
concept enabling Marxism to develon i+oueveiop its social science. Only then can
Marxism conquer this field in any relevant «„a* m.y cievent sense. To struggle with the
enemy on his own terrain is not an end in i + eoir v 4enct m  itself, but a means by which
victory can be achieved and a new terrain developed in its place. 
Similarly, to defeat the enemy on his own theoretical terrain carrying 
„0 theory which could transform that terrain, and merely armed with 
spirited critiques of the enemy’s purposes, would be to establish the 
sparrt of struggle without the material conditions for an improved future
This is not to imply that marijuana-smoking, Juvenile delin-
quency, political demonstrations, rape, prosti+,,4-.-, x. . , . * 1 ’ prostitution etc. are not worth
study from a standpoint of revolutionary socialism qllr.v l + ll.
considered as behaviours may be said to be ■ n  * 'things'Y said to be illustrations of social 
deviance and it could therefore be argued that m
y opening statements are
4guilty of closing off these behaviours to radical enquiry. But this 
accusation would miss the crucial point that, although these behaviours 
may be illustrations of social deviance, they themselves, in their very 
nature, ao not give us the concept of deviance. Deviance, as a concept, 
is not derived from the behaviours that are said to illustrate it. Such 
a proposition would be logically absurd, for unless we had a firm concept 
of deviance how could we say that these behaviours illustrate it. The 
study of these behaviours could not tell us anything about deviance 
unless we had applied a concept of deviance in the first place which 
defined such behaviours as forms of deviance. In which case it is clear 
that the concept of deviance applied, and integral to the postulated 
accusation, is th&t deviance is a type of behaviour, or that types of 
<■ behaviovir constitute the realm of deviance. Now, by theoretical enquiry, 
we may come to the conclusion that deviance is not a behaviour but, in 
fact, a social ideology. Having arrived at that point we may then 
proceed to examine the kind of social conditions which produced the social 
ideology, or we may wish to examine the kind of practices which this 
social ideology was connected to at a particular historical conjuncture 
in a particular social formation, i.e. we may wish to consider which 
practices involved the 'living out' of this social ideology. Each of 
these examinations could be reasonably defined as studies of particular 
types of social deviance and yet the concept of deviance is not one of 
»behaviour'. Hence, by arguing that the Marxist concept of deviance 
must be constructed, I am not automatically excluding the study of 
political demonstrations, theft or rape (for example). In fact to put 
the argument in a positive fashion, I am simply advocating that we do 
not wander into research assuming that there is such a thing as "data" 
which is the same from every theoretical standpoint, that the everyday 
terminology is adequate and not in need of questioning, that the 
wording of a theoretical argument is irrelevant, and that any social 
science research is possible without theoretical work constructing its 
concepts, object and methods.
Thus it is not possible, if the researcher is interested in 
producing a coherent knowledge, to begin an analysis of the ideological 
representation of a form 01 political deviance in the national press 
without examining the key concepts of 'ideology' and 'deviance'.
Similarly one cannot just "read" without explicating a concept of 
'reading'. Unless the analyst constructs his object, concepts and methods 
in a rigorous fashion he literally does not "know what he is talking 
about", he is merely "playing with the unknown" or "searching in the 
dark". This applies to all research not just the Marxist variety.
Consequently, this work as a whole can be seen to be directed 
to the explication of the object of its theoretical enquiry, the 
concepts corresponding to that object, and the methods of procedure 
consistent with the production of a knowledge of that object. I am 
uncertain at the present time whether I have developed a new direction 
for Marxist theory, but I would hope that the theoretical investigation 
contained here is sufficiently rigorous to have at least clarified (a) 
what it is to 'read ideology' and (b) what is necessary to be done to 
develop a knowledge of the object (ideological formations) constructed 
in this work. However I would strongly suggest that a knowledge of 
ideological formations is a correct aim of Marxist theory and just as 
important as a knowledge of economic and political formations. It seems 
to be right to argue that unless we understand each of the three elements 
of a social formation in themselves and in their connexions with each 
other then our knowledge of social formations must remain partial or 
unbalanced.
Firstly, let us turn to the question of 'deviance', in order 
to assess the suitability of the concept for Marxism. Through a critical 
examination of concepts of deviance outside Marxism I shall attempt to 
construct the concept required by Marxism. New concepts cannot simply 
be floated in from 'experience' or by analogy: they must be developed 
out of the destruction of the old ones. That process of destruction which 
contains construction within itself is the dialectic of knowledge. No 
concept can be destroyed without the imposition of a new concept, even 
if the latter is transitional and insecurely formed. However there are 
no guarantees that the new concept is secure - its security will depend 
on the rigour of the elaboration of its determinations. This latter 
process nevertheless depends on the process of criticism of the old 
concept for its aoility even to begin. So before I elaborate any new 
concept of deviance I must begin at the beginning with an examination of
5
6the non-Marxist concepts of deviance in the sociology of deviance and 
criminology (crime is but one form of deviance) and construct from 
this analysis a concept of deviance which will literally enable us 
"to know what we are talking about". That is, from this theoretical
investigation of deviance, I want to establish the concept of the object 
under examination.
The problematics of deviance
Previous comparisons of different theoretical perspectives 
within criminology and the sociology of deviance^ have been inadequate 
inasmuchas they have rarely examined or systematically exposed their 
. own theoretical frameworks and thus the similarities between the critic: 
and their victims have gone unnoticed. The tendency has been to sketch 
in general features and to move on to an equally general account of the 
social 'contexts' from which the perspectives allegedly emerged.
V/hat is lacking in these comparisons is the more rigorous concept of 
the theoretical problematic. As developed by Althusser the concept 
refers to a systematic thought framework, comprising epistemological,
1 . The works I have in mind include the following: S. Cohen "Crimino1o ?t " 
and the sociology of deviance in Great Britain: a recent history and 
"a current renort" in P.Rock and M.Macintosh (eds.) Deviance and Social 
Control (1972 London: Tavistock), S.Cohon and L.Taylor "Contcmnorary 
British approaches to the sociology .of deviance'* (1972 Unpublished paper 
addressed to the Society for the Study of Social Problems, in Mew Orleans, 
U.S.A.), I.Taylor "Prospects for radical criminological theory and 
nracticc" (1973 Unpublished paper, addressed to the European Group for . 
the Study of Deviance and Social Control in Florence, Italy), and D.
Matza: Becoming Deviant (1969 N.Y.Prentice Hall) esp. Part 1.
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theoretical and methodological standpoints. A problematic constitutes 
the structure of any piece of theoretical discourse. The effect of 
the structuring lies at the empirical level, in the discursive text, 
and is constituted by the absence, presence, level of development and 
internal relations of the concepts in the text. A problematic, therefore, 
is the structure of thought which predicates certain concepts, which 
renders others impossible, and which links the predicated concepts in 
a limited variety of ways. Althusser's account of the 'problematic', 
however, tends to structuralism and the problematic sometimes looks 
like a Levi-Straussian or Chomskyan 'deep structure'. Hence I would 
wish to enter the key reservation to the above formulation of the 
concept: the concept of problematic is merely a descriptive one in 
referring to a system of thought which is found in its effects at the 
level of'the text. Althusser's concept does not explain the historical 
origins of the elements and internal relations of the thought system.
.Notwithstanding this reservation, the concept- of the problematic still 
has a vital degree of incisiveness because it breaks away from the notion 
that the presences of a text reflect its aiithor’s world-view or 
perspective.
The concept makes two important suggestions:
(1) that the determinations of the text are effective in its absences 
as well as its presences;
(2) that these determinations are not exhausted by the author's
. » >conscious beliefs, prejudices and purposes. 2
2
2. See L.Althusser For Marx (1969 Harmandsworth: Allen Lane) and L. 
Althusser and E.Balibar Reading Capital (1970 London: New Left Books). 
Karel Williams has suggested that Althusser uses the concept in diverse 
manner l''Wnpr^blematic Archeology" (1974) Economy and Society 3:1 pp.41-681 
but this usage appears frequently in Althusser and seems to be the most 
appropriate one for his problematic. Miriam Glucksmann adopts the view 
°f a Proflema^ c as the fundamental question that defines a thought- 
structure's ability to question. Her approach seems to limit or reduce 
the concept to one level of reference - the theoretical; (see her 
Structuralism_ij1.Cpntemporary Social Though* (1974 London Routledre 
Kogan Paul) esp. «ETl.'ih. >Lity of a thought-sliuoturer prob emahe, 
in my view, lies in the interrelation of its various elements rather 
than in the dominance of one element. The concept of 'problematic' as 
defined and qualified above, is used throughout this work. ' ’
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Given this concept of the problematic, we can move away from 
comparisons of theories of deviance which draw out essential themes 
from the written words only. Of course, it may he argued that most 
intelligent readers usually make note of absences as well as presences in 
discourse. I would reply that, although that may "be true as an empirical 
fact (and I doubt it, as a matter of fact), the value of the concept 
of the problematic is that it points to the existence of an invisible 
set of relations within the discourse, as it is constituted by absences 
and presences, and asserts that this set of relations is immediately 
and directly related to these absences and presences. That is an incisive 
theoretical concept and not one that naturally resides in the 'commonsense' 
of the intelligent reader, who would tend to see absences as the 
deliberate omissions or accidental oversights of the text's human 
author. Althusser's concept has developed from a critique of this every­
day notion of discourse and, I think, is an advance on that notion. Thus, 
instead of describing the most prominent themes and expressed prejudices 
in deviancy theory, I shall attempt to describe the apparent structures 
of discourses constituting the field of deviancy theory, drawing 
attention to both the relations and the elements of those discourses.
The relations (or structure) are so important, for no element of a 
problematic can exist in a vacuum and its nature and power can only be 
underst.ood in its relation with the other elements. To cum up, the 
descriptive reading of the problematics of deviance, which I shall 
attempt in. this chapter, will improve on previous comparisons in that
(l) it will focus on the basic theoretical, epistemological and 
methodological elements of each problematic; (2) it will be able to see 
similarities as well as differences - empiricist 'thematic-essence' 
analysis, I would suggest, tends towards seeing only differences because 
it takes the empirical word as the sole source of its knowledge and in 
practice the words, their order, tone and texture usually differ with 
every author; (3) it will specify its own theoretical conditions of 
existence.
I shall compare the major elements of the problematic of 
'dominant criminology' with those of the 'new deviancy' problematic. This 
will set up a foundation for a comparison of these major elements with 
the elements of the problematic in Taylor, Walton and Young's The Hew
9Criminology \  I will "be able to assess the so-called 'Marxism' of 
that text, which claims to lay down the 'formal theoretical reouirements* 
for a Marxist criminology, by making this .comparison and by outlining, 
what I take to be, the basic elements of the Marxian problematic. Only 
after these tasks are complete will it be possible even to begin the 
comprehension and assessment of the possibility of a Marxist theory of 
deviance or a Marxist criminology.
The dominant criminological problematic is that framework of 
thought which is most closely connected, financially, politically and 
ideologically, to the key institution of domination, which, in most 
societies of today, is the state. It is a thought framework expressing a 
. form of dominant ideology*. In all stratified societies the dominant 
criminological problematic reflects, either simply or complexly, the 
ideological understanding within the ruling group of its conditions of 
existence. Dominant criminology is not so termed because it is the 
dominant problematic in criminology, but rather because of its economic, 
political and ideological connexions with the ruling group. It dominates 
criminological journals, grant-giving bodies, criminology courses and 
texts because it _is the dominant criminological problematic, and not vice 
versa. In this effort to outline the problematic of dominant criminology, 
the discursive material held in mind is that which is dealt with on 
orthodox criminology courses - that is, the work that portrays criminal 
behaviour as the product of constitutional, psychological, psychiatric or 
sociopathic defects in the criminal. Such work is found in the writings 
of, for example, Lombroso, Eysenck, the Gluecks, Yablonsky and West.
The new deviancy^ problematic is seen as that thought framework 345
3. (1973 London: Routledge, Kegan Paul). This text is considered to be 
of great importance by many writers in the field of the sociology of 
deviance. It attempts to destroy the theoretical bases of previous school 
and perspectives in criminology and to lay the formal requirements of a 
Marxist criminology.
4. This latter concept will be examined more closely in the following 
chapters, esp. chs. 2, 5 und 8. For the time being, 'dominant ideology' 
refers to those forms of consciousness which spring immediately from the 
ruling class and the social relations in which that class is embedded.
5. The term was used by A.K.Cohen in "New deviancy theory" (1973 
Unpublished paper addressed to the 12th National Deviancy Conference,
York, U.K.)
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whose effect is a declaration of opposition to dominant criminology’, 
and which fully emerged in the .work of Becker, Lemert, Coffman and 
Matza. Its institutional base was, and still is, primarily, sociology 
and social psychology departments in the U.S.A.. Its ideological base 
was, and still is, primarily, in the pragmatism of the emergent, liberal,, 
academic sociologists' sector of the American petit bourgeoisie.
Apart from a knowledge of the central object of this chapter 
(the concept of deviance), the work at this juncture has two secondary 
intended consequences. Firstly, the reading of deviance elaborated here 
will necessarily involve outlining a theoretical standpoint which will 
govern the chapters ahead and, at the same time, be developed in them. 
Secondly, the reading will sensitize us to the utility of materials, 
governed by the problematics analyzed, dealing with the social represent­
ation of deviance.
The problematic of dominant criminology
The most immediate element here is the notion that there is 
such a thing as the criminal man. People convicted of criminal offences 
are assumed to be different (ontologically, psychologically, physiologic­
ally, or sociologically) from other people. Thus 'deviance' in this 
problematic is the behaviour of those who are intrinsically different 
from the people (the vast majority) who are not convicted and who 
constitute, by implication, some kind of homogeneous mass. The different­
iating feature has varied from study to study and many such marks have 
been proclaimed. Convicted persons have been alleged to be suffering 
from one or more of the following differences: high cheek-bones, 
mesomorphic body type, inherited criminal genes, XYY chromosone complement,
6. 'Scientism*, 'positivism', and 'behaviourism' are terms which 
new deviancy theorists employ to signify their conception of the 'pers- 
pective' they would say they oppose. The New Criminólo.,, „!!!“
these terms and declares an opposition 7 7 7  r , .--- r—r—^ jCo
also declares an opposition to ñ¡v, d“ iancy »ut it
the terms "labelling perspective" and "phenomenoSsioa^ooc^loCT"!
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subnormal intelligence, depression, repressed traumatic memories, strong
unconscious desire for punishment arising from strong unconscious guilt,
maternal deprivation, broken homes, large family, weak ethical reactions
extraversión, anti-social tendencies or psychopathy, disorganized
neighbourhood, a subcultural value system, and a lack of sophistication
resulting in inability to learn norms of deference and to make realistic
moves in conflictual interaction-sequences. I viould not deny that some
•convicted individuals are the carriers of ’pathological’ personality
7
structures. What is¡ important is the role, even in the sociological 
variations of this problematic, of ’the emnlrical individual*  as the basic 
»unit of analysis, rather than social relations. The 'observable behaviour’ 
of human subjects forms the basis of this problematic. Thus analysis 
begins from 'visible facts', such as the criminal conviction, and moves 
outwards further and further away from the 'concrete* until the concept of 
the 'criminal man' is discovered on the high plane of the dominant crimin­
ologist's speculation, where weird and wonderful forces, external to the 
conscious mind of 'criminal man', propel him, like an object, into criminal 
behaviour. Commonly, the speculation's fruits, 'variables', are correlated 
statistically and the results hailed as concrete, 'objective facts' (in 
opposition to 'the metaphysics of the social theorist'). In consequence, 
y 'criminal nan' is 'objectively' linked with some force, personal or social, 
which stands outside his conscious mind. There is little sense of men as 
agents of social relationships, of 'men making history hut not as they 
please'
7 . Although the term 'pathological' would need redefining in terms of a 
less 'dominant-ideological' notion of the individual. For example we 
might say that particular historical sets of social relations prescribe 
particular dominant modes of individuality and that the contradictions in 
these relations produce individuals who develop other opposite modes.
Such 'alternative individualities' could be conceived of as 'socially 
pathological', and hence could tend to he seen as intrinsically 'peculiar' 
or 'deviant', by those people living out the dominant mode of individuality 
(and possibly by those carrying the subordinate mode: good and evil are
• twcTsides of the same coin but not necessarily carried by different human 
agent s).
8  ^ See for an example of the latter, Marx's portrayal of that 'great 
history-maker', Louis Bonaparte, in his "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte" in K* Marx and F. Engels Selected Works (1978 London: Lawrence 
and kichart). It is not diffictilt to see how, without overthrovring the 
basic elements of this problematic, both new devianev theory and The New 
Criminology could rebel against dominant criminology's 'man', propelled 
.»from without, and give him a consciousness, consequently emphasising
.'meaning' and 'purpose'. The total separation of 'man' from structure in 
.dominant criminology is thus not altered one iota.
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Earlier variations of dominant criminology, such.as the Lom-
brosian variety, are explicit, and obvious in their commitment to this
approach. Some later variations, of a sociological nature, have been
committed to a 'social' explanation, but they, too, base their analyses
on empirical individuals. Thus Merton argues that the value consensus in
society is based on the fact that the majority of individuals subjectively
9
fetishize money; He fails to see that money presents itself, objectively, 
as a fetish in its condition of existence as the universal equivalent 
value, a product of the social development and structure of exchange- 
value? As with Radcliffe-Brown and many other social scientists, socio­
logists of crime have based concepts such aa social structure, subculture 
and opportunity structure on 'visible' individual behaviours rather than 
on invisible (but discernible in theory) social relations which govern, 
and effect themselves in, observed human relations and behaviour? Thus, 
individual behaviours and human interaction patterns sei*ve as a foundation 
for dominant criminology. Given that immediate, non-theoretical obser­
vation is a central aspect of 'commonsense knowledge' or ideology, dominant 
criminology, through its empiricist method expresses its structural con­
dition as the servant of the ruling class. By operating as an ideology, 
on the basis of .uncritical, atheoretical, immediate observation, dominant 
criminology acts as a prophylactic preventing the development of critical, 
social theory in this area. Its concentration on individuals and their
behaviour works to deflect attention from the social relationships which
12produce these forms of individuality and behaviour. And this is not to “ 
mention the fact that its aggressive self-righteousness often discourages 
the study of the social conditions of existence of particular historical 
moralities and their class connections. All in all, the allegation of 
oddity in the criminal or deviant is an act based on ideology (or 'common- 
sense') which serves in effect to ratify existing social relations and to 
conceal them from scientific enquiry. 9102
9. Quoted in The Hew Criminology op.cit. p. 105
10. See K. Marx Capital Vol. t
11. For interesting discussions of concept s 'of'1^ ! " ^  ^  Wishart) PP-43-8
op.cit., p. 15-64, and Zygmunt Bauman's C u U u r / ^  p Ure’ 9ee Gluck^ann, 
Routledge, Kegan Paul) pp. 6O-7 7. ~  - *  3 PTVrv~’ 0 (1973 London:
12. See L. Seve Marxism and the Theorv nf T ,.
Lawrence & Wishart) for an interest ing dlscustj InC^ vid— (1975 London 
social relations and individuality. * ' n 01 't,n° connection betv/ee
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The epistemological element of the dominant criminological
problematic that is embedded in and related to the focus on the
'criminal individual' is empiricism. Empiricism seems to be the
dominant epistemological element of this problematic; its fundamental
nature affects the form of all the other elements. I am using the term
* empiricism to designate a notion of the object of study as "immediately
present to the senses" and a notion that the object can be isolated as
sucli^  Hence the knowledge of the object is posited as part of the
object itself^ There is no sense of the difference between the subjec-
15tively-conceived appearance of the empirical world and social reality, 
nor of the need to explicitly formulate, in theory, the unseen laws 
governing the mediations of appearance, movement and context of perceived 
empirical 'realities'. Criminal man is seen as immediately 'visible' to 
all because he has been convicted and from there the forces propelling 
his criminality can be investigated. This conception of the criminal as 
a convicted person is a classic piece of commonsense ideology which is 
. blind to the conditions of existence of the criminal lav; and its 
consequent modus operandi.
Dominant criminology has also assumed that the causes of criminal 
behaviour are visible and can be isolated as factors, e.g. the 'broken 
home1 or the 'disorganized area'. It is an indication of its empiricism 
that the referent of these terms is rarely in dispute. But what is a 
'home' and when is it 'broken'? What is an 'area' and when is it 'dis­
organized''? Never are these phrases seen as referring to uncritically 
and easily-adopted ideological assumptions, but always to real objects 
visible to all. Particular manifestations of this problematic-element of 
empiricism are multitudinous, but a general, empirical feature of dominant 
»criminological work which it determines is the absence of theory and the 
presence of statistical operation (the hypermania of technological meth­
odology ).
13. See Gluoksmann (1974)’ op.cit. p .144 for a useful discussion ofempiricism. ui^cussion of
14. See Althusser (l970) op.cit..
1 5 . See N. Geras "Marx and the Critique of Political /■
burn (ed.) Ideology- in Social Scipnnr. ( towo ~ — ;— ~--^52222^ R. Black---------------------- 1£2«-W972 London: fontana) pp.284-305).
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Structured in form, although perhaps not historically deter­
mined in content, hy the empiricist epistemology is the ob.ject of sxudy 
of dominant criminology, the next element for consideration. The theo­
retical object of the main branch of criminology, which deals with the 
•causes of crime’, is ’criminal behaviour*'. 'Criminal behaviour' is 
that behaviour which forms the basis of a conviction for the infraction 
of criminal laws. If there is a conviction, then the individual involved 
is conceptually defined as a criminal and the behaviour underpinning 
the conviction is taken as criminal^ To proceed by assuming that the 
behaviour producing the arrest is 'criminal behaviour' is to take the 
legal officials at their word and to implement in theory the practical 
definitions of the state and its agents! More precisely, it is to posit 
„ a:3 a thought-object something which is clearly constituted by a determinate, 
historically-specific set of social ideologies and practices. 'Criminal 
behaviour'is not 'an obvious fact of contemporary life' produced by people 
•in some way different to others (either mad, bad, sick or indifferent), 
it is a practical, social construction of the ideology of the state's 
criminal lav; and the routine practices of the police and judiciary.
The existence of 'criminal behaviour' as an object of study and 
the need to explain its origins, of course, are not determined by emp­
iricist epistemology, but rather, I would suggest,- by the structural 
x imperatives of the state to provide social control in order to maintain 
the ruling class. However, empiricism does shape the form the object 
takes, just as it shapes other elements such as the notions of causation 
and social control employed in the dominant criminological problematic.
Turning to the notion of causation, we find that 'causes' are 
taken to be active forces which impel the individual and are external to 
his behaviour. For example, 'poverty and a broken home drove the criminal 
• to do his-heinous deed'. This conception involves a linear notion of time, 
whereby an effect is the result of a chronologically earlier cause: time 
is measured by the clock not by its socially contextualized, historieally- 
snecific, reality - different contexts in social formations have different 
time scales. Quite frequently, linear time becomes a cause in itself 1678
16. This assumption is reflected in the samples taken in research which are 
ve^. frequently of convicted 'offenders', and a non-convictcd 'control' 
group.
17. This is another example of the reflection of the existing social rel­
ations, and the everyday ideology supporting them, in the structure of
the problematic.
18. See Althusser (1970) op.cit. pp.93-118 for a full articulation of this 
view of history.
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(e.g. 'criminal tendencies pass as the criminal gets older'). It is also
common to see one 'factor', or cluster of 'factors' added together,
19"becoming the sole determinant. Such a monistic concept of causation is 
shaped by the problematic's dominant element of empiricism, for it requires 
ideas of 'cause', 'force' and 'time' which specify 'visible' referents, 
whose obviousness conceals (and is concealed by) their existence in the 
realm of 'commonsense knowledge'. There is no sense of structural 
causation and thus of 'crime' as a regular practice in a complex social
totality of practices in interrelation, each practice having its own
. 2 0time scale.
The notion of social control, another key element of the domin­
ant criminological problematic, is that of a passive group of agencies 
brought into action by the infraction of unambiguous, well-known legal 
rules by the subjects carrying the 'criminal tendencies', the criminal 
individuals. Both the agencies and the rules are supported by the 
majority of citizens, since they represent the rational conditions for the 
social order subjectively demanded by that majority. This notion shapes, 
and is shaped by, the form taken by the theme of the qualitative difference 
of the criminal: if a man cannot abide by the rational procedures for 
order, then his.own rationality must be in dispute. The 'irrationality
21fof the criminal' is the other side of the 'rationality of social control'; 1920*
19. Also a regular feature is the annpim^f.0 „c. 4.1 
. the form or « .  ' criminal
are those people who commit orimep and they commit cri-oo ^  t w  are
problematic °f «•*
them from their conditions of i f 1* « " «
S p Q C 1 X 1  C X  GXiJ o  •
20. I am only speaking hypothetically, since .crime'may not yet be a valid 
theoretical concept for a problematic employing structural causation
the notion of structural causation, see infra pp 35 36 ’ Un
J P  “ tiV iorth notinE tbe distance of tke'ooncejrts together in a 
thought structure means that their specific form is shaped t, . «  , , 
form of that structure. Thus the mutually roirifn^' * 1 • uhe fl~Ct and 
ideas (irrationality cf the c r i m i n a l ^ S ^ r
only a theoretical effect, not an aspect of the > • l  13
missed hy exponents of the new deviancy problematic” ° JfCi* ,lblS point is 
T. Erikson, E.M. Lcmert and P. Rock, who havp ' , sueh as A.k. Cohon, K.
deviance in maintaining the purity, of the dominantaSlzed tho function of 
But how could these theorists see our point when fiT^ 1 °fdar in societies.
(the deviant individual) and object (deviant b e h a v i o u r ^  BUb;ject 
had changed little from those of the problematic n-r j  ^heil> Problematic
What was a theoretical aspect of'dominant criminal dominan"!' criminology? 
into the open, without alteration or question -■ Was simP1y "brought 
of 'the social function of deviance'. ' in other ^  dresGcd UP as the concept 
obetween two elements of a knowledge is no-iterl , W°fds> what is a function 
as a f u?iction betv/een two elements of reality. °y thc new deviancy theorists
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In consequence, the criminal difference takes a particular shape.
Criminals are assumed to he lacking in morality or reason, or to be in 
such a situation as to be indapable of exercising morality or reason.
Thus the list of marks of the criminal's difference made earlier consti­
tutes a record of the findings of a search for the impelling cause of 
the loss, or lack, of reason and morality. Criminal practice (the reg­
ular practice of acts knovm to be illegal) is therefore meaningless to 
the dominant criminologist: his concepts or assumptions remove the svib- 
jective aspect of criminal practice and reduce it to a mechanical effect 
of outside forms - 'criminal behaviour'.
Finally, two theoretical elements of this structure of ideas 
are also of some importance: (a) 'crime is law infraction followed by 
conviction', (b) 'crime is a socially injurious behaviour*. The first 
element involves a view of crime as a behaviour rather than as a label?
Thus there is a neglect of the study of criminal laws in the search for 
the cause of crime. By and large, these laws are taken to be impassive 
and good, and 'criminal behaviour' is seen as active and evil. Conviction 
therefore implicitly follows infraction and is right. The law-breaker is 
assumed to be convicted and the convicted person is assumed to be a law­
breaker. (These two assumptions are frequently found latent in the inter­
stices of the work of even the most sophisticated dominant criminologists). 
However, because these assumptions are visible from within an empiricist 
problematic, there was always a likelihood of their sighting. Such a
sighting occurred and was transformed into 'hidden delinquency' studies,
7\and studies of the 'efficiency' and 'justice' of 'the criminal process.
Of course these studies take place under the aegis of the problematic of 
dominant criminology and therefore are entirely empiricist in nature.
Their place of birth limits them to a mere counting of secret 'criminals/ 
deviants' and a listing or exposure of the 'deficiencies' of the administ­
ration of criminal justice. The second theoretical element mentioned above 
can be termed 'correctionalism'. Criminal behaviour is seen as a threat 
to the order of morality and reason: an idea clearly supposed by, and in, 
the concept of the nature of the criminal difference. Thus, explanations 
of criminal behaviour are transformed into practical policies with the 23
22. An element producing an absence, a space. This space was subsequently 
filled by the problematic of new deviancy theory.
23. For an account of these, see R. Hood and R.' Sparks: Key Issues in 
Criminology (1970 London: World University Library), chs. 1 2 6 7"and 8
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aim of correction. The explanations of 'aetioloeical • criminology are not, 
however, made for the purposes of correction, as is often implie^  B t
correction is the only possible'use of the explanations, given thè natuèe 
of the problematic, which has built into its concepts an implicit need for 
the correction of criminal behaviour. In practice, institutional forms of 
correction reflect and sustain the problematic of dominant criminology in 
that they revolve around the revival, insertion or reinforcement of 
approved morality and rationality^
. In conclusion, the problematic of dominant criminology is limitod 
by the interconnection of its major elements, which are, briefly:
(1) Empiricism - the dominant epistemological element;
(2) Its subject: the empirical individual - in the chape of criminal man;
(3) Its object: criminal behaviour - active and irrational;
(4) Its notion of causation - external force and linear time;
(5) Its notion of social control - passive and rational;
(6) Correctionalism - its intrinsic social policy or politics.
This totality is the sine qua non of dominant criminology and determines 
the parameters of its structure and movement. It defines the possibilities 
of expansion and variation, and forms the very structure of that 
expansion and variation.
The problematic of 'new deviancy' theory
.Common to both dominant criminology and new deviancy theory is 
the element of empiricism and its domination of their epistemologies. *25
24- b. Matza (1969) op.cit., for example.
25. Although it must be noted that there is a „ a. ,
time cycles between the history of the dominant rV ^  dlfferenco in 
and the history of correctionalist practice* The 1- + + °]°C?;ca] Problematic 
■and has a life of its own. The former i s s L c l l t i l l l  t l  8l°V'ly
developments and is consequently more diffuse and • 1 °*her intellectual
its corresponding practice. Ky brief analysis ha^tnnd»! J" m°Vemont than 
diffusion and change. This defect is the co-t ' " ,nded.toconceal this 
attempts to grasp the basic princiole^ n-r • 4. C aescriPii°n which 
movement of the problematic. P °f the ln^ ™ l  constitution and
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Again, the knowledge of the object (deviant behaviour) is conceived of as 
a real part of a real object. The object, of which nev; deviancy theory 
provides the knowledge, is seen as real thing, pre-given to the senses, 
and it is the claim of new deviancy theory that it has extracted the 
essence of that thing. The knowledge produced by nev? deviancy theory,
.therefore, is conceived of as a pre-given sector of a pre-given object, 
when it is really the knowledge of its theoretical object.
Before we can illustrate our argument we must note that the
object of new deviancy theory is not criminal behaviour - but rather deviant ' J |l ' £) ^
behaviour in general, acts deviating from the norm. ' Any illustration of 
the empiricist element must take this into account. Hence we oan say that 
the empiricism of nev? deviancy theory is exemplified in its major theoret­
ical concept - the deviant label as the essential part of deviant behaviour,
* that is, as the activating mechanism of that behaviour (that which makes
it deviant). New deviancy theory sees the deviant employing, internalising, 
ox* managing an imposed deviant label, and concludes that systematic deviant 
behaviour is essentially activated by the integrated existence in the sub­
ject's consciousness of the validity of such a label. What purity of vis­
ion and patience the new deviancy sociologist must have! All he has to do 
is look (vrith an "appreciative" posture) and he can see 'deviant behaviour' 
(because it is pro-given to the senses). All he has to do i3 to look long 
enough, via the method of participant observation, through the eyes of the 
deviant, ^  and he can see the essence of that behaviour, the internalised 
deviant label and its activating power - an external force which effects 
itself in and through the human subject, the deviant. Thus new deviancy
* theory takes an object, which it assumes to be real and pre-given to the 
senses (deviant behaviour) and produces a knowledge of that object vrhich 
specifies its essence to be the deviant label and its power.
Nowhere, even in the more sophisticated, phenomenological varieties 
of this problematic, is 'deviant behaviour' seriously questioned as the 
theoretical object. It may be argued that 'deviance' in this problematic is 
a socially negotiated and constructed behavioxiral phenomenon and, there­
fore, that it is not 'pre-given' for the new deviancy theorist. But this 
misses the point that the definitional processes in intersuhjective inter- 26
26. The definition of deviant behaviour is of rnn-r>
and a bone of contention. It will he SC’ FOmev;ha't ambiguous
,7. Start kind of theoiy *. thlo) A o L  ^  Sh°rtly*
Has the natural eye faded vrith some disease ' 'J bhe eyes of others?
mass-produced one? Or is the theory blind " t o " „ ''en roplaced V  a plastic, 
seems accurate. Like the con-man on the -tr-r+S ^  Yicion? Tho latter 
tends to be blind and sells its wares, unlike th”6” doviancy theory pre- 
theory the deception has the effect of mavinV  . °  COn~nian> for now deviancy
L ' S 3 visi°n seem absent.
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action which allegedly constitute the 'social construction* of deviant 
behaviour are taken to be observable to the senses both in the problematic- 
theory and in its methodology. Hence deviant behaviour, once it has been 
palpably socially constructed by an interaction of definitions ending in 
an equilibrium (however temporary), is openly visible as such. This is 
true of both symbolic interactionist and phenomenological wings of this 
problematic. The fact that the object of the theory comes to the problem- 
' atic unquestioned, uncriticized and unconceptualized is a hallmark of 
empiricist epistemology.
In the dominant criminological problematic, the criminal statist­
i c s  ^ e  used frequently (occasionally with caution) as indicators of the 
extent and existence of criminal behaviour - a logical consequence of the 
elements of that problematic as we have seen therm? In new doviancy theory, 
the dominant research method, participant observation, demands particip­
ation in the everyday lives of 'deviants' in order to observe the 
meanings they give to their social world and hence to observe the existence 
of deviant behavioui^? The method is obviously linked to its problematic 
in that it is designed to allow the 'observation' of the application, 
internalization, and effectivity of the deviant label - the essence of 
deviant behaviour. 'Deviants about their daily tasks of constructing and 
reconstructing their social realities and selves' are seen as a separate 
thing from the pure observation of the new deviancy sociologist with his 
commitment to "naturalistic'' description, "understanding" and "appréciatif"  
Yet all the notions mentioned above (e.g. 'deviant', 'construction of 
social reality', 'self') are the means by which this method reproduces 
its theory in research practice; the eyes with which the theory sees.
28. See Althusser (1970) op.cit., esp. pp.35-41.
29. According to the premises outlined here of course, the criminal 
statistics are nothing but the ideological categories of their compilers 
in action. See B. Hindess: The Use of Official Statistics in Sociology. 
(1973 London: Macmillan) for an interesting version of this view.
30. See J.D. Douglas (ed.) Research on Deviance (1972 New York: Appleton, 
Century-Crofts) pp.3-34, J.Irwin "Participant observation of criminals" 
in Douglas ibid. pp.117-137) N. Denzin The Research Act (1970 New
York: Aldine), H. Becker Sociolorical Work (1971 Harmonri «worth. Allen Lane) 
and N. Polsky The Hustler (1971 Harmondsworth: Penguin) pp.115-14 7.
31. See D. Matza (1969) op.cit. pp.l-40 concerning naturalism.
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The method is the theory in action. Again there is deceit inherent in 
the problematic: what is produced is presented as the real essence of 
the real object and as separate from the theoretical structure which 
determined the form of investigation and discovery, when, in fact, that 
structure reproduces itself in action through its categories of the 
method, the subject, the object and the essence. Both problematics 
discussed so far, being empiricist in kind, make claims for a reality 
which has no relation to the problematic itself yet is discovered by that 
problematic. As I have argued, such a reality is the produced discourse 
of a theoretical problematic in action and such products merely exemplify 
the ability of a problematic to generate and regenerate itself in research 
practice.
Inextricably linked with empiricism is the analytical unit of 
the empirical individual', the subject of new deviancy theory.
"In its simplest form, the theory (interactionist - C.S.) insists Jjhat we 
look at all the people involved in any episode of alleged deviance'.'" (liy 
emphases - C,S.)
Apparent 'supra-individual' categories are posited (e.g. groups, subcult­
ures, societal reaction, interaction) but they only refer to multitudes 
of individuals acting together in certain symbolic contexts^'and it is the 
individual who constitutes that environment^ Social institutions and 
associations, being processes composed of interacting, symbolising 
individuals, are the •structures* of this problematic. Everything is 
'real' and 'observable' - including the meanings these individuals, grant 
to others, situations and themselves. Never does the concept of the 
detei'minancy of social relations appear, except in an empiricist mode,
32. H. Becker "Labelling theory reconsidered" in P r^ i- »„j m , .
(eds.) (1972) opTcit• pi.45. ----- --------  OCk and 1 * Macintosh
33. ibid. pp.41-66.
34. See Matza (1969) op.cit. pp.92-93, on the creative +
capacity of the subject. Some writers within thi- nrohlemi^nSCOni3o,'tal 
the determinacy of external factors in some cir c u m s t a n c e s w  
majority choose the predominance of the formation of n °eîf-ïdén«t„ „ 
deviant in accounting for systematic deviance -ee n i
'other w ^ E i-'a ^ e l h a f t h r ^
. reality, see P. Koch S a U - l J S
'¿1
that is, as the determinacy of hunrn relations, vihere individuals 
(or groups of individuals)form the poles of the posited relation and 
vihere the relation is a purely intersubjective one (for example love, hate, 
prejudice etc.) Social relations in this problematic are human interaction 
patterns, rather than the relations betvieen men and matter vihich constitute 
the underlying determinant of human actions (that is, the constituent rel­
ations of the social formation, in their complex structure in dominance, 
at the levels of the economic, the political and ideological).
Despite evidencing this highly bourgeois element of individualism,
, new deviancy theory is explicitly anti-correctionalist and argues that 
social control agencies create deviance by the imposition of deviant labels 
as much as they prevent it. Unfortunately the ' anti-est ah li slim ent ' , 
pro-deviant, Lettish tendencies amongst most nev; deviancy theorists 
seem to celebrate,at first glance, collective political and moral stances 
»at odds with the individualism of their problematic. For, although much 
of their work expresses a pro-underdog, critical stance towards 'middle- 
level a-gencies of control', their problematic contains an entirely orthodox 
analytic emphasis on the individual as definite as in the problematic of
35dominant criminology.
Another central element in the problematic of new devinney 
theory, clearly related to the empiricism and methodological individualism, 
derives-from the focus on the individual's interactionally-located 
symbolic response to the signification of his behaviour as deviant hy 
other individuals or groups of individuals. Investigations and 
theorisation in the problematic often centre upon the relationship 
betvieen the individual subject and his interaction with other subjects 
and this occurs whatever the defined context e.g. policeman-deviant, 
policeman-police organization, deviant-family, deviant-deviant subculture, 
deviant movement-social organization. It involves a particular concern
35. I yicmM argue that this is a stronger point than Couldner's critic-ism 
.that xnese writers ignore the "master institutions" it i-
whether Gouldner is referring to social relation- r w  ° » . lear
powerful empirical institutions such as companies^ g o v e r n m e n t ° P •A.'.;. Gouldner "The sociologist as parti--in • - 3 , *->co(19 6 3) 3 American Sociologist pp. 103-116. “ — — fiy &hd .the vie If are state,1
with the intersubjective situatedness of the individual's definitions and 
typifications. Dominant criminology concerns itself with criminal behaviour 
and there is a powerful coincidence, on this point, of the focus on the 
individual, the unconscious mediation of the individual in the cause-effect 
sequence and the study of the criminal act and actors. The object, criminal 
behaviour, originating in the practico-social location of dominant crimin- 
oiogy, demands such elements and their combination appears to give a know­
ledge of that pre-given object. The uncertainty surrounding ''criminal 
behaviour' c.s a theoretical category was not seen, and, thus, there was no 
impediment to the study of 'behaviour' and propelled, marked actors. In 
the new deviancy problematic there is the strong problematic-element of
.ÜL9______________the label based on the variable situatedness of inter-
subjective definitions. That is, the deviance of any particular act is 
now open to debate. Containing firm notions of cultural pluralism and 
moral relativism, as opposed to dominant criminology's normative concensus, 
this problematic is unable to maintain a steady emphasis on the 'deviant 
act' itseli, but rather, is compelled more regularly to focus on the label 
given to the act. Perhaps the importance of the practico-social functions 
of 'criminal behaviour' as a theoretical object give it some fixity.
•Deviant behaviour', as a theoretical object, seems to bo less pre-given by 
practico-social functions, and its diffuse, uneven, and incomplete concep­
tualization as an object corresponds with a notion of deviance as ambiguous 
and, therefore, to a theoretical concentration on definitions of deviance. 367
36. A concern which takes an empiricist shape. Meanings placed on 
situations are presumed to exist and to be observable. Once fixed by the 
deviancy sociologist they are held to determine the individual's action. 
J.D. Douglas (1972) op.cit., provides an explicit manifestation of this 
remarkable empiricism of meaning.
37. The ambiguity over the theoretical object 'deviant behaviour' is 
clearly expressed in textbook definitions. Matza, using "any standard 
dictionary definition", defines deviation as "straying from a path or 
standard", (1969) op.cit. p.10; L. Taylor: "that behaviour which violates 
the accepted standards of the community" in his Deviance and Society (1973 
London: Kelson) p.35; P. Rock: "Deviancy is a social construct fashioned 
by the members of the society in which it exists" (1973^ .) op.cit. p.lQ. 
Steven Box's antics are symptomatic of the whole problem. He considers 
the definitions of A.K. Cohen, Merton, Clinard and Matza, which all suggest 
normative consensus, and then emphasizes cultural pluralism, proceeds to 
define deviance as the breaking of the rules of the powerful and 
authoritative and decides to confine his book to criminal law violations: 
Deviance, Reality and Society (1971 London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston)
u p .11—12.
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Hat::a manifests the tendency clearly:
•'. the difficulty resides in the nature of society not in the conception 
of deviation. Cultural definitions, especially in contemporary society 
tend towards ambiguity. Since standards shift, members of society may 
respond to marginal phenomena with open ambiguity... J
...The social fact of pluralism, like that of ambiguity, must be lived 
with and appreciated. It cannot be evaded simply to expedite a rigorous 
definition of deviation. Shift, ambiguity and pluralism are implicated 
in the very idea of deviation; their net effect is to make even our 
nominal conception inexact and blurred out at the edges. Thcounccrtainty 
cannot be liquidated, it can only be observed and reported.
My point is simple: Matza has turned things upside down. It is 
because the "difficulty resides" in the concept of deviance and not 'Tn the 
nature of society" that 'cultural pluralism' emerges, to be "observed and 
reported". The "net effect" of "inexact conception" of the theoretical 
object is the production of ambiguous concepts which correspond to an 
ambiguous object; concepts specifying 'shifting standards, cultural 
pluralism, the importance of ambiguous definitions, fluid, interaction 
process and individually located, symbolic identity. It is a problem in 
knowledge not in society. Concepts must be adequate to theoretical objects 
and, hence, if the object is ambiguous the concepts must assume and explain 
ambiguity. Given other elements such as empiricism and the empirical 
individual, the concepts produced, therefore, refer to conflicting 
individual definitions, and the research method of "appreciating" the 
particular peculiarity and 'unique richness' of individual worlds becomes 
logically appropriate. The unquestioned fixity of the nature of 'criminal* 
•behaviour' iru dominant criminological research has thus given way to the 
ambiguity of the deviant label in the research of modem, liberal sociology 
of deviance. Inherent in the problematic of new deviancy theory are notions 
. of conflict, normative pluralism and the appreciation of unique individual 
worlds. It seems clear now that the 'radical edge' which new deviancy 
theory displayed through its support for oppressed groups is nothing but 
the combination of these three notions. What a fine radicalism this is - 
based on the obscurity of its theoretical object! 'Underdog sociology' 
fighting for the rights of deviant minorities therefore turns out not only 
to be based on theoretical confusion but to be shaped in its very radic­
alism by that confusion! Its politics 'fit* its problematic after all! 38
3 8. (19 6 9) op.cit. pp.1 1-1 2.
From the problematic's inherent tendency to ask questions about 
public definition there flows the essence of deviant behaviour - the 
deviant label or the signification as deviant. And, of course, the nature 
of that essence is that the label is surrounded by moral, legal and cult­
ural ambiguity. The fact that new deviancy studies concentrate on such 
'grey' areas of deviance as marijuana-use, stuttering, alcoholism, and 
prostitution is simply symptomatic of the lack of fixity of the problematic^ 
object: areas of deviance are studied which are defined by commonsense 
knowledge and surrounded by moral legal or cultural ambiguity. Ambiguity 
seems to be the watchword for this problematic: its ambiguous object 
demands it, and concepts and studies of ambiguity result. The criticism 
of this perspective that it merely produces ambiguous concepts and studies 
misses the point slightly, and mistakes attempted concepts of ambiguity
.for ambiguous concepts.
The problematic employs a notion of cause-effect.like dominant 
criminology^ Irequently we see the active, external force propelling the 
deviant subject into regular deviance along a linear time-scale - only this 
time the propulsion is termed 'societal reaction', the linear time—scale 
is understood in terms of the »career* and systematic deviance is a 
'solution' not a sickness. Again the subject, the individual, mediates 
•the cause and effect. But, in this problematic, man grants meanings, is 
active and unique and, therefore, the cause is a social definition, the 
mediation is the subject's struggle and negotiation with the definition and 
the effect is a stable self-definition as deviant thus producing systematic 
deviant behaviour. The active deviant makes symbolic reorganizations to 
accomodate, utilize, manage or reject the reaction: the effect is produced 
and the deviant is now allowed the privilege of having benefit from it? 
Other causes of deviance (albeit irregular, tangential, ''primary'" deviance) 
are permitted by many new deviancy theorists but they are conceptualized 
as external forces a la dominant criminolog$} 3940*
39. There are some reservations to this, Matza being the most obvious 
He does not employ linear time but a firm notion of subjective time *
40. Lemert's utilitarianism is not atypical:
"Defining oneself as deviant is instrumental 
satisfaction.' and mitigating stigmatization, 
to interpretation of past experiences, vihich
in seeking out means of 
The redefinition of self leads 
in turn reduces inner
tensions and conflict. Ends and means are more e ^ i l - 7 - o i t ,
personal accomodations established necessary to utilize Pv h i  ’ 
n a t i v e s . "  (1972) op.cit. p.84. 1:Lze available alter-
41. For example, Lemert's "polygenetic factors" ibid. pp.62-63.
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We should note that the concern with, or tendency towards, the 
suhjcct'_s_ d_e_finitions is not wholly forced by the problematic's ambiguous 
object or by its use of the individual as .the basic analytic unit. It 
only takes its precise shape because of the conjunction of the object with 
other elements in the problematic e.g. empiricism, the active individual 
and the cause-effect notion. The fact and nature of this interrelation 
shapes each of its elements in its own specificity - their shape of origin 
(before their historically specific appropriation by this problematic) is 
moulded and altered by their specific location in the whole structure and 
its other elements. It should also be remarked, in passing, that an 
emphasis on meaning and subjective creativity does not fit well with a 
cause-effect notion of the kind employed here. There is in consequence a 
tension in the knowledge produced between the actors' creative powers and 
the deterrainacy of the deviant label and the debate over the importance 
of the label has been long and protracted?
The appearance of 'interaction' and 'process' as theoretical 
terms within the discourse of this problematic should not blind us to the 
concept of the cause-effect sequence. They merely represent concepts of 
intersubjectively-situated action demanded by the concept of the cause, 
the concept of the effect and the mode of mediation of the sequence by 
the empirical individual. The sequence■thus is described in the language 
of interpretation, creativity and ambiguity: bui, in truth, a cause-effect 
notion hides under the protective clothing provided by the other problem­
atic elements. In other words, the force of a sensually-pre-given 
empirical determinant (the definition as "deviant') causes sensually-pro- 
given empirical effects ('deviant• behaviour) and the sequence is mediated 
by a creative man giving his unique interpretations to both 'cause* and 
'effect' and making both possible. In passing it is worth digressing to 
note that any Marxist approach to 'deviance* born in the womb of the new 42
42. See for example: R.L. Akers "Problems in the sociology of deviance: 
social definitions and behaviour" (1968) Social Forces 46:4 PP«455-465,
■T. Delamater "On the n-ture of deviance" (1968) Social Forces 46:4 PP.445-51 
M. Kankoff "Societal reaction and career deviance" (l97l) The Sociological 
Quarterly 12 pp. 204-218, S.A. Kirk "Clients as outsiders: theoretical 
approaches to deviance" (1972) Social Work 17:2 pp.24-32 and E. Lemert 
"Beyond Mead: The social reaction to deviance" (1974) Social Problems 21:4 
pp.457-468.
deviancy problematic is likely to bear the birthmarks of its origin. The 
notions of 'interaction* and 'process' themselves have lent force to 
theoretical positions combining Mead, the social psychologist of this 
problematic, and Marx^ This combination requires a usage of the Hegelian 
works of Marx emphasizing creativity and an empiricist notion of dialect­
ical process which owes little even to Hegel. More generally we would 
not be surprised to see arguments positing capitalism as the determinant 
and crime or deviance as the effect with a heavy emphasis on the empirical 
individual as interpreter of capitalism and 'creating' the effect. To 
such Marxian approaches vie are tempted to rejoin, with Spinoza, that the 
concept 'dog' cannot bark. To the writers of the new deviancy problematic 
vje might reply,, with rhetorical licence, that all they have is barking 
without any concept of it - merely immediate impressions.
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It is important to understand that the problematic concentrates 
heavily on the mediating empirical individual and the effect, deviance. 
Rarely are the origins of the cause, the societal reaction, a matter of 
study. When the origins are considered, we find that the label is a 
product of the routine definitions of officials in interaction with each 
other in a hierarchically-structured interaction context (a social control 
bureaucracyAgain the problematic sights empirical individuals 
granting meanings in, and through, 'observable'interaction. Therefore, to 
understand the origins of the deviant label, the new deviancy problematic 
is pressured to demand accounts of members' definitions of socia.1 
relationships. Such a demand is best seen as the problematic's solution, 
to the problems within itself, problems clearly .seen by Paul Rccfk' 435
43. See R. Ropers "Mead, Marx and social psycholory" (1973) Catalyst 7 pp.
The Hew Criminology bears the birthmarks mentioned - but more of 
that later. For the time being we can note that it emphasizes intentional 
praxis and radical creativity. Men interpret sensual determinants - again 
.there is little sense that both the empirical determinants and the 
empirical interpretations are reflections of social relations. My argument 
is indexed by the acceptance in The New Criminology of a compatibility with 
ethnomethodology: ((1973) op.cit. p.294 fn.8) and the view expressed 
implicitly in the book that "inind and action are intentional and not 
determined". The last quote is from M. Phillipson and M. Roche "Phenome­
nology, Sociology and the study of deviance" in P. Rock and M. Macintosh 
(1972) op.cit. pp.125-162.
44. see for example A.V. Cicourel The Social Organization of Juvenile 
Just ice (1968 New York: Wiley).
45. See P. Rock "Phenomenalism and essentidism in the sociology of deviancy1 
(1973b) Sociology 7*-l pp. 17-30.
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Firstly he points out that description of deviants' accounts of their 
everyday worlds does not get the new deviancy sociologist very far since 
the deviant clearly provides mûre satisfactory accounts himself on these 
grounds. Some abstraction, he says, is necessary for better understanding, 
which involves "invoking influences which appear to have lost their 
immediate human authorship^. Secondly ho argues that the problematic is 
inconsistent with notions of social structures as real social relations 
independent of men's understandings and intuitions and this phenomenolog­
ical astructuralism will render the problematic less useful and unable to 
go beyond description! His solution, the description of members' accounts 
of social structure is a perfect solution within the problematic to its 
ovm problems, the lack of a concept of social structure. All it does is 
operate some of the various elements outlined here to solve the problems 
they produce in combination. And, of course, in consequence, all that 
happens is that the same problems appear in the solution. 467
46. ibid. p.18.
47. iMd. p.19. See also J.M. Reynolds and L.T. Reynolds "Interactionism
complicity and the astructural bias" (1973) Catalyst 7 pp 76=8^--- ~~
. "Structure is a part of everyday reality and, as such, it is a’ necessary 
intellectual resource. Criminality, social class and ideology and the 
iike are consequential social facts. The investigation of these alienated 
social facts is an entirely different enterprise from the sociologist's 
creation of his ovm reified systems. It enables the marriage of apprecia­
tion with at least one form of structural analysis.": P. Rock, ibid , p.25 
We might comment that this quote from Rock illustrates clearly the emnir
icism of meaning in new deviancy theory. We are left with a kind of“*--
Positive Phenomenology Everyone else can have theories hut the sociologi*t 
is to be content with the purity of his gaze with which he can see and 
describe these theories. At one and the same time the sociologist is 
privileged and deprived. Unfortunately just aS-the sexual chastity of 
the monk usually fails to remove his sexuality so the theoretical chastity 
of the new deviancy sociologist fails to eradicate his ability to theorize 
As in dominant criminology, there is an implicit deceit in the problematic* 
And, just as the claimed scientificity of that former criminology fail- 
to conceal it so does the claimed impossibility of 'false consciousness' 
in the latter. Neither problematic is aware of its own fundamental 
contradictions. This is brought out sharply by comparing dominant 
criminology's empiricist scientificity (separating knowledge and its 
operations from the object) and Rock's view that: "Although theorists 
and actors may inhabit the same world of phenomenological fact a 
reasonable detachment from that world is a prerequisite of „„ Js i 
("The sociolo^ Of deviance and c o n e . * ! « . . ' » ? * 
Journal of CriDinoioey 14:2 P.H5). Perhaps the problematics o f p o S S e  
science and positive phenomenology, provide the thruct *•„„ + »,„ .
of sociologists noted by Couldner: "see A.W C o S t o S  S o  £ o n W C r 1-n" “ 
of 'Western Sociology (1971 ■ London, Heinemann). ~ °  ■ lnK Cri ! ^
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•In a later text. Rock more clearly states his case. He sees 
new deviancy theory as a "focused sociology" and the areas peripheral to 
that focus, such as the politics of deviance, have been ignored or treated 
in the same way as the centre. Thus the level of analysis stays "on the 
ground" with the deviant/agent of social control dyad: "larger structures 
giving unity and order to the fragments" are untouched. The deviancy 
tradition fails to deal with "the organizational work which makes 
policing possible" - it is simply taken on trust. Rock thus wants the 
structural arrangements organizing the context of the defining encounters 
to be examined. From- here he advocates study of moral order in depth so 
that vie can unearth the fundamental taken-for-granted meanings that, 
unnoticed, structure all interactions in a given society. At first the 
innocent reader may have anticipated a shift in position, but no. Rock 
is simply reiterating one of the central elements of the new deviancy 
problematic: 'meaning systems' mediate the interactions between individ­
uals out of which systematic deviance emerges. Deviancy theory has been 
superficial he says. We might have expected it: if meanings shape the 
"effects" in the cause-effect sequence then to understand more profound 
effects we must look at more profound meanings. So, to move the theoret­
ical object from 'deviant behaviour' to 'the moral order* requires the 
transformation of the concept of 'symbolic interaction' to the concept of 
'organizational work'. Rock fails to solve his own problem and must 
always do so as long as he remains within this problematic. His solution 
carries the same problems with which he started. His method of studying 
"larger structures" keeps him "on the ground" at the level of empirical 
interaction between symbolizing subjects in groups. The invisible, or 
the blurred, within the problematic must remain1so. It is precisely 
because the concept of determinant social relations independent of man's 
consciousness and will is invisible for this problematic that it will 
never be seen through the vision of the problematic. New deviancy theory 
will never be able to engage in an analysis of 'the deviant label' as part 
of a social structure; it will remain tied to the understandings of that 
structure's agents and authors (its 'members') as they wrestle with those 
labels - it will never get 'off the ground' as long as it posits subjective 
definitions as the essence of social phenomena. 48
48. (1974) op.cit.
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The major elements of this problematic and the key inter­
relationships between them have, hopefully, been dealt with. All that 
remains is to mention some of the more minor elements. Firstly, social 
control is not a passive, automatic reaction to deviant action. Given the 
ambiguity of the cultural definitions of the action, and the creativity
• of interpretive officials, social control is seen as active and patterned 
(discriminatory). Secondly, connected to the first point, the politics 
launched from the problematic involve the defence of alternative, deviant 
worlds in the normative pluralism of modern American capitalism and the 
critique of powerful definers who impose their worlds upon the deviants.
The more radical versions of the politics of this problematic support '
‘doing your own thing', organized deviant resistance to conventional 
definitions, and a more effective democracy, unabused by the existence of 
powe$? Thirdly, rather than seeing 'crime' as a behaviour followed by 
conviction, the problematic sees 'deviance' as a behaviour with a.deviant 
cultural status and crime as a form of deviance. Fourthly, in connexion 
with the last point, it is sometimes argued that the deviant status of 
certain behaviours needs to be created for the stability of the social order. 
It is said to be functional in maintaining moral and cultural boundaries.
This rare piece of abstraction is directly linked to the epistemological 
connection between the notions of the rationality of order and of the 
irrationality of deviance. This connection has been carried forward, 
untransformed from the problematic of dominant criminology and inserted 
into social reality? Rather than investigating the historical and social
• structural origins of the labels and their patterned application, some 
new deviancy theorists simply note that both labels and patterned 
application exist and must, therefore, be functional for the social order.
In concluding this section we might say that, despite its surface
•difference in politics, research method, theoretical object and ontology, 
the new deviancy problematic is fired by much the same epistemological 
elements as the problematic of dominant criminology: albeit that these 
elements take a different shape specific to their existence and location 
in a different problematic. Empiricism, the focus on the empirical 4950
49. See R. Quinney The Social Reality of Grime (19 70 Boston: Little, Brown)
50. See supra p. 15 fn.21.
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individual and the astructural notion of causation still reign. The break 
from correctionalist criminology is made only at the level of the surface 
effects and not in the heart of the problematic. The deviant has been 
allowed an ability to grant meaning, social control is no longer 'impartial' 
crime and deviance may be functional, alternative realities are supported 
and the criminal/deviant is not ontologically different. But the focus 
remains “on the ground", definitions become all powerful, moaning is hal­
lowed and unobserved relations are 'reifications'. The new deviancy 
problematic opened up new lines of 'criminological' thinking which 
temptingly offer themselves to radicals in the field. However these new 
sightings are tainted by the vision of that problematic and are only 'new* 
within it. Whatever a Marxist criminology might look like (if it is 
* possible), its prime condition of existence would be a complete epistem­
ological break with these two previous, fundamentally non-Marxist prob­
lematics. Any attempt to develop a Marxist criminology must be examined 
in that light. The next section examines briefly one attempt and confronts 
the question of the possibility of a Marxist criminology or sociology of 
deviance.
The New Criminology and Marxism
From the previous discussion it is evident that the dominant 
elements of the two problematics were the same in general nature and 
that the only difference iay in their specific forms within each problem­
atic. It has been implicit that these three dominant elements (empiricism, 
astructural causation, methodological individualism) are alien to the 
Marxist problematic. At this point we should briefly outline the grounds 
for this view. Such an exposition must be brief and assertive since the 
argument raises issues of considerable complexity and debates of weighty 
documentation. Its function is to lay the groundwork of the study to 
follow which will enable the reader to comprehend the lines of development.
Fundamental to the Marxian problematic is its anti-empiricism. 
This element not only separates Marx from empiricism but also different­
iates his later from his earlier works. I take it that Althusser's 
arguments on this question, in For Marx and Reading Capital, are correct, 
and that he demonstrates an epistemological break (albeit a graduated, 
uneven one) between Hegel and the later Marx and between the early and
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•the later Marx. The Hegelian problematic is empiricist in that it 
identifies the real object with the object of knowledge.
"This investment of knowledge, conceived as a real part of the real 
object, in the real structure of the real object, is what constitutes 
the specific problematic of the empiricist conception of knowledge."''1^
In its production of knowledge the empiricist conception extracts an 
essence from a real object. The latter is seen as containing essential 
and non-essential sections. It is up to the empiricist theorist or 
researcher to discover and extract the real essence from the real object.
The knov/ledge of the object is thus already present, pre-given, within 
the real object. Therefore the knoviledge of the object is not the same 
as the real object since that knowledge, the essence, is only seen as 
part of the real object. Now, by that admission:
"...there are tv/o distinct objects, the real object 'which exists outside 
the subject, independent of the process of knowledge' (Marx) and the 
object of knowledge (the essence of the real object) which is quite 
clearly distinct from the real object."5
Thus there is a deception in the empiricist conception of knoviledge. It 
sees itself as discovering knowledge in a real object when it actually 
is only 'discovering' its own theoretical object - which, of course, is 
no 'discovery' at all since that latter object is already planted and 
hidden in advance by the empiricist investigator himself.
In Hegelian philosophy, empiricism involves a reduction of all 
the aspects constituting an historical epoch to one principle: the dialectic 
of the Idea. In Hegelian 'Marxism' the essence appears as the capital- 
labour dialectic (or,- perhaps, as the forces/relations of production 
contradiction). Elements of the social structure such as the political 
and ideological are seen as simply epiphenomena, spin-offs from the 
essential dialectic. 'History is seen as the progress of essentially 
creative humanity toward its absolute realization in total socialist praxis. 
The later Marx breaks conceptually with Hegelianism explicitly in the 1857 5123
5 1. See especially Althusser (1969) op.cit. chs.3 and 6.
52. Althusser (1970) op.cit. p.38.
53. ibid. p.40.
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Introduction to the Critique of Political Econom^ This text, like any 
other, is open to widely differing readings, hut nevertheless, there is 
some agreement amongst commentators with the points I take as fundamental 
Unlike Hegel, Marx separated the knowledge object from the real object.
Also unlike Hegel, Marx posits the subject of theorizing as society - not 
the theorizing individual. Three important propositions are thus sketched 
in by Marx in this text:
(1) The object in theory is a theoretical object;
(2) The theoretical object and its concepts exist in the mind of the 
theorist and are merely representations of an objectively existing 
reality;
(3) Reality, society, is the real subject and the real object of thcorju
"The totality as it appears in the head, as a totality of thoughts, is a 
product of a thinking head, which appropriates the world in the only way 
it can, a" wa^different from artistic, religious, practical and mental 
appropriation of this world. The real subject retains its autonomous 
existence outside the head just as before; namely as long as the head's 
conduct is merely speculative, merely theoretical. Hence, in the 
theoretical method too, the subject, society must always be kept in mind
as the presupposition."5S 546*8
54. Albeit in a 'transitional fashion. As Althusser comments, the concepts 
reflecting the break are not explicitly formed in the Introduction nor 
even in Capitals op.cit. pp.30—34«
55. See Althusser (1969) op.cit. pp.162-218, S.Hall "A reading of Marx's 
l897 Introduction to the Grundrisse11 (1973a3irmingham: Centre for Cultural 
Studies - stencilled paperj, H. Nicolaus "Foreword" to his translation of 
Marx's Grundrisse (1973 Harmondsworth: Penguin) and K. Tribe "Remarks on 
the theoretical significance of Marx's Grundrisse" (1974) Economy and 
Society 3:3 pp. 130-2-10. It is also worth comparing the two most available 
English translations by C.J. Arthur (X.Marx and F. Engels, The German 
Ideology Part I (1970 London: Lawrence and Wishart) pp. 124-151) and 
Nicolaus (Marx ”(1973) supra).
56. This notion obviously collapses the philosophical subject-object 
distinction that is usually the vehicle for ideological intervention into 
theoretical debates. There is only one thing - that is, real men. engaged 
in real practices, in specific times and conditions - the process of 
history. See L. Althusser "Marx's relation to Hegel" in L. Althusser 
Politics and History (1972 London: New Left Books). "
"57. Arthur's translation aT this phrase is better;"... religious, and 
practically intelligent assimilation of this world." (Marx (1970) op.cit. 
p • 14L) «
58. Marx (1973) op.ci_t.pp.10 1, 102.
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Marx is, of course, not saying that the process of knowing is separate 
from the theoretical object: rather that the theoretical process is an 
attempt to know the thought object specified as such by the theory.
These arguments developed by the later Marx are the moments of 
an epistemological break with Hegelianism: empiricism is no longer an 
element of his problematic. Marx may have "coquetted" with Hegelian 
terminology on the surface but his approach is radically different at 
the epistemological level. As Althusser argues, Marx’s occasional use of 
Hegelian terminology is the effect of the relation between his theoretical 
break from Hegel and his conceptualization of that breath We can 
exemplify the point: Marx states in Capital:
"For the rest, in respect to the phenomenal form, 'value and price of 
labour', or 'wages', as contrasted with the essential relation manifested 
therein, vi&, the value and price of labour-power, the same difference ^  
holds that holds in respect to all phenomena and their hidden substratum."
Here, in my view he is attempting to refer to the concept of Darstellung,
the idea of the mediated effectivity of a structure on its elements or,
"the concept of the mode of presence of a structure in its effects!" The
signifiers used are those developed by Hegel but the concept, signified
in the text (although never formulated explicitly), of the mediated
62existence of the structure in its effects, is Marx's.
The argument that there is a unity in Marx's work based on an 596012
59. (1970) op.cit.
60. (1974) op.cit. P.507.
61. Tribe (1974) op.cit. p.187.
62. The concept of Darstellung remains largely ungrasped and distinctly 
unelaborated. It is not the object of this project to approach such a 
mammoth task. The concept is, of course, used in this work but its 
specificity doubtfully even reaches that achieved by Althusser and 
Balibar (l970) op.cit. pp.182-193.
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ontology is well documented. A recent exponent, Paul Waltoi?, posits the
unity in Marx as the central ontological category of labour based on a
concept of man's teleological nature. We could point to the different
status and content of that category within the problematics of the early
and later Marx but that would take us well outside the scope of this
essay. It should be sufficient to say, with Nicolaus^ that if we wish
. to posit an 'ontology' in the later Marx then it is an ontology of
nature not of man. It is true that, in Capital, Marx declares a creative
65man to be one of the elementary factors in the labour process. But 
that creativity is not understood as prior to nature. It is a necessary 
condition, given the prior determinant existence of nature, for inter­
action between man and nature, or for 'labour':
"But coats and linen, like every other element of material wealth that is 
not the spontaneous produce of Nature, must invariably owe their existence 
to a special productive activity, exercised with a definite aim, an 
activity that appropriates particular nature-given materials to particular 
human wants. So far therefore as labour is a creator of use-value, is 
•useful labour, it is a necessary condition, independent of all forms of 
society, for the existence of the human race; it is an eternal nature- 
imposed necessity, without which there can be no material exchanges 
between man and Nature, and therefore no life."
"the labour process, resolved into its simple elementary factors, is human 
action with a view to the production of use-values, appropriation of 
natural substances to human requirements, it is the necessary condition for 
effecting change of matter between man and Nature; it is the everlasting 
Nature-imposed condition of human existence, and therefore is independent 
of every social phase of that existence or rather is common to every such 
phasa"°
The dialectical relation between nature and men, dominated historically by 63*5
63. This author is taken as our reference because of his close relation 
to The New Criminology and deviancy theory. The works under consideration 
here are P. Walton and A. Gamble From Alienation to Surplus Value (1972 
London: Sheed and 'Ward) and P. Walton "From alienation to surnlus value: 
developments in the dialectic of labour" in P. Walton and S. Hall (eds.) 
Situating Marx (1973 London: Human Context Books) pp. 15-36.
647 M. Nicolaus "Comment on Paul Walton's naper" in Walton and Hall (1973) 
ibid. pp.37-43-
65. (1974) op.cit. p.174. .
66. Marx (1974) op.cit. p .50 and p.179, respectively.
35
nature, is the theoretical concept to keep in mind. It is not a Marxian 
approach that lifts man out of that dialectic and gives him creativity: 
this is clearly Hegelian essentialism. The economic 'creativity' (for 
example) of men (specific, histo’.'ical men) is dependent on the relation 
"between the laws of nature and the level of development of men's produc­
tive practices, and, therefore, on the relation "between the forces of pro- 
dxiction (the result of the harnessing of those laws of nature by productive 
practices) and the relations of production (the relations structuring the 
productive practices) - that is, upon the historically specific conditions 
of economic production. 'Creativity', of course, could appear at all 
levels in the social structure and its nature, absence or potential at 
each level are the product of the relations between levels and, in part­
icular, the domination of the level of the mode of economic production 
(in other words, 'creativity' is the historically specific product of 
social relations). Talking simply about the level of the economic,
Althusser succintly makes the point:
"This determination of the labour process by these material conditions 
is at its own level a denial of every 'humanist' conception of human 
labour as pure creativity." (my emphases)
This leads us to the second element in question, the astructural 
notion of cause-effect. The notion of 'causation' in the later Marx is 
radically different from that extant in empiricist problematics. Historical 
materialism is a theory of social formations and their histories based 
on concepts such as 'mode of production', 'relations of production' etc..
It is a theory of social structures, their movements and interrelations; 
social structures which themselves are related to a complex of sub­
structures with specific movements and interrelations. The term 'causation' 
•like the terms 'cause' and 'effect', is really inadequate to the Marxian 
concept of structural determination. We should, instead, talk of 
Darstellung, the effectivity of a structure in its elements, the relative 
'weighting' of social substructures at their stage of development, uneven 
development, relative autonomy, and differentiated social time. Historical 
materialism necessitates specification of the important structures in a 
social formation, the interrelation of these structures and the relative 67
67. (197°) op.cit. p.l7i. See also pp.170-173
36
effectivity of the whole structure in its elements. This, of course,
requires the specification of previous elemental configurations in order to
understand the movements of the present configuration and its present shape:
it is one thing to theorize the effectivity of a structure on its elements
and another to theorize the emergence of that structure as a whole.
However the synchronic and the diachronic are obviously intimately connected
Investigations at the synchronic level would he static and structuralist if
they ignored the complexity of substructural movements which shift the
•balance' of the whole structure and its effectivity. Diachronic analysis
which failed to specify structural configurations would produce a
historicism based on the notion of contemporaneous time across structures.
Clearly, then, there is never a 'cause' outside an 'effect'. Structures
, and movements are not external propellants of elements but internal
mechanisms: elements of structures are not simple effects but have their
own internal organization and movement. It is the relations between (or
structure of ) social substructures in movement that is the 'determinant'
of their shape and time, and that is not external but the condition of
their co-existence as relatively autonomous entities. And, to reverse the
• coin, we might add that it is the internal relations of the relatively
autonomous elements that determines the content and limits of the whole
68social formation.
Marx's later work clearly dictates the approach outlined and
Marxism is opposed to problematics with astructural notions of cause-effect.
69The position outlined above is similar to that in Hall, but different 
from that in Godelieh^which tends towards a static structuralism. 'It is 
radically different from Hegelian Marxism which has an essentially creative 
man causing effects which limit his potential (without altering his 
creativity, usually) and which require creative action for their removal 
to enable further creativity etc., etc..
Our third point is that the Marxist problematic does not 
. involve any analytic individualism. The object of Marxism is the social
68. The importance of the term'formation' can perhaps be seen from the 
above discussion. A 'formation' is an entity in process composed of the 
determinations of its opposing elements in conjunction. It is opposed by 
the concept of entities as one-sided elements with consequently no internal 
determinations.
69. (1973) op.cit.
70. See M. Godelier "Structure and contradiction in Capital" in Blackburn 
(1972) op.cit. pp.334-368.
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formation, that is a structure of social practices in movement. Thus the 
.basic unit of analysis is the relation rather than the individual. Men 
are not, in a sense, the makers of history since, so far, they have only 
made history within social relations as the agents of those relations. The 
• individuals inhabiting a social formation are its supports as well as j.ts 
creators. Those Marxisms that emphasize continuity in Marx based on a 
concept of the essentially creative man see the individual as the creator 
of social conditions, by which is usually meant physical conditions and/or 
empirical institutions, and as the potential creator (in a mass, i.e. 
collective action) of conditions more suiting his creative potential. It 
, follows from our arguments on structural ’causation' that a problematic 
which takes social structures, or relations, in movement as its object sees 
the individual as secondary to the relation between man and nature and 
his mode of individuality as constituted by his position in the complex 
of social relations.
I hope that I have indicated the grounds for viewing the Marxist 
problematic as sharply different to the two criminological problematics 
dealt with earlier. The three dominant elements of these problematics 
are all alien to that of the Marxist. If a 'Marxist criminology' is 
possible, then, one of its conditions of existence is that it retains none 
of the dominant elements (and consequently the subordinate ones also) of 
earlier criminological problematics. Thus we can turn now to a brief 
examination of the discourse of The New Criminology to see whether any of 
the dominant elements of the 'old criminology' are significantly operati-vc. 
A Empiricism
Taylor, Walton and Young are fairly explicit about their aims. 
They want a "fully social theory of deviance". To obtain this they engage 
in an "immanent critique" of the old criminologies. They insist that a 
,"new criminology" must break with correctionalism and the labelling pers­
pective. Both these previous positions are inadequate since "the causes of
crime must be intimately bound up with the form assumed by the social
' 71arrangements of the time." In consequence of their critique they specify
72seven formal requirements of a fully social theory of deviance. These 
requirements are: (l) a political economy of crime, (2) a social 
psychology of crime, (3) a social dynamics of "the act", (4) a social 712
7 1 . I*.282.
72. pp.270-278.
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psychology of the societal reaction to the deviant act, (5) a political 
economy of the societal reaction to deviance, (6) analysis of the effect 
of reaction on the deviant, and (7 ) the "nature of the deviant process 
as a whole".
What is wrong with this drive to put deviance into a full 
social context? It is precisely the object of these seven approaches.
The frequent interchanging of 'crime' and 'deviance' in these requirements, 
and in the rest of the hook, signals the issue - it is symptomatic of the 
absence of the concept of the object. What is at stake is that they 
assume that deviance (or crime) is a real object, a form of individual 
behaviour - pre-given to any theoretical standpoint that wishes to approach 
it. Let us take the example of 'prostitution'. It could be said that it 
is obviously 'deviant behaviour'. Ky reply would question its 'obviousness' 
If walking the streets with the intention of having sexual intercourse with 
someone who will pay for it is prostitution then there are many prostitutes 
in modern societies. So perhaps it is not deviant after all. But is the 
above definition of prostitution adequate? There are many who sell sex 
for money who do not walk the streets but who advertise through magazines, 
shops, friends etc. It could be replied against me that both the supposed 
definitions constitute prostitution and obviously so. But what if I rejoin 
with the question: is a sexual relation for economic gain therefore 
'prostitution' or do you have to 'behave' using a telephone or a red plastic 
raincoat and black fishnet stockings? The answer would be: obviously the 
latter option is silly and prostitution is a sexual relation for economic 
gain. Eut there are many types of 'sexual relation for economic gain', 
for example, the 'nuclear family' l What distinguishes 'prostitution'?
The fact that it is 'immoral' and, at times, effectively or formally 
illegal, according to the dominant ideology of the day? If the latter is 
true then prostitution is not an act but a social concept built up out of 
several other concepts and Deliefs, i.e. it is an 'ideological formation'. 
Thus we eventually have reached an adequate general concept of 'prostitut­
ion' (a particular ideological formation) through critical deliberation of 
obvious, commonsense notions of it - and this is the concept of deviance 
and the theoretical method that mins throughout this text. Would a 
different theoretical standpoint produce the same concept of deviance? No k 
because different constituent concepts would be used in thinking the 
problem. Clearly deviance, (and its forms) is not pre-given to the senses 
and cannot be taken as read. Its concept requires specification. Taylor,
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Walton and Young fail to do that. Whether their object is deviance or 
crime, the point is that a problematic should specify its own theoretical 
•object not operate on the object'of another problematic or of everyday 
ideology. The assumption of the availability of objects for a theory is 
classically empiricist - the implicit premise being that there is a world of 
objects whose properties are immediately given to the senses of everyone 
and that the knowledge of these objects requires no conceptualization. The 
argument that objects 'given to the senses' arrive clothed in everyday 
ideology to one degree or another is unrecognized in The New Criminology.
.The need to define an object in order to produce a knowledge of it is unfelt.
How far this empiricism dominates other themes or elements in the 
problematic (such as it is, being explicitly, and in fact, undeveloped) of 
The New Criminology is not at issue. The fact that the element is effective 
at all in an important way is enough. What is required is a Marxist 
concept of 'deviance'. That is, Marxist concepts must be used on the 
commonsense, ideological impressions of deviance to produce a Marxist concept 
of the inner structure, or reality, behind the appearance. Althusser's 
remarks about the concept of 'history' sum up our objection:
"As it (history) is adopted and understood it is an uncriticized concept, 
a concept, which, like all 'obvious' concepts, threatens to have for theor­
etical content no more thar^  the function that the existing or dominant 
ideology defines for it."
• Taylor, Walton and Young may argue that they have actually 
been engaged in the task of reworking commonsense conceptions of deviance 
and crime. • In reply I would state that they have merely laid down sign­
posts to the silences in the commonsense notions - and even then only 
implicitly. They have not reconstituted the theoretical object - in fact 
they give little indication that the object itself needs reconstituting, and 
argue that merely the approaches to, or viewpoints of, 'it' need revising. 
Their discourse is itself silent as regards the object. Such a silence 
invites the noise of a concept of deviance, or crime, steeped in everyday 
ideology or, only slightly better, one derived from a non-Marxist theoretical 
problematic which, if taken at face-value, could lead to the revision of 
Marxian concepts to fit thé object.
B Individualism
With the stress on social theory we would expect Taylor, Walton 73
7 3. (1970) op.cit. p.93.
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and Young to take their basic unit of analysis as sociality or social 
relations. Unfortunately this stress seems to be more an unwitting pointer 
to the weakness of previous criminology than a conscious index of their 
approach. The individual appears to be of central importance. For example:
"In particular, it (the conception of consciousness as determined - G.S.) 
leads to an approach to crime in which action is merely and simply a product 
of powerful interests or unequal society — as opposed to being the product 
of purposive individual or collective.action taken to resolve such 
inequalities of power and interest." 1 (my emphases).
Frequently we hear in the book of men consciously and creatively acting
against a backdrop of oppressive and unequal social institutions. The
concept implicit in this seems to be that the social relations, institutions
and conditions (all together in one unconceptualized morass) are the earth
upon which man walks freely - apart from the dangers underfoot. It is a
'quicksand' concept of capitalism where men are men and social conditions
are their tormentors or pleasures. There is little sense that men cannot
be detached from their places within social relations. Simply by announcing
•consciousness', 'purposiveness' and 'creativity' - in true Hegelian
75Marxist style - men are extracted from their social relations. 'Man' is 
seen as essentially creative, and hence by that conceptual stroke he is 
detached from his historically, societally and regionally (in the social 
formation) specific social relations. My argument is given strength by 
the following quote:
"A full-blown Marxist theory of deviance, or at least a theory of deviance 
deriving from a Marxism so described, would be concerned to develop 
explanations of the ways in which particular historical periods, charact­
erized by particular sets of social relationships and means of production, 
give rise to attempts by the economically and politically powerful to 
order society in particular ways .... it would assume, that is .... a 
degree of consciousness bound up with men's location in a social 
structure of production, exchange and domination, which of itself would 
influence the vrays in which men defined as criminal or deviant would 
attempt to live with their outsider's status." ° (my emphases). 7456
7 4. Taylor, Walton and Young (1973) op.cit. p.2o7.
75. "Once upon a time a valiant fellow had the idea that men were drowned 
in water only because they possessed the idea of gravity. If they were to 
knock this notion out of their heads, say by stating it to be a superstition, 
a religious concept, they would be sublimely proof against any danger from 
water. His ’whole life long he fought against the illusion of gravity, of 
whose harmful Jesuits all statistics brought him new and manifold evidence. 
This valiant fellow was the type of the new revolutionary philosophers in 
Germany." K. Marx and F. Engels (1970) op.cit. p.37.
76. Taylor, Walton and Young (1973) op.cit. p.22cl
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At first glance the obviousness of the sentiment against those ideas that 
posit man as a billiard ball or mindless physique can blind us to its 
theoretical weakness. The key terms, which are symptomatic of the prob­
lematic at work here, are "give rise to", "a degree of consciousness", "of 
itself" and "influence". They index the conception that the consciousness 
of the "men" concerned is somehow separable from its connection to the 
social relations in which they exist. A dichotomy is inscribed in the 
language here, and (more obviously) at many other points, between men and thei] 
social conditions (which are usually conceptualized in diffuse form i.e. by 
'relations’, 'conditions', 'institutions'). My point is that men and their 
•consciousnesses are inseparable from, although not identical with, the 
social relations in which they exist. That is not to say that no one man can 
think further or in radically different ways from any other - far from it - 
the relations of social existence are diverse, complex and contradictor;/ 
and prescribe an uneven development of 'consciousness'. 'Consciousness' j
is structured In social relations; not "against" them, or "bound up" with 
them, or "influenced" by them, or "arising from" them. This problematic- 
element of Taylor, Walton and Young's, that 'creative man' is potentially 
separable from the inextricable connection with his relations of social 
existence, is evidenced in their textual imagery of the criminal as a pre- 
-political revolutionary, fighting against oppressive social conditions.
In Hegelian theatre, A1 Capone appears as Robin Hood.
My argument, then, is not that Taylor, Walton and Young reproduce 
exactly the analytic individualism of the earlier criminological problematics 
but rather that the element appears, complexly, in contradictory juxtapos­
ition to a genuine element of Marxism, (albeit an element conceptualized 
here in an uneven way), the determination of social relations. Their basic 
unit of analysis is neither "the empirical individual" (Weber's phrase) nor 
- social relations but both at once! The dialectical connection between the 
two is never formulated explicitly and, in consequence, there is an odd 
sort of theoretical dualism evident throughout the work.
C Causation
. i
There is no reason after reading The Hew Criminology to doubt 
Taylor, Walton and Young at their word as regards causation. They reject
any notion of cause and effect.:
"For in social explanations causes are 'inner and conceptual' - that is 
to say, the connection between physical movement and the outside world 
is in terms of what men believe (the purposes to which they hold) .... a 
social theory must have reference to men's teleology - their purposes, 
their beliefs and the contexts in which they act out these purposes and 
beliefs."7f
To exemplify their position they give the following example:
"The man who breaks the window of the British Embassy in Dublin might 
well have poor autonomic response but both his lack of reflex and violent 
behaviour can only be understood in terms of the meaning he gave to the7o 
situation and the social context of the movement for a united Ireland."
The interrelation between their notion of social causation and their 
'individualist' Marxism is clear. As we noted, they take as their units 
* of analysis both social relations and the individual and here we see both 
as key aspects of causation. It appears that objective social "context", 
as it is subjectively interpreted, constitutes the etiological recipe for 
human action. From the standpoint of a Marxist problematic, however, one 
cannot take the individual out of his social relations, but that is not to 
say that the individual is identica.1 with his social relations:
"Upon the different forms of property, upon the social conditions of existence 
rises an entire superstructure of distinct and peculiarly formed sentiments, 
illusions, modes of thought and views of life. The entire class creates and 
forms them out of its material foundations and out of the corresponding 
social relations. The single individual, who derives them through tradition 
aid upbringing, may imagine that they form the real motives and the starting- 
point of his activity."79
Taylor, Walton and Young's notion of causation has not escaped the subjectiv­
ist form that has dominated 'new deviancy' work. Again external, active 
forces either in isolation or combination bring about events: social 
relations become external to the individual and the individual becomes 
external to social relations. Social 'factors' are the ultimate cause but 
are only effective through the subsequent interpretation of them by the 
individual subject - as if the social relations within which men live are
7 7. ibid. p.6l.
78. ibid. p.60.
7 9. K. Marx and F. Engels (1973) op.cit. p.117.
perfectly transparent, waiting merely for men to interpret them according 
to the purposes, beliefs and world-views which those men hold dear. This 
combination of consciousness and material conditions can be dressed in 
dialectical clothing, and frequently is in The Hew Criminology, but remains 
a linear flow of separated factors. The determinacy of "contexts" and 
"conditions" is combined with the determinacy of conscious, purposive 
creativity - the latter being ultimately victorious. This seems like a 
remarkable mix of dominant criminological 'determinism* and the humanist 
essentialisra of new deviancy theory. But, if one separates man from his 
social relations in a 'Marxist' approach, it should be no surprise when the 
product is a dualistic notion of causation, mixing determinism and humanism.
In conclusion of this brief commentary, The New Criminology 
displays a complexity of newness and oldness and a complexity of inter­
relations betv.'een Marxist and non-Marxist elements. It is new in that 
it does employ Marxist theoretical elements, albeit in crude unclarified 
form, to analyse its object. But it is catastrophically old in that it has 
not managed to remove the elements of empiricism, astructural causation and 
analytic individualism as they are effective in shaping the object of 
theories of deviance and crime. These themes appeared as key elements in 
older deviancy problematics, and, despite the peculiar, specific forms in 
which they appear in The IJew Criminology, they play the same role in its 
problematic. And, for students of Marx and Hegel, there is the familiar sight 
of non-Marxist epistemology mixing with Marxist concepts ana revising the 
latter into, a half-Liarxist end-product. All in all, The New Criminology 
is epistemologically largely a misnomer and Hirst's indictment of recent 
English attempts at a Marxist theory of deviance seems to be applicable to 
The New Criminology (even though Hirst conflates the new deviancy problematic 
with that of The New Criminology):
"Radical and conservative theories of deviance take as their point of 
departure the given actuality of crime and law, and of ideological 
conflicts reflecting standpoints within that actuality. Radical deviancy 
theory takes as its scientific point of departure the desire to develop 
a critique of the orthodox .positions in the field. It seeks to explain 
and justify the criminal as a product of social rela-tions, to situate the
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criminal as the victim of processes of labelling and punishment which 
serve the interests and•represent the values of the establishment, and 
to question the nature of laws and values as the property of that estab­
lishment. Radical deviancy theory therefore questions the value assumptions 
underlying justifications of establishment interests and the ideological 
stand of orthodox criminology, but itggery rarely questions its own 
position, assumptions and interests."
Having looked at the two major deviancy problematics and the
first major attempt at a Marxist revision of them, we can firmly argue that
all three problematics take either ’crime* or 'deviance' or both together
(explicitly, implicitly, or in confusion) as their object. All three are,
in other words, knowledges of an unclarified theoretical object. All
three carry three epistemological elements which are thoroughly alien to
Marx's problematic. Therefore Marxism must break with them — Marxism is
epistemologically incompatible with theories of 'crime' and 'deviance', as
currently conceived. Marxism could be compatible with a theory of deviance
if the term 'deviance' referred to an object constructed and constituted
by Marxist concepts. But that is not the case.. With Hirst, we must argue
that the objects of Marxist theory are produced or specified by its concepts:
no pre-given object can be taken without commonplace social ideologies
being at work in constituting its form and content and without the
. 8lconsequent dangers of revisionism.
Hirst's critique
I would not wish to support in their entirety Paul Hirst's 
somewhat polemical remarks about 'crime' and 'deviance' simply disappearing 
into the general concerns and understandings of Marxism and the impossib­
ility of a Marxist criminology or theory of deviance. Although the 
concept Hirst is referring to is correct, his language has left many 
•wondering what there is in 'deviance' that is so repulsive to Marxism, 
and no doubt most of these people hove missed the point Hirst makes, which. 801
80. P.Q. Hirst "Marx and Engels on crime, law and morality" Economy and 
Society (1972) 1:1 p.29.
81. ibid. See also P.Q. Hirst "Radical doviancy theory and Marxism: a reply 
to Taylor and ’Walton" (1972) Economy and Society 1:3 PP.351-356.
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emphatically demands that Marxism constructs its own theoretical objects.
But, and this is important for the future, Hirst's aversion to the term
'Marxist criminology' does tend towards a closure of theoretical
development since it indicates a concept of the inherent and irremovable
referents of the terms 'crime' or 'deviance' (as signifying non-Marxist
objects). What seems to have happened is that the vehemence of a necessary
attack on radical English deviancy theory has closed a circle that should
have been left open. That is, 'deviance' and 'crime' are taken by Hirst
to be pre-given, eternal concepts rather than terms which have,
historically, referred to particular concepts within particular theoretical
formations. Within a Marxist problematic an object could be constituted
by Marxist concepts which could be given the term 'deviance' or 'crime'.
It is only a 'symptom' of a theoretical revolution that new terminology
is created, not a fundamental prerequisite. Theoretical revolutions do
not automatically produce a new terminology - some terms may continue
in use for a long time - not all Marx's terms were original, although many of
82the concepts, which they signified, were. The terms 'crime' and 'deviance'
have no pre—given, once—and-for—all, conceptual reference — the referent
has been constructed within each theoretical problematic. 'Grime' arid
•deviance', as terms, certainly are loaded with the histories of the
concepts they have carried and their irresponsible, unqualified usage
opens up those histories to the reader enabling him to interpret the
terms in line with one of their historical concepts. But such concepts
are not. pre-given, intrinsic or eternal. 'Crime' and 'deviance' carry
the concepts of the problematics that use them and there seems to be no
reason in principle why a Marxist problematic should not entitle an
object, which it has constructed, 'crime' or 'deviance'. This distinction
between the signifier, a term, and the signified, a concept, may seem
trivial but, as we have seen, it is a sharp one and helps our comprehension;
without it v;e would have missed Hirst's closure of the development of
83theory in this area.
Hirst's critique closed the question of 'crime' and 'deviance' by 
• sliding the signifier into the signified to produce the illusion that the 
terms are eternally bad and not filled by problematic—specific concepts.
That question can be reopened by remembering that it is the concept of the 
theoretical object that is important in theory and that the term we attach
82. Bee also Althusser (1970) op.cit.“ "p.15 7. "
83. The distinction will also be of importance later in the discussion of 
semiology and structuralism.
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to it is 'better judged on its repercussions for theoretical and political 
practice rather than on the grounds of our dislike for its previous homes 
(reactionary/liberal/radical humanist problematics). What is necessary 
now is to waste no more- time on objects given by everyday ideology or 
epistemologically non-Marxist problematics but to construct a Marxian 
object to replace the old objects. Of course the Marxist object will not 
simply occupy the same theoretical space as previous objects but will 
have its own space, time and structure. It will be conceptualized from 
the Marxist critique of the old concepts: its embryonic space is that 
created in the critique not that of the old concept lying in the womb of 
the old problematic. And thus vie must look to the Marxist critique of the 
concept of 'deviance'. That critique is only to be found in Paul Hirst's 
work, yet he has closed off the question for further development. So, it 
would appear that nothing is possible. Bvit wait! If Hirst was suggesting, 
as he clearly was, that 'deviance' was an unfit topic for Marxism, then 
he must have a clear concept of 'deviance'I We must investigate further 
the problematic driving Hirst's critique.
Paradoxically, but naturally of course, when Hirst's texts 
declare 'the concept of deviance' to be alien to Marxism they logically 
presuppose that Hirst's own Marxist problematic involves a concept of 
'the concept of deviance' (This may sound clumsy but it is vital that it 
is taken literally). That simple dialectical point is the key to the compre­
hension of the Marxist notion of 'deviance'. Hirst's critique is driven by a 
problematic carrying the effective concept of 'the concept of deviance'. Jn 
other words, the Marxist idea of 'deviance' is that it refers to a Social 
Concept: the Marxist problematic views 'deviance' as a term referring to a 
socially and historically determinate concept belonging to the realm of social 
ideology and not to the realm of theory. As Hirst himself puts it, deviance
is an object "constituted prior to theory by practico-social ideologies", it
84is "untheoretically given in social experience".' Deviance, then, is not a 
theoretical concept or a theorized notion, but rather an 'everyday idea' car­
ried by deviancy sociologisTs along with other members of society and which 
is thus implemented in writing and research in the 'sociology of deviance'. 
'Deviance' is, in the Marxist concept, not a behaviour but a social concept 
which forms part of and is formed by, "practico—social ideologies". This is 
the Marxist concept of deviance which lay hidden and unnoticed in the recesses 
of Hirst's problematic and thus undeveloped at the textual level.
84. (1972) op.cit. p.351
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But what a surprise! This discovery runs contrary to all 
expectations. On the one side, after Hirst's criticisms, the radical 
deviancy groups in this country simply re-asserted the existence of 
'social deviance' and thus kept i>:s conceptual status non-problematic; 
their dislike and ignorance of Hirst's epistemology, combined with an 
impulse for a purely political 'praxis', enabled the sociology of deviance to 
be continued as a viable sociological enterprise, albeit with a sense of 
crisis and lack of confidence. Hirst, himself, in his two articles had 
made it clear that he believed Marxism and 'deviance' to be alien matters:
"There is no 'Marxist theory of deviance' either in existence or which 
can be developed within orthodox Marxism". ^
It was unclear to him that by an empiricist conflation of the term 
•deviance' with its popular, historically specific concept and by a 
legislation of the permanence of the concept referred to by the term, he 
was activating a new, Marxist definition of deviance (as a social concept 
or an idea). He had produced a new concept of deviance, which remained 
unformulated, enmeshed in the interstices of his theoretical discourse, 
and yet he failed to realize that fact. What had happened was that Hirst 
had produced the Marxist concept of deviance but not discovered it: he 
had produced the 'thing-in-itself' but not the 'thing-in-its-concept'. 
Consequently he did not develop the concept in all its determinations.
Thus, having discovered the Marxist concept of deviance in the 
problematic of Hirst's discourse, I must now move on to outline the 
finite, determinate nature of that concept. But before doing that, let 
us recap. In an attempt to abolish 'deviance' as an object of Marxist 
theory, Hirst inadvertently produced a Marxist concept of 'deviance'.
This concept existed in itself at the level of his Marxist problematic, 
but at the level of textual discourse it appears by chance, as conting­
ent to his attempt to close off the question of 'deviance' for Marxism, 
and clothed in the garments of that attempt. This being so, I conclude 
that there _is a Marxist concept of 'deviance'. That concept holds that 
deviance is social ideology. Deviance is thus a fit object for Marxist 
theory since it exists in its concept within the Marxist problematic. 85
85- (1972) op.cit. p.29.
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Deviance as an ideological formation
Let us nov; turn to the task of outlining the determinate nature 
of the Marxist concept of deviance: the determinations of the concept- 
in-itself. Hirst had seen the term 'deviance' as referring to its 
extant, popular, historically specific concept and had granted that 
concept to he the permanent property of the term 'deviance'. I would say 
that this is not v/holly true hut contains a kernel of truth. 'Deviance', 
in the time and space of the Marxist problematic, refers to a type of 
social idea, which I would add, takes particular shapes or forms at 
particular historical conjunctures, and thus what is permanent about 
deviance is its ideological nature in general and not its forms at any 
partictxlar time or place. What Hirst had not seen was that his conception 
of 'deviance' as an ideological matter constitutes a new, Marxist 
conception of deviance, formulated in the concepts of Marxist theory.
Deviance, I have argued, is in general a type of social idea,86which has its particular forms at different historical conjunctures.
So far I have used the term 'social idea' to capture in simple language 
Hirst's notion that deviance is "constituted prior to theory by practice- 
social ideologies". To develop an account of the nature of deviance, I 
must explicate this reference. By 'social idea' I moan to refer to a 
tbought mattor constituted as a totality by elements of feelings, percepts, 
images and elements of spontaneous, unsystematic reflections on these
. Qrj
feelings, percepts and ims-ges. That is, I refer to a formation composed 
of a unity of thought-elements in a loose relation. I propose to call this 
an Ideological Formation. I shall develop this concept throughout the 
following chapters. For the moment, I am using the term 'ideology' to 
denote a form of thought which combines with the'images of perception to 
constitute an ideological formation, (implicitly I am defining a 86
86. We can now permanently omit the inverted commas around the word, deviance, 
which have represented the process of transition that the concept it refers 
to has been involved in. They have marked a doubt about its correct 
reference for Marxism. Their omission indexes the return of an acceptable 
concept to the term and the beginning O T Cl new stability in usage. The term, ! 
deviance, now refers to a type of ideological formation.
87« C.f. Hegel's view of the experiential elements and of their existence 
as reflections of the movement of the Absolute Idea in his Logic (1975 
Oxford: The Clarendon Press), especially in the introduction".
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-theoretical formation for the moment, as systematic thought or a tight
33
structure of thought-elements. ) These determinations do not exhaust 
the definition of 'a social idea', however, for there is the 'social' 
aspect of this 'idea' which requires attention. That is, ideological 
formations are elements within the wider whole of a social formation and 
are related, in one way or another, to the social relations and practices 
of that totality. It is this social existence and location of ideological 
formations which is the determinant of their socialibrm and content. And, 
in turn, ideological formations are one of the determinants, along with 
the other elements of the totality, of the mode of development and 
existence of the social formation.
The object of press discourse frequently referred to in this 
project, 'political demonstrations' is a provisional example of an 
ideological formation. What I am talking about when I mention 'political 
demonstrations' is a loose cluster of images, stereotypes, concepts, 
faiths and prejudices which have associated emotional cmnections. Vie are 
not talking about a number of men and women walking down a street.
'Political demonstration' is a historically determinate, ideological 
formation composed of a number of clustered ideologies and images in 
loose conjunction.
This form of deviance is normally thought of as a collective 
behaviour but the theory being developed here renders this conception 
inadequate. The 'deviance-ness’ of the deviance, I am arguing, does not 
lie in the behaviour but in the ideological formation applied to (and in) 
that behaviour. This 'collective behaviour' can only be thought of as 
'deviant' because the widely sustained ideological formation of 'political 
demonstrations' contains elements that define the act of collective political 
protest as a Bad Thing. 'Protesters', 'militants' etc. are thus seen 
spontaneously in ideology as irrational, misguided, subversive or 
manipulated, and 'demonstrations' as 'a waste of time', 'disruptive of 
traffic', 'a symptom of infantilism' and so on. 83
83. Whether the elements are of the same kind as those in ideology is an 
issue not to be taken up in depth in this work. I would suggest that 
theoretical formations aro composed of (a) logical relations between (b) 
generalized reflections or abstractions. That is, theoretical formations 
do noi/ contain within tnomselves such elements as percepts and images.
In other words the theory—ness of theory lies in its logically interrelated 
generalized reflections or abstractions. (See oils. 3 and 7 for some 
consideration of tne relation between ideology and science''. By 'theory*
I do not necessarily mean scientific theory.
9
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Deviance is a social ideology and can only be understood as such. If 
criminologists and sociologists want to understand why 'political demons­
tration' is deviant they should examine the question of ideology and attempt 
to find out where the ideological formation, 'political demonstration', 
come from and what maintains its existence. For criminologists and socio­
logists to examine the social "backgrounds or attitudes of the 'demonstrators' 
is to imply (l) that they a-ssume or "believe 'political demonstration' to he 
deviant, (2) that, therefore, the people demonstrating are deviants and (3)
that since they are deviants there must he something 'peculiar' about them
89which makes 'them' different from the, resV-ef 'us'. This means that existing 
criminology and sociology has, by and large, accepted current ideology at 
its word 'without questioning where this ideological notion cane from, 
what its history is and what its social consequences hove been. Although 
this acceptance may have been unconscious or unthinking, it is neverthe­
less a political statement of implicit commitment to the status quo and 
an approbation of an ideological notion which may have been and may still 
be instrumental in the suppression of political rebellion and criticism.
Would those same academics have decided to examine the social backgrounds 
and attitudes of Jews in Nazi Germany or Kulaks in Stalinist Russia? For 
after all, being Jevrish or Kulak in those societies of the time was also 
obviously deviant. No, of course they would not have done that. They 
would have examined the reasons for the ruling classes' definitions of 
these people as deviant. What kind of 'science' is this, which varies 
its approach with its moral/political evaluation of the society under 
consideration? As I have said above, these so-called sciences, when study­
ing their own societies, operate within the current ideological formations; 
they are therefore ideologies and no more. I am interested in a scientific 
analysis of social deviance and therefore maintain that a deviation is an 
ideological formation related to a historically determinate social formation. 
'Political demonstration' is an example of one such formation in modern 
Britain and constitutes a continual illustration throughout in this investi­
gation.
Of course, the remarks above only form a general outline of 
the determinations of deviance and no more. This outline of deviance in
89. See, for example, E.L. McDill and J.C. Ridley "Status, anomis, political 
alienation and political participation" (1962) A . J . 3 .  pp.205-213, A .fortes
"Political oiyism, differential socialization and lower—class leftist
radicalism (1971) A.S.n. 3o pp.520—835» R.G. Braungart "Family statu;.’, 
socialization ami student politics (1971) A.J.S. 7 7; 1 pp.108-130.
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general has "been necessary, even though it has involved reference to concepts 
as yet undeveloped (e.g. the concept of the location of ideological formations 
as elements in social formations)., because, without it, vie cannot develop 
the full conception of deviance in society. To perform this task, I 
required an explicated concept of deviance-in-itself and that has been 
provided. Hovrever the concept of deviance produced is by no means a finished 
product: it will, of necessity, be developed further in the folloviing chapters 
and, hopefully in the works of others. All I have acheived so far is a beg­
inning, formulating some basic aspects of the Marxist concept of deviance, 
and the process of making that beginning is part of the overall process of 
the development of the Marxist concept of ideology as an aspect of social 
formations. It is to that latter concept that vie must now turn. But, before 
I do that, allow me to briefly summarize the developments so far.
I have claimed that the Marxist concept of deviance specifies 
deviance as an ideological formation. That is, deviance is a unity const­
ructed loosely by a conglomeration of pre-theoretical thought-elements.
This unity is a fully social one in that' deviance is a type of ideological 
formation and ideological formations only exist as elements in specific 
social formations. Ideological formations, like political and economic 
formations, are integral aspects of all known societies. Hence deviance, 
as a type of ideological formation, takes specific forms in particular 
societies with definite modes of economy, polity and ideology, that is, 
with definite economic, political and cultural social relations. The 
scientific explanation of deviance therefore, must discover the connections 
between forms of economy and polity and forms of ideology. That sociology 
a.nd criminology, which thought it was explaining deviance by positing causat­
ive factors for people's behaviour, can now be abandoned as irrelevant for 
our purposes. If vie are still interested in scientifically determining why 
people commit 'deviant acts' then vie must realize that what makes a person 
appropriate commodities in an illegal or deviant manner (for example) is a 
totally different ouestion to that which asks why certain modes of commodity 
appropriation are ideologically and legally disapproved of. The latter 
question is the issue of deviance and the former is an issue for social 
psychoanalysis (involving a scientific theory of psychic responses to 
specific social conditions). The realization that the emergence of deviance 
(or ideology) and the emergence of behavioural patterns are two different 
questions is long overdue - the confusion of the two questions in the 
sociology Ox deviance is the biggest single cause of its inadequacy. To
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understand the emergence of "behavioural patterns it is necessary to have a 
knowledge of psychic structure, social relations, social needs and their 
interconnection. To understand the emergence of forms of deviance it is 
necessary to have a knowledge of the social relations of economic production 
and political domination and their interconnection. Thus, to "begin either 
project, the comprehension of social relations, the inner structure of 
social phenomena, is a basic necessity. Marx showed us the way with an 
analysis of the social relations of capitalist economic formations. The 
analyses of political and ideological formations are sadly neglected, yet 
without them Marxism must tend towards économisai in one form or another.
The work presented here is an attempt to clear away come debris hindering 
the study of ideological formations and to lay some simple, but sound, 
foundation stones to enable its successful completion.
53
2 IDEOLOGY ADD SOCIAL PRACTICE
Introduction
The object of this chapter is to specify more precisely the 
determinations of ideology itself and ideology in its location as a social 
phenomenon. These forrrmlations are seen, of course, to be within a Marxist 
theoretical problematic. They perform a double duty. In one respect they 
are demanded by the developments on the concept of deviance in chapter one. 
There, deviance v/as found to be a type of "ideological formation", existing 
in human social formations as an integral element. However, my specification 
of the concept of ideology demanded by that investigation v;ac preliminary 
and provisional. Both sides of deviance, deviance-in-itself and deviance in 
society, require an elucidation of the concept of ideology. In another res­
pect the formulations here are required as foundation for the consideration 
of a Marxist theory of reading ideology which will occur in the subsequent 
chapters.
It would be, in one sense, easy in this chapter to rehearse the., 
exchanges within Marxism over the question of ideology. At the same time 
th?-t would be difficult because of the quantity of relevant books and art­
icles from the past and the many still appearing in the present. In any 
case I am not even going to spend time compiling long footnotes to impress, 
or depress, the reader with the extent of the literature on the subject.
Some essays demand full referencing (for example, chapters 1,3 and.4 herein) 
since they involve the exposition of a reading of one problematic from the 
standpoint of another. However this essay involves a reading of the problema­
tic from whose standpoint it is written and hence, given that 'internal' 
characteristic of the essay, the constraints on the form are different. The 
former discourse demands proofs of reading but this latter, 'internal' type 
more urgently demands sophistication, clarity and, most importantly, an 
advance. It is common, amongst Marxists, to practice the intra—problematic 
type of theoretical discourse with lull references and comprehensiveness
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"but without-much clarity and rarely with any advance in theory. This prac­
tice forms a component of the whole sphere of 'theory consumption' in 
British intellectual life: much -theory is consumed (and referenced) but very 
little produced. My point is that when a discourse focusses on its own field 
its most important production criterion is that it prodvxces some advance and 
that such a discourse can assume that its consumers have consumed sufficiently 
within that field to he able to 'read' such advances. As regards this 
particular topic, ideology, I shall be pleased if I can create a degree 
of clarity in the Marxist concept of ideology - an advance is optimistic 
in such a difficult, murky area with a low level of relative theoretical 
development.
The concept of ideology in general
I h?-ve already used the term 'ideology' to denote the actual 
structure of thought-elements of a spontaneous nature. This forms a 
provisional answer to our question: what is ideology in its internal 
determinations in a Marxist problematic? The answer, however needs 
explicating since the unexplicated form Vías used, for simplicity and ■ 
clarity, in the essay on deviance.
Ideology is, in Marx's conception, a form of consciousness 
carried by human arrents. We may remember that in the 1859 Preface to A 
Contrubutior. to the Critique of Political Economy he talked of "ideological 
forms" as "forms of social consciousness", "the consciousness of men" and 
the consciousness of a period. This reference also indicates the social 
nature of ideology, but, for the moment, let us just simply note that it 
does indicate the concept of ideology-in-itself mentioned here. If, then, 
ideology is a form of consciousness, what kind of form is it and what 
elements of consciousness are involved? The latter question clearly comes 
first logically since the form is only the form of the content, and not a
1. See Marx and Engels (1973) op.cit. pp.lSl, 182.
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form in the abstract • If Marx had. systematically ta.ckled Hegel in writing 
on our ouestion I believe that the following propositions would have been 
developed out of his critique of Hegel's epistemology:
1 The elements of consciousness constituting ideology are of two kinds:
(a) the feelings, faiths, images, percepts of experience, (b) thoughts 
blended into these elements in the process of reflection on experience. 
Ideology is thus distinguished from scientific theory which is constituted 
by thoughts which comprehend, and hence systematically organise, modify and 
transform, the thoughts produced in 'ideological reflection'. Ideology is 
the immediate, spontaneous form of consciousness.
Hegel had seen "lav;, religion and morality" as "modes of
consciousness" containing "feelings and generalized images that have been
pmoulded and permeated by thought".* It is interesting to read Marx with 
this in mind. In the much quoted passage from the 1359 Preface, Marx 
talks about the "legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic" 
forms ("ideological forms") in which "men become conscious" of explosive 
contradictions in the economic social relations during "on epoch of social 
revolution".’' For Marx also, therefore, law, religion, morality, etc. are 
spontaneous modes or forms of consciousness produced through social practice. 
I think that this reading is justifiable since Marx is always reminding us 
in Capital that people's immediate consciousness is only of the appearance 
of things, that the first kind of 'knowledge', and the most primitive, is 
constituted by the impressions of the senses. Hence Marx would argue that 
the 'explosive contradictions' in the economy during a revolutionary epoch 
are not perceptible to the senses; that in such a time the human agents of 
social relations, only become conscious of the sensual repercussions of the 
social structural upheaval; and that, this mode of consciousness, in its 
various appearances such as laii, political doctrine and philosophy, is the 
form in which those agents "fight out" the structural conflict. Of course, 
there is one crucial difference between Marx and Ilegel on this question. 23
2. (1975) op.cit. p.5.
3. Marx and Engels (1973)■op.cit. p. 132. See also The Eighteenth Erumaire 
ibid, p.117* where Marx talks of a "superstructure.... of sentiments, 
illusions, modes of thought, and views of life"arising upon the social 
conditions of existence. See further The Poverty of Philosophy (1955 
Moscow: Progress Publishers) p.95.: "The same men who establish their 
social relations in conformity with their material productivity;, produce 
also principles, ideas and categories, in conformity with their social
relations".
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Por Marx, philosophy, as it had hitherto existed, including Hegel's work, 
was also an ideological mode of consciousness since it too was founded on 
the sense-data of the experience of the agents of social relations.
Philosophy may have woven a complex structure on top of that hase but 
nevertheless the base was still there at the root. And thus llarx frequently 
castigated Hegel for providing a complex rationalisation of the structure of 
the German status quo. Using the terminology developed here, Hegel would 
have to be classified as an ideological theorist since he practised an 
ideological mode of consciousness at the level of theory: that is, he 
attempted to comprehend thoughts springing from empirical impressions but 
only with other thoughts of the same kind - his comprehension never left 
the grounding of the field of experience, except in his metaphysical 
declarations on the source of his reason.
2 Ideology is, therefore, the experiential or practical mode of consciousness 
and its constituent elements arc the aspects of spontaneous experience 
(feeling, perception, faith, reflection).
3 As a spontaneous mode of consciousness, ideology is not wholly 
composed of conscious elements (e.g. 'reflection') hut also contains 
unconscious elements (e.g.'perception'). Similarly an element may some­
times he conscious and sometimes unconscious (e.g. 'feeling'). 'Conscious­
ness' should not be conflated with that which is conscious at any given mom­
ent. Ideology can thus he said to take conscious and unconscious forms.
4 As the spontaneous, experiential mode of consciousness, ideology is 
thus flexible, adaptive to circumstances, pragmatic and unprincipled.
Thus its form as a totality is that of a loose structure whose unity lies 
in its inextricable connection with social practice, the form of social 
experience - ideology's external determination. In itself it is a loose, 
adaptive structure with no coherence or internal unity, but in its existence 
as an aspect of social practice, ideology finds its unity. Ideology-in- 
itself, then, is a flexible form. As Marx commented in the 1859 Preface, 
ideology cannot "he determined with the precision of natural science.
5 There is one further aspect of the form taken by ideology. Because 4
4. ibid. There is no doubt that Marx saw ideology as fundamentally and 
precisely linked to social practice: sec (1974) op.cit. pp.78-79 where Marx 
explicitly ana precisely links the producers' view of value, as intrinsic 
to the commodity, to their everyday practice of exchange.
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it is an adaptive mode of consciousness inextricably linked with the mode 
of social experience, social practice, it tends to provide in its 
reflections a rationalisation of its produced sense-data. Hence ideology- 
in its political, philosophical, theoretical forms tends to produce 
loosely structured defences of the world in which it exists. Put bluntly, 
ideology takes' loose conservative forms when it reflects on itself. This 
point can be understood more clearly if we remember that reflection in 
the ideological mode of consciousness is the process of connecting, into 
some order, the sense-data produced in social practice. Such sense-data 
must tend to enable conservative reflections since the practices 
producing them will usually be part of the mainstream social structure of 
a- social formation. This is assuming, of course, that the social formation 
in question is not disintegrating into fragments (i.c. classes) in conflict. 
If the social structure is shaken or mortified with active contradictions, 
then the tendency to conservatism outlined above will be matched by 
tendencies to oppositionalism or escapism. It is interesting that social 
formations with slow development of productive forces and slow maturation 
of contradictions in their social relations are often called 'traditional 
societies'. From what I have said it would, follow that in stable, static 
or stagnant societies ideology obtains a fundamental role and a very 
conservative strength.
' This is the Marxian concept of ideology in its internal 
determinations. My elaboration has of necessity required reference to 
the concept'' s external determinations and the crucial aspect of the 
location of its unity in determinate social practice. It is this nexus, 
the unity of ideology in social practice, that will form the heart of 
this chapter. But before moving to that question of the unity, let us 
attend to our duties to develop the new concept of deviance as an 
ideological formation. From what has been said about the internal determ­
inations of ideology, is there anything worth saying that may refine our 
concept of deviance? I think there is. Firstly, an ideological formation 
is an association of ideological elements which finds its unity in its 
social existence as an aspect of social practice. This is not to say that 
the origin of each element lies in the connection with the social practice 
in question, but that the association of elements constituting an
ideological formation is connected to particular social practice or 
combination of practices. Forms of deviance, we can say, find their origins 
and support in social practices - although'the practices of origin and the 
practices of support are not necessarily the same. Secondly, types of 
deviance exist at the spontaneous level of experience and hence are 
"obvious". For example, it is commonly considered that most kinds of 
deviance are "obvious" and other, ambiguous types are more "a matter of 
opinion" - an ideological view also found in sociology. Thirdly, deviance 
may exist at the conscious or unconscious level or it may he fragmented into 
its elements - some being conscious and others unconscious (the foundations 
of ambiguity). Deviance at the conscious level - that is, an ideological 
formation in the psyche's unconscious which is known to the subject - 
is one foundation for its own destruction. That is, being conscio\is of the 
constituents of the notion is one basis on which the annulment of those 
constituents can take place and hence a basis for the potential destruction 
of the ideological formation. Deviance at the unconscious level - that 
is, an ideological formation solely located in the psyche's unconscious, 
where the conscious is unaware of its existence - is the foundation for 
what, at the level of spontaneous experience, would be called "faith" or 
"tradition". Deviance at both levels - that is, an ideological formation 
broken up and dispersed - is a basis of "ambiguity", "indecision", "no 
firm belief", "flexibility" or "indifference". Fourthly, the ideological 
elements constituting a deviance (or a 'deviation') are pragmatic and 
adaptive to circumstance. The possibility of their easy displacement 
makes deviations essentially unstable structxires: they are stabilised 
when their key elements are firmly tied to a stable social practice. In 
times of overall social upheaval, involving explosive contradictions 
within and between practices, deviations will be highly unstable ideological 
structn-res, but, even in more peaceful times, they will he prone to shift 
sharply in form at regular intervals and to have a permanent amorphousnesc. 
Fifthly deviations tend to be conservative formations and tend to be 
consistent with the status quo (whatever the society). This follows from 
the earlier remarks on the conservative nature of ideology.
All these developments flow from the theoretical determinations 
of ideology and are not reflective speculations based on experience or 
'empirical' studies in the sociology of deviance. But, now, let us turn 
to ideology as an element in social formations through its location in
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social practice. In itself we have found that it is incoherent, adaptive, 
pragmatic and flexible and that its unity of formation lies in its 
existence as an aspect of social practice. It is to that aspect we shall 
novi turn.
Ideology and the social formation: the concept of reflection
What are the social determinations of ideological forms of
consciousness? Marx and Engels are usually said to have outlined the
ansv/er to the question in The Gorman Ideology. Various statements are
often quoted to the effect that ideology is a sublimation of "the material
life-process", "consciousness is a social product", "conceptions" are
prod\iced by men active at a definite level of productive development,
consciousness is "conscious existence" etc., etc.. But, if Althusser's
periodization of Marx is correct, as I argued in chapter one, then The
German Ideolo-”y must be treated as one of the first works of a major
■-------------- - 6epistemological break. These works do not indicate a complete rupture 
with Hegelian idealism and Feuerbachian materialism and are scarred by the 
ideological struggle with Hegel and Feuerbach which produced them.
In consequence they present "delicate problems of interpretation" as 
Althusser notes:
"As for The German IdeoIo— r, it offers us precisely a thought in a state" 
of rupture with its past, playing a pitiless game of deadly criticism 
with all its erstwhile theoretical presuppositions: primarily with 
Feuerbach and Hegel and all the forms of a philosophy of consciousness 
and an anthropological philosophy. But this new thought, so firm and 
precise in its interrogation of ideological error, cannot define itself 
without difficulties or ambiguities. It is impossible to break with a 
theoretical past at one blow: in every case, words and concepts are needed 
to break with words and concepts, and often the old words arc charged with 
the conduct of the rupture throughout the period of the search for new 
ones. The German Ideolo -^v presents the spectacle of a re-enlisted 
conceptual reserve standing in for new concepts still in training .... 
and as we usually judge these old concepts by their bearing, taking them 
at their word, it is easy to stray into a Positivist conception (the end 
of all philosophy) or an individualist-humanist conception (the subjects 
of history are 'real concrete men').
5 . (1970) op. cit., esp. Part I.
6. See Althusser (1969) op. cit. esp. pp.21-40
7 . ibid, pp.36,37.
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Marx and Engels’ statements in The German Ideolor-y therefore have to he. 
treated with considerable caution for they reflect the incomplete, 
fragmentary nature of the rxipture. Thus when Marx and Engels talk of 
ideologies as "reflexes and echoes" of the "life-process", we must not 
interpret this to mean that ideologies are an automatic, mechanical 
spin-off from the capital-labour dialectic or that they are the crude 
creation of the thinking, concrete individual subject. Such interpretations 
arc clearly false since Marx's later work tells us that (a) levels other 
•than the economic have relative autonomy and are also determinants of 
ideologies and (b) that men are not the subjects of history but that 
history is a process, "a development considered in the totality of its 
real conditions', without a subject. The later Marx develops the concept 
of the social formation .which denotes a complex totality comprising 
economic, political-legal and ideological practices interrelated in a 
developing structure dominated by the economic ("in that it determines 
which of the instances of the social structure occupies the determinant 
place"^ at a particular time). It is this movement of social formations 
that is, for the later Marx, the process that constitutes history. And 
it is this concept of the social formation in movement that we must 
attend to in our attempt to locate social ideology as a "reflection" of 
the life-process.
Hirst has declared that, for Marx, forms of consciousness are 
only "effects of the structure of the social formation"^ This seems to 
me to he a faulty formulation. In trying to develop Althusser's Marxism 
he seems to hive fallen foul of one of Althusser’s weaknesses. At 
several points in his v/ork, Althusser's attempt to smash humanism leads 
him to imply that ideology is not a determinant, and never can he, of 
the nature and form of a social formation, hut simply an "effect" of it. 
Althusser's formulations usually carry the notion of ideology as a 'mirror 
reflection' or 'effect' of the social process. For example, in an essay on 
Brecht and Bertolozzi he says: 8910
8. Lo Capi cul i.l. (1948 Baris: Editions Sociales) p.l8l, n. cuoted by 
Althusser (1972) op. cit. p.l35.
9. Althusser and Balibar (1970) op. cit. p.224.
10. (1972) op. cit. p.36.
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"But vihat, concretely,- is this tmeritized ideology if not simply the 
'familiar', 'well-known', transparent myths in which society or an age 
can recognize itself (hut not know itself), the mirror it looks into 
for self-recognition, precisely the mirror it must break if it is tcT 
know itself? Vihat is ‘the ideology of a society or a period if it is not 
that society's or period's consciousness of itself, that is, an immediate 
material which spontaneously implies, looks for and naturally finds its 
forms in the image of a consciousness of sel£^living the totality of its 
world in the transparency of its own myths?" ' (l-ly emphases).
The relation between ideology and the social formation is thus conceived 
within the vague concept of The German Ideology - as a 'mechanical', 
automatic, photographic replication of the "life-process". Social life 
gives off ideology just as steam rises from boiling water and thus the 
agents of social life cannot see through the fog of ideology (or "mist" 
as Marx calls it) cince it is the condition of their vision. M oví  this 
is true. But, having said that, Althusser has only metaphorically 
described the rise of ideology, he has not provided the precise concepts 
with which we can think its emergence or its effects. In Reading Capital 
Althusser argues that ideology
"... bends to the interest of the times, hut without any apparent movement, 
being content to.reflect the historical changes which it is its mission 
to assimilate and master by some imperceptible modification of its 
peculiar internal relations .... It is the immobile motion which, as 
Hegel said of philosophy itself, reflects and expresses what happens in 
history without ever running ahead of its own time, since it is merely 
that time caught in the trap o ^ a  mirror reflection, precisely so that 
men wi'l 1 be caught in it too."
Again ideology is seen to "reflect" the social process and the agents of 
the process are trapped in the circularity of their time-bound vision.
The temporal fog of social life is the only sight for men caught in the 
vice-like grip of the ideology of their period. Althusser's general 
impression, therefore, is that ideology rises off social formations like 
steam off boiling water and it is consequently, in his conception, no 
use the humanists praising the God of Praxis since praxis merely 
reprodxices the clouded vision of a society's ideology. But there is some­
thing crucial in the above passage from Reading Capital that is an advance 
on the formulations of Por Marx. Let us look at the nature of this 12
1 1 . (1969) op- cit. p.144.
12. (1970) op. cit. p.142.
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advance in some detail.
For Marx contains an admixture of concepts of ideology. At 
first, when talking about theoretical ideology, Althusser declares that 
ideology has an "author", "a concrete individual", in truly Feuerbachian 
humanist styled At another point he proclaims vaguely, quoting The 
German Ideology, that "real history explains" the "formations", 
"deformations" and "restructurations" of ideology, and that ideology thus 
has no history.^- In the discussion of the levels of social practice he 
specifies the existence of "ideological practice" in conjunction with 
economic and political practice, urging us to take ideology "seriously 
as an existing practice", and then says that to recognize ideology as a
15practice is "an indispensable prior condition for any theory of ideology". 
This passage perhaps does not owe much to Feuerbachian humanism "but it 
certainly conflates ideology with 'ideological practice'. Althusser 
normally takes 'ideology' to be a form of consciousness and 'practice' to 
be a process of transformation of determinate raw material, through the 
agency of human labour and determinate means of production, into a 
social product. Thus when he talks of 'ideological practice' (he gives 
as examples: religion, politics, law, art) he is talking about that 
transformation process which has spontaneous thought as its object and 
instruments of production. Therefore to refer to ideology in itself as a 
practice is like defining coal as coal-mining or meat as butchery.
Ideology is the object and instrument of ideological practice but it does 
not constitute the practice itself - it merely is the dominant element 
of that practice. He continues through the book with this conilation, 
and at another point argues that ideology is "one of the basic practices 
essential to the existence of the social whole"^° Finally, later in the book 
v;e are left with another confusion involving a conflation. This time it 
is spontaneous ideology that is confused with reflected or theoretical 
ideology. Thus ideology is defined as
"... a system (with its own logic and rigour) of representations (images, 
myths, ideas or concepts, depending on the case) endowed with a historical 
existence and role within a given society." 134567
13. (1970) op. cit. p.142.
14. Ibid. p.S3,fn.43.
15. Ibid, p.167.
16. Ibid, p.191.
1 7. Ibid, p.231.
63
In earlier remarks on Hegel, Althusser had specified the possibility
of a theoretical ideology having a problematic and this later passage
simply resurrects the point^ However, despite this problem that he is
not offering a concept of ideology as a general social phenomenon but a
concept of'ideology in its theoretical form, this passage, like the one
IQreferenced previously, emphasizes the possibility of ideology as an 
important determinant of the social formation. Althusser has thus 
developed further than his earlier ’German Ideology formulations’ and, 
at this point, is "beginning to sec ideology as more than just an ’effect’, 
and rather as an element in social formations which has determining pov/cr, 
and which under certain economic conditions, may he the key element of a 
social formation.-
That is one useful development. There is, however, a second 
development of significance in Poi’ Harx. Following the passage quoted 
above, Althusser ventures:
"Without embarking on the problem of the relations between a science and 
its (ideological) past, we can s<?'r that ideology, as a system of 
representations, is distinguished from science in that in it the practico- 
social function is more i^gortant than the theoretical function 
(function as knowledge)."
Ignoring the ideology/science issue since it does not concern us here, 
it is clear that Althusser is alluding to a concept of the close links 
between ideology and social practice. The concept is forged by the sub­
sequent argument that ideology is "an organic part of every social total­
ity", which includes any future communist society. He continues to 
confuse spontaneity with theory in arguing that ideology only exists in 
"specific formations", but, most importantly, he advocates the view 
that ideology/ is largely unconscious and is "a matter of the lived 
relation between men and their world". Ideology is itself "the lived 
relation between men and the world". This would lead one to think that 
ideology was at the same time both a "structure" or "a system of rep­
resentations" and a "lived relation". Clearly ideology cannot be both 189203
18. Ibid. pp. 62, 63.
19.  oee f n .  l o .
20. (1969) OP* cit. P.231.
21. Ibid, p.232.
22. Ibid, p.233.
23. Ibid. pp. 233, 234.
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chicken and egg. In other words, ideology cannot he at the same time a 
thought-structure and a social relation, for the two are different things. 
Althusser does not recognise this confusion and inadvertently solves the 
problem by continuing as follows:
"Ideology, then, is the expression of the rela.tion between men and t h e i r  
'world', that is, the (overdetermined) unity of the real relation and 
the imaginary relation between them and their real conditions of exist­
ence.
Social ideology, then, in Althusser's furthest development in For narx, 
is a system of representations (largely unconscious) whose determinations 
are: (1) the relation between their agents (men) and the social conditions 
in which those agents exist, (2) the 'view' of that relation contained 
within the "consciousness" (again largely unconscious) of those agents.
As I have said,- Althusser need not argue that ideology is always 
found in "formations", "structures" or "systems". They are merely the 
forms it takes as 'humanism' (a theoretical, ideological formation), the 
object of Althusser's essay. With that reservation, we can say that 
Althusser has forged, albeit in highly indecisive fashion, a new concept 
of social ideology, a concept which breaks from the 'auteur' theory of 
his Peuerbachian formulations from The German Ideology and from the con­
fusions in For .'srx which argue that ideology is a practice. This new 
concept specifics social ideology, albeit unclearly and uncertainly, as: 
mental representations produced out of the unity of men's eocia.,1 relations 
and their images of those relations. Such a concept is obviously not 
satisfactory as a concept of ideology itself since it raises the problem: 
How car* ideology be part of the determinations that produce it? How can 
Ideology and Social Relations equal- Ideology? Thus, the concept is 
insufficient. Althusser's expression of it makes this more than clear:
"It i s  i n  this overdetermination of the real by the imaginary and of the 
imaginai?' by the real that ideology is active in principle, that it 
reinforces or modifies the relation between men and their conditions of 
existence, in the imaginary relation itself. It follows that-this action 
can never be purely instrumental; the man who would use an ideology 
purely as a means of action, as a tool, find that they have been caught 
by it, implicated by it, just when thev are using it and believe them­
selves to be absolute masters of it."2/;
23. Ibid, f t .233, 234. 
24- Ibid. p.23d.
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However, what we must, not lose sight of is the feet that in his efforts 
Althusser has emphasized the importance of ideology as a social phenomenon 
and has conceptually tied ideology to the social relations within which 
men live. This was an important development and the take-off point for 
the statements in Reading Capital.
2 r->In the passage from Reading Capital quoted earlier, Althusser 
makes a further advance. He conceived of ideology as "being closely and 
rigidly connected to social practice and that the rigidity of the connection 
forces ideology into amorphous, adaptive and flexible forms. Ideology 
is "the immobile motion" that reflects the events of history. It is 
"immobile" in that it never leaves its master's side. It is "motion" 
in that its form is adaptive and moulds itself to its ever-active 
master. How ca.n this be? How can ideology be immobile yet mobile? It
is because the master always has a servant otherwise he would not be
a master. Master and servant are two sides of the same relation. More­
over they interpenetrate. Their relationship" is dialectical. The 'master' 
is a determination of the servant and the servant is a determination of
the master. That is, the master is a part or aspect of the servant
and vice versa. Similarly: ideology is part of social practice not 
exterior to it as a superstructure. That is why ideology is mobile and 
immobile at the same time. It is always moving because of its immobility 
as an aspect of determination of social practice, one of whose other 
aspects is movement or action. Previous Marxist conceptions have often 
seen ideology as external to social practice, as 'superstructuro' 
separate from a 'base', as an image reflected in a mirror. Thus they 
have created the false problem of 'reflection'. What they have over­
looked constantly is that the image is an aspect or part of the mirror, 
that is, that the superstructure constantly inhabits the related social 
practices constituting the base. In other words, the base/superstructure, 
material conditions/thought dichotomies were fal.se as aspects of the 
social totality for the totality has no existence over and above its 
interrelated elements (social practices). Such distinctions only have 25
25. See fn. 12
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any concrete determination if they are considered as related aspects of 
the elements of the totality, as aspects of social practice. Only social 
practices can "be said to contain an infra- and super-structure and even 
then .it is metaphysical - the only concrete thing being the structure 
and elements of the practice concerned.
To recap, Althusser's formulations in Reading Capital contain, 
in unrecognized form, a key development: the concept of ideology as .an 
element of practice. Until now, orthodox Marxism has continuously 
failed to recognize this fact and has persisted in making the Positivist 
separation hetv:een materiality and ideology. What I have done is to 
"bring out a concept, latent in Althusser, which dramatically confronts 
the traditional formulations of orthodox Marxism and which demonstrates 
that the orthodox Marxist problem of 'reflection' is false and Positivist.
It is true that practice is a determination of ideology/, but it is also 
true, and this is my main point, that ideology is a determination of 
practice. This latter determination has been concealed from the Marxist 
problematic in its own metaphor of the 'reflection' of the economic 
infrastructure in the superstructure of ideology. Marx's term 'reflection' 
has been interpreted in Positivistic fashion to mean that the economy is 
the factor, external to the superstructure, which determines its forms 
and contents. 'Reflection' has not been interpreted in its full dialectical 
sense as a relation between interpenetrating opposites. Thus the correct 
Marxian position, that ideology only exists in practice and that practice 
only exists through ideology, has been ignored with inevitably cconomistic 
effects: ideology has become the plaything; of economic forces and its eff- 
ectivity has been lost to debates over the falling: rate of profit. It is 
little wonder that many activists continually think that the revolution 
is round the corner when their economism leads them to neglect racist, 
fascist,sexist and capitalist ideologies in the working classes. Political 
practice did of course teach great theorists such as Lenin, Lulracs and 
Gramsci that ideology could in fact be' a powerful reactionary/ force. 
Hopefully the present work will restore that practical fact to its true 
theoretical significance; a significance that has somehow never been fully 
realised.
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Althusser had only unconsciously produced this dialectical concept 
of social ideology in For Marx. In Reading Capital he threw a little more 
light on it hut at no time did he ever explicitly develop the concept in 
the text. For example, during his critique of Gramsci's notion that science 
is part of the superstructure, he states;
"Science can no more he ranged within the category 'superstructure' than 
can language, which as Stalin showed escapes it. To make science a 
superstructure is to think of it as one of those 'organic'ideologies 
which form such a close bfpc with the structure that they have the 
■same history as it does I" ' O'-.Y emphases.)
Here again he can only think the ideology-economy connection in terms 
of 'closeness* and the consequent lack of history on the part of 
ideology and not in terms of ideology's active presence as an aspect of 
practice. The nearest he gets to our concept, in Reading Capital, is 
during the discussion of legal and political social relations. Here it 
is pointed out that certain relations of production presuppose as a 
condition of their existence a certain type of law, politics and 
ideologyAlthusser elaborates the effects of the concept of the 
dialectics.! relation between production relations and superstructural 
relations, it means that:
"they (relations of production - C.S.) relate to the superstructural 
forms »-hey call for as so many conditions of their own existence. The 
relations of production cannot therefore he thought'in their concept 
while abstracting from their specific superstructural conditions of 
existence. To take only one example, it is quite clear that the analysis 
0I_ the buying and selling of labour power in which capitalist relations 
of production e^ist (the separation between the owners of the means of 
production °;i- the one hand and the wage—workers on the other), directly 
presupposes, x or =n understanding of its object, a consideration of the 
j ^ aL A ^ \-J^ t i o n s which establish the buyer (the capitalist) as 
much c„s i>r.e seller (the v.rage—labourer) as legal subjects — as well as 
a whole political and ideological superstructure which maintains and
a°míñor1 1 yno f° exp 2ol? e?• s eÇ'nI owners of p?dSÜètïoÂ?haStkes
the majority of the population producers of surplus-value. The whole 
superstructure of the society considered is thus implicit and present 
in a specific way in the relations of production, i.e. in the fixed 
structure of the distribution of means of production and economic 
functions between determinate categories of economic agents. 267
2 6 . (1 9 7 0 ) op. cit. p.1 3 3 .
27. Ibid, pp.177, I7 8 .
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Briefly, the point he is making about the social totality here is that 
the relations of production are present in the superstructure, and that 
the sup erst ructural relations are present in prod\iction: "the whole 
superstructure.... is thus implicit and present .... in the relations of 
production". This specification of a dialectical relation between the 
"structure" (economy) and the superstructure (law, politics and • 
ideological practice), dominated by the "structure", is the exact direct­
ion we reouire. Unfortunately, Althusser did not continue this discussion 
and develop its ramifications for the Marxist theory of ideology.
Basically, then, the concept of the ideology-social formation 
link as a connection "between externals is a false one. Ideology cannot 
be analystically linked with society as an external phenomenon. (Any 
attempted link between ideology and society presupposes that ideology 
is external to society.) Clearly that is a metaphysical, religious 
conception. Yet orthodox Marxism, in its misplaced, Positivist materialism, 
has ironically been guilty of propagating this mystical notion that 
ideology is an "effect" of the social formation. Paul Hirst, despite the 
value of his other comments, fell into this trap. Ideology, however, 
is not merely a thought-mirror of the social formation hut also an active 
asoect of social 'practice and hence an integral^determinant part of the 
social formation. However, at this juncture I must enter the caveat that 
the position I am developing here is not a humanist Marxist one.
• Ideology is part of practice - that is all I have said. I have not s'-id that 
this is the case because of the essentially and eternally creative nature of 
practice’s agents men. Ideology became an active part of practice when, 
through the development of their productive forces, the agents of animal or 
"instinctive" (Marx’s term) practice developed the scope of their 
interrelation and the means of communication, language. Once language had
• developed, ideology could be realised concretely in practice and it was only 
v/hen ideology materialised itself that it became a material part of practice: 
at that point instinctive labour became human, purposive and social. Men 
were not born ’essentially purposive’, that facility developed historically. 
Also the nature and effects of ideology will vary with the society, and the 
level and class nature of the practice considered. In some conjunctures, 
for example, the structure of the society may be such as to make ideology a 
minimally effective element in it, in others ideology may be very effective. 
Ifo doubt the latter conjunctures give rise to the impression that choice, 
puroose, creativity or human agency in general is the key element in social 
life. But that would be to take the transitional as eternal.
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'Reflection1, like all the other optical metaphors used, by Marx 
to describe the dialectical relation, is often adopted by Marxists as n 
one-sided notion incapable of comprehending the tvo-sided nature of 
any relation. Until now it has been the major obstacle in the development 
of the Marxist theory of ideology in that it helped to conceal the 
'intcriority' of ideology in the social formation. Althusser's failure 
to remove it in his major texts has enabled critics to level charges of 
•determinism' against him. Many complained (but rarely in writing) of 
his denial of the role of ideology and the consequent absence of some 
policy on the role of ideology in revolutionary political practice and 
an adequate theory of ideological domination. Prom my analysis, we can 
see that they found a weak spot - but most critics had no idea that they 
had done so. Althusser's position merely reinforced tendencies in 
humanism to support concepts of Praxis and Creativity. It did not encour­
age the solution of the problem of ideology in historical materialism.
It seems to be true that Althusser's failure in his major works to destroy 
the one-sided notion of 'reflection' in orthodox Marxism with its clearly 
Positivist cause-effect implications, has not helped the development of 
a Marxist theory of ideology.
To put the matter entirely straight and to be accurate about 
Althusser, he did make some further developments in the later essay
2 3Ideology and Ideological Strte Aruaratuses.  ^ This essay has not received 
as much attention from his critics in this country as have For Marx or 
Reading Capital. It is amazing but it is necessary to register the fact 
that both orthodox and humanist Marxists have failed to produce so much 
as an extended commentary on this later essay. To the best of my know- 
lcdge this essay has been widely read, but its implications have either 
not been grasped or they have been accepted uncritically. Given my task,
I am not going to engage in an exposition of a minute reading of the essay. 
What is necessary is to demonstrate the developments in the Marxist theory of 
ideology made by Althusser in this essay and to show their shortcomings.
At the least, this qualifies as one reading of this very important essay.
28. (1971) op. cit. pp.121-173.
"Ideology and. Ideological State Apparatuses"
My reading of Althusser's discourse so far has indicated that 
Althusser has not yet 'discovered' the concept of the integral existence 
of ideology in practice. He has produced it, .just as much as he has 
produced (hut, in this case, discovered as well) the concept of the 
integral existence of lav; in economic practice; hut he has not 'discovered' 
it. This precise absence is the key structuring mechanism in the essay 
considered now. The concept seems to appear in the essay hut, in fact, 
the terms Althusser uses are actually referring to another concept, the 
one he explicitly develops in the text. However, it is necessary to 
explicate my reading before commenting further.
In "Ideology and. Ideological State Apparatuses" Althusser is
attempting to put ideology back into orthodox Marxist theory. He notes
its woeful absence and reouires amends to be made; but amends which
escape the Positivist formulations of Marx and Engels in The Herman 
29Ideology. ''The way Althusser chooses to conduct the rescue operation is 
via the theory of the state. Ideology is inserted back into society - and 
that is a development in Marxism which all anti-Positivists can only 
celebrate, along with the defeat of the 'reflection' debate - but, through 
the state, and not through its proper channel, social practice. Althusser 
does eventually link ideology with practice hut that development contains 
an ideology connected to and produced by the state and hence ultimately 
the level of the economy. As a result his account is one-sided and 
Positivistic. This is illustrated by the fact that the ideology of the 
subordinate social classes is forgotten until the postscript. (His comments, 
• in fact, would make a lot more sense about law’ than ideology, since that must 
be dealt with through the concept of the state).
Althusser makes it clear from the beginning that he believes 
that the infrastructure/superstructure dichotomy is still valuable, 
although descriptive. What is of interest to him is to describe the 
relevance of the superstructure for the base or, as he puts it, "the 2930
i29. Ibid, pp.1/19, I50.
30. Ibid. pp. 129, 13C.
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functioning of the Superstructure and its mode of intervention in the 
Infrastructure".^  His basic argument is that this theoretical object must
be thought from the point of view of the reproduction of the relations of
32production. Tims ideology is an aspect of the reproduction process:
"... the reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction 
of its slcills, but also, at the same time, a reproduction of its submiss­
ion to the rules of the established order, i.e. a reproduction of sub­
mission to the ruling ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the
ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of
exploitation and repression, so that they, tqo, will provide for the 
domination of the ruling class 'in words'."’3'
How, of course, following classical Marxist theory, Althusser must turn 
to the state which is held to be the "machine" by which the ruling class
of a society maintains its power and economic position.And this is the
nexus for the réintroduction of ideology into the social formation. Ho 
argues that the view that the state is just a repressive institution is 
simplistic and purely "descriptive". State apparatuses have ideological 
as vieil as repressive functions but, most importanti/, Althusser form­
ulates the existence of Ideological State Apparatuses (iSAs) which appear 
as private institutions, e.g. the Church, the Media, the Schools, the 
Political Farties. These 'private' institutions arc part of the state 
because of their functions for the state in reproducing ruling class
power and they arc called 'ideological' because they function primarily 
3Sby ideology. J  The function of the ISAs is described by Althusser as 
follows, the are said to
"... largely seexvre the reproduction-specifically of the relations of ^  
production, behind a shield provided by the repressive"State apparatus."’
The ISAs can function like this because they are the strongholds of ruling 
class ideology. This ideology ensures a harmony between the various ISAs 
and between the ISAs and the repressive state apparatus. And, given 
this unity in ruling class ideology,the ISAs can have a reproductive 
function bece.use of the subjection of other classes to their ideology.
31. Ibid. p. 170. 35- Ibid. PP. 137,
32. Ibid. 131. 36. Ibid. p. 142.
33. Ibid. pp. 127, 128.
34. Ibid. p.131.
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This subjection is uncontented and the proletariat are the playthings 
of this multiple propaganda symphony orchestrated by ruling clans ideology^ 
Talking about education, Althusser argues:
"But it is by an apprenticeship in a variety of know-how wrapped up in 
the massive inculcation of the ideology of the ruling-class that the 
relations of production in a capitalist social formation, i.c. the 
relations of exploited to exploiters and exploiters to exploited, are 
largely reproduced"'''
The only time before the postscript that there is any suggestion that 
the ruling class cannot just ’implant' its ideology on the subordinate 
classes at will is when Althusser mentions in passing that the former 
ruling classes and the proletarians "occasionally disturb" the concert of 
subjection.
Thus, from our discussion of Althusser's developmentfrom 
For Piarx up to this point, we can see that Althusser has not really 
escaped from the one-sided concept of 'reflection' and the concept of 
the integral existence of ideology in social practices is absent. The 
economic structure gives state power to the ruling class who control 
the ISAs and transmit ("cram",) their ideology directly to the receivers, 
to the brains of the subordinates. Equipped with the right messages, 
the labour-power is fit for its role in the economy. Thus idoology is 
a reflection of the economic structure which travels via the state into 
the workers' brains. The concept can be diagrammatized as follows:
THE TRAVELS OF 
IDEOLOGY IN  THE 
PROCESS OF 
REPRODUCTION
State institutionsX
State power of 
ruling class
A
Economic base
Subordinate 
c la s s e s  
(notably the
proletariat)
It is as though the position of having state power enables the ruling
37. See ib id .  p. 
3 3. I b id ,  p.148.
1/|6 for examples of. Althusser's notion of easy subjection.
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class to bounce ideology off the state institutions into the subordinate 
classes just as a radio transmitter can bounce images off a satellite to ■ 
a receiver in another part of the globe. This is Althusser’s ’satellite 
concept’ of ideological transmission. It is. clearly highly Positivist 
and very similar in its mechanism to the concepts of cybernetics and 
information theories of mass communication.''"' V/hat is disturbing is that 
Althusser seems to be employing structural-functionalist thought to 
develop the Marxist theory of ideology; it does look as though this 
system-function has been ascribed to these institutions simply hcce.uso 
it appears to exist at the moment (because the French proletariat is not 
yet free from its domination by bourgeois thought). Certainly Althusser 
presents a very one-sided theory of ’ideological transmission’, up to 
this point.
It has been necessary to register these deficiencies strongly 
because otherwise they would be concealed by the stealth of Althusser's 
subsequent formulations. He continues by arguing, in line v.'ith the 
position outlined, that ideology is merely a "pale, empty and inverted 
reflection of real history" ' - thus taking the Marx of I84.6 at his VJord. 
But how do these "phantoms", as Marx called them, find their way so 
easily into the sensible heads of the masses? Firstly, Althusser says, 
the ISAs arc the realization of a "regional ideology" (c.g. religious, 
legal, ethical, aesthetic) in their constituent practices. Ho then makes 
a crucial statement:
"... an ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice or 
practices." 1
Remembering that the ISAs realize ruling class ideology, we can see 
that all ideology, bar those famous "occasional interruptions", is ruling 
class ideology. This is clearly a remarkable implication: remarkable for 
its one-sidedne s s £in d thus for its exclusion of the possibility of 
existence of working class ideologies supported by proletarian practices 
and institutions. He continues, now, by arguing that those people v:ho 
live in ideology participate in regularized, ritual practices, which are 
those of the ISAs. These s^^bjects, who are subjected to ideology, "derive"
39. See later, ch.3 on information thcorv
40. Ibid, p.151. ory*
41. Ibid, p.156.
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-their ideas from participation in the practices of the ISAs "because these 
ideas are inserted into those practices. Thus he implies two things;
1. There is no practice except within an Ideological State Apparatus;
2. That subjects participating in the practices of the ISAs are 
automatically doomed to ideological subjection.
To these implications vie must put some questions;
(a) Are there not practices outside the ISAs?
(b) Are the practices which Althusser defines as elements of the ISAs 
necessarily so? Is not the definition of the ISAs so wide that it leaves 
no space for any other kind of practice (functional for the ruling class 
or not)?
(c) How within this scheme of the territory of social practices can 
revolutionary, critical, liberal or mediated ('mixed') ideologies arise 
except from thin air? (This particular absence leaves a v?ido-open space 
for humanists to insert such ideologies into the scheme as the products 
of essential human creativity).
It is clear that the absent concept of the presence of ideology 
in practice and the present one-sided concept of the economic 'reflection' 
of ideology have produced a view of ideological domination vfhioh is one of 
transmission and implantation from above, and that, to enable his argument 
for the role of the state as the agent of ideological domination, Althusser 
has had to analytically deny any contradictions or practices which may 
give rise to non-ruling class ideologies. This is so far, then, a non- 
- dialectical- analysis of ideological domination, with highly Positivistic
underpinnings.
However we must recognize that Althusser does advance the prop­
osition that
42"...there is no practice except by and in an ideology ..."
As I have said, this does not mean that he has produced the concept of the 
integral nature of ideology in practice, at this stage. For what he is 
arguing is that all non-econonic practices belong to ideological State 
Apparatuses and therefore, since economic practices already have ruling 
class ideology inscribed in them, there cannot be any practice without 
ruling ideology. This is a different thing from saying that ideology is 
part of any social formation as an integral part of any 42
42. Ibid. p. 159*
V J
social practice - which is what I have been a r g u i n g . However, the 
terminology is the right terminology for my concept. Thus I am hound 
to say that Althusser has produced the terms of our concept hut not the 
concept itself. Or, in other words, ho has produced the correct concept 
hut it is part of a discourse from another problematic - that of posit­
ivist, Feuerbachian materialism - and hence exists in the text to support 
other propositions than the ones it should do.
He makes a second important proposition:
"... there is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects. " 43 4
This proposition expresses his subsequent description of the mechanism of 
intei’vention of ruling class ideology in the everyday practice of the ISAs. 
That mechanism is constituted by the dyad: (l) ideology "constitutes 
concrete individuals as subjects" and (2) concrete individuals are "sub­
jected to the Subject". And so the "duplicate mirror-structure of ideology" 
ensures :
" ... the mutual recognition of subjects and Subject, the subjects' 
recognition each other, and finally the subject's recognition of 
himself ... "
Althusser is arguing that "all ideology is centred" by the notion of the 
"absolute Subject" and. that, consequently, bearing in mind that everyone 
participates in the practice of the ISAs with its deadly effects, men 
live in "the trap of a mirror reflection" centred on themselves as 
s u b j e c t s .  Ideological domination of the masses by the ruling class is 
thus achieved through two mechanisms:
1. The involvement of men in the practices and ideology of the ISAs.
2. The recognition of themselves as subjects in ideology which is 
centred on the absolute power of the subject.
Men are caught in the spider's web of the ideology of the subject 
inscribed in the practices of the state's ubiquitous ideological apparatuses
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid, p.168.
" Result: caught in this quadruple system.of interpellation as subjects, 
of subjection to the subject, of universal recognition and’of absolute 
guarantee, the subjects ’work', they 'work by themselves' in the vast 
majority of cases, with the exception of the 'bad subjects' who on 
occasion provoke the.intervention of one of the detachments of the 
(repressive) State apparatus. But the vast majority of 'good' subjects 
WOrk all right 'all by themselves' i.e. by ideology (whose concrete 
forms are realized in the Ideological State Apparatuses). They are 
inserted into practices governed by the rituals of the ISAs."'1-’,
The above passage illustrates several elements of Althusser's discourse 
in this text. It demonstrates the one-sided nature of this concept of 
ideological domination thought the state and encapsulates its mechanism. 
It illustrates also that Althusser believes that the function of the 
process of domination is to reproduce the existing social relations of 
production.
All that remains now is to examine the remarkable postscript 
to the essay. But, before I turn to that, one thing can he salt . The 
Feuerbachian Positivist shell can he discarded and the concept that 
practice only exists in and by ideology can he acknowledged ns a corn ct 
one for Marxism, alongside its sister concept that ideolo,--/ only exists 
in and by practice. Ideology is inextricably and dialectically linked 
vrith social practice.
At the end of his essay Althusser adds a passago written ono 
year later. In it he mentions "several important unanswered problems", 
or, I would say, more honestly, he tries to correct two of his great 
mistakes. Firstly, he brings himself in line with Marx and states tint 
the reproduction of the relations of production is only realized within 
production and circulation process itself. Tims reminding himself of 
the fact that Ealihar had argued this point in Reading Capital*.
th
"The concept of reproduction is thus not only the concept of the 
'consistency* of the structure, but also the concent of the noco'^rv 
determination of the movement of production by the permanence of 
structure; it is the conoept of the permanence of that structure* <+*■ 
the concept of the permanence of the initial elements in the vorv ‘ 
functioning of the system, hence the concept of the necessary condition- 45
4 5 . Ibid. P-169• In my view, Althusser overestimo+or <* 
dominant ideology/. In every factory I have vc ?  \  1 ih° SUCOOSO of 
"work by themselves": they need considerable '■ ln.t! o v;°rk:rn do not 
they are going to produce any surplus value "iJporvinion and control if 
that Althusser underestimates the effect- of ^  iho othor hnnd I think 
piece-work) in persuading the workers to“v,fJr,.eCOnomic practices (e.g.
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of production, conditions which arc precisely not created bv 
what Marx calls the eternity of the mode of production: »This’ince 
reproduction or etemalizaticn of the labourer.-is the sine nu: non"‘nV 
capitalist production* (Capital Vol. 1 p.5 7 1 ." 40 — ---— 1
In other words, the dialectical concept, which Althusser and Balihar hod 
developed in Reading Capital, of the necessary conditions of oxistcnco of 
a mode of production had "been omitted in the essay on ideology. This was 
a key omission because it precluded the possibility of his determining 
the "mode of intervention" of ideology in the mode of production. Tho 
omission had left Althusser with a concept of the production process os 
simply a means of producing commodities and a concept of the 18 A a as a 
means for reproducing the relations of production of commodities. Sue}) 
a sociological 'pluralism* of course is alien to I'.arxian theory which 
locates the reproduction of the relations of production within the 
production sphere itself. If he had remembered his earlier notion (it 
seems I was right in concluding that it was very underdeveloped) he would 
have realized straight away that, of course, ideology, lav:, politics etc. 
all "intervene" directly in the mode of production and that therefore, 
their function in production is not an effect from without. That is, 
"intervene" is the wrong word and implies a Positivistic infrastructure/ 
superstructure notion. Instead we should say that.determinate political, 
legal ancl ideological relations are an aspect of (or, are inscribed in) 
the social practices of economic production, just as the social relations 
of production are inscribed in the political, legal and ideological 
practices of a social formation. The infrastructure/superstructure 
metaphor is just that, a metaphor, but it lived on in Althusser's discourse 
in his essay, even though he explicitly tackles the sense of the 
metaphor.
Having corrected this error, a door opens reminding him of tho 
class divisions within production and hence the class conflict necessarily 
involved in that sphere/ " 1 Once that is apparent the weighty importance 
of class conflict in ideology is felt:
"In fact, the State and its Apparatuses only have me-rvi™ r  
of view of the class struggle ensuring class 1 î TOm thc point
the conditions of exploitation and its reproduction 5 -hd garant eel ry-
class struggle without ante./mrl-i rvh olar.'-r- ' —U-fc- thorr' -1 >' HO
of the ruling" glass says resistance, GT-V saya class stru.le
ruled class. — ----cl£ 4678(7 .y emphase a) struggle of tho
46. (197°) op. cit. p.272.
4 7. (19 7 1) op. cit. p.1 7 1.
48. Ibid. pp. 17 1-172.
78
The use of the dialectical concept of the noce 
existence as the integral aspect of a mode of 
Althusser to return the sadly-neglectèd 'other 
- the side of oppositional, class ideologies, 
the installation of the ISAs and the dominance 
"guaranteeing" the reproduction of the classes 
tained hy class struggle within the ISAs.
ssary conditions of 
production has enabled 
side' to his exposition 
And ho now argues that 
of ruling class ideology 
is only enabled and main-
Further, Althusser makes an admission of his biggest error. 
In a convoluted last paragraph he agrees that:
"... ideologies are not 'born' in the ISAs but from the social classes 
at grips in the class struggle: from their conditions of existence, 
their practices, their experiences of the struggle, etc."^
So the record is finally put straight: ideologies are born in practices 
and, therefore, there are class ideologies based on class pivot;con 
which exist outside the practices of the ISAs. Importantly, the lynch n 
of my exposition is supported: ideolo y's existence in interior to tin- 
social formation - it exists as an integral element of social practiocs. 
Ideology is not an "effect" of the social formation but an element within 
it. Its place in the social formation lies in social practico and it 
is to that concept we must now turn.
The concept of social nractioe.
The investigation into the social determinations of ideology 
leads us to the conclusion that ideology is the immediate, 
spontaneous mode of consciousness which exists as an integral part oi 
social practice. All the time I have tried, to hold constant m  tho 
background the notion that the social formation is a totality of social 
practices interconnected by relations of dominance and subordination and 
that there are different levels of social practice, each carrying its own 
mode of existence. It is now necessary to outline the internal determin-
49. Ibid, p.173.
50. Althusser and Balibar (197C) op. cit. p .258
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•ations of social practice in general. This -La-v 0i.A .1S 1:3 also made necessary be-
cause of the dangers that occur when the concept of social practice ia 
brought into the arena. These dangers relate to 1hc possible reading of 
social practice as a concept which centres on the human subject. As 
Balibar has noted, it is too easy for the centring of practice on the hu­
man subject to occur.^ Such an event can lead to the reduction of 
• social practice to the 'chosen action' of its agents (which is how it 
appears to them). This tendency will hopefully be ¡voided.
¿acn practice in the social formation is relatively autonomous 
and must he analyzed according to its own nature. To enable any sue}', 
analysis, however, it is necessary to specify the concept of social 
practicc-in-itself which is to bo operative.
Each social practice has its own internal structure composed 
of elements and relations. As Althusser has defined it, and as I 
mentioned earlier, socin.1 practice is a process of transformation of 
determinate raw material, through the agency of human labour and specific 
means of production, into a social product. 51 These elements are linked by 
social relations. Practice is therefore conceived as a labour process or 
as production. The^internal determinations of social practice can be 
outlined as follows:
A The elements - (l) raw material,
(2) human agents,
(3) instruments of production.
B The relations between the elements.
It may be asked where ideology has got to, or whore it fits 
into this schema. This answer is simple. Ideology is the spontaneous 
mode Oi consciousness and, it must not be forgotten, is carried by 
human agents in their trains. Therefore ideology is part of social 
practice in that it is part of the human agency. I have said nothing 
about the offectivity of ideology within a practice but also I have said 
nothing about the effectivity of vry of the elements or relations within 
the social practice. The effectivity of ideology will be dependent 
on the importance of the human agency for the effectivity of a practice
50. Althusser and Balihar (1970) 0p. cit. p 2S3 ~~ '51. Ibid. p. 316. P*O0.
9*-* Iollo.;inf, Al bhusser cind Bslito,!* ( 1070  ^ _
1 U970) op- C1*t. PP. 165-181 and 2C9-225*
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in producing its object. In other words, some practices will involve the 
instruments of production as the dominant element, others may contain 
the dominance of the human agency and its constituent powers. All that 
is necessary here is to outline the concept of social practice, and that 
I have done.
Implicitly the concept of social practice employed here is an 
active rejection of any 'praxis'-type concepts which substitute the 
concept 'human action' in one way or another for 'social practice'.
Such concepts of 'human action' fail to recognise the importance 
of 'nature' in social practice: the raw material and instruments of 
production. They also fail to acknowledge the 'natural' aspect of the 
human agency as an Agency of historically determinate, biological capacity. 
These concepts only allow for choice, purposiveness, the ability 
to grant meaning etc. (what I would want to call the spontaneous mode 
of consciousness or ideology) as the determination of human movement, 
mhus the concept of 'human action' is idealistic and humanistic in t at the 
concrete determinations of social practice are reduced to an ontological 
abstraction: human nature in general (i.e. abstract 'purposiveness').
I reject such notions as purely ideological in the sense that they are 
products of spontaneous consciousness: in the everyday experience everts 
are rut down to people's choices and wills, thus if times are bad it is 
said that man has an 'evil' nature or that he has gone 'bad'. The concept 
of social practice breaks with the ideological humanism of the concept of 
'human action' since it sees two things: (l) that ail the elements to a 
process of production of a social object are determinant in some way, and 
(2) that the social relations of the production, the relations between the 
elements, arc- a condition of existence of the production process. The 
concept of creative human 'praxis' or 'action' tends either to relegate 
(what it calls) 'nature' to a position outside the process of production 
of the social object, or to reduce nature to an eternal position as the 
obedient object of ideal man's imagination. Furthermore, notions of 
1human action' seem to involve viewing the social relations of production 
as an after-effect of production.rather than as implicit in its existence - 
•man creatively produced an evil society which now constrains his creative 
potential* .
In conclusion, I 
internal determinations of 
social practioe-in-it s-soci 
social practice. Analysis
should just note that I have outlined the 
social practice but not the determinations of 
al-existence, the determinations of a specific 
of specific practices in particular historical
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periods and. societies is a task pertinent to another project - the 
empirical analysis of a specific social phenomenon. The present work is 
one in the realm of general conceptsin order to pave the way for empirical 
studies of particular social ideologies. Hence the specifically social 
nature of an historically determinate practice is an empirical matter 
outside the scope of this present work. However it should never "bo 
forgotten that, although general concepts are vital, they have no realized 
value until they are put into practice in concrete historical research.
Devjance and social rractice
Given these formule.tions on ideology and social practice, it 
is necessary to mention briefly some implications for the concept-of 
deviance. Deviance, we have said, is an ideological formation or an 
association of ideological elements which finds its unity in its social 
existence as an aspect of social practice. Prom our further remarks it 
is clear that deviance is an ideological product of social practice. A 
social practice may have several products - main ones and by-products - 
a deviation may be one of them. If deviance, then, is so tied to a 
social practice or a complex of social practices, it is clearly not 
simply a product of the thinking hrain. If we take the simple example 
of one deviation emerging out of one practice, wc could say that deviance 
is an outcome of, and a subsequent element in, a social process of 
production (of a social object) which involves men and nature in combin­
ation. Thus, deviation derives from the part played by the human agents 
in a specific production process of a social object taking place within 
specific social relations. It would be wrong to ray that a deviation has 
nothing to do with human agents because its connection with the elements 
of a social practice lies in the function of the human agency in its 
structure. But it would also be wrong to say that a deviation or an 
ideological formation was a product purely of men's thought. Without the 
developed biololcal capacity of the human agency the substance (thought- 
matter) of ideology could not exist but the form of the ideology (the 
deviation) is determined by the social relations within which these human 
agents work.
02
'Deviance in general, therefore, in a product of social practice 
and' an element within it: "both its states, as a 'product' and as an 'elem­
ent', existing within the human agency. It is determined in form by the 
social relations or structure of the practice that produced it. It is 
the necessary condition of existence, (as an ideological formation), of a 
particular social practice or complex of social practices. Thus deviance 
.becomes an internal part of any social practice which produces it. Of 
course, an ideological formation may enter and sustain a social practice 
which did not produ.ee it or it may be produced by a social practice yet 
not be compatible with it, resulting in its expulsion from its struoturo 
and possible displacement into another practice. Deviance should be 
understood as an ideological formation sustained in a social praotico.
It should not be seen as a, practice nor as simply a self-definition 
carried by a 'deviant subject'. Ilor is it a phenomenon that is created 
"purposively" by subjects as a reaction against social conditions. A 
deviance, as an ideological formation, may bo carried in the practice::, of 
the people who are treated 0.3 'deviants' - it may not be - this possibility 
is not a defining characteristic of deviance. If it docs so exist then 
it may be 'activated' by the nature and consequences of the social practices 
engaged in by those people. Host importantly, we should realize that it 
is not a case of deviants creating deviance but of deviance being a 
necessary condition for the existence of deviants. Thus it can r.nt be 
the 'deviants' that are of primary interest to socia.1 scientists who 
want to continue work in this field but rather the emergence a-id sustenance 
of deviant ideological formations within the structures of social practices. 
Deviance is a quality of the social structure, not of "the act" as the 
'new criminologists'would have it. Deviance is a form of ideology throvm 
: Up -by the structure of social practice. Therefore, if vie wish to under­
stand deviance and its changing forms of existence and appearance, we must 
study the historical movement of the structures of specific social praoticoc
PART TWO
READING IDNOLOGI
84
3 co: :T ANALYSIS: PRAGMATIC A'ID SPECULATIVE
Introduction
From a specification of the concept of ideology and of its 
place in social formations I shall now move on to the development of a 
theory of reading ideology in social discourses. This theoretical work 
is vital. I cannot move immediately from a concept of ideology to a 
reading of ideology for that would leave a gap in my theoretical discourse 
which would he prey to ideology, in the form, of the 'connonscr.se', every- 
dav-idcological notion of 'reading'. Without anticipating what comes 
ahead, I shall just say that 'reading* is usually taken as simply a 
physical act that is obvious in the simplicity of its accomplishment - 
like reading a newspaper over breakfast in the hajsy clouds of the early 
morning. But this ’obvious’ mode of reading is spontaneous and bathed 
in everyday ideology - this must be so from our conclusions about ideology 
in the previous chapters.. Now it may well be true that my ideological 
reading of the press, like that of many others, may well be a radical or 
critical one which involves certain rules regulating who and what is
believed and which tries to extract 'the facts' from propaganda. Ac
such the presentation of a series of such readings may enlighten or 
affirm the everyday ideological readings of other news consumers - or it 
may not. But that is all that could be accomplished by such a subjective, 
ideological reading: its only value would be at the level of the politico- 
ideological struggle with the ruling class and its agents for the minds 
of the people. Clearly this is not irrelevant and. a task that can and 
must he continued hy Marxist militants every day. The first, semiological, 
reading (of press discourse) that I did (described in chapter 5) could 
he used adequately for such purposes. However, after completion of this
reading, something continually worried me about the subjectivity of
ideological readings and the question arose: could one have an objective 
reading of ideology as well as a subjective one? The rest of this text
85
is devoted to the task of discovering the outlines of an objective mode
of reading ideology.
What follows in this chapter and the following three is an 
exposition of the investigations involved in the process of achieving 
the object of the construction of a theory of the objective reading of 
ideology. The exposition is largely devoted to notes, commentaries and 
critioues on materials which are either directly about reading ideology 
or which present a reading of press reports of 'political demonstrations'. 
Within this section I include in chapter 5 Qn exposition and critiqun of 
the semiological reading that I accomplished in 1973» I must acknowledge 
that these four chapters do not present treatments of all theories and 
methods of reading ideolo y. For example, there is nothing said about 
Lukács*s work on the novel or Goldmann's 'sociology of literature' or 
the work of the Frankfurt Marxists. Ilor is there any consideration of 
the ethnomethodologists' conversational analysis as exemplified in the 
vork of Sacks, Schegloff and i’oerman. I think that those omissions arc 
excusable on the grounds that I was not attempting to review the field 
but to accomplish the urgently required task of constructing a theory of 
the objective reading of ideology. Therefore, although it was necessary 
to examine many existing materials from other theoretical positions which 
specified modes of reading ideology, it was not necessary to road every­
thing in the original. The important thing to do v;a.s to isolate the main 
problematics in the reading of ideology and identify their weaknesses. 
These problematics cut across a number of different theoretical and pol­
itical positions. From the critique of these problematics I developed a 
theory of the objective reading of ideology which corresponds to the 
Marxian theory of ideology.
My 'second-hand' readings of Lulcs.cs and Goldrnann led to iho 
provisional position that their work is Hegelian and idealistic in found­
ing itself on the view that ideological discourses are the representations 
of a class 'world-view'. This is tautologous and the tautology is 
symptomatic of an absent adequate theory of ideology. The work of the 
Frankfurt Marxists, for example Adorno and Marcuse, seems to suffer from 
the same defect, only in this instance the effect is pure speculation 
about the relations between superstructural forms and the social formation 
And as for ethnornethodological readings they are very similar to semiolog­
ical readings in that they take a text and search Cor its intrinsic
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connotations, taken-for-granted meanings etc.. I think it is fair to 
say that the works commented on in the next four charters contain all 
the defects of the works ignored. The speculative-critical readings of 
radical deviancy theorists echo the readings of Lukács, Adorno and 
Habermas. The structuralist and semiologicnl readings coho those of 
ethnomethodology. So, all in all, I feel that these chapters do tackle 
the central issues head on even if they ignore some of the exponents of 
the positions on those issues. It must bo borne in mind throughout, if 
the reader feels that I have 'short-changed' some of the materials dealt 
with, that the object is to construct a theory of the objective reading 
of' ideology for karxism and not to create a scholastically-comprohonnivo 
review of the minutiae of the field.
There are three questions which guide the discourse in these 
four chapters. They all flow from the concepts developed ro far:
(1) Hoy: does the problematic of reading ideology in question discern 
the absence or presence of ideology in discursive materials? That is, 
what arc its methods?
(2) ’./hat does the problematic see as the nature of any absence or 
presence of ideology in discursive materials? That is, how door: it 
think the mode of existence of ideology in discourse?
(3) What does the problematic under consideration specify as the grounds 
on which the analyst can read the ideology in the discourse? That is, 
how does it justify its readings?
These ouestions should enable us to drav: out the deficiencies of the 
theories of reading ideology examined. They vrill enable us to explore the 
whole question of reading ideology. To repeat again: this theoretical work 
is vital since our practice must be an application of our theory and since 
there are no privileges (c.g. because of a spirit of militancy or 
congenital Marxism) or guarantees for that connection - the mode of 
practice must be produced in theory before it can be consciously realised.
The particular problematic which is the object of this chapter 
is that which takes the content of ideological discourse as its object. 
This may seem a peculiar thing to say since one might think that all 
problematics of reading ideology took the content as their object.
However that is not so. As vie shall see in chapters 5 and 6 some 
problematics take the form of the content as their object. This distinct­
ion between form and content separates the modes of reading dealt with in 
this chapter and those in the following two chapters. All the modes of
reading dealt with in this chapter are variants of tho problematic of the 
content and those of chapters A, 5 and 6 are variants of the problematic 
of the form. Form and content are the two sides of discursive material 
and all discourse-analysts have concentrated on ono side at the expense of 
the other. I'-j intention in these four chapters is to briny out the 
consequent ’weaknesses of each one-sided focus. Thus my critique in this 
chapter uri 11 demonstrate the absence of a theory of form in content analyst 
and, in the next three chapters, the absence of a theory of content in 
the analysis of form. Both my critiques will attempt to spell out the 
ramifications and consequences of these deficiencies and to make soiao 
necessary developments toward a Marxist theory of reading ideological 
discourse. These* developments, of course, will contain an appreciation 
of the fact that ideological discourse is two-sided.
«7
Content Analysis - a case of pro'-mat ic emuirici rn
Berelson, in a well-knovm passage, defines content analysis '-3
follows:
"Content analysis is a resesrch technique for the objective, systematic 
and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication."
The "technique" is said to involve the invention of a set of analytic 
categories which should be applicable without any problem of interpret: tion 
(this is said to constitute its 'objectivity') and which can be used on 
the v.hole of the analysed item (c.g. a news report) to produce re: ults of 
general application (this constitutes its 'syetematioity'). Once the 
categories have been created, the kc-' operation in content analysis takes 
daces the quantification of "the extent to which the analytic categories 
anuerr in thy content"7 If we investigate the definitions of the tormc 
and look closely at the assumptions behind and inscribed in the "technique" 
vie shall find that a theory of ideology and its rcadin predicates this 
ideological practice of taking appearances as reality and confirming the 
fact by counting their extent. 1
1 . "Content, analysis in communication ret poh" in M. Berelson and M. 
Janov.it z deader in Public Opinion and Communication (Ï966 ¿lew fork:
7? n> n  Placee* ^  OFree Press) p.263 
2. Ibid.
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Content analysis, argues Berolson, is concerned with what is
communicated., not the intentions of the communicator'.’ So, what is the
object of content analysis? According to Pcrclson, the answer is: a body
of meanings. But, apparently, not all meanings are relevant. Only
those meanings which are shored between the communicator, his audionco
and the analyst are to be investigated. Content analysis concerns itself
with "denotive" rather than "conr.ota.tive" materials, with the as, acts of
the text which are part of a "common univorse of discourse"^ But what
are the grounds for this supposed distinction between denotative and
connotative communications? Bcrelson replies that communications can be
placed on a continuum of universal comprehensibility. At one on'1 we find
denotative materials which are understood by all, and, at the other,
connotative materials intelligible to some groups or individuals but not
5to others, and there are various gradations in botween. Only denotative 
materials should be dealt with using contest analysis: ■ . , oven then, 
the quantification of this supposed body of mcar.i’ s should only take 
place when the frequency of occurrence is thought to bo "an important 
factor in the communication process".
. What is to bo deduced from the findings of the count? BoroIcon 
declared that content analysis was a "technique" to enable "description" 
and did"not say anything about its explanatory value, no nothin is to 
be deduced, but wait! It appears that the 'knowledge' of tho denotative 
content can legitimately support inferences about tho intentions of the 
communicators I But Bore Ison had. forewarned us that he was only interes­
ted in the "what?" of communication, not the "why?", on tho grounds that 
any content analysis which took its object as the motives' and intentions 
of the communicator had "low validity" (without "direct data" on the 
communicators), "low reliability" (owing to the likelihood of inter- 
coder differences in interpretation) and "circularity" ^deducing 'cause' 
from 'effect' would be followed by inducing 'effect' from 'caune'J.^
3. 1 bid. p. 26b .
4. 1 bid. pp.b64—265
p. 1 bid.
6. Ibid. p. Bod.
7. Ibid. pp.262-263
From this contradiction I conclude that content analysis is not simply 
a 'neutral' "technique" but a device for producine and implementine a 
particular, practically useful 'knovilcdge' about communicators' consciousness 
where the analyst cannot or docs not wish to study it directly. The real 
object of the 'knowledge' involved in this ideological practice is not 
the "manifest content" o f the communication but the 'consciousness of 
the communicator'. It is thus an implicit notion in the practice of 
content analysis that 'communication' is achieved by and through an 
individual human subject and that what ho or she says Ì3 a simple out­
come of his or hfer consciousness. To illustrate the strength of my 
critical explication, let me note BoreIson’s words:
"Content analysis is often done to reveal the purposes, motives, and 
other characteristics of the communicators as they are (presumably) 
'reflected' in the content ..."
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Having drawn out the nature of the assumption or ideology involved 
in the practice of content analysis, the next task is to examine the r«-Jr ' ion 
between the ideology (the "assumption") and the action involved in the 
practice. My main thesis here is that this relation involves a severe 
contradiction, which in many writings is often antagonistic. Fundamentally, 
content analysis is an ideological practice whoso action is in contradiction 
with the object of its corresponding ideology. IIhy is this so? Because:
8. This conclusion is supported by the fact that contest analysis devel­
oped rapidly in Jorld ’.Jar II and in the U.3. . in the McCarthy period 
and by the fact that many of the studies using content analysis attempt 
to demonstrate to the communication-receivers that the message is 'biased' 
and that the communicators intend to deceive the receivers. In other 
words the social conjuncture of its development required an apparently 
scientific method which enabled the legitimacy and the transmission of 
the message: 'Take no notice of them. They aro not objective. They are 
trying to subvert you." As Lasswell noted:
" . . .  i t  may be pointed out that quantitative ways of describing attention 
may serve many practical, as well an scientific, purposes. Anticipatin'” 
the enemy is one of the most crucial and tantalising problems in the 
conduct of war. The intelligence branch of every staff or operations 
agency is matching wits with the enemy. The job is to out-guars t a enemy, 
to foretell his military, diplomatic, economic and propaganda■moves be­
fore he makes them, and. to estimate where attach would do him the noat 
harm. A principal source of information in what the 
his media of communication." 
and Janowitz ( i 9 6 0 )  op. cit. p.253.
9 . Op. cit. p.253.
enemy disseminates in
II. Lasswell "’..'by be guant ititi ve?" in Berci son
the action only becomes 'technically' feasible on the condition that it 
is directed towards a "shared universe of discourse", and, therefore, its 
products can only tell' its practitioners somethin# about the nature of 
that "universe of discourse", they can provide no information about the 
"purposes, motives and other characteristics of the communicators".
The necessary object of the action of content analysis is denotative 
discourse, but the necessary object of the ideolo y of content analysisIQis the communicator1s consciousness. The research notion of the practice 
of content analysis gives a knowledge of an object different to the 
object of its implicit ideology!
Hoviever I do not think that we can leave the natter thoro.
The contradiction between the object of the 'communications theory' and 
the object of the action or method of the ideological practice of content 
analysis has as a. necessary condition of its orl stereo the concept o" 
the si-~nificanco of a denotative meaning. This concept is tN  site of 
the expression of that contradiction inasmuch as its function is to mediate 
between its opposing components. For how can one use a method aimed at 
denotative meanings to produce a knowledge of the communicator's conscious­
ness unless the repetition of denotative meanings is thought to signify 
something about that consciousness? Thus the notion of the significance 
of repeated denotative materials lies in dialectical relation to the. 
contradiction between the object of the action and the object of the 
ideology in which it operates. The contradictory relation between the 
method end its ideology involves the concept of the significance of 
repetition as the vital cohesive function which enables that relation to 
continue: that is why the quantitative aspect of content analysis is scon 
bv commentators as its most distinctive feature - this aspect _i_s in f: ot 
crucial to the coherence of the practice. 10
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10. Whether the ideological practice is adequate to its political funct­
ion of "detecting political propaganda" (as Lasswell puts'"it’ (i960) op. 
cit. p.254) is another matter. At the political levol of the social 
formation, power is more important than internal logic. The product: of 
the practice can be declared scientific, and used to support the theory 
that they reflect the consciousness of the communicator's, rim ly by fiat 
from a position cf power. Thus it is that "propag Md.a" is "detected" 
from the findings of a method which can only produce knowledge about the 
frequency of appearance of pieces of denotative discours: . In fact tl on, 
the detection o [ propaganda disguises the production of propaganda: :• 
nice piece of ideological inversion.
Vie can no;: deal with the questions posed in our introduction.
The absence or presence of ideology for content analysis, as v;e have 
seen, lies in the consciousness of the communicator, and the frequency 
or omission of certain .kinds of denotative category is taken to sign­
ify the presence or absence of some kind of ideological consciousness 
in the communicator! 1 In consequence the absence or presence of an 
ideology is detected in content analysis by the counting (or estimation 
of Quantitative extent) of the occurrence of these denotative categories - 
a procedure justified for the analyst by the alleged shared, universal 
nature of denotative signification.
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Having laid bare the main aspects and interrelations constituting 
the structure of the practice, it is possible to make a critique of content 
analysis. The central argument must be the nonsensicality of the key 
notion of the significance of repetition. However much a message is 
repeated, if the receiver does not know what it means then it ic not 
communicated to him. Repetition itself is insignificant (literally). 
Significance, however, i_s significant and if repeated would undoubtedly 
raise some kind of attention from its receiver. It is not the signific­
ance of repetition that is important but rather the repetition of sign­
ificance. In which case the first question to answer concerns signific­
ance and perhaps then there can be some counting. But content analysis 
has no theory of significance. It merely assumes the significant exist­
ence (or existence—as—significance) oi what it counts. It may be count­
ing illusions or a fragmentary part of a real significance, but without 
a theory of significance it would not know; its concept of the signif­
icance of repetition wives it no knowledge of the significance of what 
is being repeated. The absence of a theory of signs, signification and 
significance renders content analysis absurd because its key concept is 
left unsupported and that concept gives it no knowledge of its avowed 
object, the content! The concept that holds content analysis together,
11. Whether ideolo ;y is 
'unwitting bias') varies 
theory* employed in the
conscious (e.g.
with the versi 
analysis.
•prejudice' 
on or ■variant
) or unconscious (c 
of 'communications
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-the significance of repetition, is in itself a nonsense. In fact, there­
fore, 'content analysis' is an incorrect label: 'repetition speculation' 
would he more accurate, since its practitioners are merely speculating 
about the significance of repetition.
Aaron Cicourel arrives at the same criticism from a different 
theoretical perspective:
"any field researcher is confronted with the task of deciding how mean­
ings are assigned to events. But in content analysis the project cannot 
get off the ground without some preliminary specification of the ling­
uistic problems inyqlved and of the cultural definitions presupposed 
in each ‘analysis." "-
Cicourel agrees that a theory/ of s 
ourel's critique is immersed in a 
which, involves a view of 'society'
igns is reouired}^ Unfortunately Cic-14"differential" concept of culture; 
or 'culture' as the product of the empir­
ical interaction of a mass of psyches. Consequently ho is more concerned to 
know about the definitions of the categories in content analysis than 
the logic of counting their repetition:
, ,v ' . ; I
"Since the content analyst is dealing exclusively in meanings of verbal 
communications, the categories used obviously presuppose rules which 
define the provinces of meanings under which elements in communication 
are to be assumed. The assumption that a quantitative description of 
communication content in terms of the frequency of occurrence of some 
defined characteristics is possible requires that the categories employed 
stand in some specifiable correspondence with the characteristics and 
that equivalence classes exist among the characteristics thereby permit­
ting counting to.take place. But Berelson does not explicate the theoret­
ical assumptions and methodological procedures for generating equivalence 
classes."
Similarly Cicourel is more concerned with the "normative rules governing
communicator, audience and analyst interpretations of the meanings of
one another's communications"^than the social relations governing the
production and consumption of mass messages which structure the norm-
17ative rules of interpretation held by communicators and receivers.
12. A.V. Cicourel Method and '"cagurement in Sociolory (1964 ft.Y. 
p. 150. _ '
1 3» Ioid. p. 1 p 9 •
Free Press)
14. Zygmunt Bauman's name
1 5. Op. cit. p.150.
16. Ibid, p.151.
1 7. It is doubtful, in my 
represent valid theoretic
for it. See Bauman (1973) op
view, wnether 'communicator' 
al concepts ih'any case.
• C J. c
and '
. ch.l, esp.; p.l' l~  
audience'
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My second, more peripheral, criticism of content analysis i3 
short and simple. It is an ideological practice containing empiricist 
thought. The analytic categories, -which it employs as elements of 
significance worth counting, are said to he intrinsic to the material, 
yet they are really the practical arm of the undeveloped concept of 
’denotation*. Content analysis holds that its concept of denotation is 
hy nature at one with, or in correspondence to, the real object, the 
discursive material and its categories, when, I would suggest, the concept 
is in fact an element of the structure of content analysis's ideology, 
'communications theory', which holds ideology, or connotative significance, 
to he a distorted, sectional discourse or a perversion of the truth. This 
'communication theory' claims that what is denotative or universal, and 
what is connotative or sectional ideology, is obvious or pre-given to the 
naked eye. No justification is ever given for this claim: an insidious 
one, too, since it enables its proponents to convert their ideological 
assumptions into 'the true meaning' of discourse and those of their 
opponents into partial and disputable interpretations of that 'true meaning'. 
The concept of denotation becomes particularly insidious when operational 
in a research practice which is commonly granted scientific status and is 
effected forgetful of its unclarified, undeveloped, theoretical support 
and possible origin in the political conjuncture of the Gold War. The 
'truth' (sic) of the theory (that is, its concepts of denotation and 
ideology) becomes transformed into 'neutral', operational procedure and the 
analytic categories are thus selected from the discursive material as 
significant, denotative units. Vihat begins as a vague concept of ideology 
as a distortion of truth or genuine discourse finally ends its life'as a 
method of arbitrary selection. The ideology inscribed in the practice of 
content analysis thus transforms itself into the method of category-selection 
and disappears, so enabling the conclusion that the method or practice is 
"objective" or "scientific". Clearly with an unclarified notion of 
significance, or denotative discourse, the 'method' is arbitrary and 
unsystematic, and could not be anything else. Therefore, we can conclude 
that content analysis is based on empiricist thinking which provides that 
the 'truth' is self-evident and visible - a provision which conceals the 
operation of its own spontaneous concept of ideology.
This brings us right back to Berelson's definition of content 
analysis as a "research technique". He can see it as such since its 
corresponding ideology of ideology disappears in its practice which, 
therefore, renders that consequent practice a simple natter of efficac­
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ious technique and arduous method. Content analysis can thus he presented 
as a scientific, neutral, objective, technical device for the analysis of 
content when in fact it is a ritualized ideological practice, based on a 
contradictory and unclarified structure of ideas, logically only enabling 
the description of repetition. Thus grasped as 'a technique for studying 
content', content analysis can act as a shield behind which the real 
activity of slandering the invented motives of the invented enemy can
18proceed. Content analysis is social science's Cold War methodology.
The third criticism is that content analysis is a necessary 
condition of existence of a 'communications theory' and therefore reflects 
the weaknesses of 'communications theory'. It is the peculiarity of 
'communications' theories that they are theories of 'communication', that 
is, that they attempt to attain a knowledge of 'communication'. The 
concept of 'communication' refers to a process whereby one human being 
emits a message which is received and comprehended in its (or some other) 
meaning by another human being. Given that reference point, it is obvious 
that the key aspect of 'communication'■is that it involves 'meaning* as 
a central element. 'Communication' is thus purely an interpersonal, 
interactional process where meaning is transmitted, negotiated, or modif­
ied: meaning3^are held to be created and affirmed by reciprocal, conscious, 
interpretive subjects. And this is the whole problem. As a consequence 
of the structure of 'communications' theory, the question of ideology- 
transmission is reduced to the question of cor^cious/uncoii^cious bias by the 
'communicating' subjects and, therefore, to the identification of frequent 
themes whiph "reflect" that bias. I would prefer a view which held that 
the transmission of a particular ideology is an effect of the structure 
of the production process involved and the historically developed location 
of that structure in the totality of the social formation; and that the 
people carrying out this production are material, subjective elements in 
the structure of production. The 'communicators'' exact role in the 
process of production is specified by the structure of that production. 
This is not to say that the people involved are irrelevant machines, far 
from it. It is to say that they do have an important location in the 
process in that they carry' ccnscious/unconscdous ideology, but that the 8
l8. For examples of this see N.Leites and H.D.Lasswell The Language of 
Politics (1940 New York: St-ewart) and the titles in the bibliography of 
Berelson and Janowitz (1966) op. cit..
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precise form and effectivity of the ideologies they employ in the process 
of production is determined by the mode of production and its place in 
the social formation. Hence, in my view, 'bias* and its alleged quant­
itive indicators are merely superficial points of focus: more consequent­
ial and fundamental are social relations (which produce particular forms 
of ideology and consequent ’biases') and hierachies of class power 
(which govern the effectivity of particular ideologies).
Content analysis is deficient as an operational research pract­
ice since it involves a communications theory which sees ideology as the 
product of the motivated human consciousness. The practical consequences 
of this theory for the method of content analysis are: (l) the strict 
limitation of the practice to the counting of denotative materials, 
because it is held that the majority share those meanings as rational 
human subjects in reciprocal interaction, and (2) the practice becomes 
a device for producing data about the communicator's consciousness when, 
as vie have seen, it is only a device for telling us about repetitions.
The problem with the view of ideological discourse as the product of 
human consciousness is the fact that all this view declares is that a 
person's beliefs as discerned in the text are a product of a person's 
beliefs. Ideology human consciousness for communications theory 
(whether it is seen as all forms of consciousness or just certain 
particular forms); therefore it cannot be its own product. Again we find 
ourselves back to an earlier point: content analysis has no theory of 
signs or significance. It merely asserts 'signification' and 'symbol' 
as existing bits of reality. This absence of a developed theory of the 
sign constitutes its most damaging deficiency. For unless a theory of 
significance exists it is impossible to have a rational method for the 
analysis of signs. When the impossible is attempted, as one would expect, 
the result is an irrational method based on an everyday or commonsense 
ideology of ideology where the socially significant is an asocial product 
of the peculiarity of the individual psyche. And, alongside the homo 
economicus of political economy and homo sapiens of social anthropology, 
emerges homo significans of communications theory. He is ultimately the 
hidden hero and creator in content analysis: the human essence (albeit 
in its evil, demonic.form) becomes the ultimate source of ideology.
Content analysis exists in a theoretical vacuum created by the 
absence of a theory of significance. Hence we must look elsewhere to 
discover a theoretically valid method for the reading of ideology. But 
before we do that, let us illustrate our theoretical critiqvie with a 
brief look at the employment of content analysis in a major sociological
research project dealing, inter alia, with the press signification of 
a political demonstration.
Halloran, Elliott and Eurdock in Demonstrations and Communicat-
19 — — ~ — 1---ion provide an illustration of a sophisticated usage of content analysis.
Their object is the "inferential structure" employed unconsciously by
’media men' in making news. This "inferential structure" exists in
the minds of newsmen but not at the conscious level; it is seen as an
21"underlying frame of mind":
"the development of an 'inferential structure' is not the development of 
a pro or con bias but is a process of simplification and interpretation 
which structures the meaning given to the story around its original news 
value" . * 2012 23
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Consequently, their view of the "limited" interpretation of the 1968 
Grosvenor Square demonstration by the press and T.V. in the U.K. was that 
it was an effect of the communicators' consciousness, as it was externally 
determined by sociological factors, notably "professional socialization":
"However, the point has been made and enough has been 3aid to indicate 
that the selection and presentation of news is not simply a function of 
conscious attitudes and deliberate policies. It springs from an under­
lying frame of mind which itself is related to occupational and instit­
utional arrangements." ^
19* (1970 Harmondsworth: Penguin Books). This text can be used to exemp­
lify content analysis since the method is used. However it must be noted 
that Halloran et al. make several sociological developments from the basic 
communications theory implicit in the method. However these developments 
in no way reverse or modify the subjectivist core of the theory of comm­
unication implicit in the practice of content analysis. They merely build 
an edifice of sociological determinism upon it.
20. The term "inferential structure" was coined by Lang and Lang. See 
Halloran et al. (1970) op. cit. p.215.
21. J.Galtung's term. Quoted in Halloran et al. (1970) op. cit. p.26.
22. Halloran et al. (1970) op. cit. pp.215-216.
23. ibid. p.3l8. The concept of linear causation is clearly effected 
here. Elsewhere they divulge the Original Sin: professional socialization 
(pp.88-89). Professional socialization is the main "occupational" 
arrangement which causes men to transmit a bias of the truth or an ideol­
ogy. This is a sociological version of homo significans: his evil was 
learned in his social interaction. When Halloran et al. refer to "struct­
ure" or to "occupational and institutional arrangements" they are referring 
only to relations between men, that is, conscious, signifying subjects - 
not to relations between men and nature. See the discussion la-ter on
(pp. 332-342) for a theorisation of the emergence of »news values’ out of 
particular social relations which places ’news» ideologies within their 
specific production context.
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"The point- is that faced with a gap "between what they knew about events 
in an area and what was necessary for a complete interpretation, there 
appears to have "been a tendency for newsmen to accept the interpretation 
which was in line with their pre-conceptions. This emphasized features 
of the event relevant to the story’s main news angle.
The inferential structure of the communicators takes the form of shared 
"news angles" or "news values" and these angles structure the content.
From here the task of our analysts is to "identify" the "relevant" news
angles and transform them into coding categories for a quantitative
25analysis. In this way they can count the "unwitting bias" of the
'¿G 27communicators. This process is objective, has "precision" and
provides a "partial explanation" "of the way in which various patterns of
28coverage developed".^ The rest of the explanation of the coverage is
29provided for by an analysis of the "multiplicity of choices and decisions" 
(my•emphases) which constitute the organisation of the mass media. Thus 
the whole explanation of the news presentation ultimately rests on the 
human consciousness: men make decisions, have attitudes, carry unconscious 
biases. A typical communications theory is involved here: ideology in 
the news is caused by human subjectivity which, in this case, is evil 
because of the hierarchy of intersubjective relations involved in news 
organizations and its relation to the whole national hierarchy of inter- 
subjective relations.
Content analysis is used to count the effects of the 'unconscious 
framework'. Its use here is qualified in the usual way:
"Ihie to the restrictions imposed by the techniques available, the content 
analysis deals only with those aspects of the coverage which can be 
systematically identified and measured."''
From Berelson we could assume that the restrictions limit usage to denot­
ative materials - materials that rate high on the alleged 'continuum of 
relative comprehensibility'. Halloran et al, in order"to maintain a 245678*30
24. Ihid. p. 178.
25. Ibid. esp. pp. 92-96.
26. Ibid. p. 96 ( implicit ).-.
27. Ibid. p. 92.
28. Ibid. p. 125.
29- Ibid. Again we see an example of 'structure' as a hierarchy of human 
views ana intersubjective relations: relations of ownership and control 
over the means of production are absent.
30. Ibid. p. 125.
balance between precision and. insight",^1 are more ambitious and. attempt
to analyse the denotative system of a particular group. Their coding
categories are based on the alleged importance of the two universally-
■joshared news angles of »negativity' and 'personality' as they are applic­
able to the "pre-event" coverage. So the 'denotative system' used here, 
therefore, is one allegedly shared by a particular group of people, 
journalists. As in classical content analysis, the object of enquiry i3 
said to be content that can be "systematically identified and measured". 
These two particular angles were suggested by Galtung and Huge, in an 
oft-quoted article,^to be likely characteristics of a story that became 
news. Thus the categories employed by Halloran et al. emerged from the 
'data' of Galtung and Ruge's study of news reports of military conflicts; 
this latter study derived its notion of the importance of these two 
angles from its 'data'. Thus the effects of the factors operational in 
the reporting of military conflicts are taken by Halloran et al. as the 
explanation of the question 'what is news?'. The thing-to-be-explained 
became the explanation for Galtung and Ruge and so too for Halloran et al.; 
the thing-to-be-explained, 'personality' and 'negativity' categories in 
the discourse of the news, are taken as the explanations. In consequence 
Halloran et al.'s analysis is enabled, by the application of these two 
explanatory categories to the items (press cuttings) in the "pre-event 
coverage", to produce corresponding coding categories for the analysis of 
the "event coverage". Thus what they take to be the real object, the 
"content" or the "event coverage", is nothing but the object of their 
ideological practice (the 'biased' parts of the discourse), an object 
which is created through the application of the coding categories derived 
from the pre-event coverage as examined in the light of the categories of 
"personality" and "negativity" (which include, for example, "violence", 
"splits and boycotts" and "external influences"). 312
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31. Ibid. p. 92.
32. Ibid. pp. 90-91*
33. J. Galtung and M. Ruge "The structure of foreign news; the presentation 
of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus crises in four foreign newspapers" Jo. of 
International Peace Research (1965) pp. 64-90.
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Before they start counting the frequency of these categories, 
then, the result is pre-given. . 'Personality' and 'negativity' new values 
are assigned to be immanent in all news and must therefore appear in 
the content in some shape or form. 'News' has been declared, in a 
piece of classical communications theory, to be essentially a prodtict of 
"news angles", perceptions by newsmen. In typical content analysis 
fashion, particular categories are arbitrarily said to have significance 
for the communicators under study. The effectivity of "news angles" in 
general, and of the two aforementioned ones in particular, is then 
'planted' in the "event coverage" through the coding categories and is 
subsequently extracted as 'a discovery' after the application of science, 
that is, content analysis. Even the use of the term "event coverage" 
itself does not signify the real object but only describes an ideolog­
ical element of news production, an "event" (the creation of 'nows' 
within 24 hour cycles or, more conventionally, the concentration on 
"events"), and elevates it into a category of scientific analysis. Thus, 
all in all, the things-under-observation, the "news angles", are a product 
of the empiricism of the communications theory employed, and the concept 
of the effectivity of "news angles" is planted in the 'answer' in the 
form of the concept of the object, "the event coverage" and the coding 
categories. The very concepts and categories which Halloran et al. use 
to explain biases are, in fact, the very constituents of that bias - tho 
explicandura not the explicans. Things that appear in practice as important 
(e.g. "event coverage", "news angles") are taken, in true empiricist fashion 
as facts which explain themselves. Apart from their idealist explanation 
in 'professional socialization', nowhere do Halloran et al. try to find, 
the mechanism which produces these appearances: 'professional socialization' 
is only a part explanation of how 'news angles' are passed on - it does 
not specify the social relations which generate them. If it is found 
regularly in research practice that particular 'news angles' appear to 
be determinants of bias, the question is: why do these particular 'news 
angles' appear in this way?
It is these relations between their theory of communication 
and their method of content analysis which enables them to conclude that 
they had "shown" that:
f t • • • the story was interpreted in terms of the same basic issue which
had originally made it news."^
In one sense it is right to deny that they had shown any such thing, hut 
in a peculiar sense (not the sense they imply) they have. They displayed 
concepts, practices and their interconnexions which give "birth to and 
structure such a statement. That statement is simply a precis of the 
operation of their concepts and practices, a summary of their 'display 
of mind' (Blum's phrase) in the hook. All they are saying is: news is 
news because of the employment of news angles and these news angles 
structure the form of the news! My conclusion from all this is that the 
actual coxmting itself is absolutely irrelevant to their 'theorization' - 
its results simply illustrate the concepts driving it, they do not provide 
any 'truth' for them. Why is it irrelevant? Because their conclusion 
is given theoretically beforehand through their objects (the "event 
coverage" and "pre-event coverage") and their concepts ("news angles", 
"inferential structure").
What is actually wrong with the concepts of Halloran et al.? 
Answer: the whole edifice (such as it is) collapses when one asks the 
simple question - where do the "news values" come from, because the true 
answer is that they have been extracted from some news reports by Galtung 
and Huge. The false answer given by Halloran et al. is that they originate 
from the shared professional socialization of journalists and hence 
joximalists have them in their minds (unconsciously).^^ In other words, 
the apparent 'slants' or 'biases' from some selected news reports have 
been observed and called 'news angles' and, in the style of the political 
economist and the anthropologist,^ Halloran et al. have concluded that, 
since 'news angles' existed, they must be a product of the human will 
(albeit its unconscious motor) as it is determined by some external, prior, 
causal factor. In fact, however, 'news angles' did not derive from this 
ultimate causal factor, professional socialization, they were extracted 
from news reports. Therefore 'news angles' derive from 'news angles'.
They are an impression transformed into an unreasoned, simple theoretical 
assertion. My objection to that is that such a thin 'theory' has little 3456
100
34. Halloran et al. (1970) op. cit. p. 3C0.
35. Ibid. pp. 58-39.
36. See Althusser and Balibar (1970) op. cit. pp. I5S-I64.
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chance of generating knowledge adequate to its object. 'News angles* 
are 'nev;s angles' - that does not tell us very much about 'news angles'.
In conclusion, to develop from the work of Kalloran et al., we need to 
understand the social mechanism which produces 'news angles', we need to 
see 'news' as an objective function rather than a subjective inclination, 
we need the concept of the unconscious which is embarassingly absent 
from their work, we need a theory of ideology as a product (and consequent 
component) of determinate social practices, and we need to conceptualise 
the place of particular ideologies within particular practices in order 
to get beyond the sociologist's ideological concept of professional 
socialization. As their work stands, it lacks a social theory of 
ideology and is thus forced into asserting that the presence of ideology 
('prejudice', 'imbalance') in the news is a product of ideology ('news 
angles'). This is the same basic absence that characterizes the theory 
and practice of content analysis in general. In conclusion, Demonstrations 
and Communication illustrates the bankruptcy of content analysis by 
practising it.
37Information tneory
Like content analysis, information theory blossomed from
wartime. It is an approach to communications studies deriving from
physics and electronic engineering. Its proponents are rightly ambivalent
about the transfer of a theory from one field, pure physics and electronic
engineering, to another, communication studies, but that does not deter
them. To explicate and illustrate the structure of information theory,
36I shall look at Brian Winston's Image of the Wedia. Like other 
information theory supporters, Winston admits that:
"It is dgngerous to extend a theory from pure physics into less discrete 
areas." 3789
37. This will not be dealt with in great depth since its influence at 
this time remains limited.
38. (1973 London: Davis-Foynter).
39. Ibid. p. 32.
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But nevertheless he ^oes on to claim that:
"It is "because of this substantial extension to the mathematics that it 
is possible to see in information theory a classic attempt by Western man 
to find a system of interpreting the universe. Such systems are all now 
in jeopardy. Information theory and its child, cybernetics, possess 
perhaps more validity than some older universal keys because they are 
part of the theoretic basis of those machines which are most destroying 
our old categories and conceptual forms."
This amazing claim alternates with more sober statements which suggest 
that, combined viith sociological work, "information theory" could be 
very powerful. More specifically, the use of information theory is said 
to enable us to
"analyse- on a statistical basis the words in which the various codes 
used by the media, note the differences that occur from society to 
society and gauge more accurately than by othpj means the relative 
informational content of different messages.'
These claims collapse when we realize that information theory 
in the communications field is simply the use of an analogy. What in 
fcict happens is that the concepts of electronic engineering are taken as 
applicable, on the grounds of insightful analogy, to what is seen as ’human 
communication processes'. The problem lies in the fairly unmcdiated 
transformation of the concepts from one field into the concepts of the 
other without regard to their use as analogy. Consequently there is an1 
absence of argument as to why these concepts are appropriate: the metaphor 
becomes the reality. Thus, although information theory in engineering is 
concerned with the quantity of ’information’ that can pass through a part­
icular channel, the reduction of interference ("noise") a.nd the use of 
feedback devices to control the strength of the input, information theory 
in communications studies implicitly equates information (the "reduction
of incertitude") with meaning (whilst explicitly denying that it does so),
42noise with misunderstanding and feedback with learning. And consequently 
Winston is enabled to construct his statements about the ability of 
information theory to "quantify the content of the message". 4012
40. Ibid. p. 33.
41. Ibid. p. 82.
42. Ibid.^  4* Equations which, unsurprisingly, given the lack of a 
theory of signs or ideolo gy, fail to provide information theory with a 
method of analysis; mere speculations are the only consequence.
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But is this analogy insightful? No. The use of 'information', 
in the engineering sense, is inadequate for a theory of reading ideologr. 
Why? Because the notion that any piece of■ discourse contains a certain 
number of "hits" of information^is based on several mechanical and 
untenable assumptions (or articles offoith): that the whole system is 
static and stable, that each "bit" of information is equal in strength, 
that there is universal sharing of the code constituted by the bits, that 
the communications system is totally autonomous and has no 'external'l
conditions of existence, that the relation between the communicator and 
receiver is non-antagonistic and non-contradictory, that this latter 
relation functions and therefore was created to that end. This mechanical, 
systems theory of communication is more suited to electrical processes 
than social processes and has many absent concepts, but, notably, it lacks 
a concept of significance. The "reduction of incertitude" is assumed to 
occur v/ithout the "receiver" actively reading the code which is said 
to structure the message and thus dictate the meaning. 'Certainty' is 
alleged to be intrinsic to the message whatever the mode of its production 
or the class of its consumer. 'Certainty' is not a product of class 
relations of production and consumption of mass messages over time but the 
intrinsic property of the message. The electrical engineer's concepts 
of redundancy, noise and feedback cannot be used as analogies unless 
there is some theory of significance. How could a message have a definite, 
large 'redundancy' score unless we assume that the receiver automatically 
receives the r.on-redundant bits of information? It is logically impossible 
for it to be otherwise. Hence a consensus of meaning is always assumed 
to be simply and automatically extant. Similarly it is logically imposs­
ible to have fixed redundancy scores if we argue that the specific 
historical changes in the elements of meaning can change their interrelations 
(Consequently I would suggest that the concepts of information theory are 
compatible with structural linguistics and/or structuralist anthropology 
which also assume that changes in relations are independent of changes 
in the units of the s t r u c t u r e . T h e  elements of the code are fixed in 
information theory. All round the latter is very much an ahistorical, 43
43. Ibid. pp. 83-85»
44. This seems to be supported by Smith's linking of information theory
with and tne linguistics 0 Chomsky and the anthropology of Pike, and by 
Slater's combination of the work of Lévi-Strauss with that of Shannon and 
Weaver. See A.G. Smith (ed.) Communication and Culture (1966 N.Y.s Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston) and K. Slater Lévi-Strauss in Fleet Street 
(Unpublished : .A. dissertation, 1970 Univ0rsity"ôf"Essex).------
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static, consensual, structural functionalism.
In conclusion, lacking a theory of ideology, information theory 
is unable to discern the absence or presence of ideology, nor even its 
efficiency. Thus, of course, neither can it inform us of the nature of 
ideology's effects or of the grounds for the analyst's ability to read 
them.
Speculative criticism »
Both the modes of reading discourse discussed so far are 
products of an empiricist problematic. The relation of the reader to the 
discourse has been denied its dialectical nature. Whereas, in reality, 
the reader constructs a reading out of the discourse which, in turn, is 
effective in the development of his 'means of reading', (his structures 
of significations or ideology), in content analysis and information 
theory the reader is a "scientific" analyst discovering the intrinsic, pre- 
given, characteristics of the content. The reader is subservient to the 
dictates of the truth of the text. His reading is innocent, it is- the 
text that is found guilty. The third mode of reading ideological discourse 
I wish to consider is also non-dialectical. It is a mode frequently 
found in the sociology of deviance and bears remarkable similarity to the 
mode of literary criticism practised in 'English studies' for many a 
decade.
'Traditional literary criticism has many variants, but has two 
basic, ideological elements dominating its practice. Firstly it involves 
a notion of the text as self-sufficient or self-enclosed. That is, the 
text is seen as intrinsically separate from its reading and its properties 
are to be found on the surface, readily available to a sensitive reader. 
Secondly, in connexion with this first point, the reader must be thorough, 
sensitive and critical. He must give himself to the discourse in all its 
richness. No 'model' or 'method' is adequate because a 'method' could 
not deal with the complexity of the text in all its variable wonder. We 
are reminded of the similarity to content analysis*, Berelson's remarks 
illustrate the link:
"since the content represents the .means through which one person or 
group communicates with another, it is important for communication 
research that it be described with accuracy and interpreted with insight. 
Communication content is so rich with human experience and its causes and 
effects so varied, that no single system of substantive categories can
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be devised to describe it."
This view is shared by many literary critics and is an index of the
concept of knowledge as a ’model' against which the critic can
juxtapose an ever pre-given reality; a concert found only in empiricist 
46problematics. This notion of the text's richness of meaning is also 
symptomatic of the substantive theory which corresponds to the empiricist 
epistemology, the theory of communication which views discourse as the 
chosen meanings of an intentional author. Both literary criticism and 
content analysis share this theory which specifies the text as the 
concrétisation of a complet of intended meanings; in other words, as a 
complex 'human communication'. Consequently both enterprises spend their 
time attempting to discover what the communicator 'really' or 'actually' 
communicated. In content analysis this activity is speculative in form 
and pragmatic in content. It is the reverse in literary criticism; here 
the form is pragmatic and the content speculative. The substance of 
its operation is speculation over the 'real meaning' of the text; an 
activity which produces a narcissistic esotericism in critics regarding 
the quantities of literary sensitivity they possess and a contemptuous 
hypercriticism which functions as a display of the magnitude of those 
quantities. Literary criticism is therefore basically the reading of 
texts in a speculative, empiricist manner which produces criticism as 
its corresponding mode of discourse. The form of the operation of 
literary criticism, its criticism, is pragmatic in that the speculation 
focusses randomly on the discourse, having renounced any possibility of 
method. Consequently any systematicity or coherence achieved by the 
speculative criticism is a random one with untheorized foundations. And 
this is, of course, why I describe the mode of reading as speculative.
It cannot be anything else without a theory of ideology and its reading.
Speculative criticism, then, involves a critical reading of 
texts without any theory of reading. It is this mode of reading ideolog­
ical discourse that is characteristic of studies of press reports in the 
sociology of deviance. The operation of this mode can be well illustrated 
by Cohen and Young's book, The Manufacture of News; Deviance, Social 
Problems and The Mass Media.^In producing a reading of this text, let 4567
45. (1966) op. cit. p. 260.
46. See Althusser and Balibar (1970) op. cit. pp. 117, 118.
47. (1973 London: Constable).
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us look firstly at the effects of the structure of the problematic of 
speculative criticism on the book as a whole. Only one article in the 
book focusses on the question of the discernibility/transparency of
A ftideology in its effects and that one is heavily edited. ' 1 The other art­
icles that involve a reading are all 'critical1 and are thoroughly dev­
oid of any theory of reading ideology. Next we can also note that the 
•linking' sections between the readings also effect the problematic. The 
introduction is classic in its terminology and its absences:
"The second Part (of the book) is the largest and consists of separate 
case studies - using diverse sources and methods - on the modes of pres­
entation and undc-rlyino: models of deviance and social problems employed 
in the media."~ 'J (my emphases)
Part Two is entitled "Modes and Models". In the preface to that part the 
editors comment that:
"The first set of readings describes the content of the images presented 
to the public by the mass media, contrasting this, where possible with 
evidence from alternative sources.""’ (My emphases.)
The transparency of the "models" structuring the content is given and 
thus unproblematic: they are assumed to be immediately readable. This 
elision of the concept of immediate readability is coupled with a polit­
ical concern for the content of the models which, without its correspond­
ing theory, exists as naked protest, a kind of Hohnbawmian "primitive 
rebellion" at the level of ideological practice.
Let us listen to the editors' own words, bearing in mind our 
comments on communication and literature studies:
"To stress the creative nature of journalism and the way it moulds events 
into particular world views is to narrow the distinction between fiction 
and non-fiction. Prom this point of view, neither form of writing is 
inherently 'superior': our critical evaluations do not relate to the act­
ual use of on interpretative paradigm - this is inevitable - but to the 
content of the models and world views which shape such interpretations, 
whether by journalist, film producer of novelist."^ *49501
AO. S. Hall's paper "The determination of news photographs" in Cohen and 
Young (1973) op. cit. pp. 176-I9O."
49. Cohen and Young (1973) op. cit. p.ll.
50. Ibid. pp. 93, 99.
51. Ibid. p. 97.
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This passage illustrates our theory of speculative criticism very well.
Its illustrative elements can he broken down into 7 sections as follows:
1. "the creative nature of journalism"
2. "it moulds events into particular world views"
3- "an interpretative paradigm - this is inevitable"
4. "the models and world viev/s which shape such interpretations"
52These four pieces of discourse reflect the basic element of the "comm­
unication studies" problematic: the authorship of meaning lies in the 
human nature of the agents of communication. Thus Cohen and Young are, 
according to my theory of speculative criticism, arguing that 'subjectiv­
ity' in journalists' discourse is unavoidable and that therefore it can­
not be criticized in itself. It is unavoidable because of the character­
istic of journalism as an occupation which i3 necessarily carried out by 
human agents who can only act and think subjectively. All discourse is 
simply a product of human agency. Thus all practices producing a discourse 
are equivalent in this problematic:
5« "to narrow the distinction between fiction and non-fiction"
6. "neither form of writing is inherently superior"
7. "whether by journalist, film-producer or novelist"
These examples illustrate my theory of the continuity within "communicat­
ions studies" as the product of their view of the 'origin' of a communic­
ation in its intentional author. All modes of discourse production are 
equal in that they involve human agency. Consequently, within this 'sub­
jectivist' problematic, Cohen and Young can only protest against the 
"content" of the "authors" interpretations: analysts of ideology can only 
be critical, they can only make "critical evaluations" or subjective 
comments. Operating strictly within such a problematic, analysts are for­
bidden a scientific knowledge of the content by their own premises? all 
they can do is 'critically evaluate'.
I have shown that the discourse of a subjectivist problematic 
is reflected in Cohen and Young's theory of the 'human' nature of comm­
unication: 'bias' in press reports is held to be "inevitable". In this 
sense their work is similar to the theory of communications in content 
analysis. However there is a development in their work from the simple 52
52. 1 use the term in its dialectical sense clarified in the discussion 
in ch. poer 2. llius these "pieces of discourse" are a condition of exist­
ence of a certain theoretical problematic.
communications theory involved in the method of content analysis. Like 
Halloran, Elliott and Murdock,■they view "news", sociologically, as a 
product of the necessities of the social organizations that produce news­
papers, not as the simple necessity of a communicator's ideology."News" 
is still seen as a product of journalists' subjective interpretations but 
those interpretations are caused externally by the requirements of organ­
izations for the production of newspapers. Journalists' interpretations 
are the effect of a prior cause:
"News, rather, is manufactured by journalists through interpreting and 
selecting events to fit pre-existing categories, themselves a product of 
the bureaucratic exigencies of news organizations and the particular con­
centration of media control and ownership ... distortion is not limited 
to the heavy hand of direct censorship but is a less obvious process — 
often unconscious and unstated - of interpreting the event in terms of 
an acceptable world view."')
Thus, as in Halloran et al.'s work, a sociological, linear cause-effect, 
determinism is added to the basic ideology of 'human communications' 
intrinsic to content analysis. In this fact, we have the grounds for 
stating that Cohen and Young have not repudiated the ideology of content 
analysis.
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Part Two of Cohen and Young's text consequently consists largely 
of readings which, in themselves, do not repudiate the ideology of content
55analysis. In fact some of the readings are classic content analyses.
Part Three of the text i3 devoted to readings supporting Cohen and.Young's 
new aeviancy problematic which sees that images of deviance disseminated 
by the nedia fall into a narrow range around a "consensual image of 
society" and that the consumers can "rarely escape" the boundaries of 
these images of deviance. Consumers are highly "segregated" into "normat­
ive ghettoes" and, therefore, know little about the nature of social 534*
53. Unlike Halloran et al., however, they do not explicitly adhere to the 
"technique" of counting categories. They, like the literary critics, 
reject the "objectivity of method" as a means of comprehending data which 
is seen as full of the richness of human experience. That is, their 
position is not a Weberian one as is that of Halloran et al..
54. Cohen and Young (1973) op. cit. p. 9 7.
55* I "bid. the articles by Berelson and Salter, Davis,Kimnally and Linsky.
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deviance. Thus the media reinforce the "consensual image of society"
r)6already present in the -consumer brain. The methodological -individualism 
. or subjectivism of the new deviancy problematic in the sociology of 
deviance thus finds its natural theory of communications: 'deviant labels' 
are the interpretations of human sxibjects in interaction which are 
"reinforced" by the 'labels' or 'images' disseminated by other human sub­
jects, also in interaction (the "social organisation" of news). -Deviance 
images in this problematic are simply constituted by the ciistomary notions 
of right and wrong held by people and reinforced by other people in power­
ful positions, such as journalists. In this concept of deviance there is 
no sense of its 'concrete' base, that is, its material determinations. 
Deviance, according to my formulations, is indeed a mental composition 
carried by human agents, but it is not simply a "moral" notion grounded in 
a consensus of consciousness (whether 'authentic' or 'contrived').
Deviance is firmly grounded in the social practices of a social formation. 
The xinity of an ideological formation is given by its integral location in 
a social practice which takes place under determinate material conditions and 
within determinate social relations. The subjectivist concept of deviance 
is one-sided and fails to grasp the objective, concrete side of deviance 
as an idea sustained, produced and effective -within specific, social 
practices. Hence, it fails to grasp the very reasons why deviance can be 
seen by observers as a moral notion grounded in custom or consensus. VJhen 
social practice sustains an idea over time, it loses its character as a 
product and element of specific social practices and appears simply as a 
natural, pre-given, eternal, moral essence. The labour, from which a 
social conception of deviance emerges,disappears in the product and if the 
product survives long enough it becomes "customary", it takes on the app­
earance of a natural custom, the settled definitions of a people. Thus, 
'political demonstration' is an idea which reflects long-standing political 
relations in capitalist societies and which is employed and sustained 
within various cultural or intellectual agencies, such as the press and 
novels. By now, its meaning is taken for granted and its practical 
grounding has disappeared from view. Subjectivist theories only grasp mor­
ality as it appears in its outward aspect as a given custom,as a peculiarity 
of a people, as the effect of a 'social contract' (either chosen or 56
56. Ibid. pp. 337-349
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forced). They fail, to understand that the character of deviance as 
a moral order is a merely transient impression or appearance (although 
a real one, nevertheless) supported "by the stability of a social 
formation and the existence, within that formation, of social practices 
which maintain the particular deviation in question.
The fourth part of Cohen and Young's book is entitled-"Do-it- 
yourself media sociology", implying that reading ideology requires no 
theory and is a pursuit Anyman and Everyman can take up. It is simply a 
matter of technique and the imaginative use of practical devices - just 
like putting up shelves. Under the heading "Suggested Projects" the 
following 'handy' advice is given:
"The project you pick depends on how ambitious you are. You might want to 
limit yourself to one form of mass media - for example, the press - and 
to one form of deviance - for example, vandalism - and you mirht want to 
confine yourself to a simple description of the dominant imagery through 
which this phenomenon is reported."^ (my emphases)
"Simple description" only occurs as an effect of an empiricist problematic.
Further on, our would-be, do-.it-yourself, empiricist, speculative critic is
advised to learn "something about content analysis and other techniques
58of collecting and classifying and coding your material." Any old "tech­
nique" (note the use of the term) will do - as long a3 it 'works' - it's 
only 'a way in' to the 'data'. Coding categories are not theoretical 
issues - but merely materials in the handiwork: base them on the data, 
dress them up as explanatory and present as confirmation of your theory.
In conclusion, The Manufacture of News is a good illustration 
of speculative criticism. The transparency of ideology in its effects 
is given. The nature of the absence/presence of ideology, and the 
grounds enabling a reading of ideology are not seen as issues. Thus the 
book speculates with a criticism of the consensualism and conservatism of 
media products. But the critique in undermined by its nudity of theory 
(and consequent appearance as primitive protest) and the pragmatism of 
the abstraction formed lazily upon it. Again there is a gaping absence 
of an elaborated, adequate theory of ideology. Nowhere is this more 
evident than in this fourth part of the book. Here, theory and method 
are treated with contempt and as long as the approach is critical, any 
kind of speculation as to the nature of the discourse is permissible
5 7 . Ibid. p. 373.
5 8 . Ibid. p. 377.
Ill
Nowhere is it clearer that the subjectivist problematic of communications 
is simply prepared to take the truth of its sense-impressions on trust.
Youngs paper in the book "The myth of the drug taker in
the mass media", is an excellent example of speculative reading in full
59flovr. Without any hesitation or doubt, Young immediately moves into a 
reading of the media. He fails to specify which "media" exactly, or 
precisely how much media he bases his speculations on. However, we need 
not worry too much about that, except to note that such methodological 
anarchism is typical of speculative criticism. Young soon suggests that 
'news' is not just information and that "facts do not speak for themselves". 
He argues that the mass media offer "a consistent world view","an amazingly 
systematic frame of reference".^ It is interesting to note that he 
immediately assumes that the fact of this 'media world view' speaks for 
itself and can be heard by anyone who listens. Ho continues (using terms 
such as "model" and "mythology") with a scries of speculations, which 
argue that media myths are "grounded in a particular view of society".
This "world-view" contains contradictions and the media's myths are an 
attempted resolution of these contradictions. He gives no reasons- why 
this should be the case. He cannot do that because he is simply specul­
ating: a practice indexed by the regular use of the phrase "I wish to 
suggest". The paper continues with an imaginative (literally) description 
of the-alleged "consensualist" "world-view" of "the media" and its contr­
adictions which the myths attempt to solve. Young concludes the essay 
by making.his final speculation:
" ... the mass media portrayal of the drug taker is not a funct^n of 
random ignorance but a coherent part of a consensual mythology"
This totally specxilstive, atheoretical account of ideology in "the media" 
illustrates perfectly the practice I have explained in this section. The 
method is purely imaginative, containing not the slightest bit of theor­
etical guidance. Of course, we must register the fact that Young's prac­
tice in this article is also 'critical'. Implicitly he rejects the hypo­
crisy of those who propagate and support propaganda about 'deviants'. *601
59- Ibid. pp. 314-322.
60. Ibid. p. 314*
61. Ibid. p. 322.
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"For by fanning up moral ponies over drug use, it (the mass media - C.S.) 
contributes enormously to public hostility to the drug taker and precludes 
any rational approach to the problem."'
Explicitly, he criticizes the media for helping to make 'deviants' the 
scapegoat for the problems of contemporary British capitalism.^ Both 
these criticisms are surely to be welcomed by anyone concerned with liber­
ating people from the oppression of capitalist societies. But, as they 
are, Young's arguments and comments are only counter-propaganda.: that is, 
his work here remains at the level of practical, ideological-political 
struggle. As such they are valuable to a degree, but, without a basis in 
a precise, theoretical grasp of deviance as an ideological formation 
rooted firmly in social practice, and without a theory of reading ideology, 
political criticism in this field will he prone to opportunist and 
idealist diversions.
"V/orld views" and the possibility of a science of ideology
The internal determinations of the subjectivist ideology of 
speculative criticism raise the central issue about all forms of "content 
analysis". It is necessary to confront this issue now, in the light of 
this ideology and in the light of my formulations in the previous chapters, 
because speculative criticism raises in a sharp form the question of the 
possibility of a scientific knowledge of ideological discourse. Thus a 
critique of a speculative criticism will now follow. It is a critique 
which follows naturally all that has gone before and naturally precedes 
all that comes later: it is not a digression.
The key concept in speculative criticism, behind which all its 
other concepts throw their weight, is the "world view". There is a great 
difference between the "world view" of a subjectivist-empiricist problem­
atic and the concepts of "ideological formation" and "ideology" of a 
Marxist problematic.
Firstly, a "world view is defined as a total way of looking at 
the v:orld. It is a "model" or a "paradigm" which produces "interpretations 623
6 2 . Ibid.
63. Ibid.
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Clearly implicit in this notion is that human subjects carry a total 
vision to all their practices. Thus it is different from the 'problematic', 
which only exists in theoretical practice, as a systematic body of con­
cepts. It is also different from the 'ideological formationJ which only 
exists in particular social practices and which is only a fragment or 
part of each human agent's mode of spontaneous consciousness.
I would say that the latter typically contains several ideological 
formations, some of which exist together in contradiction and some in 
harmony. The internal unity of an ideological form lies in its connection 
with human action and material conditions in the structure of a social 
practice. The unity of an ideology does not lie within itself. In the 
subjectivist notion of the "world view" the unity of an ideology is 
found internally. The human agent is said to have his "model" of the world 
which he carries to every practice and which is not governed by any 
particular- practice. The determination of the "world view", therefore, 
is internal to itself as the product of the "creative" human agency. That 
is, the fact that humans have brains and senses governs the unity of 
their "world views". Clearly this is absurd and nothing to do with the 
Marxist concepts of ideology and ideological formation. In Marxist 
thought, the characteristic of humans as possessors of brains and senses 
is only a Natural_ condition of existence of ideology, a mechanism which 
enables an ideology to have a material existence, it is not the condition 
of existence of the social form of an ideology. Having a brain made 
nobody into a Fascist, a Moderate or a Marxist; to put it simply. The 
condition of existence of the form of an ideology, or a spontaneous 
mode of consciousness, is the presence of that ideology in historically 
determinate social practices. Note two key differences, therefore, 
between a "world-view" and an ideology: (l) an ideology is produced, sustained 
and effective within particular social practices, not simply within a 
human brain in itself; (2) even a theoretical ideology is fragmentary, 
containing a mixture of ideological formations (clusters of thoughts, ^
perceptions, reflections, etc.) pertaining to a variety of social practices. 64
64. It can only attain systematicity in ideological practice, where 
ideology is the object of its own operation, and where ideological 
problematics are produced. See supra pp. 54, 55. p0r a good example 
of theoretical ideology see any of Talcott Parsons'najor works.
Secondly, one "world view", in the subjectivist problematic, is 
as valid as any other "world view". Neither are scientific, for all science 
is underpinned by a "world-view" or "values" dependent upon a "world-view." 
No truth is possible, everything is relative to the particular "world-view" 
of the subject: or, what is the same thing, everything is true relative to 
the subject's world view. Now it is true that the Marxist problematic would 
hold that one subject's ideology is as 'valid' as any other. Neither are 
scientific knowledges. However Marxism does hold that ideological format­
ions are inferior to scientific formations, since the latter, produced in
65scientific practice, grasp in theory the determinations of an object 
which (a) produce its impressions in ideological formations and (b) 
constitute the other side, the "inner connexions", the 'invisible' aspects 
of those impressions. So, for example, Marx's theory of value in 
Capital not only constitutes the determinations of value but also explains 
that these determinations necessarily produce a tendency to a particular 
spontaneous mode of consciousness of value. That is, the scientific laws 
of value specify that value has a definite form of appearance, exchange- 
value, and that, consequently, it appears to people in practice that the 
exchange-value of a commodity is determined by the utility of that 
commodity, i.e. by its internal characteristics. Like any science, 
basically Marxian theory explains (literally) why things appear as they do.
Now this does not mean that the nature of value involves a part­
icular, 'empirical' mode of 'appearance' or 'manifestation' which is the 
only, 'visible' thing, 'out there', for human subjects to see, if they so 
wish. That is, it does not mean that value's 'mode of appearance' in 
given social relationships is absolutely true in the philosophic sense. 65
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65. Scientific practice: the application of a developed theoretical 
science or ideology to previous theoretical ideologies, or to simple ideo­
logical impressions, producing a scientific knowledge or developments in 
such a knowledge. Science is defined in the text. The scientificity of a 
social knowledge is provable within modes of social practice (either econ­
omic, political or ideological) specified by the knowledge of the theoret­
ical object. That is, like Althusser, I propose that the criterion of 
truth for a science is internal, but, unlike Althusser, I would argue that 
the criterion of proof in Marxist science is not always scientific 
practice in experimental conditions but rather a mode of practice (economic, 
political, ideological or scientific) specified by the knowledge of the 
theoretical object. I shall return to the question of science and 
ideology in Althusser's work, and in my own conception, in ch. 7.
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Nor does it mean that value's 'mode of appearance' in given social relat­
ionships is absolutely false, in the philosophic sense. Some otseivcrs 
may wish to read Marx to say that his account of commodity fetishism in 
Capital is the basis of a theory of ideological mystification. It may be 
said that Marx is arguing that the 'mode of appearance' of value is ill­
usory and conceals the hidden truth, that men can only see the visible, 
absolutely false impressions of value and that the absolutely true 
"inner connexions" go unnoticed. And there are phrases in Capital which 
lend strength to this reading. (However if.one reads phrases out of con­
text as the indicators of the theoretical discourse, there are other 
phrases in Capital which do not support this reading. ) This reading, 
however, is wrong. Marx's discourse specifies that the mode of appearance 
of value is neither absolutely true or absolutely false: it is simply 
true in historically snecific economic practice. That is, value will 
tend to be seen by the agents of economic practice in the only way that 
they can see it: as it is, in economic practice. The key passage in 
Capital, where Marx's theoretical discourse 'breaks the surface', is 
as follows:
"The two-fold social characters of the labour of the indivi.d\ial appears 
to him, when reflected in his brain, only under those forms which are 
impressed upon that labour in everyday practice by the exchange of prod­
ucts."
The producers and exchangers can only see value as it exists in historical, 
social practice, as commodities which can be sold at certain prices. 67*
66. For example, (1974) op. cit. p.77. "the fantastic form", p. 79 "the 
mist through which the social character of labour appears to us" and, of 
course the general argument that Political Economy failed to grasp the 
labour theory of value because of the "mystical" form of commodities.
67. For example, ibid. p. 77* " ... commodities, social things whose 
dualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses", 
p. 78 " ... the relations connecting the labour of one individual with that 
of the rest appear, not as direct social relations between individuals at 
work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons and 
social relations between things", and p. 79 " ... this fact appears to the 
producers, notwithstanding the discovery above referred to, to be just as 
real and final, as the fact, that, after the discovery by science of the 
component gases of air, the atmosphere itself remained unaltered."
63..Ibid. p. 78.
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Value has its internal and external determinations.^In its external 
determinations, value jis commodities. It does not just take the 'form’ 
or 'shape' or commodities (this is why 'mdde of appearance' and 
'manifestation' are strictly speaking misleading terms). Value exists 
socially in its favourite mode of production, capitalism, as commodities. 
That is value does not exist socially in disguise. In its external 
determinations, that is, in its social existence, value is commodities.
Commodities are not just values, hut value in only concrete in commodities 
of which money is also a form.
Therefore, the producers are neither living under delusions 
nor celebrating eternal truth when they see value in commodities. 
Commodities have value: that can he found to he true in economic practice. 
That is how things actually are in economic practice. Many Marxist 
militants have arrogantly proclaimed that they know the 'inner truth', 
that value is simply congealed, human labour and that the opinion of the 
worker or the bourgeois, which says value is money or goods, is an 
ideological mystification. This is a mistaken reading of Marx, who, in 
effect, is saying that both aspects of value are true - one in theory 
and one in practice. The vision of the worker or bourgeois is one 
connected with economic practice, the vision of the Marxist is connected 
with the political-ideological practice of ’demystification’ and education 
Both producers and Marxists only see from the viewpoint integral to 
their respective economic and political-ideological practices. Thus the 
producers see value in its economic, practical existence and the 
Marxists see value in its non-economic theoretical existence. Both see 
accurately, for value is both an abstract form and a practical matter.
The producers tend to see it as a practical matter or substance, i.e. as 
a good or as money. The Marxists tend to see it as an abstract form,
i.e., as a quantity of congealed human labour. Both are right but both 
unscientific. As Marx explained, value is both of these things. Its 
concrete aspect can be proved true in economic practice and its abstract 
aspect can be proved true in theoretical practice. 69
69. In its internal determinations, value is congealed, general, human 
labour and is abstract or ideal in form.
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Hence Marx's discourse is not a theory of mystification "but a
theory of value in its two-sidedness, as a thing-in-itself which is
reflected in its form as a social thing, a thing-in-its-othernoss. The
70passage in Capitol on commodity fetishism cannot "be read on its own, it 
must "be read in the context of Marx's method of working and the many other 
passages in Capital on things and their social existence.
In conclusion, the subjectivist concept of the "world-view" is 
radically different from the Marxist concepts of ideology and science.
The "world-view" concept pronounces nothing to "be true, except for the 
human subject in question. This concept clearly fails to grasp the "this- 
sidedness" of ideology which is 'true' inasmuch as it can be shown to bo 
true in a particular social practice. It fails to grasp that all ideology 
has its 'blind side': the truth it cannot grasp, inasmuch as that side 
'makes no sense' (literally) in the particular social practice ideology is 
attached to. And, crucially, the concept of the "world view" cannot grasp 
the truth of_a science which explains the inner determinations of things, 
their outer determinations and the relation between the two. It cannot 
see that science explains the two-sidedness of things and how each side 
is provable in a mode peculiar to itself. Consequently, a scientific 
knowledge of ideology is possible, bvit not within the subjectivist 
ideologies of pragmatic content analysis, information theory and 
speculative criticism which can only see ideology in its form of appearance 
as the expression of a human consciousness, and which fail to see that 
ideology is an aspect of historically determinate social practices, the 
practices that are the sir.e oua non for the expression of human conscious­
ness. Just as value only appears iri utilities and as exchange value and 
is thus seen in practice as exchange-value intrinsic to a utility, so, too, 
ideology only appears through human subjects in social practice and as a 
chosen system of thought and is thus seen in social practice as a systematic 
prejudice invented by a capricious human consciousness. The problematic 
of reading ideology dealt with in this chapter failed to see beyond the 
form of appearance of ideology and took it at its word. But then how 
could the ideology of ideology see its own material conditions of existence? 70
70. (1974) op. cit. pp. 76-B'7
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We have found, that the problematic of the analysis of the 
content of ideological discourse has no theory of ideological discourse. 
That is, the problematic seeks- to analyse the content of an unknown or 
unrecognized form. It is, in consequence, intrinsically random and, the­
refore, irrational. As such it cannot possibly achieve scientific status. 
How can one analyse the content of a form if one has no theory of that 
form, of its mode of existence in the content, or of the way that the 
analyst can recognize it? Vie have learned, however, that this problematic 
of the content sees ideological discourse as the systematic expression of 
the human consciousness. Is this not a theory of ideological discourse?
Ho - because all this view says to us is that the immediately prior cause 
of the content was the will or expression of the human mind. That state­
ment does not tell us anything about the form of the content, since it is 
not a theory of ideological discourse-in-itself but rather a description 
of the form of appearance of ideological discourse. It tells us nothing 
of the inner determinations of ideological discourse; that is, the nature 
of its form. Such a statement is a classical eiample of the ideological 
notions of linear causation, methodological individualism (or subjectivism) 
and empiricism. It is the type or form of statement that corresponds 
neatly with the absent concept of the form of ideological discourse.
With no concept of its form, ideological discourse must present itself 
spontaneously and therefore as a unity of meaning, set into action by 
human a-gency. Thus, as the reader will remember, Berelson observed that
"communication content" was "so rich with human experience" that no
71theoretical set of categories could grasp it. The spontaneous, 
theory-free view of ideological discourse can only see its unity as an 
expression of human authorship and can only fix this aspect as a product 
of the creativity of the human mind. This is the law of the appearance 
of ideological discovirse in social practice. It is illustrated clearly 
in all the spontaneous readings discussed in this chapter. The 
sociological versions also involve this mode of reading, but add some 
social limits to mental creativity - human interpretation is still the 
producing agency but its scope is narrowed by the prior, external limits 71
7 1. See supra p. 104- fn. 45*
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imposed "by other, more powerful, interpretative creatures. This law 
of the appearances of discourse in social practice is also illustrated 
clearly in common parlance. Northerners have the saying: 'There's nowt 
so funny as folk'. This saying appears in different forms all over the 
country and, I -would guess, across different social classes. However 
another common saying amongst the Northern working class (i do not know 
how widespread this saying is) is that 'actions speak louder than words'.
So although ideological discourse presents itself to people in practice 
as a necessary and systematic outcome of human peculiarity, it is not 
necessarily taken too seriously by some sections of the English working 
class at least. I would speculate that the saying of the Northern 
workers reflects the long history of double-dealing, hypocrisy and false 
promises by factory management in the course of the class struggle.
At least they have come to recognize, to some extent, through the economic 
and political struggle of the classes, that ideology is inextricably a 
part of practice. However, at the level of spontaneous observation, 
ideological discourse remains a form of the peculiarity of people. Thus 
the ideological problematic of content analysis in all its variants, 
must necessarily continue to combine notions of linear causation, subject­
ivism and empiricism until it develops a theory of the form of ideological 
discourse and its mode of appearance in the content.
Without a theory of the form this problematic can never know 
(literally) the shape of the content. The problematic of content analysis 
is therefore doomed to uncertainty, an uncertainty which is completely 
intrinsic to itself. This is clearly reflected in all three variants 
examined in this chapter. Pragmatic content analysis is seen by its 
practitioners as simply a mechanical 'technique' which needs to be com­
plemented by 'imaginative' use of the resulting 'data' in order to 
provide 'insight1 into the 'complexity'of discourse. Information theory 
depends precariously on the application of an analogy which its practit­
ioners see only (again) as an 'insight' into a 'complex' object. Specul­
ative criticism abandons all method, submitting its subjects, the 
subjective critics, to the task of utilizing their 'imaginations’ 
'insightfully', and, thus, reduces them to the insecurity of 'suggestion' 
and speculation. Prom the plaintive remarks in their texts, it 3eems 
that the agents of this problematic of content do not bear its oppressive 
weight without some discomfort. This marks a nice, dialectical contrast 
to the extravagant exuberance of the explorers of form to whom we now turn
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4 THE ANALYSIS OF FORM: STRUCTURALISM
Introduction
From the problematic of content vie have arrived at the problem­
atic of form. The object here is the structure of the content. All 
kinds of phenomena are taken as illustrations of form within this problem­
atic. Structuralist researchers have studied myth, fashion, literature 
and many other areas. The common thread is the search for the form of 
things. As opposed to the problematic of content, this problematic is not 
so much interested in the immediately apparent, concrete aspect of the 
artefacts of social life but rather in their latent, abstract countenance. 
Things are of interest inasmuch as they are the manifestations in the 
concrete-real of the abstract form. It is in this sense that this problem­
atic can be described as Structuralist. This term is actually one in 
common usage that refers to a modem* variant of the problematic of form. 
That variant has been carried forv:ard by many French intellect­
uals in the fields of anthropology (e.g. Lévi-Strauss), economics (e.g. 
Godelier), literary criticism (e.g. Barthes) and psychoanalysis (e.g.
Lacan). However the term is of wider value than as a specific reference, 
for it indicates that the interest in social phenomena within this 
problematic is a focussed interest in their structure. Form is only 
the form of the content; hence this problematic can be said to focus on 
the form, or structure, of the content. The content itself is seen simply 
as an effect of the form or structure of the thing, as merely an immediate, 
empirical expression of an inner connexion. It is in this sense that the 
problematic under attention could also correctly be called the semiological 
problematic - because content is seen as a sign of the inner form or
121
structure. Semiology, in general, is the study of signs and, in modern 
parlance, also usually refers to the branch of the French structuralist 
movement which concentrates on the analysis of mass media products and 
literature. In this chapter I shall examine the theoretical problematic 
of structuralism (or semiology) in the abstract and make a critique, 
illustrating my points with reference to a work which 'applies' the 
problematic. In the following chapter I shall outline the 'applied' 
concepts of semiology, and apply the critique developed in the present 
chapter.^
The structuralist problematic of forms, signs or structures 
presents itself as full of promise. It appears to be anti-empiricist 
since it makes the clear distinction between the outward appearance with 
its transitional character and the inner connexion or law which drives 
the surface movement yet is not external to the content. It appears 
to be dialectical, again because of its use of the form/content distinction, 
and also because, as we shall see, it does raise the question of the 
relation between the reader and the text. But not only are there those 
appearances; the structuralists make other claims. Most importantly 
they claim that their work is scientific and that it is Marxist. All 
these appearances and claims will be investigated in the next two chapters.
As in the preceding chapter, I shall pose the problematic
2the three questions on its mode of reading ideology. This interrogation 
will be the dominant element in the structure of this chapter - the 
following chapter is more expositional. Again, I shall use a reading of 
press accounts of political demonstrations for illustration. One final 
note of introduction is that Althusser's lecture symptomale (symptomatic 
reading) is held back until chapter 6 because it is an especially complex 
and important mode of reading and because its nature can only be comprehendec 
fully in the light of an extended discussion of the structuralist problem­
atic .
1. The position, that 'structuralism' and 'semiology' refer to the same 
problematic, is one adopted by Jonathan Culler. He feels that the fact 
that there are two terms is purely accidental. See J. Cxiller Structuralist 
Poetics (1975 London: Routledge and Kegan Paul) p. 6.
2~. Supra p. 36.
frr
122
The object of the structuralist problematic
Roland Barthes's definition of contemporary structuralism as a 
"mode of analysis of cultural artefacts which originates in the methods 
of contemporary linguistics" is a good one since it "brings out the key 
point that linguistics has a central role in the structuralist problem­
atic.^ Structuralism has made many analogies from the concepts of 
linguistics - not the least "being that the structure of a discursive 
content is a coded ideological language. As Barthes says,
"I have been engaged in a series of structural analyses which all aim at 
defining a number of non-linguistic 'languages'"
I do not intend to investigate the technical weaknesses of the linguistic
analogy in structuralism. That would be beyond my competence. However
there is one important thing to say: linguistics already contained a
structuralist problematic, modern structuralism did not just lift elements
from linguistics and make them its own. Language in general was already
conceived within structural linguistics as composed of a temporal content
5and a law-like structure. Structuralism, in its recent attempts to 
understand myths and other cultural ai'tefacts, naturally applied the 
concepts it had developed in the field of linguistics. Thus cultural 
artefacts were seen as arbitrary contents governed by the language of 
myth.
The concept of the language of myth (or ideology) can be 
better -understood if we look at 'language' in linguistics (structui'alist 
variant):
3 . From "Science versus literature" Times Literary Supplement, 28th Sept.
1967 pp. 897-3» paraphrased by Culler (1975) op. cit. p. 3 .
4. From gssais Critiques ( 1 9 6 4  Paris: Seuil), quoted in Culler (1975) op. 
cit. p. 4-
5 . See J. Lyons "Structuralism and Linguistics" and J. Culler "The Linguistic; 
basis of ^r^ctiiralin", both in D. Robey (ed.) Structuralism (1973 London: 
Oxford university Press) pp. 5-19 and 20-36 respectively.
"What, then, is the central thesis of Saussurean structuralism as far as 
language is concerned? To put it first at its most general, it is this: 
that every language is cut to a unique pattern and that the units out of 
which utterances are composed - more carefully, the units which we 
identify (or postulate as theoretical constructs) in the analysis of 
utterances - can he identified only in the terms of their relationships 
with other units in the same language. We cannot first determine what 
these units are and then, at a svibsequent stage of the investigation, 
inauire what structural relationships hold between them. Linguistic units 
derive both their existence and their essence from their interrelations. 
Every distinct language is a unique relational structure; and the units 
which v/e identify in describing a particular language - sounds, words, ^
meanings etc. - are but points in the structure, or network, of relations". ’
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Language, in both linguistics and ’cultural analysis', is from the point 
of view of structuralism best seen in terms of units or functions and 
relations between them. The elements of the system only r,oA, their content 
from their formal nosition, their location in the structure. This was 
the main thesis of Saussure, the founder of the analysis of signs (semiol- 
ogy) and the founder of the structuralist school of linguistics. It is the 
central aspect of the structuralist problematic; the point at which its 
historical existence in linguistics meets its contemporary form in 
cultural analysis. In the latter form, all aspects of 'culture' (including 
economic production) are to be seen as languages. Every cultural artefact 
has its outer, transitional, concrete shell which is the reality of its 
structure. Units of culture "derive their existence and essence from their 
interrelations" - to transpose Lyons' dictum. Units or elements are 
concrete only because of the relations between them.
Given this concept of the phenomenon, the structuralist 
problematic has as its object the structure, the relations between the 
elements which produce those elements. For, in this problematic, to 
focus on the elements themselves without examining their internal relations 
is madness, since to do so would be to avoid the source of explanation and 
would thus be to produce mere speculation or meaningless abstraction. 
Structuralism therefore derides empiricism which sees the 'given' as the 
product of some outer external force and not as a product of the relations
6. Lyons (1973) op. cit. p. 6.
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"between itself and other elements of the structure in question.
The structure is so important for structuralism as its objoct 
that we must grasp precisely what is meant "by it. It is absolutely wrong 
to think that, in structuralism, the elements are anything but the 
creations of the relations. They have no 'relative autonomy'. This 
point can be expressed by drawing four lines on the pare as follows:
By making these four marks, I have created five spaces on this particular 
horizontal, which can be termed as follows:
Now, A, B, C, D, S, are all internally 'blank'. They have been created in 
"their essence and existence" by my act of imposing a vertical structure 
of lines upon an undifferentiated horizontal space. They only exist as 
aspects of the relations between them. They exist only as "points in the 
structure". It is vitally necessary to comprehend this fact in order to 
understand the object of structuralism. The units of a system are not 
determined within themselves for they only exist as places, locations or 
"points" in the structure. The structure is all. Elements are arbitrary: 
they are mere places in the sti'ucture, products of its existence - they 
have no internal determinations. The passage from Lyons, quoted above, 
illustrates this clearly. Lyons illustrates the point that the elements 
of language are purely arbitrary "points in the structure", just as the
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elements of any structure considered "by the structuralist problematic are 
purely and simply constituted by that structure. In conclusion, then, the 
object of the structuralist problematic is structure, the total network 
of relations or systems of differences, which determines the limits of 
variation of its units or elements, as they appear at the empirical 
level as the content.
A critioue of structuralism
Having outlined the object of the structuralist problematic and 
the concepts that constitute it, let us turn to a critiquo of the prob­
lematic. As with the critiaues in the previous chapter, this critiquo 
involves developing the theory of reading ideology that Marxism requires. 
There are five points which must bo made:
1 Structuralism fails to deal with a structure in its 'historical'
aspect. Structure is seen as a static system of relations. Thus Burgelin 
states correctly that structuralist linguistics views language as
" ... a form not as a substance, that is to say, as a pure system of differ­
ences, in which what determines the value of each linguistic unity is 
not a relation of absolute character which may be maintained with some 
non-linguistic entity, but its situation within the system of language."
Structure is a form, a "pure system of differences", which produces the 
content. But how does a structure change and develop? And how did it 
form in the first place? Structuralism cannot answer these questions, 
except speculatively, since elements have no lives-in-themsolves (they 
have no internal determinations) and hence no movement. The relations(or 
structure itself) have no movement either, for that would entail some 
causative factor outside the structure itself. Clearly, in structuralism, 
a structure cannot be the cause of its own movement because the relations 7
7. Olivier Burgelin Structuralist analysis 
Radio and T.f. Culture Research Institute:' and mass communications (1968 Nippon Hoso KyokaiJ p. 154.
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constituting the structure have no internal determinations (just like the 
elements or units). The structure is simply a system of differences or 
relations "between the elements' or content, that is, relations only 
exist as links "between elements. Therefore, just as elements exist only 
as poles in the relations, or points in the structure, and therefore lack 
internal determination, so, too, the relations exist only as links 
"between the poles or the connections "between the elements and lack inter­
nal determination. All together, then, real movement is impossible 
within a structure. Neither the elements nor the relations can change 
their nature - they are conjoined for ever in a static phenomenon.
The absence of this concept of movement or history is one 
which can easily be filled with ideological formations (or assumptions) • 
such as the Absolute Logos or the Absolute Telos. Some external body can 
easily be taken as the ultimate cause or the ultimate goal, and henco as 
the cause of a posited movement. A good example of the realisation of 
this possibility, a possibility created by the absence of a concept of 
history in structuralism, is provided by Lévi-Strauss. He declares 
structuralist linguistics to be a science, because it has
" ... reached beyond the superficial conscious and historical expression 
of linguistic phenomena to attain fundamental and objective realities, 
consisting of systegs of relations which are products of unconscious 
thought processes."
In registering this point, he has partly provided an example of my critic­
ism in that he praises structuralism for having got beyond the "historical 
expression of linguistic phenomena". By this stroke he excludes from 
structuralist 'science' the possibility of a theory of history. He prov­
ides full example of my criticism when he goes on to ask:
"Is it possible to effect a similar reduction in the analysis of other 
forms of social phenomena? If so, would this analysis lead to the same 
result? And if the answer to this last question is in the affirmative, 
can v:e conclude that all forms of social life are substantially of the 8
8. Lévi-Strauss structural Anthropology (l972 Harmon,Isworth: Penpiin)
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same nature - that is, do they consist of systems of behaviour that rep­
resent the projection, on the level of conscious and socialized tho\ight, 
of universal laws which regulate the unconscious activities of the mind?"^
The exclusion of history goes hand in hand with the provision of an 
Absolute Logos. Thus Lévi-Strauss can attempt to locate or "reduce" all 
social phenomena to forms of representation of the absolute lav;s regulat­
ing the operation of the unconscious mind. In structuralism, the compreh­
ension of history becomes reduced to the comprehension of historical 
forms, and, even then, these historical forms are only variants of the 
possible elements of the Absolute Form or Structuring Structure. History, 
as a structuralist discipline, reouires a knowledge of forms, as forms of 
the Absolute Telos or Logos, but no knowledge of real history.
Against structuralism's static structures, I would argue that 
elements and relations have their own internal determinations and hist­
ories. That is, a phenomenon has its own laws of movement which are insc­
ribed in both form and content. These laws may not be the same for both 
form and content and thus there is the possibility of explosive contra­
diction between form and content (relations and elements) and the dissol­
ution of the phenomenon. The realisation of this dissolution is conditional 
upon elements related to the phenomenon in question: the autonomy of a 
phenomenon is literally only 'relative' i. e. the relatcdness of the 
phenomenon to other phenomena is the necessary condition of its generalized 
or social existence and hence its general dissolution. Structuralism's 
lack of a sense of history is conditional upon its concept of one-sided 
structural determination. Once we conceive of a concept of the determinatio 
of the content and a concept of the existence of the whole phenomenon 
within a system of other phenomena, the possibility of a theory of 
history arises. If we take as an example structure, the capitalist mode 
of production, it has a possibility of dissolution because its elements 
have one history (i.e. the hidory of the development of the forces of 
production) and its relations have another (i.e. the history of class 
relations, class struggle). The elements and relations are, of course,
9. Ibid. pp. 58, 59.
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interconnected, but that does not of itself ensure non-contradiction 
and stability. However structuralism's lack of a concept of hirtory is 
also conditional on other elements and absences within its problematic. 
This leads us to the second criticism. 10 But let me first briefly 
summarize this first and crucial one.
Structuralism cannot account for the genesis of tho particular 
form of a thing. It has no concept of history. This entails the absence 
of a theory of the genesis of forms or sets of relations. Such a theory 
is logically impossible within the structuralist problematic, since tho 
form is the causative element. Just as tho form or structure cannot 
cause its own movement neither can it cause its own genesis. And, given 
that the content or elements of the structure are just determined products 
of the structure, the content cannot logically be said to generato the 
form. Structuralism cannot conceive of the emergence of a structure as 
a product of the inability of a prior structure to organize its content 
or elements, its inability to 'structure' its elements. That is becauno 
structuralism cannot conceive of a situation where the form and the content 
are in antagonistic contradiction. It cannot allow for the relatively 
autonomous development of the elements of a phenomenon.
2. Structuralism is a functionalism. The problematic by the very
nature of its concepts and object grants every relation of tho structure 
a function or element (or unit). There is no sense of uneven development 
of a phenomenon or set of phenomena. There is no concept that relations, 
and elements exist within their own time and space, that each aspect of 
the phenomenon has its own integrity or internal determinations.
Consequently there is no concept of relations existing in contradiction 
to elements, nor of the difference between antagonistic and non-antagonistic 
contradictions. 11 For’example, structuralism could not account for the 
possibility of an ideological formation, born within the structure of 
one social practice, being active within the structure of another social
10. All these criticisms will be developed further on in +w
with rexerence to ideology. cn ln this chapter
11. See Mao Tse Tung "On contradiction" in Anne .
Tung: An antholory of his writing /i'oV.p n YnJ. ®mentle (ed-) Mao Tse
J Mentor Books) pjT. 21/]—?41
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practice and losing its place within the original practice. In structural­
ism every element of the system .has its function within the system and th-t 
system is the life-blood of its Emotions: the two are inseparable. 
Relations and functions (or elements) exist simultaneously in structuralism 
in a state of mutual 'causation*. This explains why a structuralist can 
point to the conservative functionalism of Parsons* sociological theory 
as an example of structuralist thinking. 12 In Parsons' social system all 
the roles, institutions and norms (the elements) havo a function for that 
system and are thus harmoniously integrated (the relations). There is no 
sense of contradictory coexistence in structuralism. For oxample, 
structuralism could not explain that, within a system (tho capitalist 
mode of production), two elements (the capitalist and proletarian classes) 
can exist in contradiction or conflict. Furthermore, it could not explain 
why the contradictory relation between those two classes could continue 
without the dissolution of the system. This is because it has no concept 
of the specificity of the conditions which maintain tho systom dospito 
tho antagonism of two of its elements. These absences involve anothor 
central absence: the concept of tho dominance of some relations and elements 
of the phenomenon at the expense of others. This conneots with my third 
point.
3. . Structuralism is an idealism. In any phenomenon, for structural­
ism, the concrete omits are arbitrary and tho relations between them aro 
all important. Thus the concrete is arbitrary and transient and tho 
abstract totally determinant. Put if a system of units had a givon object 
then surely certain units are necessary to that system? It is impossible 
to build a brick wall without bricks. Thus, in some circumstances, wc 
could argue, the elements are as important as tho relations within a 
phenomenon - and, in others, perhaps the elements may be more determinant 
than the relations between them. A passage from Culler illustrates my 
criticism:
12. Sec Burgelin (1968) op. cit. p. 168.
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"In separating the functional from the non-functional in order to recon­
struct the underlying system, one is interested not so much in the 
properties of individual objects or actions as in the differences between 
them which the system employs and endows with significance."
In structuralism, intrinsic properties disappear and arc replaced by 
systems functions. Apart from showing that the structuralist disposoo 
of the "non-functional" aspects of a phenomenon (those aspects play no 
part in an adequate description or explanation of phenomena in this 
problematic), this passage shows that structuralism excludes internal 
determinations from its system (even if it recognises that they could 
exist somehow) and thus leaves a causative residue of relations. Clearly 
the internal qualities of bricks are not important for the structuralist's 
house-building practice - only the relations between tho bricks, the land 
and the builder.
Structuralism cannot remedy its blindness to the 'materiality 
of elements', to their existence as things with properties, since the 
power of the relations in creating the content is the central concept of 
the problematic. Thus it could not conceive of tho possibility, in some 
conditions, of the elements' peculiar properties determining the relations 
between them in some way. For example, given that they have developed 
in practice certain abilities, human beings aro able to havo relations 
of 'communication' with each other and, given that they have certain 
internal properties, x’oeks are unable to have communicative relations.
To develop this argument further, and in a crucial fashion, wc 
have to raise the question of the primacy of tho form or content (relations 
or elements) of a phenomenon. In structuralism, the forms or relations 
are solely determinant and therefore have primacy. In Marxism, however, 
there is a dialectic of determination between form and content, moreover 
a dialectic dependent for its final specificity on other conditions. The 
content determines the limits or 'expression' of the form and vice versa. 
Eut does this mean that content and form are equal aspects of a 
phenomenon? Yes. Neither comes first. They are both aspects of a thing. 
If a thing exists in content then it must have a form, however transitory, 13
1 3. Culler (1975) op. cit. pp. 10,11.
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mobile or loose. A thing has form and content - that is its nature. If 
a thing has form then it must have content. Neither form nor content 
are necessarily visible but they are always there in some way or another. 
Marxism does not neglect content like structuralism. Marxism, in this 
precise sense, is a materialism and structuralism an idealism. Of course, 
the terms 'materialist' and 'idealist' are misleading because they arc 
often used as synonymous for truth/falsehood and reality/illusion.
Clearly I do not use the terms in these empiricist senses. Materialism 
describes a problematic which notes that content is as much a part of a 
thing as form. Idealism describes a problematic which forgets that fact. 
One -structuralist, at least, is aware of this idealism:
"Structure, we are repeatedly told, is not an abstract form but content 
itself, grasped xn its logical organization, but seldom is this article 
of faith mo^e blatantly flouted than in general discussions of structur­
alism ... "
This awareness runs against the structuralist grain however since the 
basicconcept of the problematic grants an arbitrary status and character 
to the content.
4- Structuralism is descriptive and not explanatory. Bccauso of its
inability to talk of movement, contradiction and the specificity of the 
elements, strxicturalism produces descriptions of relations or forms as 
they exist in the given elements or content. As we have noted, the 
specificity of the content cannot be fully explained by its form: a full 
explanation requires a knowledge of the movement of the content and the 
forms which it adopts. Thus structuralism produces a description of one 
side of a phenomenon as it exists at a given point in time and remains 
blind to the historical specificity of that time for the development of 
the phenomenon. It cannot produce a description of the internal 
determinations of both sides nor of the conditionality of the determing 
Power of either, given its concepts. Therefore its description is of a 
limited, static aspect and cannot be the full historical description and, 14
14. Culler, in Robey (1973) op. cit. p. 20.
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in—it s—otherness.
5* Structuralism speaks-of closed systems. This flown from all
that I have said so far. However it is worth emphasizing. Because of its 
central concept of immanent causation - the outward formation of a total­
ity Being an expression of its immanent organization or inner structure - 
it is impossible for structuralism to specify the 'causative* effects of 
the location of a set of phenomena within a wider set for either tho 
relations or elements of the narrower set. That is not to say that struct­
uralists do not do such a thing. But it is to say that, logically, they 
cannot do it within their own problematic. Each system, for structuralism, 
is closed unto itself as a totality and has no effectivity on the relat­
ions or elements of any other totality. It cannot provide for this, for 
to say that a totality acts as a determining element in another set of 
totalities is impossiole since only the internal relations of a totality 
can determine its nature. Mor can it logically say that the elements of 
one system are constituted by the relations of another. Nor can it say 
that the relations of one system are constituted by the elements of another. 
Yet it would have to say these things if it placed one system (A) in its 
place within a system (B) of systems. In such a case, system A would 
have to be seen as an element constituted by the relations of system B.
But that view would contradict the concept of the constitution of system*, 
by the -relations between its elements' And thus structuralism would have 
to speak of A as simply an arbitrary point in B, or of B as an anarchic ag­
gregate of sub-systems A, C, D, E, F etc.. The first alternative, 
when applied to human history, would give a view of society which denied 
autonomy to its elements (e.g. industry, classes, ideology) and made them 
simple reflections of some master structure. Lévi-Strauss tends to thin 
alternative. The second alternative would give a view of society which 
denied any effectivity to the relations between the elements and which made 
the latter totally autonomous. No structuralist could hold such a view
In short, structuralism cannot logically envisage a society as
the conjoint existence of.a set of related, autonomous elements. So if'
we consider a number of systems together tho struc+nr-ii.i.4uoouraiin-t problematic
breaks down: it cannot conceive of a determinant system of systems. It
can only deal with one system at a time, as a di<?r>T<n+„ ,. /uJ-i3^ iexe entity.
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Clearly the inability of the structuralist problematic to think 
of the social totality as a system with a structure and relatively auton­
omous elements is a very serious defect. Consequently some structuralists 
have imported ideological notions to cover the gap. The only way the struct 
uralist can have a concept of the structure of structures (e.g. society) 
is to abandon immanent structural causation. The common standby is an 
Absolute Logos or an Absolute Telos. Hence, as we have seen, Lévi-Strauss 
adopts the 'universal structure of the human mind' as the Absolute Logos 
riding through history. Lévi-Strauss's 'mind-structure' is the form of 
which all social life is the concrete manifestation: it is the absolute 
structure. Clearly this is a religious concept of 'social causation' in 
that an external metaphysical thing i3 made responsible for social phen­
omena and.their interconnections. Structuralism cannot think the internal 
determinations of the 'social', the conjoint existence of things. Zygmunt 
Bauman provides us with another example:
"Nothing but the formal universals of praxis, it3 'generative rules', con­
stitutes the tough, invariant core of human history; and perhaps even this 
can be reasonably claimed insofar as v;e deliberately confine vision to 
the life span of our species, which is, in itself, a historical event 
within a wider context ... the culture-social structure controversy belongs 
organically with the family of issues stemming from the basic experience 
of the dual nature of the human existential status."
"It (culture - C.3.) is, simultaneously, the objective foundation of the, 
subjectively meaningful experience and the subjective 'appropriation' of 
the otherwise inhumanly alien world"
"Karx picked a number of universal, species-anchored features as the 
precondition of social praxis .. "
"Human praxis, viewed in its most universal and general features, consists 
in turning chaos into order, or substituting one order for another - order 
being synonymous with the intelligible and meaningful" "J
15. (1973) op. cit. pp. 146, 1 1 0 , 117, 1 1 8  and 1 1 9  respectively. It is 
interesting, in passing,to note the normative functionalism of Bauman's 
structuralism. Social life moves teleologically towards an ever greater 
order. This is not dissimilar to many statements in the work of Radcliffe- 
Brown and Parsons.
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For Bauman, the Absolute Logos is the universal structure of Human Pt-axi- 
and the absolute Telos is order, and thus all social phenomena aro reduced 
to the concrete manifestations of this abstract, transcendental, innately 
human capacity to 'order' the world. To put the criticism of this in 
terms of my own concept of social practice: just because the formal 
aspect of social practice is constituted by its elements and relations does 
not mean that specific social practices and their specific products are 
immediately comprehended. To comprehend a social practice in it a oxact 
specificity we v;ould need to know its formal and its material aspects, wo 
would need to know both. We could not understand journalism simply by 
knowing that social practice in general requires raw materials, objootc, 
labourers, non-labourers and relations of production, we would need to 
know what those formal aspects of journalism wore in concreto uctuality. 
That is, we would need to know what journalism's raw materials were, what 
its objects were, what were its relations of production etc.. As I said 
before, one formal aspect of the human agency is that human3, physiological 
speaking, have brains, but having a brain did not make a man into a 
Fascist or a Marxist. The exact forms of thought adopted by men can only 
'be understood when we know the concrete social relations within which 
these men act as elements of a definite social formation. Structuralism 
will tend to look for Universal Structures which aro immanent in all 
phenomena considered in their conjoint existence since, because, in its 
very nature, it lacks a concept of the 'social', the effectivity of 
conjoint existence. This tendency is the neco3sary effect of the very 
working principle of structuralism: immanent causation.
Consequences of the critique for a theory of reading icleolor^
I have shown that structuralism is seriously deficient and con.
tains ereat limitations on its ability to generato a knowledge. I sha,,
now turn to the consequences of these weaknesses for- -, + v101 theory of rending
ideology.
S i g n i f i c a n c e  in  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l i s t  p r o b le m a t i c  i s  g i v e n  by tho 
l o c a t i o n  o f  a u n i t  o f  s i g n i f i c a n c e  in  a system  o f  sign-units. A u n i t  o r
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sign only has any 'meaning* or substance inasmuch as it is a point in 
the structure of signs, the system of significance. Thus to dcciphor a 
sign, the structuralist argues that the analyst must know the codo, or 
the relations of the sign-system which give the sign» their meaning. 
Significance only arrives therefore with a system of differences or relat­
ions between signs and can only be created through the uno of that syntom. 
Significance is only possible for those who understand the oodo bohind 
the message.
Consequently, structuralist analysis of ideology is ooncomod 
to decode signs in order to construct the codo which produces the meaning. 
In doing this it is acting strictly in accord with the genornl principles 
of the structuralist problematic. The procoss of deooding si -ns involves 
an analysis of the empirical articulation of signs in conjunction which 
aims to bring out the logical interconnections that arc said to produce 
their significance. Immanent, or structural, analysis, of course, specif­
ies that no outside elements arc to be taken into uocount when determining 
the logical relations of significancc. Tho analyst can only take into 
account the signs as they appear in the text. Hence tho structuralist 
analyst should ideally be a Trappist monk, avoiding all contact with his 
social world. As Barthes puts it:
"But when a myth reaches the entire community, it is from tho latter that 
the mythologist must become estranged if ho wants to liberate tho myth." 0
It is interesting to note that tho absent concept of 'the social* in 
structuralism leads structuralists to take shelter in an imaginary hennotio 
isolation to protect them from the feared, yet unknown, effects of their 
social existence. Burgelin provides an illustration of an explicitly asoc­
ial analysis:
"The essential moment of the linguistic work is, therefore that
ent analysis' of language, in tho course of which om, 1 of imrn*n~
interior relations in the system, by excluding nil that havc^to Y
the relations of the system with man, culture, nooiotv in V Y  Y * '
outer world, whore one makes efforts to establish a 'code” Y
analysis of the structure of the 'message' without hoin /  ’ J Jy r o 'xl :n
other considerations whether it  bo physiologic nave»»*?* (Tuided ty  Qny historic. 1,1 ^ ysioio, io, psyohologio, oooiologio or 167
16. R. Barthes Mythologies (1973 St. Albans: Paladin) p. 197.
17. (1963) op. cit. p. 154.
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The hard., concrete content of the real-worltl-appearancc of the magic 
’structure' must he swept aside. All the structuralist wants in his anal­
ysis is a clear sight of the inner, abstract relations whioh produce r.ign- 
ificance. There is no sense that the full specificity of a thing can 
only he grasped by viewing its inner structure in its specific content, a 
content which can only be understood, in itself, in its socialmd historical 
context. I think it is clear that the relations of signification sought 
by the structuralists in their analyses are purely transccndontal, 
abstract, asocial and ahistorical. Structuralist idealism producer, a 
structure which appears as magic and as if by magic. It has no history 
nor social existence, no physiological or psychological determination:' - 
nothing but itself in its purity as the "systems of pure difforoncon".
Thus, to the critic of structuralist analysis it appoarn that tho structure 
is magical in quality and is produced out of the analyst’s hat by magic. 
Structuralism makes the structure appear by magic in its research practice 
since it exists as a magical form within its problematic.
If we pose structuralist reading the question of the observation 
of the absence or presence of ideology, the answer is clear. Ideology, or 
(in structuralist terminology) tho relations of signification, can bo ’ 
discerned immediately in its effects and, thus, the analyst must observe 
the effects and deduce tho relations from them. Ideology for structuralicm 
is a structure, code or system of relations of signification whioh 
produces the units of significance and is immanent in them. Idoology i 
therefore readable in its elements or effects: i d c o l o ^  
its* effects. Therefore all the structuralist analyst of ideology hao 
to do is to road the content to see immediately its form of* oxiotenco.
In other words, since the content is arbitrary and only constitutes the 
points of the structure with no internal determinations of its own, 
the structuralist can read ideology as it oxists on tho surfaco, 
immediately present in its elements.
Hov; could it be otherwise? The render must not forpot that 
structuralism hae no concepts of history, sccinlity, the uneven develop­
ment of elements or relations, tho internal determinations of element, 
and relations and of contradictions within phenomena. The olemontn of a 
phenomenon are directly the product of ito relations or tom. Therefore
the form is directly visible in its emi+r>.,+ . i ,oiuxc in its content: ideology is transparent in
signs.
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In structuralism it would appear that ideology, with ono foil 
swoop of its assumed sharp blade, cuts through an assumed rrimoval 
continuum of insignificance and effects itself in its creation and creates 
itself in its effects. Thus, in this Garden of L’don concept of the 
emergence of ideology, the magical appearance of ideology in "its existence 
and essence" takes place in the "existence and esoonco" of itc content.
Just as God made man in his ovm image so docs ideology mako its offooto 
in its own image. The absence of a theory of the genesis of forms in 
structuralism is filled by the presence of a magical, quasi-religiouri 
original creation at the boginning of history. Thin notion in a condition 
of existence of Leach's account of significations
"I postulate that the physical and social environment of u young ohild 
is perceived as a continuum. It dorr, not contain any intrinsically nopar- 
ute 'things'. The child, in due course, is taught to impose upon tri­
environment a kind of discriminatory arid which servos to (iirtin.--ui.sli t’. - 
world as being composed of a large number of separate things, onoh labelled 
wiuh a name. The world is a representative of our language categoric.-', 
not vice versa. Because my mother ton.-uo is English, it goerne self- 
evident that bushes and trees arc different kinds of things- , I would not
think this unless I had been taught that it wan the case."18
How similar this passage is to Halloran, Elliott and Murdock's tabula 
rasa journalist v.ho learns ideology in his professional oocinlization 
and Larsons' concopt of tho emergence of norms in the interaction between 
tho tabula rasa Ego and Alter.' All three accounts share the same gap 
created by the absence of a theory of the genesis of forms of ideology.
All three fill that gap by making tho emergence of the ideological form tho 
product of an act of creation by factors external to the human agents at 
the beginning of their relevant history. If the outoido Creator is not 
posited as God, that is not important. Tho point is that tho oroation in
external to the carriers of ideology and is tho not of others whether
they be teaching parents (Loach), guiding senior newsmen (Halloran ot a].) 
or negotiating fellow interactors (Larsons). Structuralism cannot 
produce a structuralist theory of the genesis of forms and has to import 
other theories to fill the gap. These imported theories posit an external 
creator who creates ideology suddenly in its offects and effects it in
,Q m Leach "Anthropological aanectn of language«, animal oRtegoriciL.ond  ^
^ h a i  abuse" in V :"~rTnda (ed.) Mythology (l‘;72 Harmondeworth« lenguin)
p. 46.
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its creation. Tho above passage from Leach illustrates this well. It also 
illustrates the ahistorical, asocial, imiveroaliot concept of homo r.ignif- 
icans who, by his very nature,'has the need and the powor to signify the 
natural world; and it shows how structuralism grants form a dominanoo over 
content ( a child only perceives things v/hen it is carrying nomo knowledge 
of their forms).
Our previous critique had made it abundantly clear, althou«h 
always implicitly, that structuralism was incompatible with dinleotiosl 
materialism. The present applied criticism shov;s hou undielootioal 
structuralism is since it demonstrates the ono-sidod determination of a 
content by form. It also shows how empiricist tho structuralist 
problematic is in assuming that the content (tho offoot of tho form) in 
immediately visible outside any given social prnctioo (literally).
Reading ideology in its effects a la structuralini' is hardly any different 
from the readings of the content analysts - tho only difforonoo is that 
whereas ideology is external to tho content in tho work of tho problemaMe 
of content, in the problematic of form ideology is immanent in its 
content. In content analysis, the ideology of tho communicator producer, 
repetitions of significance which are said to be an index of hi» ideology. 
In structuralism, ideology in intrinsic to the text and not the product of 
an intentional communicator. In both prob]omatics, howover, idoolory in 
immediately read from the text's appearances.
What enables the analyst to read that transparency of ideology 
in its contents, according to the structuralist problematic? Tho usual 
answer given is that the relations constituting idoology aro universally 
recognizable.1^  As Burgolin points out:
"In short there is none exterior to the message which can toll us tho 
significance of one of the elements. Thus we arc ferood to go back to 
the message itself and to admit that the only strict definition of tho 
significance of an element of 'vocabulary'2gf tho maos tnodio i t h e  one 
involved in the context (or the phrases)."'
19. See, for example U. Eco "Rhetoric and ideology in Sue'» Los I’ynteron do 
Paris". International Soc. Sci. Jo. XIX No. 4 (l967)~pp. 551-569 and A.  
Veron "Ideology and social sciences: a communication'll annroach" Semiotic;
3(1) (1971) PP. 59-76.
20. (1968) op. cit. p. 1 5 7.
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As in content analysis,, the signifioancos or tho text arc obvious, they 
are easily and readily available to Anyman. Both tho analysts of form' 
and the analysts of content assume that the discourse of the ideology in 
obvious and readable at the surface level of the text. Content analysts 
embellish their assumption with a count of the Bignifionnt repetitions and 
the structuralists embellish theirs with an emphasis on their rigorous 
extraction of the logic of the discourse. But both only provide 'oovorago' 
for their assumption that tho true ideological discourse is spontaneously 
readable from a text. This is reflected in an interesting fashion in 
Burgelin's article where f.ho seer, structuralist analysis and contont 
analysis as different modes of tackling tho oamo objoot. 21 Content 
analysis is seen as the mode of reading ''manifest contont" (Borolson's 
phrase) and structuralist analysis an tho mode of reading "latent content" 
(Berelsoir's phrase) or form, or "style" (as Burgelin oalls it). Both 
forms of analysis have the name object in a sense, but they each oonoantrat 
on a particular aspect of it: one takes its form, tho other examinos its 
content. I . ig  it in the c&m© in "bctli cnoec* tho virihl vrititi'* of* 
the text, Both forms of analysis tftke as their object, ultimately, 
the £J^-rc:rL,.^^£cn;rsc: the discourse that is apparent in tho spontaneous 
practice of reading a text. In this nenoo both content analysis and 
structuralism are thoroughly empiricist: all they can ooo is tho 'visible* 
discourse of a visible text. Neither problematic can conceive of aspects 
of the textual 'discourse* which are not immediately readable in their 
effects. *’or all its apparently theoretical nature, then, structuralisra
belongs to an empiricist problematic just as much as content analysis.
Each mode of reading'ideology is a wing of another entity: tho problematic 
of empiricist epistemology. This problematic has as its dominant aspect 
tho concept of the immediate identiliability of tho oasenco of a thing in 
its visible impression. As ono wing, structuralism thinks it can identify 
- the essential form of the thing in its visible impression, and on tho 
other wing, content analysis thinks it can identify tho essential 
content of the thing in its visible impression.
Consequently tho structuralist reading o f  ideology is undisput- 
edly non-dialectical, idealist and empiricist in nature. Thcuo d e fioion oio  
have several consequenco3. They can be listed as follows:
21. (-1963) op. cit.
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1 Structuralism cannot comprehend the p o s s i b i l i t y  of an ideological
formation which is born within one social practice yot lives on in 
another practice (perhaps even a practice within a different mode of 
pi ocluct ioil j • ..ithin structure-list theory there can be no c o n c e p t  o f  the 
historical fragmentation, overlap, lag or prematurity of ideological 
formations: ideology for structuralism is a contemporaneous system of 
elements without a historical dimension. Similarly s t r u c t u r a l i s m  
cannot comprehend an ideological formation w ith  internal discontinuity, 
fragmentation and looseness; all its ideologies are neat, fullv- 
functional, cybernetic systems.
2 Some relations of signification in a system may beget units 
which are repressed by other units or relations with whom they co-exist 
in contradiction. Such repressed units may therefore he absent on the 
surface text. Similarly, some units of significance may be the products of 
histoiically ^rior relations of signification, thus the units may appear 
at the level of the text without their original constituent relations.
Again, «n ideology's relations with another ideology may no longer be 
effective in different social conditions. Some units of significance
may be more dominant in one period than another. Structuralism cannot 
allow for any Ox these possibilities within the strict terms of its 
problematic. With its mode of reading ideology as a total system present 
at the level of the text it cannot detect the absence or presence of 
these possibilities and hence it cannot guard against their harmful 
consequences for its method.
3 The relation with, or function for, society of an ideological 
formation in a particular conjuncture may demand, of necessity, 
particular relations of signification or particular units of significance.  
Particular units of significance may be socially necessary conditions of
a mode of production and yet their allegedly constitutive significant 
structure or relations may not yet exist; in fact, the relations in ouch 
a situation could be produced by the units! In some social conditions 
an ideological formation may find itself in rupture through no internal 
contradiction of its own. Structuralism's inability to conceptualize the 
social determinations of ideology results in its oversight of the possib­
ilities of the dissolution of an ideology, and of the determining effect 
of the significant units. Thus, structuralism is weak in that it relegates 
units of significance to a passive, subordinate role. The task of invest­
igating the relations between particular units of significance and 
particular social practices is one that structuralism has neglected and,
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from my formulations h.ere and in previous chapters, seems to be the key 
direction for a Marxist reading of ideology.
In chapter two, in agreement with Althusser, I posited that the 
general nature of ideology was that it was always an aspect of a social 
practice (after man had ceased to be an animal) and, therefore, always 
mobile in its materializations or content. Structuralism cannot- see that 
the content of ideology must be grasped in its social, historical signif­
icance and that this significance of ideology must be grasped in its 
content. Without this dialectical, historical, analysis of ideology, any 
reading must become either the production of systems of abstracted and 
abstract forms, lacking in content, a la structuralism, or the production 
of random samples of formless contents a la content analysis.
4 Struct\iralist readings of ideology can only result in limited 
descriptions of apparent relations of signification and cannot explain the 
existence of changing, socially-situated, ideological formations. This 
explanatory absence is built into its practice of reading which is a 
method for producing a description of the spontaneous impressions of a 
static form. Spontaneous impressions of a temporary, static form can 
never pose as theoretical explanations of a moving content. Structuralist 
practice has no concept of the dialectic of significance and hence its 
significations have no dynamic nor any mechanism of development. In other 
words, structuralism lacks a concept of the mode of production of 
ideology and its social and historical location.
5 Structuralism's emphasis on closed systems produces, out of its
practice, ideologies which are discrete, isolated and asocial phenomena.
Ironically, it is true to say that the structuralist problematic takes
the sign out of the "heart of social life" and the society out of "the
22science that studies the life of signs within society". This crucial 
absent concept of the social aspect of the significance of signs, in the 
heart of its science, its problematic, leaves a space which can only be 
occupied by non-social concepts of the social. As we have seen, homo 
significans and the Universal Mind have appeared as substitiles. Thus 2
22. Saussure's phrases. See F. de Saussure Course in Gmrrai
(1974 London: Fontana) p. 1 5. --------
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structuralism has no tools to provide a reading of social and historical 
significance, merely the limited equipment for a reading of non-social, 
temporary relations of signification.
Structuralism at work
The operation of structuralism in the practice of reading
ideology can he illustrated hy Melvyn Slater's otherwise excellent
23dissertation Lévi-Strauss in Fleet Street. This text is suitable for 
such an exercise- since it is structuralist whilst not being concerned 
vith developments in French semiology and since the reading it contains 
is of the English press reports of political demonstrations in the same 
period (September and October 1968) as that used in Halloran et al.'s 
Demonstrations and Communication. I shall not make a direct comparison 
between Slater and Halloran et al. but will proceed straightaway to an 
investigation of the effects of structuralism on Slater’s reading practice.
Slater claims to show "that the structuralist method of myth
24analysis can potentially be used in the Marxian critique of ideology".
His specific project is to demonstrate that the "Great Student Plot" of 
1968 (elaborated in the mass media) is a myth in the sense that myth 
integrates langue (language) and parole (speech) into an inclusive total­
ity. This intention immediately alerts us to a structuralist display of 
functionalism. The ’integrative' functions of the relations or form in 
the myth, and the theme of closed systems in the notion of the inclusive 
totality are classic aspects of the struct viral ist problematic. 234
23. (197c) op. cit..
24. -Ibid. Preface.
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" ... an attempt will "bo made to demonstrate that the structure (of the 
myth — C.£. ) is generated "by a small set of logical (and practical) 
contradictions embedded deep in the centre of the ruling ideology of 
capitalist society: and hence its relation of transformation to many other 
'structures' of this society."^
Slater wishes to demonstrate further that this myth is transmitted by all 
the newspapers of the "established" press in this period and that its gen­
erative relations are effective in the reports of other kinds of militant 
action and protest. This is a classically structuralist object - to 
shov; the one-sided determinism of a system of relations.
In an early discussion of ideology, Slater slides into the 
structuralist notion of the mode of appearance of the structure in its 
effects: immanence. He is considering the relation between "praxis" and 
"representations" and produces a schema which allows for two modes, homo- 
ology and inversion. Within the structuralist problematic, with it3 concept 
of immanence, of course, only these two relations are possible. The early
27Marx would have described them as the mirror-image and the camera obscura. 1 
These modes of appearance are the double articulation of the central 
structuralist concept of immanence: the governing role of the code, the 
langue, the relations, or the system of difference and the arbitrariness 
of the units of significance as 'reflections' of the 'deep structures', 
as the discourse of the generative grammar. Thus, armed with the concept 
of immanence, Slater sets out in search of the inevitable homologies and 
isomorphisms (transparencies). 256*
25. Ibid. P. 83. This particular quote is also heavy with a notion of the 
Absolute Source. Unable to relate closed systems, structuralists must 
specify one source for all the systems, which is usually 'external* to 
them. Here the deep structures of ruling class ideology performs this 
originating lole they are a direct product of the deep structure of bour­
geois society: the capital/labour dialectic. See pp. 116-17S
26. Ibid. p. 88.
27» I® curious to note, in passing, that Lévi-Strauss says that Kart 
noted other transformations beyond the 'mirror-image' and cites the Intro­
duction to. the Grundrisse (1957) and the Eighteenth Brumal 7* T T 7T ~ ~
o f  Marx's "works of the break") which indicate the develop!^ concept of 
the relative autonomy of levels of the superstructure (the "artistic" and 
the politico-legal, respectively). He states that Marx went to great 
lengths to discover these complex transformations. And then with 
amazing blindness to the effect of his own problematic, he goes on to allow 
the possibility of ignoring content and argues for proceeding to unravel 
the forms, and their transformations, until we "uncover ... an ideal 
homologous relationship between the different structural l e v e l s "  See 
Lévi-Strauss (1972) op. cit. PP. 333, 334. *
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He "begins by applying structural linguistics and declares that
the "surface meaning" "of the myth is not "the" meaning of the myth. Inst­
ead, he argues, the meaning of a section or "episode" of the myth must
(be sought at a deeper,level:
: I 
("Rather the episode should be thought of at first as a content-neutral 
(in a sense, mathematical) structure, the meaning of which is discovered 2
by its relationship to other^gtructures within the same myth (or other 
myths in the same culture)".
Thus it is that he outlines par excellence the basic principles of the 
structuralist reading of ideology.
<
Methodologically, the immanentist imperativo is taken Tip in
c
Levi-Straussian style. This requires the delineation of the functions of
tthe system, in Levi-Straussian terms, the "gross constituent units", which 
in the-terms I am using, are groups or classes of elements. The grounds 
for classification are unclear, except that there are "similarities" among 
the units or functions of a class. Versions or variants of the myth must
i
then be analyzed to discover the laws of their permutation which leads 
to the discovery of the myth's"deep structure" or, again in my teme, 
the form of the ideology. Classical structuralism thisi The relations are 
read off from the units on the principle of transparency derived from 
the concept of immanent causation. The meaning or social significance 
of the units is assumed in order to put them into classes: of course, 
presupposing a knowledge of the relations of the code which the structuralist 
is supposed to he 'discovering*.
To his credit, Slater critically notes that the analyst must
have some notion of the structure he in looking for from the beginning,
29otherwise he could not group functions or units. He deolares this to be 
a weakness of the structuralist method and thereby commits an error, in 
my view, because, from my analysis earlier, it is clear that the structur­
alist theory of ideology grants no significance to the units outside their 
constituent relations and'that historical, social or extra-systemic cignif- *29
v
23. (1970) op. cit. p. 20.
29. Ibid. pp. 33-36.
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icance is an absent concept. Structuralist theory holds to a closed system 
with a functionalist concept of its nature and cannot, strictly speaking, 
recognize the social significance of the functions. Hence the methodolog­
ical "flaws" are a necessary aspect of the theory in action - they are 
not simply a defect in its application. The theory could 'work* no other 
way. The analyses of Lévi-Strauss and Slater could not be done without 
an imported ’knowledge' of the social significance of the functions which 
enables the production of social theory of the relations. Unfortunately 
for the structuralists, this does not mean that the theory is wrong and 
the method right. It means that the critique of structuralism advanced 
here is illustrated by their practice. Even their method is rut 'right'; 
since the 'knowledge' of the socially significant functions is ex cathedra, 
unexplicated. The method of structuralism thus lapses into empiricism 
because it allows the social significance of the functions a privileged 
position as pre-given, 'raw data'. Structuralist theory is empiricist in 
its concepts and this predicates a method which is empiricist in practice. 
"Transcendence" of the "flaws" in the "technique" i3 not the solution to 
structuralism's problems. Only the provision of a theory of reading 
which takes into account the social significance of the functions could 
be that: a provision that is impossible for a rigorous structuralism.
Without such a theory v;e can only say that the social significance of the 
units, postulated ex cathedra by the structuralists, is spontaneously
read and hence conceals the laws of the production of social significance
30in its visible impressions.
In passing, we should note (since it later develops an importance) 
that Slater at least doubts Levi-Straiiss' s view that the structuralist 30
30. Prom lis analysis of Lévi-Strauss's analysis, Slater concludes that 
Lévi-Strauss actually has a theory of myths up his sleeve anyway, .based on 
his use of "sequences" and "schemata" v.'hich represent the synchronic and 
diachronic "axes" of the myth. Lévi-Strauss has stated earlier that myth 
integrates synchronic and' diachronic time referents. Slater is analyzing 
Lévi-Strauss's "The story of Asdiwal" in E. Leach (ed.) The Structural 
Study of ”• th and T o temism 1968 London: Tavistock) pp. I-48. This, 
however, is not an answer to my criticism since that theory of myth is 
unexplicated, and, in any case, significance is still granted to the 
functions prior to analytic categorization into "sequences" and "schemata". 
Slater senses this and weakly argues that "we do have to start somewhere" 
(p.52).
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analysis of myth (ideology) tells us something about the universal struct­
ures of the human mind. For Slater, "structural analysis" attempts
" ... to discover the relation between the myth as an aspect of the super­
structure of a society, and its material infrastructure. It is also con­
cerned with mythic thought as a 'relatively autonomous' superstructure, 
and thus with fqjmal mythic structures, transformations, anu various logic­
al operations."”1
The object of Marxist structural analysis seems to be combined viith the 
object of structuralist analysis in an \mholy alliance. The dominant 
problematic is the strxicturalist one because the relation between 'base' 
and 'superstructure' in Slater' 3 conception is somewhat direct and one­
sided, involving a non-dialectical, immanent causation. Thus the 
combination of structuralism with the "Marxism critique of ideology" he
mentioned in the beginning only leads to a structuralist revision
32rather than a development of Marxism. Consequently Slater's many passing 
references to the relation between myths and social practices fail to 
take any 'grip' or 'bite' in the analysis - his own problematic provides 
us v.'ith a good example of an antagonistic contradiction between relations 
o f  signification involving the repression of some significant functions!
When we arrive at Slater's analysis, t h e  s c e n e  i s  s e t  b y  h i s  
announcement that he will amalgamate in fo r m a t io n  theory, Lukács' notion 
of the totality and structuralist analysis of myth. He wonders whether 
they are compatible and decides that the task of explicating the grounds 
for their compatibility would recuire a "philosophic, and necessarily 
massive dehate" and is therefore outside the scope of his dissertation. 
Under the weight of that task, I am inclined to say that he was right to 
continue with the problem unsolved, because the three theories are com­
patible. Information theory involves a concept of a static system of 312
31. (l$70) op. cit. p. 68.
32. This can be illustrated by Slater's ambivalence over Lévi-Strauss's 
"universal structures of the human mind". The struggle between Slater's 
orthodox Marxism and Lévi-Strauss's idealism is explosive. Marxism loses: 
see up. 73, 74. A more direct illustration is the whole of Ch. 3 which 
revises Marxist theory by formula4ions which implicitly deny the 'feedback' 
role and relative autonomy of ideology in s t r u c t u r a l i s t  fashion, while in 
true Marxist fashion constructing, at a minimal level, a dialectic 
betvieen relations and functions of signification.
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relations and functions which means that significance is internal and auto­
matic and the Lukacsian concept of the totality sees each part as an 
expression of the whole, that is, it sees the functions a3 expressions of 
the structure or system of relations. Both are highly concordant with 
the structuralist problematic. The crucial consequence for Slater's 
Marxism is that he becomes concerned to show that myths are functions of 
the three base relations or the three aspects of the determining struct­
ure. These three relations are:
(a) "Contradictions within praxis";
(b) '"Contradictions between ideology and a changed praxis";
33
(c) "Intellectual contradictions within ideology itself".
In classic, but complex, structuralist style, Slater has posited an 
abstract universal structure as the source of the specific mythic discourse 
under observation. Typically, there is the central absence of the material 
dialectic between these contradictions and their consequent ideology.
Also, does the 'resultant' ideolo¿’y really resolve them? May it not be 
in conjunction with them and play a determining role? That is, might the 
contradictions be overdetermined? Where is the inbuilt explanation (the 
mechanism) of the changes in these contradictions? Might not the nature 
of the contradictions repress the emergence of an 'ideology-as-solution'? 
Are these relations or contradictions simultaneous historically with 
their 'ideology-as-solution'? Might not the 'ideology-as-solution' have 
been generated in an earlier social formation? What accounts for the form 
of these relations as "contradictions"? All these problems, and more, der­
ive from the structuralist problematic and its lack of a theory of the 
social nature of ideology.
Since those fundamental relations are given in modern capital­
ism, says Slater, there must be a myth-producing agency. There is, and he 
contends that it is the 'mass media'.^ He implies that the media is the 
only myth-producing agency. The concept of the Absolute Source seems to 34
33. Op. cit. p. 82.
34. Ibid. p. 95.
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have appeared again in -the disguise of the mass media as the oracle of
bourgeois mythology. He goes on, inevitably, to argue that the press i3
a function in a system of relations and expresses the relations that
35make it so in a direct, immediate fashion. Its constituent relations are 
immanent within it. Thus every relation of signification within the 
system of press mythology is seen as a transparent function of the 
relations that give press mythology its function in the social totality.
As a natural consequence, Slater hopes that the use of structuralist 
method will lead him through binary oppositions (relations) in the myth, 
through the contradictions for which the myths act as solutions and to "the
37contradictions in the real basis from which they are transformations".
My argument that the structuralist problematic was fundamentally idealist 
is evidenced in strength here. The concept of reading off relations from 
functions.in this problematic when put into Marxist terminology leads an 
avowed Marxist to try to discover the "real", material conditions in 
their transformations in the realm of mythologies!! To understand the 
•real’, Marxism starts from the real, not from spontaneous impressions 
of the mythicalI
"And as in private life one differentiates between what a man thinks and 
say3 of himself and what he really is and does, so in historical strugg­
les one must distinguish still more the phrases and fancies of parties 
from their real organism and their real interests, their conception of 
themselves from their reality."
Without delving into the minutiae of Slater's analytical pract­
ice, let us note that he proceeds to discern, from a "piece" of the 
press discourse of the period, a number of binary oppositions e.g. the 
police get insufficient publieity/the demonstrators too much, the police 
are supported by the old/the demonstrators by the young. Each significant 
function ("pieces" of discourse) involves a binary opposition (a relation) 
and each function of that binary opposition involves another binary 
opposition e.g.:
35. Ibid. pp. 95> 96-
36. To give Slater his due he is much more systematic than some other 
structuralists: he deftly places sub-systems into wider systems and 
maintains his 'cool'. The fact that he has no solution for the problem 
of the inclusive nature of each totality does not seem to bother him.
37. Ibid. p. 9 6 .
36. K. Marx The Eighteenth Brumaire of Lo\iis Bonaparte, in K. Marx and P. 
Engels (1973) op. cit. p. 120.
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significant function
Vast majority Small minority Militants Moderates
(small minority) (vast majority)
Some "pieces" of discourse, we may comment, are found to be "poor". They
lack "enough data". For a structuralist analysis to proceed "the text
39must provide contents and repetitions, at least". How similar this i3
to the problematic of content analysis which also 'requires' contents and
repetitions! The existence of content analysis and structuralism within
the same wider empiricist problematic forces both of them to look for
the 'given' content and its repetition (which seems to provide more
certainty of the giveness of the content as data). Clearly some "piecos"
of the discourse are denied social significance by Slater since they
apnear not to be the functions of structuring relations. At the same 
AOtime,+ he argues that he knows the significance of those pieces since he 
is a "member of the potential public"! This 'knowledge' of the code is 
no use however for Slater, because it must be "expressed explicitly for 
analysis", therefore he supposes that the news features will act as 
"code sheets" containing all the relations of the structure.^ 1 And, thus, 
he selects certain news features as "code sheets" for definitive analysis. 
In brief, we can say that here we are observing the operation of select­
ivity built into the structuralist problematic. This selectivity exists 
even though the analysis is supposed to be of all the "data", of all 
the'variants of the myth'. Structuralism cannot live up to its own prom­
ises by its very nature.
All the time during this investigation of the complex structure 
of constituent relations, the functions, which are only given by these 
relations, are granted social significance. For example, the function 39401
39. (1970) op. cit. p. 120.
40. Ibid. p. 121.
4 1. We see that the discourse must appear in the 'visible content' or else 
it is abandoned. 'Code sheets' are only devices which provide 'content'. 
Again this is highly similar to the practice of content analysis which 
analyses the repeated 'visible content' as an index of 'the disco\u‘se'.
42"spy" is taken to summon up notions of 'cracking international plots', saving "the Viest" from disasters, investigation of the enemy etc., etc.. 
Slater is not supposed to "know" this without a knowledge of the constit­
uent relations. He claims he does - as v ë  have seen, because he is a 
"potential member of the public". This fundamental problem for structural­
ism has as its necessary condition of existence two inextricably linked 
concepts: (l) the concept of the existence of a "common universe of 
discourse" (the concept of ideology as a discrete, monolithic system),
(2) the view that significance is produced in a logical system and can 
thus be elucidated solely by logical reference. Slater adopts both, and 
the problem is raised that: if there is a common universe of discourse, 
Slater's Marxism-must hold that the contradictions in capitalist societ­
ies only exist at the infrastructural level, and not at the superstructural 
level. That is, the adoption of the 'consensus' solution of structuralism 
implies that the superstructure is a direct, one-sided, passive function 
of the relations of the infrastructural system; a satisfactory resolution 
of contradictions in the base! Thi3 is a Marxism that Marx (with his 
concepts of dialectic, antagonism,relative autonomy and complex struct­
ures) would not have recognized.
Having outlined a complex series of binary oppositions, immed­
iately 'underlying' the selected pieces of discourse, Slater attempts to 
discover the contradictions for which the structure of the myth are a 
solution. These contradictions are at the level of ideology (in his def­
inition of the concept) which 'mediates' reality and myth. 'Ideology', 
unsurprisingly, seems to be equivalent to the "collective consciousness", 
a universal code of discourse. Earlier Slater had commented on the 
repeated appearance of certain significant functions:
"It suggests that at one and the same time the Press is using a pre­
existent (ideological) language, and also transforming that language. It 
was a pre-existing language because in order to represent an event such 
as the demonstration in the first place it draws upon various codes 
already present in the 'collective consciousness' of the public: Commun­
ists, trouble-makers, militants, foreign agitators, 'Londoners', violence, 
revolution, extremists etc.. It transforms the ideological language to 
some extent, by changing the meanings associated with expressions form­
erly considered to have different, or othervdse quite common meanings ... 
.. there is a real sense in.which nothing happens ... and what is 'new' 
is not really news at all."r 423
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42. (1970) op. cit. p. 134.
43. Ibid. p. 142.
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As -the myth producing agency the 'mass media' thus operate with the univ­
ersal "public" ideology as their instrument of production. Using Leach' 3 
concept of the creation and nature of the constitutive relations of 
ideology,^ Slater then discusses several examples of constitutive ideo­
logical relations vihich all seem to boil down to one binary opposition: 
humanity/pi'operty. Are we to be surprised that this is the ultimate, 
deep structure of ideology when Hegelian Marxism, with its focus on the 
dialectical Logos, capital: labour, is combined with a structuralist S
problematic? The inability of structuralism to conceive of dialectically 
related systems in a complex, historically determinate, structure-in- 
dominance results in an Ultimate Source. Hegelian Marxism must posit that 
source to be the capital/labour structure, or, in other terms, the oppos­
ition humanity/property. As regards the "student revolt", the ultimate t 
source is the ideological "contradiction" or structure: Students as humans/ s 
Students as investments. Students as humans are part of "Us" and have J-
the normal characteristics of Everyman. Students as investments are the a
commodities of technological capitalism. V/hen "rebel students" come along n 
they "fuse the two roles" or, if you like, they exacerbate the contradict­
ion for they are both humans and commodities. They can only be represent- 1 
ed within the units of this structure and, therefore, three solutions are i
46 Lpossible:
(a) Rebellion is denied. If there are too many rebel students to make c
this possible the rebels are presented as the tiny minority, thus negat- 1
ing the rebellion;
(b) The rebels are students as humans. That is they are not really students11
at all. They do not work, or they are professional revolutionaries, or V 
they cannot play student roles properly; h
(c) The rebels are fulfilling their correct function as intelligent, B
critical students. Perhaps the adminstration is authoritarian or old- 
fashioned.
Thus these three units of significance are three possible functions of 
the same basic relation or contradiction. Clearly there are other possible *456
44» Ibid. p. 1A2.
45. Slater (1970) op. cit. pp. I69, 170
46. Ibid. p. 171.
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outcomes ox' the "basic structure along the lines of the ones Slater out­
lines (e.g. under (a) a great quantity of rebel students could be seen as 
non-rebels simply making a 'sensible', 'human' protest) but that is not 
important. What is important is that the variants or functions of the 
ideology (in my sense) are reduced to functions of one basic ideological 
structure or original relation which is said to have been made into an 
antagonistic contradiction by some abstract 'human praxis'.
This concluding 'discovery' of Slater' 3 illixstrates everything 
I have said. He has found a deep ideological structure to explain the 
variations in the myth. In typical structuralist fashion, he has, in 
fact, simply described, at a general level, the apparent nature of the 
mythic discourse/ Students as human3/students as investments is not an 
explanatory structure but a description of the apparent key dilemma in the 
discourse of the myth. Only structuralism would try and locate the base 
of an ideology within ideology itself: it cannot provide the concepts with 
which to specify the sociality of ideology. Structuralist readings cannot 
account for the historical or social specificity of significant functions, 
their uneven development, and their determination in a dialectic with 
the elements of a concrete, specific, social practice. This inability is 
inextricably related to the structuralist problematic which is dominated 
by the principle of immanentism, which is a condition of existence of the 
object of structuralist analysis. That object is the structure.; a structure 
which constitutes its effects in its own likeness and which ultimately is 
reducible to one master relation or set of relations, tne Original 
Structure, the Structuring Structure of all History, the Creator. Struct­
uralism, we must definitely and categorically conclude, is fundamentally 
antithetical to Marxian analysis, and cannot, therefore, do anything to help 
us construct a theory of reading ideology, but can only lead us to revise 
Marx's work rather than develop it.
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5 SEMIOLOGY
Introduction
To introduce this chapter it is only necessary to reiterate 
briefly the relevant points made at the beginning of the last chapter. 
•Semiology' is the same as 'structuralism'. The existence of two terms 
for one problematic is an historical accident. The problematic they refer 
to is the problematic of forms, a problematic which sees things as forms 
of something else, as signs of an inner essence. This problematic has 
been outlined, criticised and illustrated in the last chapter. As a 
result, this chapter on the branch of the structuralist problematic known 
as European semiology will be more expositional than critical. The point 
of its inclusion is that this branch or development of structuralism has 
influenced many Marxists and persuaded the present author to do a reading 
of ideological discourse under its aegis. Therefore I would like to give 
attention to the more 'applied' concepts of structuralism in its guise 
as semiology, in contrast to the analysis of the 'pure' concepts of 
structuralism in the last chapter.
Therefore it is the case that this present essay performs two 
tasks. Firstly it is an exposition which constitutes a self-criticism and 
a warning to other students of ideology attracted to semiology. Secondly 
the essay shovjs in detail' what the practice of structuralist reading 
entails. The analysis of Slater's work in the last chapter was only 
sufficient to demonstrate the weaknesses of the structuralist problematic 
in general. The work examined here will provide the more detailed minutiae 
of the reading practice of structuralism. The exposition of the details 
should further enlighten comprehension of the faults of structuralism in 
general. Furthermore the application of the critique developed in
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chapter 4 should enlighten the link between structuralist theory and • 
structuralist practice. Certainly it must "be stated that this chapter 
must he read in the light of the previous, chapter. None of the chapters 
in this text stand on their own and this particular one is especially 
connected to the last.
The concepts of Barthesian semiology
Semiology, as I have said, is the same a3 structuralism. For 
the structuralist problematic, the world is only a world of appearances. 
Nothing exists in its own specificity - everything is a sign for some­
thing else, its real essence, contained deep within it. I shall quote 
several passages to illustrate this basic point extensively. Barthes 
has said:
" ... as soon as there is a society, every usage is converted into a 
sign of itself...
He conveys the basic tenet of structuralist discourse that the real is 
nothing but the content of a sign-form, and that it is only intelligible 
in that form. Umberto Eco argues:
"Ue only know a cultural unit communicated to us by means of words, draw­
ing or other means. For the defence or destruction of these cultural 
units as for others such as /freedom/, /transubstantiation/ or /free 
world/ men are even ready to go out to meet death. Yet, death, once it 
has arrived, and only then, constitutes the one and only referent, or 
event, that cannot be semioticiged (a dead semiologist no longer commun­
icates semantic theories). But ri ~ht up to the moment before, "Death" is 
mainly used as a cultural unit."
1 . R. Barthes Elements of Semiology (1967 London: Cape) p. 41.
2. U. Eco "A semiotic a-nro?ch to semantics" Versus 1 (19 7 1) p. 23.
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Freedom and oppression are mere forms (or signs) without any real 'guts'. 
Sven death is only a sign-form until its concrete side is realised. For 
the semiologist the concrete side of death can never he comprehended, 
since at the point of comprehension he is no longer alive. Life in sem­
iology is the movement of pure form: death is the static quagmire of 
impure hut stark reality.
Form is always extracted from content in the structuralist 
problematic, even in its 'Marxist' variants. Julia Kristeva 
illustrates my point:
"In his study of the capitalist system of exchange Marx showed that it 
is a semiotic system in which money, through a series of mutations, be­
comes the general equivalent or the sign of the work invested in the 
exchanged object. The economic system is thus a semiotic system: a chain 
of communication with a sender and a receiver and an object of exchange 
- money - which is the sicrn of a piece of work."
'Marxist' semiology reduces even the production of material wealth to a 
cybernetic system of forms! Note how Kristeva reduces money to simply a 
sign, a form of value. At no point in Marx's analysis of value did he 
consider the phenomenon one-sidedly. To consider the determinations of 
value as purely 'formal' is to mistake the analysis of the form and con­
tent of the real for the analysis of the foin of the real: such a step 
'Hegelianizes' the Marxian dialectic. Marx's own comments on such struct­
uralist, formal practice are highly appropriate:
"The fact that money can, in certain functions be replaced by mere sym­
bols of itself, gave rise to that other mistaken notion that it is in
itself a mere symbol. Nevertheless under this error lurked a presentiment 
that the money-form of an object is not an inseparable part of that 
object, but is simply the form under which certain social relations man­
ifest themselves. In this sense every commodity is a symbol, since, in 
so far as it is value, it is only the material envelope of the human labour
spent upon it. but if it be declared that, the social characters
assumed by objects, ex'* the material forms assumed by the social qualities 
of labour under the regime of a definite mode of production, are mere
3. J. Kristeva "The semiotic activity" Screen Vol. 14 No. l/2 (1973) p. 35
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symbols, it is in the same breath also declared that these characteristics 
are arbitrary function's sanctioned by the so-called universal consent of 
mankind. This suited the node of explanation in favour during the eight- 
eenth century. Unable to account for the origin of the pussling forms 
assumed by social relations between man and man, people sought to denude 
them of their strange appearance by ascribing them to a conventional 
origin."^ (my emphases)
It is never permissible in Marxism to separate form from content', leaving 
form as an abstract existence. As Marx notes, this formalist extraction 
leads to the importation of imaginary universels to explain the inexplic­
able. As we have seen, modern structuralism,like eighteenth century 
formalism, has followed this path.
Let us now turn to the concepts of European semiology, having 
reiterated (and hopefully clarified) its basis as a formalist, structur­
alist problematic. To explicate these concepts I shall use the work of 
Roland Brrthes, the leading European semiologist. I choose his work be­
cause of the extent of its development.
Barthes' commitment is to the reconstitution of the rules with­
in which a reading of a literary text or "cultural unit" (Eco's phrase) 
must be elaborated. That is to say, his concern is not to discover 'the'
meaning of the significant item, but to extract the form or structure of
5the item which provides the parameters for any reading of it. In other 
vjords, Barthes sees his task as the elucidation of the ideological 
structures which determine the limits of variation of the significant 
units of the system. To do this it is necessary for Barthes to have somé 
prior knovdedge of the social significance of the units. As I argued in 
the last chapter, this is one of the key problems with the structuralist 
problematic. It does not seem to worry Barthes:
"Semiology is the science of forms, since it studies significations apart 
from their content.V
4. (1974) op. cit. pp. 939 94.
5. See G. Genette "The reverse side of the si.?n" Social Sciences Informat­
ion Vol. VIII (4) (Aug. I909) p. 170.
6. (1973) op. cit. p. 1 1 1 .
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A3 I have shown, the reduction of things to signs should be nothing for 
a Marxist to be proud ofI
In the search for the form or structure of things, Barthes 
employs Saussure's distinction between lanyue (language, as an abstract 
code) and parole (speech or message). For Barthes, langue is a social 
institution:
"It is the social part of language, the individual cannot by himself 
create it or modify it; it is essentially a collective contraot which 
one must accept in its entirety if one wishes to communicate."^
What Marx was saying, about those who separated form from content and, 
then, in puzzlement at the problem they had created, ascribed the origin 
of the form ("arbitrary fictions") to "convention", to the "so-called 
universal consent of mankind", seems to apply to the work of Barthes. 
However, Barthes is no apologetic, bourgeois 'social-contract' theorist, 
and hedges at his produced concept of the conventional, customary origins 
of the language-structure. He proceeds by noting the "manifest affinity" 
of the language-structure, of langue, and Durkheim's concept of the "cons­
cience collective". Novi, Durkheim and Saussure certainly worked in Paris 
at the same time and Saussure was aware of Durkheim's work. But Barthes 
does not investigate this connection further and, instead, opts for the 
solution that in most sign-systems the code (structure) is elaborated
g
by a "deciding group" and not by the "speaking mass". The Logos of the 
Levi-Straussian 'universal structure of the human mind' is thus replaced 
by the Telos of bourgeois ideology. Barthes' position here is no less 
crude or functionalist than Slater's position: since ruling class 
ideology dominates at all social levels of capitalist society and since, 
therefore, ideology functions only for the benefit of the ruling class, 
the origins of ideology lie in its position as a function of 'the' 78
7 . (1967) op. cit. p. 14.
8. Ibid. pp. 23-27 and 31, 32. This concept is practically the same as 
Althusser's location of the preparation of ideology in ruling class- 
dominated, state ideological apparatuses. See ch. 2, supra.
'deep structure' of society, the relation between capital and labour."* 
Barthes, like Slater, sees a society's relations of signification and 
units of significance as a function of the dominance of the bourgeoisie, 
a dominance provided by the deep structure of capital/labour. Consequently, 
elaboration of the langue or language-structure is the privilege of the 
ruling class and the forms are handed out, without recrimination or 
response, to the subordinate classes. Barthes' formulations, like those 
of Slater and some of Althusser's, often resonate a kind of Parsonian 
radicalism!
Parole, for Barthes, is the individual, diachronic aspect of 
language: "an individual act of selection and actualization".^ It is a 
combination of the ability of the "speaking-subject" to use the code to 
create discourse and the "psycho-physical mechanisms" which enable him 
to exteriorise the discourse.'*’' This concept reminds one sharply of the 
notion of homo significans imported by structuralism to solve the prob­
lem of the absent concept of the social emergence of significance. 'Man' 
signifies - men interact - structures of signification are built up - 
language, or langue, becomes a social institution. Again we can note 
the similarity between radical, European, modern, functionalist 
structuralism and the conservative, structural-functionalism of Durkheim 
and Parsons.^
Langue and parole are said to exist in dialectioal process - 
each of the two forms achieves its full definition only in dialectical 
unity with the other. It is within this dialectic that "linguistic 
praxis" exists:
"On the one hand the language is 'the treasure deposited by the practice 
of speech, in the subjects belonging to the same community' and, since it 
is a collective summa of individual imprints, it must remain incomplete 
at the level of each isolated individual: a language does not exist 
perfectly except in the 'speaking mass'; one cannot handle speech except 
by drawing on the language. 91023
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9. See Oh. 4, supra.
10. Barthes (1967) op. cit. p. 15.
11. Ibid.
12. Compare Barthes (ibid. pp. 14,' 15) on parole with Durkheim's account 
of the emergence of social institutions and Parsons* account of the 
emergence of shared value-orientations.
13. Barthes, ibid. p. 16.
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This dialectic is the focus of the semiologist's attention, the purpose 
of vihich is to separate the langue from the speech and hence to constit­
ute "the problematic of the meaning".^ Barthes here explicitly delineat­
es the target from which structuralism extracts the form and content 
analysis extracts the content, the target I mentioned in the last chapter.1  ^
This target is ’empirical’ discourse: discourse perceived in its immediate, 
spontaneous impressions. Barthes merely pays lip-service to dialectic 
here. The concept is an insignificant unit within his discourse; he is 
only interested in practice in the forms of spontaneously observed 
discourse. His actual method of reading does not at all take cognizance 
of those forms as-reflections of a particular structured practice. It 
thus excludes the dialectic between active-speech and passive-language in 
its practical concentration on the passive language or code.
He can now move to the concept of connotation. Connotation 
is said to be the aspect of the discourse which contains the attitude, 
choice, prejudice or intention of the communicating subject. For Barthes, 
connotation is the level where private ideology intervenes in the public 
institution of language. The socially-contractual, arbitrary aspect of 
discourse is conceived of as the level of denotation, upon which layers 
of connotation are added. Discourse is thus constituted by the pure, 
shared level of denotation and the added ’culturally-specific’ level 
of connotation or ideology. Like the American content analysts (and 
many 'non-scientists' such as politicians), Barthes conceives of ideology 
as an intentional, sectional appendage or overlay to the common universe 
of denotative discourse. Language (the denotative level) is tlvus 
separated from the ideology (the connotative level). The former is ’pure' 
and fundamental to social life and the latter is a sordid, motivated, 
•distortion': 1456
14. Ibid. p. 17.
15. See p. 139*
16. Barthes (1967) op. cit. pp. 89, 90.
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"Entrusted with ‘glossing over* an intentional concept, myth encounters 
nothing Tout betrayal in language, for language can only obliterate the 
concept if it hides it, or unma.sk it if it formulates it. The elaboration 
of a second-order semiological system will enable myth to escape this 
dilemma; driven to having either to unveil or to liquidate the concept, 
it will naturalize it."^
Connotative systems of discourse are thus developed to 'naturalize* the 
motivated ideology of the sectional, interested subject or group.
Ideology is thus the unhealthy development of class society. It is 
thoroughly distasteful and muddies the water of denotative discourse:
"The fact that we cannot manage to acheive more than an unstable grasp 
of reality doubtless gives the measure of our present alienation •••"■ 3^
The task of the semiologist Ì3 to scrape away the layer of connotation,
the site of the intentional concepts of ideology, and "liberate" the 
19"significant". Connotative discourse is a parasitic growth on the 
host, denotative discourse.
Denotation is "contractual", the level where "this contract is
collective". Connotation is a sectional form reflecting social and
cultural divisions. The signified referents of connotative signifiers
are ideological "fragments” which have a "very close communication with
culture, knowledge and history, and it is through them, so to speak, that
20the environmental world invades the system". Never has the purity and 
abstract sociality of language (at the denotative level) been expressed 
so forcefully! Perhaps the reader may think that Barthes' ideological 
"fragments" connected to social divisions are very similar to my 
ideological formations, elements in social practices. But this is a 
deceptive appearance, for what Barthes is basically constructing is a 
classically structuralist discourse about two discrete systems of. signif­
icance. Denotation and connotation, for Barthes, represent two 
discursive systems which have an unexplicated co-existence in capitalist 
social relations. Barthes can only talk of the real sociality of 178920
17. Barthes (1973) op. cit. p. 129.
18. Ibid. p. 159*
19. Ibid. p. 9.
20. Barthes (1967) op. cit. pp. 92-92.
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ideology by positing the abstract sociality of 'language proper' or 
denotation. Connotative discourse, for Barthes, is the form in which 
an abstract language appears socially. In my formulations there are no 
statements or even hints that one can extract the form of discotirse and 
ascribe to it a discrete, asocial, abstract existence, sanctioned by 
the "universal consent of mankind". I would hope that I made it clear 
that discourse only existed socially, in social practice, and that its 
form and practical conditions of existence existed in dialectical rel­
ation. The absence of a dialectical, materialist conoept of discourse in 
Barthes' work is inscribed in the very fact that Barthes employs two 
concepts of discourse instead of one. 'Denotation' represents the meta­
physical, agreed forms of discourse and 'connotation' the real, unshared 
forms. The two cannot exist together in the same sphere, hence Barthes 
is forced to separate them. This feature of his discourse reflects 
structuralism's inability to conceive of a material dialectic between the 
social conditions of signification and the units of social significance*, 
structuralism always posits a one-sided determination of the social 
content by its immanent, abstract, non-social forms. Without such a 
dialectic of signifiennee one cannot begin to understand the social 
effect, in certain historical conjunctures, of the dominance of particular 
ideological forms and contents. This concept of the dialectic between 
social relations and forms of social significance is absent in 
Barthesian semiology; an absence which fixes its inadequacy as a 
social theory of ideology, and its positivity as merely a means for the 
subjective description of apparent,immediately readable structures.
The allegedly determinant "structures" or "codes" produced by the practice 
of semiological reading are thus purely abstract in their theoretical 
status: 'abstract' - in that their social reality is never located 
within any specific social practice.
In semiological terms, the structuralist problematic's key 
concepts of relation and function are knovn as the svntagmatic and para­
digmatic "axes" of discourses. Barthes would see every discourse as a 
discrete phenomenon, as a closed system of units or signs. The divisions 
or differences which produce the units or functions exist at the syntag- 
matic level. The units available to a given system exist at the 
paradigmatic level. The syntagm is the division of the continuum which 
is the 'blur of reality'. It is the fundamental operation of a discourse 
since the creation of these "divisions" prodxices the "points of the
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structure" known as the units. ' Thus the syntagmetic level of a discourse, 
in general structuralist terminology, is composed of the relations(or 
system) which constitute and establish the units or functions. Within 
a particular syntagm or discourse-system, only certain units or sign- 
functions are possible. Terms which are equal in that they serve as 
variants of expression of a point in the system stand in "paradigmatic" 
relation to each other. Thus, when making a semiological reading of 
a discourse, the analyst uses what is called the commutation test. If 
he suspects that term X is a function of relation A, he supposes that 
there are other terms which could equally act as functions of relation A. 
Thus he substitutes, in his imagination, the hypothetical terms for 
the term in the text in order to confirm his suspicion that relation A 
is at work. If the substituted terms do not alter the meaning of the 
text then he concludes that relation A (or syntagmatic form A) is in 
operation. ' These three concepts (of the syntagmatic plane, the para­
digmatic plane and the commutation test) are, therefore, simple 
expressions of the basic concept of the structuralist problematic 
(that the structure is the detenninant of the content and that the 
content is only the transient manifestation of its inner formal essence). 
Our criticisms in the previous chapter are applicable in toto to these 
semiological concepts, so I will not go through the tedious process of 
repeating them all. The only thing I will mention again is that these 
semiological concepts are clearly based on an empiricist problematic 
which takes it3 object to be the visible essence of the visible real.
All three concepts presuppose the transparency of the formal essence in 
the substantive content of the text without any theory of why this 
might be the case. Barthes argues that "it is impossible to guess in
advance the syntagmatic units which analysis will discover for each 
23system". However, the semiologist can only act on his suspicions as 
to the operation of a syntagmatic unit or structure because he has 
ascribed a social meaning to the term in the text. So, although it 213
21
2 1. Ibid. p. 64.
22. Ibid. p. 65.
23. Ibid. p. 63.
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is obviously true that the semiologist cannot guess the syntagmatio 
level of an unseen text, once he has made a spontaneous reading of a 
text he has assumed he knows what the syntagma are in the act of granting 
meanings to the units of the text. Hence, semiology forces its pract­
itioners to "guess" sytagmatic units in advance of analysis, in 
typically empiricist fashion.
It must he remembered that semiology claims to he the science 
of all sign-systems whether they "be forms of food, dress, cars, 
literature of ideology. Thus in its analyses it is concerned to extract 
the code (the syntagraatic plane of relations) from the units of the 
system. Some things are seen as complex and combine tv;o systems. Thus 
foods are structured by two systems, the relations between the food-forms 
themselves and the relations between the discursive or linguistic forms 
that refer to the food-forms. Similarly, discursive materials are seen 
as combined systems. They are composed of the system of denotation and 
the system of connotation. Each of these systems is held to be a form 
unto itself and the analyst is held, therefore, to be capable of 
extracting the level of connotative relations from discourse. The two 
systems are combined in a particular way. Barthes makes it clear that 
denota.tion is the base level of all discourse and connotation an added 
level and that, therefore, signs constituted by the relations of deno­
tation constitute the sign ’demonstration' to refer to 'a political 
meeting or procession'. In other words, in the system of denotative 
divisions, the mark 'demonstration' is a particular unit or sign-function, 
referring to 'a political meeting or procession'. The series of units 'a 
political meeting or procession' similarly refers to other sign-functions 
and units (e.g. meeting refers to an organized gathering),which in turn 
refer to yet more sign-functions and so on. Thus, 'demonstration' is 
simply a unit within a whole series of units which are all given their 
unit-ness or function by the relations of denotation i.e. the relations 
between the units. Novi, this sign-function 'demonstration', when placed 
in a connotative system, retains its nature as a denotative sign-function 
but also acts for another system, the relations of connotation. Within 
the latter system 'demonstration' retains its old 'meaning' as 'a 
political meeting or procession' but possesses an additional reference 
as (for example) 'an emotional gathering of militants'. Thus it is that
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Barthes argues that connotation simply adds meaning to the ’pure', 
•linguistic' level of denotation.
The connotation of 'demonstration’ in our example would be,
Q A
for Barthes, a "fragment of ideology".” That is, the reference at the 
connotative level is a sign-function of an ideological system produced 
by real, social life (unlike the sign-functions of denotation which 
seem to be produced abstractly by the magical 'social contract'). Each 
connotative reference is a part in a total system of connotative references, 
just as a denotative unit only exists as such within its system. So, 
for example, the ideological reference 'an emotional gathering of 
militants' presupposes other ideological references such as 'we disapprove 
of militants', 'we disapprove of political meetings', 'militants are 
emotional since they are not rational and level-headed' and so on. The 
ideological sign-function of 'demonstration' only exists as such within 
an interrelated system of ideological sign-functions. In sum, we can 
see that the structuralist notion of discrete, closed systems appears 
in these semiological concepts, which specify two separate sign-systems 
only linked in the practice of signification. This problematic relation 
between ideolory, denotation and practice can now be briefly examined.
It is noticeable that the relation of ideology to social life 
is not mentioned much nor explored in any theoretical depth in semiolog- 
ical work. Semiology cannot really grant origins to the system of 
ideological sign-functions without contradicting itself. Strictly 
speaking, it must say that the functions are products of the relations and 
that the system is totally autonomous and discrete. To illustrate this, 
v?e can comment on the lack of explanation of the view that the system 
of ideological discourse swallows up the system of denotative discourse, 
of the view that denotation only exists abstractly as the neutral 'tool' 
or "raw materials" of ideology. Why should there be two systems of 
discourse and why should the abstract one be the basis of the social one? 
Semiology cannot answer these questions. From a Marxist perspective the 
answers are simple. Social discourse or ideology swallows up denotation 24
24. Ibid. p. 91.
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■because denotation is simply a figment of the semiological imagination. 
The denotative code is simply an abstract form or structure created by 
semiology and not a real part of social discourse. Semiology cannot 
deal with the structure of denotation as a social fact "because it is 
only an abstract form extracted from the content of social discourse, 
at a specific historical conjuncture, and granted the "universal consent 
of mankind". In social reality there is only ongoing social discourse: 
discourse is only expressed historically and socially, in particular 
social practices. Thus Marxism must abandon the concept of ’denotative 
discourse' and, instead, talk of specific, structurally-located, social, 
ideological discourses. It can then focus its attention on the real 
underpinning structures of ideological discourses - the structures of 
specific, historical, social practices. Similarly Marxism can abandon 
the talk of 'discursive systems' in relation to ideology, if it abandons 
formalist structuralism, and, instead, talk of ideological formations
which do not form in exact systems or precise structures. As we have
25said before, ideology exists only in a loose structure, some of its 
forms interconnecting, others being isolated, always lying within a 
particular social practice. Particular ideological formations (such as 
deviance) only exist socially as aspects of definite social practices. 
They are not ;roducts of some abstract form: their 'constitutive 
relations' are thdr connections with other elements of social practices - 
the social relations linking the elements of a practice. The 'idealism' 
of semiological concepts is apparent in their extraction of forms from 
their contents and in their constitution of those forms in neat systems 
which are privileged by the collective adherence of the people to them 
or by the decision of the ruling class to advance them. A materialist 
approach to ideology refuses to separate ideological forms from their 
contents and locates both, concretely, in determinate social practices. 
Thus Marxism doe' not conceive of language as a pure, word-form overlaid 
with social, ideological contents. For Marxism, language is the mode 
m of expression of the social discourse or ideology of a people engaged 25
25. See ch. 2
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in social practices in a particular social formation. There are a 
number of languages and language-forms each linked to the ideologies 
of classes of people engaged in class practices. There is no such 
thing as 'a society's ideology'. Language is the form in which a 
social class expresses its ideologies, hence, in class societies, 
there are as many languages and language-forms as there are classes. 
Thus, for example, in modern Britain the ideologies of members of the 
v/orking class are rarely expressed in 'the Queen's English' or in 
v/ord-forras in general. Perhaps from hitter experience, members of 
the working class believe that 'actions speak louder than words'.
Of course, I do not moan to suggest that, in any given historical 
situation, languages and ideologies are mapped in perfect parallel 
Yiith class structure. The classes with most wealth and power Y-ri.ll 
usually be able, thereby, to establish their langue and their parole 
in the institutions of communication and 'culture'. T o v e r  and wealth 
enable cultural hegemony. HoY-;ever, the propcrtyless, poYrerless 
classes do not accept this vrithout demur; nor are their cultures ever 
smashed as long as they are alive. Hegemony involves conflict and 
struggle rather than submission and uniformity.
A semiological reading of press discourse on political demonstrations
To exemplify the practices of semiological reading I shall 
noY? describe the reading I completed in 1973.
From March 7th 1973 to April 7th 1973 I extracted from the 
newspapers of the English national press (excluding the Morning 
Star - the Communist nev/spaper) all the cuttings (92 in total) Yihich 
contained neY/s-items on 'political demonstrations' taking place in
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the U.K.. Features and editorials which talked about 'political 
demonstrations* were to he analysed at a later (never to arrive) date 
and were to provide-the 'code-sheets' (Slater's term) to confirm my 
analysis of the ideological structures in the news stories. The 
Morning Star cuttings were also to he analyzed later to prove that its 
ideological structures were only the inverse of the 'orthodox''press 
and v;ere within the same frame of reference. That is, I held the idea 
that the whole national press was working within one great system of 
ideology which expressed itself fragmentedly in news stories and 
purely and extensively in editorials and features, and which expressed 
its opposite form in the Communist newspaper. Clearly this was an 
approach of a structuralist or semiological nature which conceived of 
ideology as a socially universal set of relations,as a neat system.
Which cuttings qualified as 'cuttings about political 
demonstrations'? Only those which employed .the term 'demonstration' 
or its variants: 'demonstrated', 'demonstrators' etc., or those which 
reported an event which was "obviously" a 'political march or 
procession'. Thus 'strikes' and 'sit-ins' may have been excluded if 
they were not described by a newspaper as 'demonstrations'. 
'Demonstration' was thus conceived as one sign-function within the 
supposed monolithic, ideological system of sign-functions employed by 
the press.
Having selected the cuttings, each one was analysed in 
great detail - every word, comma and headline being taken into 
account - and a series of relations of signification produced along­
side a series of units of significance or paradigmatic functions. Let 
mo illustrate the practice of the reading by an account, based on my 
notes at the time, of one analysis. 26
26. I assumed 'foreign' demonstrations would be dealt with differently - 
this seems to be true.
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Before detailing my analysis, some precautionary remarks are 
necessary. In the analysis of this cutting, there entered one factor 
which semiologists rarely mention. To all the cxittings, after the 
first few, I would "bring assumptions and expectations about finding a 
systematic ideology. Based on a theory which specifies that all these 
cuttings will express a neat, discrete system of ideology, this 
tendency is perfectly natural. Since the analyst is looking for a 
system he tends to look for elements which repeat themselves. Slater
also noted that the structuralist analysis needed content and.
27repetitions. V.'hen a reader is attempting to extract the 'deep 
structure" from a series of discourses, it is inevitable that he will 
look for repetitions and particular contents that 'catch his eye'. 
Thus, the practice of cemiological reading supports my theoretical 
finding that structuralism is very similar to content analysis - both 
types of reading are based on the frequency of appearance of selected, 
spontaneously observed, contents. In sum, therefore, my reading of 
this cutting was informed by preliminary notions that certain synt- 
agmatic relations or structures were at work. It is necessary to note 
this so that the reader of this text does not think that I whisked my 
reading of this example-cutting out of thin air. It is also necessary 
to note that I assumed that headlines encapsulated the ideological 
message in a nutshell - an expectation which was often seen to be 
true, but not always. Headlines clearly have other, more practical 
functions than this one e.g. drawing the reader's attention. 27
27. See supra p. 149
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‘Sell-out’
protest
by
angry
steelmen
By PET|R WELBOURN 
ANGHY plat’rtrd-wuvinR 
B t e e 1 workers yesterday 
accused union leaders of 
selling out to the Govern­
ment and the bosses.
They were protesting after a conference of dele­gates from 10 unions agreed to Steel Corporation plans for closures and redundan­cies as long as alternative employment was created.
Spokesmen for 30(1 demon- * Enters from Rhotton. Flints— where 0.600 .lobs will lie lost— Knst Moors, Curdiff (4.600) and Cnrbv, where redundancies are also 'threatened, said: "This decision is a disgrace.
Blocked“They are accepting the bosses' plans and standing idly by while we end up at the labour exchange. Whose side ore they on? "All attempts to frame mu­tant resolutions . at the Shef­field conference— or the T.U.C. /tied ronimliaUve committee - vtcrc blocked by Us clitiunmn, 
ti\v David Davies.Afterwards Sir David, general sccrel.iiry of the Iron nnd Steel •Hades Confederation, said: "Strike action would be a matter for individual unions.” 
lie made it clear that the unions would fight to hold up closures until alternative eniploiment has been created.
Daily Express
8th March 1973 p. ! •
My am lysis of this cutting was as
follows:
Headline - 'Angry' lins in syntftg- 
matic rotation to 'pro­
test' (i.e. 'angry':
• protest').
- ''sell-out'' = a slogan 
/.angry:protest:slogan
- ''sell-out'' lies in in­
verted commas and is 
therefore, at the best, 
not granted any legit­
imacy and, at worst, 
disputed. (The implicat­
ion that a 3ell-out has 
not in fact occurred 
supports our reading of 
'''sell-out''' as a slogan. 
The connotations of slo­
gan, and the fact that
the relation angry: pro­
test: slogan has already 
been suspected, streng­
then the conviction that 
angry:prote3t:slogan is 
at work in this news- 
story. At this stage, 
before we read any more, 
we strongly suspect that 
the steelmen will be por­
trayed (a) unfavourably 
and (b) as militant and 
irrational.
PARAGRAPH 1 - 'Angry':'placard-waving'
(Militant irrationality i3 strongly connoted here along 
with the effects of emotion and possibly a Lebon—type
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PARAGRAPH 2
PARAGRAPH 3
Heading
theory of croval-hysteria).
Angry:protest:slogan:action:emotion:irrationality: 
militancy: disapproved.
(At this stage the last three elements of the structure 
are only tentatively posited).
•accused' - implied that at a mininum their 
allegations may not be fair or true, 
very tentatively, the structure workei’s:bosses:: 
unions: government seems to be at work here (That i3, 
workers are in the same relation to bosses as are 
unions to government). This possibility rests on 
the use of 'workers' and 'bosses' in the same 
paragraph - it could have been put in other ways, 
'conference' - reinforces the mild, business schema 
or framework that had been developing by the use of 
'sell-out'. 
accused:'protesting'
the implication is that they are 'protesting' for 
nothing since 'alternative employment' is a condition 
of the agreement. (Protest always seems to be 
pointless i.e. protest: futility is a common structure. 
The implication is, of course, that 'there is no 
need to take to the streets, protest or criticise 
because your leaders will look after you'. 'Leaders' 
was used in the first paragraph).
Protest:'demonstrators' (And therefore 'demonstrators' 
fits into the chain of relations developed during 
the analysis of paragraph l)
'Spokesmen':demonstrators::union leaders:steel workers 
(Note: 'Spokesmen' = an anonymous collective. Do 
they not warrant names as demonstrators?)
'Blocked' follows main headline thus, we get 'protest 
blocked'. (Protests are always 'blocked' by one of 
our great leaders). Thus we expect the following 
paragraphs to describe the block.
Simply presents the full flow of the protest. We wait 
for the application of the 'block'.
PARAGRAPH 4
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PARAGRAPH 5
PARAGRAPH 6
PARAGRAPH 7
The 'block' is applied.
It is applied hy a named 'chairman' (as opposed to 
unnamed 'demonstrators1' 'spokesmen'), who is even 
given his title.
"were "blocked by" - passive tense. The 'militants' 
are active. He, as a moderate-by implication, 
simply blocks militancy. Moderates are rarely said 
to actively attack militants - they merely respond, 
'militant' - this was expected from the above 
paragraphs*
Angry:protest: slogantaction:emotion:demonstrators: 
militants:disapproved.
Sir David Davies is, by implication, a rational, 
passive moderate. Tentatively then we have a 
counter-structure:moderate:rational:passive:approved. 
'All attempts' -strength of Sir David Davies, he 
'blocked' everything the militants threw at him. 
Militancy vías totally defeated (as usual). (Thus to 
our list of related significant units we could add 
/futility/ and /always defeated/.).
'Sir David'. He's obviously very popular. (i 
v/onder if the article went on longer whether he'd be 
called ’Dai'). His surname has been dropped and he 
has been granted more status as the 'general secretary' 
of another body.
'said' — passively no doubt. There's no 'accusations' 
or sloganeering for 'Sir Dadd'.
Regarding the content of his statement, the clear 
implication I would say (from my reading of previous 
cuttings) is that the collective policy is rational, 
sensible and moderate etc. and that as a moderate,
'Sir David' would not impose himself on the unions.
If any of them v.Tanted to engage in irrational 
militancy then that is up to them.
"made it clear" - to those vriio, in their emotional 
state, could not see the moderate, rational nature 
of their leaders' policies.
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’fight* - this cannot mean 'strike' since that was 
said, to he a matter for individual unions. Hence 
we get the relation: 
fightsctrike:{moderate{militant
(Thus 'fight' clearly means 'negotiation'. Moderates 
always 'fight' by negotiating)
- The statement reinforces the point made above that 
the implication is that they are 'protesting' for 
nothing ance jobs will be provided. 'Sir David' 
makes that 'clear'. (So there is a slight sense 
. of puzzlement in the article as to what they are
protesting fori I think the question is answered 
by the conceptions of 'militants' and 'demonstrators'. 
They are usually motivated by more evil purposes 
than the ones they claim).
This kind of rigorous reading is, of course, totally 
speculative. One can see clearly how it is just one radical's spontaneous, 
close reading of a news-cutting. The natural after-effect of such a 
reading is to believe that one is watching a ruling class ideology 
in operation. After doing this kind of analysis painstakingly through 
92 cuttings and observing the same 'signs' and 'relations of signification' 
at work time and time again, one becomes absolutely certain. There is 
no question about it, in the spontaneous practice of reading 'news- 
discourse' it appears that there is a systematic ideology 'underpinning' 
•that discourse. Or, to put it another way, at the level of spontaneous 
reading, ideology appears as a system. This is how it has appeared to 
all the spontaneous readings we have discussed so far. Researchers 
such as Berelson, Young, and Slater, engaged in spontaneous readings 
(whether they recognized it or not), have all concluded that there is 
some kind of systematic or unified ideology underpinning the discourse. 
And, of course, 'non-researchers' or 'people in general' also attribute 
some kind of systematic, unified ideology to any extensive piece of 
'cultural discourse' - whether they call it 'a prejudice', or a slant', 
or 'a world-view', or 'a point of view', or 'a bias'. As we noted
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earlier, at the spontaneous level, ideology appears as the product 
of human agency and hence as thought given a unity by 'choice? or 
•will* (whether 'role' or 'interest' forced the unifying practice is 
irrelevant). The two appearances go well together and we can say that, 
in general, cultural discourse is seen spontaneously (ideologically) 
as the chosen product of a human being and as the expression of his 
point of view. This general notion is the axis of many variants, some 
colloquial, some philosophical and some sociological, but basically 
the point I am making still holds: at the level of the spont­
aneous social practice of reading discourse, ideology appears to its con­
sumers in a twofold manner:
(1) As a system or totality. That is, it appears as a unity in itself. 
This is the form of its appearance.
(2) As an expression of a human 'will' or 'mind'. This 'will' or 'mind' 
is the content of its appearance. The essence of the human agent is 
contained within the ideology as it appears.
In other words, ideology is the mode of spontaneous consciousness made 
up by a morass of the thoughts, images and percepts of experience only 
given structure by their location within a social practice, but in 
the spontaneous reading of discourse ideology appears as a unity 
constituted by 'the human essence'. That is, the ideology of 
ideology only sees human nature expressing itself, and does not 
comprehend that ideology can only be seen as such because it is a cons­
tituent element in a social practice whose agency is the physical 
human being. To conclude, the other side of ideology, not seen by 
the ideology of ideology, is that the only unity it has is its 'fixing' 
connection with the other elements of a definite social practice and 
that its only 'essence' is as an expression of the social relations 
combining the elements of that practice. Ideology may appear as a 
unity expressed by a man's inner nature, but it is in fact, I would 
submit, a constituent element of social production carried out under 
definite social relations. 26
26. See supra p. llS.
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It may "be thought from this that ideology's 'appearance' is
mystical, illusory and false. But make no mistake. Ideology's 'appearance
is as real as its 'non-appearing' side. In fact it is only too real:
This point can be reinforced by referring back to my 1973 semiological
reading. But, before I return to this illustration, let mo just repeat
29a point made earlier. 'Appearance' is a misleading term. In the 
spontaneous practice of reading discourse, ideology does not just 'appear 
as' but, actually _is a unity expressing one human being's nature. In 
such a practice, that i_s the perceptible form taken by ideology, just as 
in economic practice, in the capitalist mode of production, value i_s 
price. The term 'appearance' could lead the reader (of this text) to 
believe that ideology's form in the social practice of reading discourse 
is illusory. That would be wrong. In the spontaneous mode of reading, 
ideology's form is real: within such a practice it i_s a unity expressing 
human nature. Ideology, like value, has several forms - all equally 
real and all conditional. The condition of 'existence of ideology 
(in discourse) as a unity expressing a human nature is the spontaneous 
reading of that discourse. In other words, the spontaneous practice 
of reading ideology i3 the condition of existence of its form as a 
unity expressing a human nature. This fact i3 amply illustrated by my 
spontaneous reading of the other press reports of that same 'demonstration' 
of March 8th 1973. Let us nov; turn to those cuttings to see that 
ideology's spontaneous appearance as a unity is not illusory but very 
real' and convincing.
We can look first at the cuttings from the Daily Telegraph and 
Financial Times, (newspapers which, along with the Daily Express, are 
usually thought of as the 'right-wing' press) for a likely source of 
support for the ideology apparent in the Daily Express report. 29
29. See supra pp. 114-116•
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W o r k  f o r c e  
c u t s  a g r e e d  
b y  steel m e n
D a l l y  T e l e g r a p h  H e p o r l c r
De l e g a t e s  r e p r e s e n t *i n g  2 2 0 , 0 0 0  s t e e l  
w o r k e r s  d e c i d e d  i n  S h e f ­
f i e l d  y e s t e r d a y  n o t  t o  
o p p o s e  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t ’s 
p l a n s  f o  c u t  t h e  s t e e l  i n d u s ­
t r y ' s  w o r k  f o r c e  b y  5 0 . 0 0 0  
; b y  1 9 8 0 .  ■
B u t  w i t h i n  m i n u t e s  o f  r e a c h -  
i n s  t h e  d e c i s i o n  (h e y  w e r e  
a r c u s c d  o f  " a  s e l l o u t ”  by 300 
d e m o n s t r a t o r s  f r o m  W u le s  a n d  
t h e  M i d l a n d s .
S i r  D a i  D a v ie s ,  g e n e r a l  s e c r e ­
t a r y  o f  t h e  I r o n  a n d  S t e e l  t r a d e s  
C o n f e d e r a t i o n ,  l a t e r  t o ld  a  Pre^.s 
c o n f e r e n c e  t h a t  It w a s  n o w  o p  
t o  I n d iv id u a l  u n i o n s  to  d e c i d e  
o n  t a k i n g  d i r e c t  a c t i o n .
H e  s a i d :  " W e  r e a c h e d  c o m  
m n n  a g r e e m e n t  n o t  to  o p p o s e  
m o d e r n i s a t i o n  b u t  to  m a k e  s u r e  
t h a t  n e w  jo b  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  m u s t  
b u  p r o v i d e d  b e f o r e  c l o s u r e s  o r e  
: I m p l e m e n t e d . "  .
S p e a k i n g  a f t e r  t h e  T U  V. s t e e l  
•j c o m m i t t e e  b a d  c o n s i d e r e d  t h e  
W h i t e  P a p e r  S e t t i n g  o u t  t  h e Government’s 10-year £3.000 
m i l l i o n  i n v e s t m e n t  p r o g r a m m e  
f o r  t h e  i n d u s t r y .  S i r  D a i  s a id  : 
“ W e  h a v e  t o  a d a p t  a  p o s i t i v e  
a t t i t u d e .  ‘ V i .
• • U l  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t ’s  p l a n s  
o u g h t  to  b e  f l e x ib l e  s o  t h a t  s t e e l  
c l o s u r e s  c a n  b e  p u l  b a r k  u n t i l  
s u c h  t i m e  a s  j o b s  a r e  a v a i l a b l e . "
' i '■ Shottoa lobbv
S e v e r a l  h u n d r e d  s t e e l w o r k e r s  
from Shotton, F l i n t s h i r e ,  w h e r e  
the jobs o f  ,6 .5 0 0  men a r e  
threatened tinder t h e  pro­
gramme. lobbied the meeting.
M r  J o e  A t k i n s o n ,  a s s i s t a n t  
s e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  S h o t t o n  a c t i o n  
c o m m i t t e e ,  s a i d  a f t e r w a r d s :  " W e .  
a r e  n o t  s w a l l o w i n g  t h e  a l t e r a a -
Shotton steelworkers demonstrating outside a meeting 
of the Trades Union Congress’s steel committee in 
Sheffie ld  yesterday. An  eight-strong delegation w a s  
allowed to attend part of the proceedings.
D a ily  Telegraph 
8th March 1973 p.7
The D a ily  Telegraph o u ttin g  has the com plication of a photograph# 
In my praotice o f seraiologioal reading I  assumed th at headline and
photograph f i t t e d  together to  provide a strong connotation, or the main 
id e o lo g ic a l message. This c u ttin g  provides us with an example o f  a 
poor f i t .  The headline announces the consensus between the Government
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and the workers, but'the photograph signifies a workers' protest 
against Government measures. This is a contradiction. However, if we 
follow Hall's work on newsphotographs, we assume that the caption 
directs us to the appropriate message or connotation, that the caption 
'anchors' the meaning of the photograph. In thin instance the caption 
lessens the contradiction considerably by alerting us to the connotation 
that it v;as only the "Shotton steelworkers" who disagreed with the 
Government policy. It lessens the contradiction even further by 
denoting that the Shotton workers were actually represented at the 
conference, connoting that their interests were democraticcilly represented.
The text begins by counterposing "220,000" who accepted 
Government policy to "300 demonstrators" who did not. Those in disa­
greement were "demonstrators" and they "accused" their "delegates".
Their accusations were clearly based on pre-conceivcd ideas, the text 
connotes, since they were accusing "within minutes" of hearing the 
decision. Thus the series - demonstrators:accusing!actives ideologically 
motivated:sectional interest - is developed already. A series very
Vvsimilar to that in the Daily Express cutting.
Our speculations, regarding the popularity of David Davies in 
the ideological structures at work in the Sxnress cutting, are reinforced 
here by the Telcgrarh's appellation "Sir Dai Davies". He gets title and 
nickname. At the press conference, he expresses the "common agreement" 
and, again, it is connoted that he will not stop "individual unions" 
"taking direct action". As in the Express, the image of him is one of 
a passive, rational moderate in line with the consensus. Further on in 
the text his appellation becomes "Sir Dai". He increases in popularity 
as the report goes on.
The remainder of the text makes it clear that the Shotton work­
ers who demonstrated v/ere only a small minority of the workers át Shotton 
whose jobs were threatened. Again, they are pictured as the active, 
militant minority. The quote from ono of their leaders (who, to be fair, 
does get his nickname, "Joe", and his title"Mr.") does nothing to suggest 
that the workers' resistance to the plan is anything more than stubborn­
ness, based on irrational fear.
30. See S. Hall "The determinations of newsnhotcrraphs" (1973) W.P.C.S. 3 
pp. 53-87- See also R. Parthes (1973) op. cil. pp, 1Ô9-159 and "Rhetoric 
of the image" (1971) W.P.C.S. 1 pp. 37-52.
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Action group of steel 
men calls protest talksBY JOHN WYLES, LABOUR STAFF SIIKITIKl.O. March 7.
A RANK and file conference of steel workers is to be organised in Manchester on April 13, following a refusal today by leaders of the TUC steel committee to commit them­selves to industrial action to resist plant closures.The conference has been called by the action committee at the British Steel Corporation's Shut- ion works, in N o r t h  Wales, which may lose up to  (1,0(10 jobs hy
1980 b e c a u s e  o f  m o d e r n i s a t i o n  plansOver 300 Welsh steelworkers travelled from Shotton and the East Moors plant in Cardiff to Sheffield today, to demonstrate noisily outside at a dclcgato conference of the 1G steel Industry unions —  the first such conference to he organised by the TUC steel committee.According to delegates, it was marked by stormy oxrh.mgcs tirtween toe plnlfoiiii ami the lloor. A number of delegates were angered and disappointed that the conference hail not hren able to frame a national union policy on closures.During the conference. Sir Dai Davies, chairman of the TEC steel committee, had refused to accept resolutions calling for industrial action because, as ho later explained, these would " usurp ” the power of individual unions to make their own (ten­sions on direct action.Stating TUC steel committee policy afterwards, Sir I)ai claimed that the proposed rut- hack of jolts would have to he delayed unless the unions were satisfied that new jobs were available in the affected areas.lie said there had been ••general agreement" that the unions could not logically oppose
modernisation of an Industry which had suffered in the past because of n lack of investment.Tlte TllC's moderate line on closures is likely to bo further challenged at n first-ever delegate conference of Sir Dal's own union, the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation, on April 18.• The British Steel Corporation las) night withdrew its notice of a ‘.it lutin' shutdown of the rolling mill at East Moors works in Ont-difr. BSC said: "As a ('oncession and act of goodwill we have decided that the rolling mill will continue in operation."It is hoped this gesture will help in obtaining a favourable decision to return to normal loading of supplies to customers."Workers at the plant, which is due to close hy 1975 with the loss of 4,590 jobs, have been threatening to hold a sit-in over I he proposed rolling mill closure.
Financial Times 
8th March 1973 p. 21
The headline here immediately links "action" with "protest". 
Again-the demonstrators are said to he a small minority, and they "demon­
strate noisily". David Davies i3 again "Sir Dai Davies" and very rational 
as he "explains" why he would not force any union to take industrial act­
ion. "Sir Dai", as he is later called, adopts a "moderate line".
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This is obviously not a thorough analysis of the cutting. It 
merely selects points that coireGpond with those in the Express and Tele­
graph reports. It should "be clear now, after only three cuttings, that 
some significant units are repeated time and time again across the 
national press and that certain relations of signification also repeat 
themselves frequently. Look hov; my analysis of the Express cutting almost 
predicted the appellation "Sir Dai". Look how the connections between 
/militancy/irrationality/noise/protest/action arise in each of these 
cuttings.
However, allow me to continue further with this demonstration 
of the way that ideology presents itself as a system when it is read 
spontaneously.
A  s s l t - s u t ,  
s a y  a n g r y  
s t e e l m e n
By JAMES BEECROFT 
T j r . N i m i  l>s nr ansrv  
-* “ »tcdwnrkrrs d u n l ­
ins; th a t  l lnv  li.nl lieeti 
' 'so ld  ont ' pti Udril a
T I T  spnnvon-il n iretins  
o f  union diit'I's yesterday. 
'I lu* s It'd nieii u r r r
limlnlv 11 ii >u ‘.|i,iii»ii
" orlis In I litiKIni I- iiml 
l l i r  vast Moors iwirlis at< artliir. line in 
«limit r u n a  ■ > <!Iiinl.iin i,a 
lirtwreii t lirin under the 
l lr i t ish  S t r r l  C uninra-
< ion's .CI.IIOl) million 
modernisation. plan.
'J llev n a n l f i l  i l ir ir  
leaders, nirelini;  a t  the 
I'lil'lrn rrin;: ï lnion nlllces 
In  Sllellielil, In |or« t- a 
Fhoudnivn «  i I Ii the 
f io ie r m n e n t  over I he 
plan.
l in t  the merlins:  sldc- 
Alrpped (hr  men's grl-  
touRli (leinanils.
Daily Mirror■  !■ ■ ■ !■  I» HI I I. .»I ■ ' —
8th March 1973
The Mirror wastes no time in linking /angry/ with /chanting/ 
and /picketed/. The irrational militants wanted to "force a showdown"? 
this was one of their "get-tough demands". Again w e see the connotation 
of the active, aggressive militants trying to force the moderates to do 
something against their will.
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Steel workers angry 
at attitude to cuts
H y  G E O F F R E Y  W U I T E 1 . E Y ,  N o r t h e r n  l . u l i m i r  C o r r e H j H i n d e n t
U n i o n  l e a d e r «  In t h e  sttec l  m o d c m b i a t i o n  o f  t h e  I n d u s t r y ,  f o r  u n i t e d  d i r e c t  a c t i o n .  Action* 
i n d u s t r y  a r e  to  te l l  t h e  G o v e r n -  w l i l r l i  h m l  in u l i t lo . i i . l l v  hr s a l . l  ■«f***; wmm f o r  .1 m U vidM M .
•>,.  n V i t u s  f r o m  lack  ol lu v c s iu u - n l .  u n io n s .  N e i t h e r  t h e  r u t -  n o r
m c n t  a n d  t h e  B r i t i s h  S t e e l  G or-  T h  c r a r i s m p „ ' s l e a d e r  M r  a n y o n e  e l s e  c o u ld  d i c t a t e  to
p o r a l i o n  t h a t  n o  p l a n t  c lo s u r e s  J o h n  B o y d  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e  » " i o n  e x e c u t i v e s  w h e t h e r  t h e y
c S n i i l r l  t o k n  n l o P A  i i n r l n r  t h n  n r n  _ i J . .  1............... : . s l i o i l l i l  f i t r i l f f 1.s h o u l d  t a k e  p l a c e  u n d e r  t h e  BSC- p l a n ,  w h ic h  e n v i s a g e s  a s h o u l d  s t r i k e ,  
p l a n  f o r  r e d u c i n g  t h e  s iz e  o f  l a b o u r  f o r c e  o f  a b o u t  180,OOU B u t  S i r  D a v id  e m p h a s i s e d
t h e  i n d u s t r y  u n t i l  t h e r e  a r e  b y  1980, w o u ld  c o n t i n u e  to  h e  t h a t  t h e  u n i o n s  w e r e  d e t e r -  
f i rm  g u a r a n t e e s  a b o u t  j o b s  f o r  c h a l l e n g e d  hy t h e  u n io n s ,  w h o  m in e d  to  p in  d o w n  t h e  c o r p o ra -  
r e d u n d a n t  w o r k e r s .  f d i d  n o t  b e l i e v e  t h e  c o rp o ra -
A t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  t h e  u n i o n s ,  p l a n n i n g  w a s in f a l l ib l e ,
r e p r e s e n t i n g  220,000  w o r k e r s ,  a l t i l u d e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  a rn
l io n ,  a t  t a lk s  o v e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  
j o b s  d u e  to  s t a r t  on  M a r c h  20. 
T h e r e  w a s  s c e p t i c i s m  n h o u t
80^000 o f  w h o m  « r e  l i k e l y  t o  u n l i k e l y  to  s a t i s fy  d c m i u i d s  f o r  l u o r a l s e a  n im lc  liy t h e  eurpori i«
lo se  t h e i r  j o b s  i f  t h o  BSC p l a n  A rm  o p p o s i t i o n  to  t h e  p la n .  ! |^!,c^ nc^ rn nrnioMl« In
g o e s  a h e a d ,  a r e  m o v i n g  t o w a r d s  A b o u t  4 0 0  s t e e l w o r k e r s  f ro m  J u s t i f y  I ts  c lo s u r e  p r o p o s a l s  i n  
a c c e p t a n c e  t h a t  r a t l o n a l U a t j o n  S h o t t o n ,  UsirdiiT a n d  C o rb y  e v e r y  d e t a i l ,  
i s  i n v l t a b l c .  T h i s  v i e w  w i l l  b e  w e n t  to  S h e f f ie ld  to  d e m o n -  U n i o n s  w o u l d  In s i s t  t h n t  a l l
g r e e t e d  w i t h  a n g e r  b y  w o r k e r s  s t r a t c  a n g e r  a t  t h e  i m p e n d i n g  s o c ia l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  b e  co n -  
w h o  h a d  h o p e d  f o r  a  b a t t l e - c r y  lo ss  o f  e m p l o y m e n t .  s i d c r e d .  I f  u n i o n s  w e r e  n o t
f r o m  t h e i r  u n i o n s .  O n o  d e m o n s t r a t o r ,  M r  s a l i s f lc d  a b o u t  a l t e r n a t i v e
S 4 « S « r S  tte, « « “ "*•• “ * "P •« J .b , wit« a v a i l a b l e ,
p r i n c i p l e .  T h e y  w i l l  t r y  t o  co n -  r e s i s t  t l i e  P a r t i a l  c lo s u r e  a t  M e a n w h i l e  t h o  u n i o n s  f e l t
c e n t r & t e  o n  m a k i n g  s u r e  t h a t  S h o t t o n ,  s a i d  w o r k e r s  h a d  t h e y  s h o u l d  c o n p e r a to  w i t h  t h o  
e n o u g h  J o b s  a r e  c r e a t e d  f o r  t h o  h o p e d  t h a t  u n i o n  l e a d e r s  w o u ld  G o v e r n m e n t ' s  “  t a s k  f o r c e s . ”  
r e d u n d a n t .  p r o d u c e  a  p o l ic y  o f  o u t r i g h t  -< yy«, h a v o  1« t a k e  n p o s i t i v e
S i r  D a v i d  D a v ie s ,  g e n e r a l  o p p o s i t i o n .  “ T h i s  Is n l e t - d o w n  a l t i t u d e  a n d  c o o p e r a t e  In e v e r y  
s e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  I r o n  a n d  S t e e l  ¡ o u  a  n o n - e v e n t ,  lie sa id ,  p a s s i b l e  w a y  In e f fo r t s  to  p ro -  
T r a d e s  C o n f e d e r a t i o n .  t h e  T h o s e  f a c e d  w i th  r e d u n d a n c y  v i d e  n l t e r n a l l v e  jo b s ,"  t ie  sa id ,  
c h a i r m a n  a t  y e s t e r d a y ’s  con-  w o u l d  h e  "  d i s g u s t e d  at t h e i r  ’i b i s  v ie w  m a d e  l i t t l e  Im p a c t  o n  
f e r e n c e  a r r a n g e d  b y  t h e  T U C  l e a d e r s ’ a t t i t u d e .  t h e  d e m o n s t r a t o r s .  S i r  D a v id ,
s-toel c o m m i t t e e ,  s a i d  a f t e r -  T h e  d e m o n s t r a t o r s  c h a n t e d  w h o  l e a d s  t h e  l a r g e s t  o f  th n  
w a r d s  t h a t  t h e  u n i o n s  d id  n o t  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  m e e t i n g .  B u t  s t e e l  u n i o n s ,  d e c i d e d  lo l c a v o  
f e e l  t h e y  c o u ld  lo g ic a l l y  o p p o s e  i n s i d e  Sir D a v id  r e s i s t e d  p l e a s  by a back do o r .
The Guardian 
8th Maroh 1973 p. 6
Again the TUC view is put as the "logical" view and the workers 
are "angry" and fearful (requiring"firm guarantees"). "Sir David Davies" 
becomes "Sir David" again, rather than 'Mr. Davies'. The workers want to 
"demonstrate anger". A member of the workers' aotion committee, "Mr.
Gordon Roberts" is described as "one demonstrator", Mr. Davies is 
described as "general secretary of the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation" 
Never in suoh reports are people like Mr. Davies described as 'one 
moderate'. Never in reports of 'political demonstrations' do the 
moderates act irrationally like the militants e.g. here "The demonstrators 
chanted throughout the meeting". "Sir David" "resisted pleas", in the 
passive manner of a true moderate, for a polioy of aotion because he did
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not want to "dictate to union executives whether they should strike".
The moderacy never wants to dictate - hut it is so frequently implied 
that militants do. Of course, as we all know, in reality moderates 
do dictate and, as they tenaciously hold on to the power which they 
exercise so frequently, they cry 'we do not want to dictate'. The 
Guardian's report ends with a classic scenario; the militants refuse to 
cooperate and the moderate is in fear of his neck. Militants, of 
course, never want to cooperate and always threaten moderates' safety, 
property, etc...
To "anchor" my point about the reality of ideology's appearance 
as a system from the viewpoint of the spontaneous reading, I shall now 
list some headlines that appeared in my sample of 92 cuttings.
Daily Telegraph 7th March 1973 p.36 AGITATORS 'WORKED UP 
DEMO CROWD
The Guardian 7th March 1973 p.5 
(same story as above)
— DEMONSTRATORS 'IN FRE”ZT'
The Guardian 8th March 1973 p.8 — BATTLE OF SONG IN WELSH 
PROTEST
Daily Express 8th March 1973 p. 6 
(same stoi'y a3 above)
THE WELSH MEET THEIR 
WATERLOO
The Sun 8th March 1973 p.4 — WELSH DEED GIRLS RIP IT UP 
IN A COURTROOM
The Guardian 10th March 1973 p. 20 — SIT-IN STUDENTS REJECT 
PEACE MOVE
Sunday Telegraph 11th March 1973 p.3 — FIGHT ENDS WOMEN'S LIB 
SIT-IN
Sunday Mirror 11th March 1973 p.2 
(same story as above)
— WOMEN'S LIBBERS 'GST STUCK 
IN'
Daily Kail 15th March 1973 p.9 - STUDENTS MARCH OUT
Daily Telegraph 15th March 1973 p.2 — POLICEMAN HURT IN CLASH 
WITH STUDENTS
Daily Express 16th March 1973 p.6 - POLICE SEAL OFF TOWN
Financial Times 16th March 1973 p.23 
(same story as above)
— COURT ACTION FROTEST SHUTS 
LIVERPOOL DOCKS
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Daily Telegraph •16th March 1973 p.7 PICKET CASE DEMO BRING!
(same story again) DOCKS TO HALT
Daily Mail 16th March 1973 p.11 
(same again)
DOCKERS ON THE MARCH
The Guardian 16th March 1973 p.6 - DEMONSTRATORS FACE 800 
POLICE OUTSIDE STRIKE-
(same again) CASE COURT
I could £0 on to provide many more examples. Of course, the 
ones I have provided are selective - I have chosen those that illustrate 
the overall ideological message running through the vast majority of the 
cuttings. No more examples of my point should he needed however. It 
should nov; he simple enough for the reader to imagine how one can build 
up a view of one systematic ideology running through the press reports. 
Time and time again the same connotations about 'militant demonstrators' 
causing industrial stoppages, damage, 'disruption to the peace' etc. 
appear, accompanied by all the stereotypical images of 'the demonstrators' 
themselves. It is important to stress, therefore, that the spontaneous 
rea-ding of ideology can find support for its concept of a grand 
ideological structure. This appearance of an organized, systematic 
ideology is rea.1 - from the standpoint of a spontaneous reading.
Built in to the concepts of a semiological reading is the conc­
ept of the grand, abstract structure existing transparently on the sur­
face level of the text. The significant functions or units are thus cap­
able of being grouped into classes. These classes of units are composed 
of units which are interrelated to form a paradigmatic element. In my 
work then the next step was to set up the classes of units. I 'found' 
two: the paradigm of. militant demonstration and the paradigm of moderate 
demonstration. Each paradigm consisted of a syntagmatic series of 
connected connotations. The paradigm of militant demonstrations 
contained the following major ideological connotations (this list is not 
comprehensive):
Demonstrations transform a peaceful situation into one of trouble/They 
cause much damage/Hilitants' demos are organised by extremists with the 
ulterior motive of destroying the system/l-Iost of the demonstrators are 
manipulated by their leaders/tfilitants rarely get strong support /Milit­
ants never give up/They demonstrate for self-interest/They are usually 
irrational because the government looks after their real interests/llilit- 
ants' demos create crowd hysteria/Demonstrators are noisy, mindless, child ish etc. etc.
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The paradigm of moderate demonstrations involved the following main elem­
ents:
Moderates are disciplined, sensible, unemotional and tidy people/Their 
demonstrations are quiet, sincere, interesting and have good motivation/ 
Moderates only support good, human causeo/Their demos involve united masses 
(often whole families go on them) spontaneously expressing their rationally 
and quietly held views/Speakers address them rather than agitate them/ 
Moderate demos are usually in self-defence of interests threatened by 
aggressive militants/Their demos lead to no violence but good humour etc. 
etc.
This operation is a classically semiological one. Spontaneous 
impressions of the connotation of the text are ordered into abstract 
structures which never actually appear in their full form. Syntagmatic 
relations are therefore grouped together under a paradigmatic structure: 
militant/moderate. Clearly, all I was doing by creating these groxips 
v;as organising my own spontaneous (even though rigorous) impressions into 
some abstract model. The defect of the semiological approach is evidenced 
clearly here. All the semiologist does is to weave pretty patterns with 
his spontaneous observations whilst pretending to move to a different 
level of analysis. What I, in fact, did was to create an abstract model 
or structure which was said to operate throughout the national press. This 
act takes ideological formations (or ideologies) right out of specific 
social practices, groups them together and sets up the groups as The 
Structure, which is then said to determine the ideological expressions 
in the news reports. It is only a short step from here to the assertion 
that this base-structure is carried by all journalists (who all work con­
sciously for the ruling class, of course)} a ridiculous notion and one 
that is truly metaphysical. In actual fact, I never did get round to 
speculating about the origins of the militants/moderates deep structure 
because my doubts about the nature of the method had grown. However, I 
had intended to shov; that the militants/moderates structure was an 
effect of a more important ideological structure: democracy/communism.
I had mapped out on paper the clear connections between the two structures. 
It did seem clear that the fundamental deep structure was that which 
justified the political system of capitalism as against that of communism. 
Had I gone through with this step of the work, I would have finally 
arrived at a complete semiological view v.’here a fundamental ideological 
structure vitally close to the economic and political structure of 
capitalism generated a series oi ideological expressions. I would have
found an' Absolute Source. This Absolute Source, or Structuring Structure, 
would have been entirely abstract with no concrete social existence: as 
abstract as Lévi-Strauss’s universal structure of the human mind.
The effects of any arrival at such a Structuring Structure as 
Capitalism/Communism illustrate the faults of semiology outlined 
previously. Firstly, I would have arrived at the position that all 
ideological formations about politics derive from one particular ideo- x 
logical formation (Capitalism is good/Conmunism is bad) which reflected 
the fundamental particularity of the capitalist social system, the fact 
that it is capitalist. In other words, my discovered Key Ideological 
Formation, the Structuring Structure, would have been the reflection of 
a general concent, capitalism. Instead of seeing the many particular 
ideological formations as products and instruments of particular, 
concrete social practices, I would ultimately have derived ideology 
from the social totality - as if a totality could give off an all- 
embracing ideological structure. It would have been analogous to finding 
that a particular piece of meat had its origins in ’butchery', or that 
the next particular word in this sentence came from 'writing*. It would 
have been an attempt to derive a particular fact from a general principle. 
Obviously that level of theoretical approximation is useless and almost 
metaphysical.
Secondly, the lack of historical perspective meant that the 
possibility of the same ideological structure, 'militants/moderates', 
occurring in another social structure was ignored. The politico-ideolog­
ical disapproval of rebellion is, on first glance, not peculiar to cap­
italism. Thirdly, explaining the ideological impression by a general 
idea is a method alien to historical materialism and more fitting for 
a Hegelian problematic. More pertinent would have been a movement from 
contemporaneous impressions to impressions of ideological formations of 
'political resistance' in prior capitalist periods and in other modes 
of production, and from there to the analysis of the material, social 
conditions which gave rise to these apparent ideological formations.
Even better, however, would have been a research practice which started 
from social conditions and moved to ideological formations. Farthly, by 
moving from impressions to the abstracted collection of those imuressions 
the research completely loses all sense of the connection between 
ideological formations in''the news' and the social practices of news
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production. Instead of attempting to locate the connections "between 
the ideological formations and their most immediate source, news 
production, one would move, through the semiological approach, to their 
least immediate source, an abstract, general concept. Fifthly, the 
semiological approach, by its very nature, makes its practitioners face 
the perplexing question of how they can 'read' the ideological formations 
of the text. This uncertainty in the semiological method lies, right 
at the very beginning, in the practice of reading the structure (of 
ideology) as immanent in its effects (the text). This: is the fundamental 
tenet of any structuralist method and, in itself, it generates the problem 
of what it is that enables the reader to see the effects of the structure 
as solely composed of selected elements of the visible text. Such an 
uncertainty at the heart of it3 method provides semiology with the seeds 
of its own downfall. It was such an uncertainty that led me away from 
the method. For, if I could read the ideological formations accurately 
from the textual presences, then it seemed to me that this could only 
be because I was already aware of those formations. And, if I was 
already aware of them and if the reading was only a process of recog­
nizing the already-known, then there was hardly any point in using this 
method - I could have just written something polemical, of a politico- 
ideological nature, on the capitalists' attitude to political resistance. 
At this point it became clear that what ought to have been at stake wa3 
the question: what are the social origins of ideology? It became 
obvious that what had to be explained was the problem of how it is that 
•we already know', l/hat was at stake was an explanation of the obvious, 
an explanation of the 'already-known'.
At this conjuncture, I realized that the obvious, the ideolog­
ical, could not be explained by beginning with the ideological. Like 
Slater, whilst practising a semiological approach, I was attempting to 
derive ideology from ideology. That was not a very Marxian approach.
Of course, ultimately, I would have found the Absolute Source to 
be capitalist society in the form of 'dominant' or 'ruling class' 
ideology. This would have produced an apparently Marxian product. 
However, a scientific, Marxian approach to ideology does not explain 
bourgeois ideologies by simply asserting the existence and domination 
of bourgeois ideology. It still seems to me that many Marxists are 
working within such a tautology, even a great master such as Althusser.
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The same remarks are applicable to the question of deviance.
To look for the sources of deviance in the ideological forms disseminated 
by the mass media and received by the masses is simply to attempt to under' 
stand an ideological formation by positing its source in ideological 
formations. That is simply a tautology. At tris point the questions of 
ideology and deviance began to merge. Just as one had to look for the 
conditions of existence of ideology in concrete social practices, so, too, 
one had to look for the conditions of existence of deviance (a type of 
ideological formation) in concrete social practices. Deviancy theorists 
of all kinds, over the last seventy years, have attempted to explain dev­
iance by reference to a normative order, or to the definitions of the 
morality-enforcers, or to the definitions of the ruling class. In other 
words, deviance has been put down as the effect of ideology. All these 
explanations have broken dovrn into simple tautologies because their pro­
tagonists have had to admit that what constituted 'deviance' vías an 
infringement of the ideologically acceptable and, therefore, have put 
themselves in the position of trying to explain ideology by ideology.
Such sociologies are analogous to the nineteenth-century political 
economists who tried to explain surplus value by its own forms (profit, 
interest and rent). Hitherto, the sociology of deviance has remained 
caught within this trap of tautology and, thus, has so far only produced 
descriptions of deviance. Clearly, if one tries to explain ideology 
as a product of ideology, all one can achieve is descriptions of 
ideologies; explanation is outside the parameters of such an operation.
To move from a merely descriptive, superficial sociology of deviance to 
an explanatory sociology of deviance requires an adequate theory o.f the 
social and historical origins of ideologies.
6 : THE MARXIST FORMALISM
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NSO-STRUCTURALI sm
Introduction
The search for a theory of reading ideology cannot end yot for, 
although we have distinguished two distinct modes of reading (foivnloss 
empiricism and empiricist formali&i), there remains a hody of work which 
attempts to transcend these ideological modes and to develop a dialect­
ical materialist theory and practice of reading. This hody of work can 
he entitled 'new-structuralism' because, as we shall see, it remains 
imprisoned with the problematic of form with all its associated weaknesses 
I shall consider the effects of these deficiencies in selected writings 
from the work of Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva and Louis Althusser.^
I snail not produce a comprehensive review of their.texts since 
I am closely familiar with only one corpus out of the three, that of 
Althusser. All that I c m  achieve hero are some indications of the inad­
equacy of their wor.-:, as far as I understand it. Hence my comments on 
Derrida and Kristeva are purely provisional - and await the overdue 
translation of their major works into English. However, having said that, 
I must add that I am satisfied that one can grasp the general direction 
and substance of the work of Derrida and Kristeva, even from the small 
amount of their writing that exists in English translation (in Kristeva' 3 
case) or in English publications (in Derrida's case). This degree of 
certainty arises not from a cavalier attitude to scholarship but from
V 1; ^ucaultfs work is also 'neo-structuralist •. However his work will 
not be dealt with since I am only familiar with it at a very general level,
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the fact that even small quantities of their writing can he readily 
comprehended if one has grasped the nature of previous theories of 
reading ideology and from the fact that their available works take the 
form of intellectiial manifestoes, or programmatic statements, which are 
fairly explicit. My work in the previous three chapters has described 
and criticised the existing problematic of reading ideology against 
which the work of Derrida and Kristeva must be read.
Although all of Althusser's major works are in English 
translation (the most important for our purposes is Reading Carital), I 
would argue that, despite this plenitude, we cannot really grasp 
Althusser's theory of symptomatic reading (and its consequences for his 
reading of Marx) unless we set it in the cnvtext of other theories of 
reading. Set in its context of neo-structuralism and. in its struggle 
with existing empiricist and structuralist problematics, Althusser' 3 
mode of reading comes alive from the stylish ambiguity and convincing 
novelty of its formulation in Reading Capital, (it is vital to appreciate 
that Althusser is fighting empiricist and structuralist epistemologies: 
this appreciation is easily achieved since Althusser continually names 
his enemies. But, it is also vital to appreciate that Althusser's fight 
exists within the problematic of neo-structuralism. The relations between 
the theoretical work of Althusser, Derrida and Kristeva should become 
clear as this chapter progresses.) For the moment, let us just note 
that, given Althusser's impact on world Marxism, it is obviously very 
important to understand the relation between neo-structuralism and struct­
uralism, and, therefore, this chapter must be read in the light of the 
previous three. I would say that, once digested, this chapter orders us 
to 'decode' Althusser's interpretation of Marxism on the basis of a more 
detailed knowledge of his neo-structuralist problematic. This task is 
beyond the scope of this project, but it is of such obvious importance for 
the development of Marxism that I shall try in passing to give some 
indications on the key points at stake.
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De-centring the discourse
In our discussion of the problematic of form we gave air to 
the problems naturally flowing from the concept of Structure. -To re­
iterate only the main points, we examined the problem of movement or 
history, the problem of internal contradiction, the empiricism of the 
structuralist reading, the 'de-substantiation* of the concreto elements 
of the structure, the logoce.'trism or teleogism resorted to in order to 
give the structure a context, the universal infinitude and asociality of 
the structure and the problem of the combination of structures. All 
these problems arise from the static, formal, asocial, 'abstract' concept 
of structure. Structuralism, in short, had taken the blood and fight out 
of history. Indeed, structuralism could be said to have taken the 
history out of history and left it with the rotting skeletons of form
which act as signposts or monuments to an elusive, never-prenent reality.
2It is no wonder that structuralists talk of 'archeology'.' They strip 
history of its flesh and bury the bones carefully in profoundly 
mysterious places; only to return with their semiological shovels to dig 
the whole thing up again and to leave joyfully, proclaiming that they 
have 'discovered' the 'signs' of past civilization. Structuralism has 
not just 'neglected' the social 'context' of the cultural message in 
its attempt to discover universals, as one reviewer has argued:^ its 
basic concepts and consequent methodology logically exclude cny concrete 
analysis of the social nature, movement and function of ideologies. As 
• we saw in chapter 4, structuralism is totally antithetical to Marxism, 
to a dialectical, materialist analysis of phenomena. Structuralism 
fundamentally excludes movement and matter in its fetish for the static 
form. As such it stands radically opposed to Marxism.
2. See M. Foucault The Archaeolo-y of knowledge (1974 London: Tavistock).
3. T. Lae 11 "Anti-Earthcuakc bill11 Times Higher Education Supplement 14th 
September 1973«
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The movement away from 'pure' structuralism takes place (in 
the field we are considering) in Prance in the 1960s and 1970s, notably 
in the work of the Tel Quel group, a collection of Marxian cultural anal­
ysts and linguists whose work v;as produced in the journal Tol Quel and 
a series of texts on the theory and practice of reading ideology.
Derrida and Kristeva belonged to this group. The movement clearly 
affected structuralism proper. Roland Barthes, in 1971> was arguing 
that there is no general semiological system and that each text had its 
own system. Agreeing with Derrida, Barthes now thought that each text 
must be seen in its "difference", as the accomplishment of many codes.^
For Barthes,:
"Reading must focus on the difference between texts, the relations of 
proximity and distance, of citation, negation, irony and parody. Such 
relations are infinite and work to defer any final meaning.",.
The absolute meaning of the text had therefore disappeared. The text no 
longer had 'its structure'. Various readings of the text were now allowed. 
The stress had shifted from the Structuring Structure to the creativity 
of the reader in producing an 'active reading'.
Culler summarises the Tel Quel position as a conscious reject­
ion of structuralism.^ He says that the group would argue that the con­
cepts of 'literary competence', 'the collective code', 'the semiological 
system' etc. are means whereby orthodox culture is frozen and preserved. 
The concepts of structuralism arc denounced because they are Gaid to deny 
the value and existence of creative violations of cultural conventions.
The Tel Quel group, states Culler, would emphasize the possibility of 
several different readings of the text, or cultural artefact, and would 
reject anything which would grant one reading a privileged status.
Derrida has expressed this emphasis well:
" ... the absence of an ultimate meaning opens an unbounded space for 
the play of signification."
4. See J. Culler (1975) °P» cit. p. 242.
5. Ibid. pp. 241j 242.
6. Ibid, pp» 241, 242.
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"the joyful Uietzchean affirmation of the play of the world and the inn­
ocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs which has no 
truth, no origin, no nostalgid guilt, and is proferred for active inter­
pretation."^
Reading ideology now becomes the creative practice of signification 
where past, present and future significance all enter play as active 
features. The analyst must 'let his hair down' and enjoy the human cap­
acity to create sense and meaning. Any critical reading will do, since 
no-one is privileged in this socialist utopia of classless readings.
Such is the position of Tel Quel at its most genei'al level. Structuralism 
would appear to have given way to an avant-garde humanism pleasuring 
itself in the aesthetics of creative reading. Let us examine this 
apparently remarkable shift in more detail and see how it relates to 
Althusser, Kristeva and Derrida.
Jacques Derrida rejects the classic Saussurean structualism 
embraced by Barthes's work as "logocentric" in that it grants an 
Absolute Meaning or Source to the text. For Derrida and Kristova the 
view that the empirical words or sounds are simple expressions or 
representations of the Structure is characteristic of all previous 
Western philosophy of the sign. Like Althusser, they see Leibniz and 
Hegel as the best exponents of this "representativism" (Derrida) or 
"expressivism" (Althusser). Giving a discourse a "centre" is to give it 
"a definite origin" and to make each visible part of the system an 
expression of the invisible Structure. 'Centring' the discourse, 
therefore, argues Derrida, closes the play of the elements which that
discourse inaugurates. "The concept of the centred structure is in fact
3that of limited or founded play" and it thus testifies to the presence 
of an i d e o l o g y ,  since, like Althusser, Derrida sees ideology as a closed 
discourse, one that prevents further development. Derrida, therefore, 
rejects the very basis of structuralism when he renounces the notion of 
discourse with a fixed structure or centre. In place of the all-powerful
7. Passages from 'L'Ecriture et la fl0^7 .Culler ibid. p. 2A ~ . “-----— --- (lsà7 Paris:Seuil) quoted in
8. Culler, ibid., p. 244.
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structure, which dictates the meaning of the empirically visible elemr 
ents of a discourse, Derrida develops the concept of the 'system 
decentre', the decentred structure. In this cmcopt each reading displaces 
the Centre of the system or structure. For Derrida, every discourse has 
a surplus of meaning and this surplus creates "a play" in the process of 
signification. Each term in the discourse may have 'normal' usages, but 
it refers us to other possible meanings. These possible meanings may 
involve reference to past connotations, or present connotations, or, 
indeed, they may involve the creation of new references. Derrida argues 
that meaning is a function of differences between terms, a la pure structur­
alism, but for him the relations between the terms are infinite and all 
have potential for producing meaning. Hence every reading is an active 
process of signification which decentres the 'orthodox', 'customary' mean­
ing of the discourse its invocation of other, less orthodox, 'private' 
meanings and references.
This general outline of Derrida's analytic position shows that 
the concept of the denotative structure of language survives but now it 
exists alongside the concept of the continual displacement of that 
structure by every new act of reading. The structure, in other words, 
is always being displaced. It is no longer the limit to the posciblo 
meanings of the text, as pure Barthesian semiology would have it. In 
fact, the structure must give way to the active reader, rejoicing in his 
"Nietzchean affirmation of the play of thevorld and the innocence of 
becoming".
We can now examine more precisely how Derrida constitutes his
g
theory of the decentred structure. Firstly, he urges us to see all 
signification as a "formal play of differences", or as a formal play of 
"traces". This concept of the "play of differences" can be grasped more 
easily if we remember that 'pure' structuralism (found in Saussure, 
linguistics and Barthesian semiology) saw the structure as a system of 
differences which specifies the units of the structure and thus 
constitutes their significance. Derrida argues that the fact of a system 9
9. This section draws mainly from J. Derrida "Sémiologie et grammatologie" 
in J. Kristeva, J. Rey-Debov and D.J. Umiker Essais jn Semiotics ( 1971' The 
Hague-Paris:Mouton) pp. 11-27. The article vias kindly translated for me 
by M. White.
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of differences means that no element ever exists in a discourse purely 
in itself and reflecting nothing hut itself. As an element in an infinite 
system of differences, an element of discourse is merely a "trace".
It is a mere 'notation* or transient flash of significance in an infinite 
sky of meaning. Such an element, therefore, contains traces of the 
rest of the system. It does not exist in itself in the discourse hut 
as an element in a chain. It thus reflects other elements in the chain, 
some being visible in the discourse, others invisible, others absent 
altogether. Every element in a discourse therefore carries traces of 
related elements from the system of differences. It is in this sense 
that Derrida goes on to argue that no element of the system is over 
simply absent or present in the discourse, "there are only differences 
of differences and traces of traces". The whole system of infinite sign­
ificance's, therefore, forever -potentially present in any discourse.
It is ever, already-riven in its nresence and is thus the most general 
concept of semiology. 10 Derrida gives the ever-pre-given structure of 
significant differences the term "the gramme". Semiology, for Derrida, 
must therefore become grammatology - the study of the infinite plane of 
the significant traces.
The gramme is structure and it exists in movement. It is the 
systematic play of traces or differences called into movement in the 
praxis of signification. It is a structure but not a static, synchronic 
one: "Differences are the effect of transformations" (Derrida). These 
shifts in the structure of significance which effect differences lead 
us to the centrality of signifying practice of "semiotic activity" for 
Derrida's neo-structuralism. The gramme, or ever-pre-given-structure of 
significance, only exists in and through its activation in signifying 
activity. The play of traces is no mere slogan, it is Derrida's concept
10. We can note how Derrida's concept of the structure-in-movement of
significance is extremely similar to Althusser's concent of the social
structure: * ^’"Instead of the ideological myth of the philosonhy of origins
and its organic concepts, Marxism establishes in nr-miuT „ .??
of the givenness of the copies structureo î % £  co“ ret 
structure v/hicn governs both the development of the ob-ject and the’ 
development of the theoretical practice which nroduero +1 , , ®
it. There is no longer any orignal essence* onîy S  ever ™  "  °f
however for knowledge delves into its past ... There ls n o l l ^  S T “ ’ 
original simple unity (in any form whatsoever), but y
pre-givenness of a structured complex urn+.-.r •• t otead> the .ever-
pp. 198, 199. ----------- ----- * L* Althusser (1969J op. cit.
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of -the active employment of the potential structure of significance in 
practice. Every text or discourse is thus a production, which can only 
be read against another text or discourse - that text or discourse which 
was unconsciously transformed or refected in its production.
Derrida points out that the notion of "epistemological break" (an obv­
ious reference to Althusser) is misleading since every now* discourse is 
always reinscribed in an old fabric which must be continually, and 
interminably, undone. Discourses only exist as transformations of other 
discourses, as situated productions, and can never escape the formal play 
of the structure of differences. They are always constituted by the 
trapes in them of the other elements of the system.
It is interesting that Derrida comments, in puzzlement, that 
"grammatics" is introduced by him at the moment when he appears to have 
"neutralised all substance". He is reflecting on the fact that material 
substances such as speech, books, etc. all appeared to have collapsed under 
the weight of his concepts of 'gramme' and 'semiotic praxis' and the 
critique of Saussurean expressivism (which saw the empirical world as 
the mirror reflection of the structure carried and mediated by the 
motivated subject). It is interesting because always Derrida puts the 
structure, the system of differences or gramme, before all else.
"There is no presence outside of and preceding the semiological difference 
(the gramme — C.S.)", says Derrida. He goes on to argue that we nust 
begin with the systematic production of a system of differences before 
vie can talk about code/message and langue/parole distinctions. In other 
words, semiologists can only begin to construct abstract, metaphysical 
'codes' or structures out of the units of a message on the very basis of 
their (the semiologists') systematic production of a set of differences.
To put it bluntly, the be—all and end-all of Derrida's position is that 
significance is always actively produced in semiotic practice and the 
semiologists' work is no exception. Every discourse is a creative read­
ing of the world, acting upon and constructing a chain of differences, 
and there is no discourse outside this practice, ¿ret, at the same time 
there is no significant practice without the system of traces which is 
ever-already-pre-given. Nothing precedes the gramme or system of 
traces. Derrida should not therefore be surprised when grammatics 
appears as substance vanishes; for Derrida's Grammatics are yet another 
celebration of the Structure or Form at the expense of its content, which 
is relegated to an "effect". Thus, for Derrida, the structure of the
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discourse is for ever "being decentred "by its active receivers or 'readers' 
but only because the field of the significant is such an infinite structure, 
an endless chain of systematic relations. The infinitude of the svstem 
of significance provides the surplus mesnin^ which all ieadors can actively 
exploit in their semiotic practice. The ever-already-givenness of the 
gramme is thus the basis for the always-creative practice of signification.
Derrida has attempted to rid us of the notion of the Logos, 
the Absolute Source or Structure, by conceptualizing signification as 
creative work. Both the text and its reading are productions. Every 
discourse has its difference as a creation of a possibility already 
present in an infinite range of linked possibilities. Meaning is no 
longer the production of a 'subject' but is ever-already-given by the 
structure of significance.
Julia Kristeva also rejects the ideological aspects of semiol­
ogy and spends much time criticizing them, arguing that she wants to 
combine semiology and Marxism to create a science of ideology.^^ For 
Kristeva, semiology, to become a science, must continually analyze its 
own postulates:
"Semiotics cannot develop except as a critique of semiotics ... Research 
in semiotics remains an investigation which discovers nothing at the end 
of its quest but its own ideological moves, so as to take cognizance of 
them, to deny them, and to start out anew."^
Semiology must continually decentre its own structure. This may seem to 
leave semiology in a state of avant-garde, cultural masturbation, based 
on the pleasure of producing mew meanings. This would, of course, be 
acceptable if it renounced its claims to scicntificity and its links 
with Marxism: semiology as an artistic or propagandist practice would 
be an honest and valid proposition. However Kristeva wants a semiotic 
science and founds her claims on a position identical to Derrida's.
For Kristeva, the "infinite memory of significance", represented in
11. See J. Kristeva "L'expansion de la semiotiouo" i« v ■(1971) op. oit. pp. 3J-4b, "La s e m i o l o H o . Kristeva et al.
Semiotica 1 (1909) pp. 196-2~and "The semiotic ldeolo*ie?.,,
No. 1/2 (1973) p p . 25-39. ----- ~ - 1C Screen Vol. 14
12. Quoted in Culler ( 1 9 7 5 )  op. cit. p. 2 4 5.
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Derrida's concept of-the "gramme", is termed the "gcno-text". This 
structure serves as the "substratum" (Culler's term) to any aotual text
" ... the geno-text can bethought of as a device containing the wholo 
historical evolution of language and the various signifying practices it 
can bear. The poaibilities of all language of the past, present m d
future are given there, before being masked or repressed in tho phono- 
text."^
Like Derrida, she holds that the only concept that oan serve as the 
centre for her analysis is a concept of the infinitude of significanco. 
She, also rejects Saussure's emphasis on the signifier ns the combination 
of material letters on the page of tho text. This is 'empiricist' - 
the letters or words are really only "supports" (Althusser's word) for 
the structure of differences which is always present; just as human 
agents are only the supports of the structure of the social totality in 
Althusser's marxism.
Kristeva, like Derrida, wishes to produce 'readings' unrestrained 
by a particular 'cultural' theory. She, too, wishes to live in the 
permanent revolution of a continually-deoentred, ideological stricture. 
Culler points o.ut that her own readings, in practice, actually operate 
"qiitc rostiictive conventions of reading".'*'^  Kristeva would probably 
be satisfied with the defence that her 'reading conventions' were in a 
state of premanent de-centredness:
"At every moment in its development semiotics must theorize its object, 
its own method and the relationship between them; it therefore theorises 
itself and become? , by thus turning back on itself, the theory of its 
own scientific practice ... "
15
This is a self-justification of the most obvious kind. Any reading is 
permissable because its validity is guaranteed by its existence as an 
expression of the geno-text. It may not be scientific at first, but if 
the reader looks at the assumptions of the reading, and theorizes them as 1345
13. Ibid. pp. 246, 247.
14. Ibid. p. 250.
15. Ibid. p. 251.
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an activation of an ever-present geno-text, he can then say that his 
reading is fully theorised and scientific. We may note that no recourse 
to any outside consideration is necessary - the scicntificity of the 
practice is guaranteed internally. The point was worth mentioning at 
this stage "because, later we shall see that Althusser guarantees his 
own scientificity in the same way (without any reference to anything 
outside the sphere of differences "brought into play "by the theorist 
himself). The plane of systematic references activated "by the practice 
of the analyst (or the theorist) defines its own objects, concepts and 
methods; scientificity is thus internally constituted, as a mere point 
within the system of differences.
Again like Derrida, Kristeva "believes that semiotic gesturos
should he seen as semiotic practices with the same status as other
social practices.^ Their social value lies in the "global model" of
the world suggested in their practice; bearing in mind that one should
always relate the "global model" to the specific phase of the country's
17
s o c i a l  development and not lapse into teleology,r and "projectivism".
This is the nearest Kristeva gets to relating semiology to the world 
outside her busy hive of semiotic reproduction. Her main project is 
"semanalysi3". This would be a form of analytical semiotics that 
attempted a typology of signifying systems, it would attempt
" ... to dissolve the constitutive centre of the semiotic enterprise 
such as it was posited by the Stoics, and this would mean tho interrog­
ation of the fundamental matrix of our civilization grasped in its 
ideological, neuralgic locus.
In other words (and as usual with the neo—structuralists, we do need 
'other words') the project of Kristeva' 3 semanalysis would be to coll 
into question the whole theory of knowledge in Western thought. This pro­
ject would be of the utmost importance for "contemporary thinking" sinco 167
16. Kristeva (19 7 1) op. cit. p. 37.
1 7. Ibid. By "projectivism" Kristeva seems to mean guesswork or speculat­
ion. Structuralism always masks simple materialities with the convoluted 
terminology of their essences or forms. The very incomprehensibility of 
structuralist discourse is built into its problematic: it is hard to 
express essences in simple terms.
13. Kristeva (1973) op. cit. p. 34.
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the sign-is "the foundation of our culture".
Ideology may well be crucial to capitalism's future, but 
Kristeva's approach will not carry us very far. Her main concern seems 
to be to "think the constants of (our - C.S.) culture" in order to pose, 
"once more", "the problems of the signifying act" and to reformulate 
them. Kristeva is concerned only with the infinite grarnmatological poss­
ibilities of reformulating the problem of formulation (or signification); 
she seems to care little about the relation of her formulations to the 
real world, the world of social relations which present immediate 
appearances. The process of formulation and signification seems as 
important to her as the process of money-making to the capitalist.
As 1'p-t x notes, it is not money but money-making that entrances the 
capitalists in neo-structuralism it is not knowledge btt tho process of 
knowledge-producing that interests its proponents. This would appear 
to be true of Derrida and Althusser as much as of Kristova. As 
Althusser puts it:
19
"Unlike the 'theory of knowledge' of ideological philosophy, I am not 
trying to pronounce some de jure (or de facto) guarantee which will ass­
ure us that we really do know1 what we know, and that wo can relate this 
harmony to a certain connexion between Subject and Object, Consciousness 
and the »¡orld. I am trying to elucidate the mechanism which explains to 
us ho.-, a de facto result, produced by tho history of a knowledge, i.e., 
a given deteiminate knowledge, functions as a knowledge, and not as some 
other result (a hammer, a symphony, a sermon, a political slogan etc.).
I am therefore trying to define its specific effect: the knowledge effect, 
by an understanding of its mechanism. If this oucstion has been pronerly 
put, protected from all the ideologies that still weigh us down, i.el, 
outside tne field of the ideological concepts by which the 'problem of 
knov. ledge is^  usually posed, it will lead us to the question of the mech­
anism by which forms of order determined by the system of the existing 
object of knowledge, produce, by the action of their relation to that 
system, the knowledge effect considered. This last question confronts us 
definitively with the oijierential nature of scientific discourse, i c 
with the specific nature of a discourse whioh cannot be maintained as a  
discourse except by reference to what is present as absence in each mom­
ent of its order: the constitutive system of its object, which in order 
to exist as a system, reouires the absent presence of the scientific dis­
course that 'develops' it."9n
19. Ibid. p. 35.
20. (1970) op. cit. p. 69.
193
like Kristeva and Derrida, Althusser's object is the mechanism of the
production of significant systems, i.o. their mode of production.
Like M s  fellow writers, he is concerned to protect his work from the
field of ideology and to understand scientifically the mechanism of
signification. And, like them, he seems to cut off his theoretical work
from the project of making sense of the world as it appears in practice.
Vie will return to Althusser; however, I would suggest that, although he
poses knowledge-production as a question, he docs in fact build in the
answer in his construction of the question. The mechanism that
produces the knowledge is presupposed: it is the system of differences at
work for the theorist. The "systematicity of the system" makes the 
• 21"knowledge-effect" possible. Like Derrida and Kristeva, Althusser 
posits scientifioity as a 'trace' within a system of 'traces': it is the 
structurally of the conglomeration of meanings that creates 
scientificity. Scientificity for the neo-structuralists is constituted 
internally by every semiotic system.
Retiirning to Kristeva, her "semanalysis" would base itself on 
two main concepts: Karxfe concept of work and Freud's concept of tho 
unconscious. Signification os an act of unconscious production is thus 
the 'centre' of Kristeva's 'field of differences'. The process of sign­
ification as work involving a "formal play of differences" becomes her 
base-point. * And, having defined her object as semiotic practices 
my terms, the sphere of ideological practice), it is not surprising that 
she focusses the would-be semanalysis on literary and poetic texts.
After all, as Kristeva says, these texts, more than any other type, 
carry a 'surplus of significance' v/hich provides the material for an
approach which orients itself to "the pre-signifying and pre-conscious
23work" that the text exposes. This 'surplus of significance' will un- 
doubtedly give her much scope for creative readings and re-readings of 
the unconscious work "exposed" in the text. 213
21. Ibid. p. 68.
22. Kristeva (1973) op. cit. p. 37
23. Ibid. p. 33.
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As with Derrida, vie find that Kricteva focusses on. the active 
production of significance in the field of 'literary or artistic creat­
ivity'. Doth of them seem to he attending to the question of the mode 
of production of 'creative art', of how an artist can operate a field of 
differences to creative effect. This involves "both of them in a 
recovery of Freudian psychoanalysis since the active creativity must 
necessarily be unconscious(since neo-structuralism rejects human author­
ship).“'^  It is thus a fit ending to this brief exposition to note that 
Kristeva and Derrida displace the God of Structure and replace it with the 
artistic practice of decentring the Structure. Inasmuch as they bring 
'social practice' in to play, their neo-structuralism is an advance. But 
in so far as social practice only moans the creative, artistic praxis of 
literary and poetic work this advance is limited. Furthermore, given that 
they see the semiotic practice of art as simply the creative docontring 
of the Orthodox Structure of Conventional Normative Discourse through 
the operation of an already-pre-given, infinite Structure of Significance, 
Derrida and Kristeva have not left the hoiurds of structuralism.
C-Htioue of Derrida and Kristeva
• » #
It seems to me that these WTitors have simply replaced the 
structure of orthodoxy with the infinite structure of the possible. Or, 
perhaps more accurately, they have added to the structure of unorthodox 
meaning an opposite which is presupposed by it. By viewing ideologies and 
ideological formations as the expression of a structure of ideological 
significance, however infinate and complex in its differentiation, they 24
24. It would be interesting to examine Jacques Lacan's position in all 
Lacan has become important because of his structuralist rewrite 
of^Freud. Althusser, Derrida and Kristeva are all very familiar with 
his work.
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have not moved one step away from Hegelian expressivism, despite 
their statements to the contrary. Ideology is still its own source 
and master. We are still left with an abstract, universal structure 
which lies in wait for the beginning of any significant practice.
The emphasis on practice is a very important advance but it is retarded 
by its location within a structuralist problematic. Derrida and 
Kristeva have only tallied about practice activating and developing a 
pre_given structure: they have been failed to sp e c ify  even at a gonoral 
level, the social origins and locations of ideological structures as 
elements within specific social practices. The concepts of 'gramme* 
and *geno-text* are simply metaphysical since they posit an abstract 
structure with no social location. Kristeva and Derrida have destroyed 
the concept of the structure of the visible text, but only to replace 
it with the concept of the structure of every text, the gramme.
Thus they have not destroyed the structuralist concopt of structure but 
merely displaced it to a more abstract level. Consequently, all my 
previous criticisms of structuralism (mentioned at the beginning of 
this chapter) are applicable to their work.
Creative, but unconscious, praxis in the works of Xristeva and 
Derrida is a motto for the comprehension of avant-garde art.
Social practice in the context of their problematic is thus not only 
crippled by its position as an qgency for a mysteriously pre-given struct­
ure of meaning but also by its restriction to creative work in tho 
field of art. Science demands that we sweep away the ideological 
notion of ideology (ideology as an expreaion of itself) and move towards 
the analysis of the material conditions and socal relationships neces­
sary for the production of particular ideological forms. In the 
work of Kristeva and Derrida, material conditions and social iclations 
of production seem to be unimportant, yet, a3 I have argued, one can 
only understand ideological forms as material elements within social 
practices composed of other material elements and social relations. 
Without this rigorous concept of the labour-process, their work simply 
reproduces metaphysical concepts of ’creation* as the human production 
of a prior (religious) presence.
Relegating creativity .to the unconscious does not solve the 
problem either - it simply helps to conceal their concept of the 
production as the work of a human agent activetting an ever-already- 
present, monolitnic structure. Rendering Jesus unconscious would not 
make him any less the agent of the Deity. Nor does the 'decentred
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structure' solve the problem. It still posits the existence of an 
unconceptualized, dominant ideology (the structure-to-be-dccontred) and, 
moreover, perpetrates the notion that even the liborative act of 
decentring is only the expression of a collectively-shared, infinite 
structure of significance.
The concept of the pheno-text or gramme, the infinite structure 
of significance, seems to be yet another structuralist universal. It is 
slightly different from Lévi-Strauss's 'structure of the human mind' but 
it still retains the character of a vague, ahistorical presonco. If it 
was clear that they were arguing that, since the time man ceased to be 
an animal and developed ideology and language, each particular histor­
ical social structure begets a particular structure of significance 
which limits all ideological and scientific expression, then that would 
be an interesting proposition. However, their emphasis on the infinit­
ude of significance in any historical period^ and on the ability of 
creative decentring work to conjure up any past, present or future mean­
ing, clearly forces us to criticize them for setting up another cultural 
universal. Just like Leach, they appear to be operating a concept of the 
primeval continuum of significance out of which creative men carve inter­
esting chunks. In typically structuralist vein, they have expropriated 
the history from history and left us with the skeletons of the universal 
structure. I, for one, am less interested in skeletons than in the 
bodies they inhabited and the part these bodies played in the develop­
ment of social life. Reducing history to forms is not an activity that 
is begotten by Marxism, in my view, but rather one begotten by structur­
alism. Marx never sanctioned the reduction of history to the expression 
of cultural universe-ls or the consent of mankind.
Derrida and Kristeva do not in any way take the study of the 
significant out of the ideological sphere of 'Cultural Studies'. Sign­
ificance and signifying practice remain in the domain of 'culture' as 
though 'culture* was some element of society separate from social pract­
ice. In Marxism, ideologies are an integral element in social life. In 
'Cultural Studies', 'culture' is usually something produced by the tipper 
and middle classes in their leisure time; a conception that loses the 
fully social nature of ideology to social science. For all his faults,
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Barthes had at least tried to demonstrate the diffusion of •myth* 
throughout the social formation. Unfortunately he also suffered from 
the conception of myth (a form of 'culture') as the production of the 
ruling classes: dominant ideology thus remained the privileged product 
of the bourgeoisie. Derrida and Kristeva have failed to challenge this 
pervasive notion and to place ideology in its general location in 
social practice. They have universalized ideology inasmuchas they 
posit a pheno—text of significance, but this concept fails to grasp the 
general concept of the place of ideology in social practice which 
enables us to develop a knowledge of the historical origins, specificity 
and development of any particular ideological formation. Their concept 
of & generalised ideological structure is too metaphysical to lead us 
to any such theoretical development. Derrida talked of the movement 
of the gramme when he argued that significant differences were the 
"effect of transformations". However, he did not provide us with the 
concepts with which to think the nature of these "transformations".
The transformations of the gramme appear as a general assertion, an 
article of faith. Derrida fails to develop the concepts adequate.to 
the movement of ideological forms. Had he and Kriotova begun to think 
of ideologies as necessary elementsof specific social prácticos, then the 
concepts of the movement of ideologies could have been constructed. But, 
without connecting ideologies to the elements and relations of specific 
social practices, it is impossible to do anything but posit a Mysterious 
Movement .of an Absolute Structuring Structure.
These remarxs close our critique of Derrida and Kristeva. I 
have not put to them the three questions on their reading of ideology 
(the questions outlined in ch. 3) because these questions can be best 
answered by dealing with the problematic as a whole. VJe must examine 
Althusser's "lecture symptomale" before the ouontions can be addressed 
to the whole problematic. Before Althusser, however, let us briefly 
look at Jonathan Culler's response to the work of Derrida and Kristeva.
Culler's critinue
Culler begins his critique by arguing that the Tel Quel group's 
position is subject to its own arguments. The fact that a text can be 
read in a number of different ways does not demonstrate the lack of
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structure in the text so much as.the complexity of the readVng process:
"If each text had a single meaning, then .it might he possible to argue 
that this meaning was inherent to it and depended upon no general system 
hut the fact that there is an open set of possible meanings indicates 
that we are dealing with interpretive processes of considerable power 
which require stidy."2^
Thus, for Culler, the principle of the decentred structure, adopted by 
the Tel Quel group, is just another principle of interpretation that 
centres the discourse under study and consequently it is just as ideol­
ogical as any other principle of interpretation or reading. Moreover, 
the ideological reading of Tel Quel is particularly weak because it 
specifies that any reading of the text is possible. Ciiller finds this 
apparent anarchy unsatisfactory since it forgets that there are conventional 
ways of reading. It is one thing to try to change the ruler, for reading 
but it is equally valid, says Culler, to study the conventions that actually 
do commonly operate in the current social situation.
The perpetual self-transcendence, advocated particularly by 
Kristeva, does not secure invulnerability from current cultural and 
ideological influences in Culler's view. Firstly he points out that, in 
order to transcend orthodox readings, one has to study existing 
•established' semiotic conventions - it is a step that cannot be avoided.
I think that this criticism is misguided since Tel Quel do not deny that 
conventional readings must be examined before any progress can made. 
Kristeva's whole position is based on a process of critique of orthodox 
conventions, clarification of the concepts of the critique, application 
of the new concepts in a reading, re-clarification of the mode of reading 
and self-criticism, a new application, and so on. Culler' 3 second 
point is that there is no such thing as a freedom to create meaning 
since every creation implies a rejection or destruction of other possible 
meanings. Each reading har- its own limits and constraints. Therefore to 
search for the totally creative reading is utopian in the extreme since 
there will always be limits and constraints to any mode of reading. 25
25. Culler (1975) op. cit. p. 243.
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Prom this correct observation, Culler then jumps several steps in 
the argument to the position that no reading can escape from the 
existing conventions of meanings
"Whatever type of freedom the members of the Tel Quel group secure for 
themselves will be based on convention and will consist of a set of 
interpretive procedures ... What I should like to argue, then, -is that 
while structualism cannot escape from ideology and provide its ovm 
foundations, this is of little importance because the critiques of struc­
turalism, and particularly of structuralist poetics, cannot do so either 
and. through their strategies of evasion lead to untenable positions. Or 
perhaps one should say, more modestly, that any attack on structuralist 
poetics based on the claim that it cannot grasp the varied modes of 
signification of literature will itself fail to provide a coherent alter­
native."^
He goes on to direct us:
"Rather than try to get outside ideology we must remain resolutely within 
it, for both the conventions to bo analyzed and the notions of understand­
ing lie within. If circle there be, it is the circle of culture itself.
In other words, all readers are trapped within the circles of their per­
sonal ideologies and there is therefore no point in trying to break out. 
All the literary critic can try to do is "participate in the play of the
text" and to isolate the "series of forms" in the text "which comply
28with and resist the production of meaning". Criticism should focus
29on "the adventures of meaning" and make the text "interesting". But,
Culler anticipates, his return to structuralism is not a return to a 
structuralism f or pLeasure (the pleasure of making pretty and "interesting"
patterns out of the text in order to combat "boredom"). Pleasure, he argues 
is not the only value of a structuralist reading: "Literature offers the 
best of occa.sions for exploring the complexities of order and meaning".^ 26789*
26. Ibid. pp. 252, 253»
27. Ibid. pp. 252, 253. '
28. Ibid. p. 254.
29. Ibid. p. 262.
3C. Ibid. p. 264.
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Vie are thus to return to structuralism, according to Culler, in order to 
understand hovi man makes sense of the world. And, a3 I expected, he 
finally reasserts structuralism's concept of "homo significans" and 
assumes that by understanding "man's" ways of reading we will understand 
the world we live in:
"Man is not just homo sapiens hut homo significans: a creature who gives 
sense to things ... To know oneself is to study the intersubjective pro­
cess of articulation and interpretation by which we emerge as part of 
the world.
. Prom this reading of Culler's critique and in the light of the
history of theories of reading ideology, it seems that he has relapsed 
into that form of structuralism known to sociologists as 'etlmo- 
methodology'. The absolute, universal structure (homo significans) rem­
ains and the task is to explore the various taken-for granted meanings 
that this basic structure can produce in different situations (i.e. 
different intersubjective contexts) in order that we might find out 
more about it. Despite his protests to the contrary, he has regressed 
from Tel Quel structuralism and restored the logocentricity of the 
Absolute Source, the human subject. Like the ethnomethodologists (espec­
ially Garfinkel), he is not concerned with changing ideologies but only 
with exploring "the adventures of meaning" which they enable. Like 
the ethnomethodologists, Culler sees the social production of normative 
conventions (or 'ideologies' in my terms) a3 a matter of intersubjective 
interaction in everyday existence. And, like the ethnomcthodologists, his 
subjectivism produces no expressed concern with the social rdations bet­
ween men and nature which form the basis of social life and enable the 
very existence of purely intersubjective relations.
Derrida and Kristeva may have failed to establish the 
materialist concepts for the reading of ideology but at least they 
rejected the logocentrism of the human subject as Absolute Creator 
of meaning. Culler's relapse into a kind of phenomenological subjectivism 
takes us no further in our quest for an adequate theory of reading 31
3 1. Ihid.
ideology. He never left the realm of spontaneous readings of discourse 
and thus became enmeshed in its circle of insecurity based on the 
question: how do we knov?? Because the answer to the cuestión is not 
available at the level of spontaneous analysis he could not find it. 
However, the solution is not to give up and assert the fact that, at 
the level of ideology, all is subjective. Rather the task is to develop 
a general theory of the mode of production of ideological impressions 
and thus to move from the level of subjective, spontaneous reading 
to the analysis of objective social practices which demand and sustain 
specific social ideologies. All is indeed subjective at the level of 
ideology: what theory must achieve is a knowledge of the objective, 
material conditions which produce and maintain the ideological forms 
that structure the vision of the human subject.
Althusser’s "lecture synptomale1
Re-reading Althusser's theory of theoretical discourse in Read­
ing Capital in the light of the work of Derrida and Kristeva is quite 
startling. What becomes obvious very quickly is the similarity between
his concepts and those of Derrida. I hope that in what follows I can
3 ?indicate the basis of this obviousness.
Just as Derrida rejoiced in his 'Vorld of signs which has no 
truth, no origin, no nostalgic guilt" where the "innocence of becoming" 
is regularly affirmed, so Althusser submits there is "no such thing 
as an innocent reading"^ and enjoins us to share in his "adventure" of 32
32. The similarity between Foucault and Althusser could also be demonst­
rated - focussing especially on their concepts of semiotic activity, and 
the systematic field of differences structuring such activity.
33. Althusser and Balibar (197C) op. cit. p.14.
reading Marx's Capital. To be more accurate it is Althusser and friends 
who read Capital:
"The studies that emerged from this project are no more than the 
various individual protocols of this reading: each having cut the 
peculiar oblique path that suited him through the immense forest of this 
book"^.
Is this to say that each reading of Capital was seen as purely 'subjective 
Since Althusser goes on to announce that "We are all philosophers" and 
that they had engaged in "philosophical reading", it 3eems clear that 
he locates the "guilt" of the reading not so much in its subjectivity as 
in its application of a philosophical problematic to the text:
"To read' Capital as philosophers is precisely to question the specific 
object of a specific discourse, and the specific relationship between 
this discourse and its object; it is therefore to put to the discourse- 
object unity the question of the epistemological status which distingu­
ishes this particular unitv from other forms of discourse-object unity".
35
The philosopher's 'problem of knowledge' guides their "paths" through 
"the immense forest" of Capital. A grid, composed of a system of phil­
osophical differences, is thus placed over Capital and a reading is made 
of'Marx's philosophy".
Althusser feels no shame about the reading: "It is a guilty
3 6reading, but one that absolves its crime on confessing it." His 
position is practically identical to that of Kristeva and Derrida. 
Neo-structuralism is continually making "active" readings, criticising 
their assumptions and developing nev.' ones; for example, Kristeva seemed 
to accept a state of permanent de-centring of the structure as the
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid. p. 15
36. Ibid.
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nox-mal state for neo-str cturalism. ^  This continual self-examination 
ensured that semiotics always "theorized itself" and alvrays existed as 
"the theory of its ovm scientific practice". Semiotics, therefore, is 
practised in a permanent state of soientificity: a state justified for 
itself from within. Althusser's "philosophy" appears to he very similar 
to Kristeva's "semiotics" and Derrida's "grammatology" in that the 
practice of all three is self-justifying. All three programmes represent 
attempts to specify a relation between a proposed field of significant 
differences, operating unseen within any given text or discourse, and the 
explicit "concepts" and "objects" of that text or discourse. All three 
modes of exploration operate by concepts which provide a 'safety net', 
i.e. they all use the notion that any reading is permissible provided its 
constituting system of significances or 'grid' (Althusser's tenn)is 
systematic enou h to prove itself necessary. The systematicity of 
»the reading' thus ensures its own validity and necessity.
Althusser rejects Hegelian models of reading vihich provide an
3°"immediate reading of essence in existence", and 'fetishist', ' and 
claims that Marx inaugurated a scientific reading in Capital;
"Capital, on the contrary, exactly measures a distance and an internal 
dislocation (decalage) in the real, inscribed in its structure, a dist­
ance and dislocation such as to make their ovm effects themselves 
illegible, and the illusion of an immediate reading of them the ultimate 
apex of their effects: fetishism."
Just as Marx savj that the text of "history cannot be read in its manifest 
discourse" and is the "inaudible and illegible notation of the effects of 
a structure of structures", so too, Althusser argues, a theoretical 
discourse cannot be read from its immediately visible text as though 
that text vjas the direct expression of its human author's vision. 
Althusser thus registers the important concept of the dislocation of 378940
37. See infra p.19 5,fn. 15«
38. Foucault's "archaeology" seems to represent the same operation.
39. (1970) op. cit. p. 1 7 .
40. Ibid.
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, of the significant functions from their relations (or structure) of 
signification. Derrida and Kristeva did not make this point explicitly, 
hut, clearly, since they rejected expressivism and posited the "pheno-text" 
as an expression and repression of elements of the "geno-text" or "gramme" 
they implied a definite concept of the dislocation "between the pheno-text 
and geno-text. The visible elements of significance in the pheno-text 
were not just related to each other but also to invisible presences 
and to significations absent altogether from that text. The neo­
structuralist structure is always decentred. Ben Brewster's Glossary 
definition of Althusser's concept of "dislocation" is interesting:
"Althusser argues ... that the relations between idmlogy and the other 
practices, between the different practices in general, between the elem­
ents in each practice, and between ideology and science, are, in principle, 
relations of dislocation, staggered with respect to one a other: each has 
its own time and rhythm of development."^
The principle of the de-centred structure has thus been applied to the 
social structure: each element has its own "relative autonomy" or inter­
nal specificity. The latter point is also, of course, a basic premise 
of dialectical materialism . Consequently, Althusser correctly notes 
that Marxism thinks of the social formation as a "structure-in-dominance", 
a structure of dependent, but independent, elements dominated by 
one element, the sphere of the economy.
Examining Marx's method of reading the texts of Adam Smith, 
Althusser finds that Marx reads Smith in two ways:
(1) A "grid" reading. Marx reads Smith spontaneously through the 
grid of his own problematic and finds him lacking, ridden with 
"oversights" etc. This readi-.g concerns itself with the observation or 
identification of the weaknesses in the ohject-discourse and does not 
trouble to reflect on the reasons for these inadequacies.
(2) A "symptomatic" reading. This reading reads the connections 
between the visible and invisible (or, strength and weakness) in a 
discourse. Any "oversights", inadequacies or concepts invisible to 41
41. Ibid. p. 312.
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the theoretical discourse in question, are seen to be built in to its
vision or problematic as part of its whole field of operation.
Althusser armies that Marx does this kind of reading; but never consciously
t\Lks about it. It is unconscious to Marx but nevertheless, it is argued, it
is an integral part of his theoretical discourse. Like his first reading,
Marx's second reading measures one "text" (his ov:n) against another
(e.g. Smith's). But what marks off the second (symptomatic) reading
42is that Marx's "text" is "articulated with the lapses" in Smith's text.
I shall attempt to explain what Althusser means by this.
It is this attribution of a method of symptomatic reading to 
Marx that marks the operation of the concept of the decentred structure 
in Althusser's theory of theoretical discourse. Therefore we must 
examine this symptomatic reading in detail.
To understand "lecture symptomale", we must realize straight 
away that Althusser sees knowledge as a production:
"What political economy docs not see is not a pre-existing object which 
it could have seen but did not see - but an object which it produced 
itself in its operation of knowledge and which did not pre-exist it: 
precisely the production itself, which is identical with the object.
Shades of Derrida here as Althusser introduces the notion of theory as a 
semiotic practice! Althusser seems to share Derrida's notion of the 
"play of differences" created by semiotic production because he has 
introduced the na>-structuralist concept of a space created by discourse. 
The discursive space is composed, as we have seen, by traces of traces 
of traces, by a conjuncture of elements from the gramme, a field of 
significant differences.
Althusser continues: 423
42. Ibid. p. 28
43. Ibid. p. 24
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"This introduces us to a fact peculiar to science: it can only pose 
problems on the terrain and within the horizon of a definite theoretical 
structure, its problematic, which constitutes its absolute and definite 
condition of possibility, and hence the absolute determination of the 
forms in which all problems must be posed, at any given moment in the 
science.
A theoretical problematic is a product of theoretical practice (the trans­
formation of ideology into knowledge by means of theory^). But where 
doe3 theory come from? Theoretical practice? But surely that would bo 
tautologousi Theory would simply derive from theory. Althusser’s 
reading of Marx has ignored the many asides in Capital to the economic 
and political "interests" of the political economists. These asides 
may be ad hoc and untheorized but they must be confronted. By fooussing 
on Marx's supercession of Political Economy in theory, Althusser renders 
the process of theoretical transformation totally autonomous. This 
problem reappears many times in Althusser's works in the forms of 'the 
relation between Marxism and political practice' and of 'the general 
relation between theory and practice'. A similar problem exists for 
Derrida and Kristeva in that they fail to transcend the notion of the 
ideological source of ideology. This problem (which has become knom as 
the problem of 'tneoreticism') is very important for Althusser's position 
and one that remained unsolved in his prior text, For Marx.^In that text 
he had- specified the notion of scientific knowledge as the product of 
work done on ideological formations by scientific theory. That notion 
opened up the problem which he creates again in Reading- Capital. In
For Marx the problem was indexed with a note declaring that the concept_ - ‘ , 47
of 'theory' "obviously deserves a much more serious examination".
In the passage quoted above from Reading Capital Althusser again posits
the "theoretical problematic" as the "absolute and definite condition of
possibility" of a "science". In my view thi3 begs the question: what 4567
44. Ibid. p. 25.
45. Ibid. p. 316.
46. (1969) op. cit., esp. pp. 182-193.
47. Ibid. p. I84.fn. 21.
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connection does the production of science or theory have with the 
ongoing production of social life (in its various forms)? After all, 
there are other necessary conditions for science; notably, the scientist 
must eat and obtain shelter - this simple point means that we must ask 
about his position in the structure of production and in what vmys this 
position influences his science (either positively or negatively). Like 
Derrida and Kristeva, Althusser seems to propose that a theoretical 
discourse is a dislocated expression of a theoretical structure and that 
this structure exists purely in theory, i.e. abstractly and asocially.
In this strict sense, Althusser has not left the terrain of a 
structuralist problematic. The "forms" which theoretical "problems" 
take are governed by the theoretical problematic. Is this not the 
same as Derrida's vievr that forms (past, present and possible) of 
significance are governed by the "gramme" or Kristeva's view that the 
forms of the "pheno-text" are governed by the "geno-text"? Althusser 
seems to be operating the same neo-structuralist concept of the 
mysteriously-appearing, grand structure which determines all forms of 
the content of a discourse. The "theoretical problematic" seems to stand 
in relation to theoretical discourse as does the "gramme" to the "formal 
play of differences".
Althusser goes on to argue that this concept of the theoretical 
problematic removes the subjectivity of theorising and reading:
"Any object or problem situated on the terrain and within the horizon, 
i.e., in the definite structural field of the theoretical problematic 
of a given theoretical discipline, is visible. We must take these words 
literally. The sighting is thus no longer the act of an individual sub­
ject, endowed with the faculty of 'vision' which he exercises either 
attentively or distracte; ly; the sighting is the act of its structural 
conditions, it is the relation of immanent reflection between the field 
of the problematic ana its objects and its problems. 48
48. (1970) op. cit. p. 25.
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Thus the reader or theorist is "unwittingly" the agent of the
theoretical structure or problematic. Althusser footnotes the fact
that, as his work is consciously (note the irony) ’anti-structuralist',
the concept of "immanent reflection" used in this passage presents problems
It certainly does, since it is a classic structuralist concept! How
similar this is to the other neo-structuralist works which by-pass the
'human subject' through their conception of the text as the dislocated
expression/repression of the geno-text or Structure! Althusser's footnote
refers us to a later section of Reading Capital but this seotion fails
4 - 9 --------- -----to solve his difficulties. The section concerned simply argues that 
the organization and order of succession of concepts in a theoretical 
work are underpinned by the "systematicity" of the system of concepts in
the theoretical problematic and that a concept's meaning is given by
.. 50its "place and function" in the totality of concepts. These are
classically structuralist notions. The problem is indexed by Althusser's
uneasy use of two favourite structuralist terms "synchrony" and "diachrony"
(he argues that the "synchrony" and "diachrony" of the concepts are
given by their "place and function" in the theoretical structure).
The reason why Althusser calls thin method (of reading the
structure of a theory in its absences and presences at the level of the
text's theoretical concepts) a method of symptomatic reading is as
follows: Under "certain very special critical circumstances" (unspecified
by Althusser), the theoretical problematic prodtices "the fleeting pre-
51sence of an aspect of its invisible"-7 within its visible field of
discourse. To the spontaneous, "grid" reading, this presence of the
invisible appears as a theoretical lapse, weakness or oversight. To
a symptomatic reading, the presence of the problematic's invisible field
(its 'repressed' concepts) at the level of the visible is a symptom of
52the "unconsciousness of the text", its problematic; just as some of the 
patient's utterances are for Freudian psychoanalysis a symptom of the 495012
49. The very fact of the footnote at this juncture (p. 25) indexes again 
the problem of structuralism in Althusser's discourse.
50. "(1970) op. cit. p.
51. Ibid. p. 2 1 .
52. Ibid. p. 3-17»
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structure of the unconscious. It is interesting to consider that the 
tern 'symptom' can mean 'sign' and that 'semiology' is the science of 
s i g n s  or symptoms. Althusser's 'discovered' mode of reading in Marx 
seems to he no more than an imposition on Marx of a 'neo-structuralist' 
or'radical semiological' approach to phenomena. The similarity of 
terminólo~y "between Althusser and the structuralists simply indexes 
that fact. However it would he wrong to say that the neo-structuralists 
are simply structuralists. They definitely remove the concept of the 
immediate presence of the structure in its effects and definitely 
construct the val\iahle concept of semiotic modes of production, two 
important moves away from structuralism. However, on the other hand, 
we should not exaggerate the differences; neo-structuralism is just a 
new, developed form of structuralism. What conceptual developments 
neo-structuralism has made simply displace the concept of the Absolute 
Structure to another, more abstract, level; they do not remove it 
althogether.
A 'symptom' is defined (in the 1971 Oxford English Dictionary) 
as "a perceptible change in the body or its functions, which indicates 
disease, or the kind of disease". 'Symptomatic reading' is th\is a very 
accurate term for the neo-structuralist mode of reading since it 
expresses the fact that this group of theorists see the Structure as a 
thing in movement. In this sense, their conception of the Structure is 
a dialectical one - a distinct advance on structuralism. And, because the 
Structure (the problematic, gramme or geno-text) is in continual 
transformation,movement or "dialectical mutation" (Althusser's term), 
it is constituted two-sidedly by its presences and absences. Thus the 
symptomatic reading observes the dis-ease within the theoretical proble­
matic as it moves; the dis-ease being constituted by the antagonism 
between the two poles of the problematic, its recognized concepts 
and its unrecognized, hidden or repressed concepts.
As such, symptomatic reading is an advance on ordinary structuralist 
readings, which only observe the 'recognized' or 'visible' concepts of 
a static problematic or ideology and fail to discern the totality-in­
movement of the structure composed of visible and invisible concepts 
in connection. Unfortunately on the other hand,being a form of 
structuralism, neo-structuralisra fails to locate its discovered forms 
within the social totality and fails to define the concept of the
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importance of the 'contents' or material substance of a form. Neo- 
1 structuralism has been very important in introdvtcing the concepts of 
Structure-in-movement and contradictions-within-the-Structure, but it 
has failed to put the Structuring Structure into the social totality, 
to give the elements of the Structure any real materiality and history and 
to solve the problem of the combination of structures.
These weaknesses or failures can be illustrated by pursuing 
Althusser a little further. Althusser's concept of the theoretical 
problmatic and its effects is remarkably similar to Derrida's concept 
of the gramme with its appearance in traces. Althusser also talks of 
the production in theory using a spatial metaphor like Derrida. These 
two similarities can been indicated by the following passage:
"Hence, if we wish to preserve the spatial metaphor, the paradox of the 
theoretical field is that it is an infinite because definite space, i.e. 
it has no limits, no external frontiers separating it from nothing, pre­
cisely because it is defined and limited within itself, carrying in it­
self the finitude of its definition, which, by excluding what it is not, 
makes it what it is.''53
This may appear to be sheer gobbledegook or dialectical metaphysics, but, 
in my view, Althusser is attempting to specify the concept of a created, 
discursive space in movement. He is trying to steer clear from static 
concepts of structure and to embody movement in his definition of the 
problematic. Thus he sees it as a "disengaged" theoretical space, "limit­
ed within, itself" and "marked inside itself", created by a productive 
mechanism - the knowled®' s mode of production. This concept is practic­
ally identical to Derrida's concept of the infinite sea of differences 
in which semiotic practice introduces a particular 'play'. And, as regard 
the form of appearance of the field of differences, Althusser talks of 
"illegible notation" and "the fleeting presence of an aspect" while 
Derrida talks of "traces" and "traces of traces". Hot only do they both 
use the same 'stars-in-the-night-sky' image to indicate the profound 
degree of mediation between the structure and its effects, but also they
53« Ibia. p. 27•
share the view that the absences of the text are as indicative as its 
presences.
Althusser argued that the distinguishing character of a 
Marxian symptomatic reading lies in the fact that the reader's 'text' is 
articulated in the "lapses1' of the real text because (he says) Marx 
occupied the terrain of the unconscious text of his victims. Only 
on the condition that the reader through his theoretical 'work' has 
occupied both the conscious and unconscious terrain of the theoretical 
problematic under examination can he achieve a symptomatic reading of 
that problematic's written, theoretical texts. The theorist or 
reader must, literally 'conquer' the territory of his predecessors 
before he can make the advance of opening up new theoretical space for 
the creation of knowledge. He must grasp in full the thought-structures 
in existence before he can locate and resolve their inadequacies: for 
only by understanding the mechanism (the structure) of their production 
of knowledge can he eradicate it, or improve upon it, and so create 
new knowledge. It may be observed that this is rather obvious to 
anyone who has engaged in any kind of serious, scientific research and 
that it does not take all this complicated language to express the 
fact that 'one_ has to master the field of knowledge before one can 
advance it'. I may be doing Althusser an injustice hut, at this 
point in time - after this long and arduous deciphering of his discourse, 
this observation seems to be fully justified. To say that a theoretical 
text is always inscribed in and against the field of significance of an­
other text is surely to state the obvious. Moreover, the fact that it is 
so obvious is suspicious, to say the least. My suspicions lead me to 
suggest that the obvious substance (yet magical appearance) of 
Althusser's symptomatic reading corresponds to an absent concept of 
the social origins of theoretical revolutions (and stagnations). 
Althusser's discourse focusses solely on the movement of theory, as if 
it went on in a vacuum; none of his concepts reflect the relation 
between theory and the social formation. The reason why it seems 
obvious that theory is produced in and against a field of theories is 
because that conception of the origins of theoretical revolutions is an 
ideological one, or, what amounts to the same thing, it is purely
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descriptive in referring to the apparent differences between theories, and 
,the apparent, purely theoretical, structures which produce them. 'Theory 
evolves from theory' is as ideological as 'ideology evolves from ideology' • 
it is equally tautological and equally descriptive. Symptomatic reading, 
therefore, is simply a thorough way of describing theoretical differences. 
That is all Marx does in the passage given so much attention by Althusser?^ 
Consequently, symptomatic reading is not so markedly different from "grid” 
reading - it is simply the reading theorist's reflection on the differen­
ces between his "grid" and that of the object-text which ho has 
comprehended and superceded.
Just as Kristeva produced a concept of semiotics as a 
continual reflection on its own field of differences, so too has Althusser 
produced a mode of reading which continually reflects on its own 
differences. Symptomatic reading simply produces a list of differences 
between two theoretical "grids” and explains those differences in terms of 
the different structures of the two grids. In an era of increasing 
surplus labour, it is interesting to note that "lecture symptomale" is 
very much a 'surplus' reading; the basic form of reading is "grid" 
reading. Normally, theoretical advances should be possible on the basis 
of "grid" readings. However, the symptomatic reading, in its nature, 
will clearly give the theorist a greater degree of certainty over 
the novel nature of his concepts and an apparent explanation of the 
inability of other problematics to produce his discoveries. Perhaps, then, 
a symptomatic reading of Marx (to produce the specificity of his 
differences) has been produced at a time when there is a felt need for 
a development and/or a redefinition of basic Marxian concepts in the 
light of threatening tendencies such as Stalinism, anarchic humanism, 
adventurism, reformism etc., etc.. Does the uncertain Marxist retrace 
his steps of theoretical origin at times of crisis in the socialist 
movement? Perhaps. But should he then generalise his retreat as a 
new, 'Marxist' theory of reading? No. It seems to me that Althusser's 
symptomatic reading is, in one way or another, itself merely a symptom - 54
54. Ibid.pp. 20, 2 1.
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a symptom of a Marxism (or form of Marxism - Communist Party Marxism) 
in retreat, retracing its steps, in order that it can go forward on a 
correct and sure footing. But, on the other hand, the practice of sympt­
omatic reading is not thereby an incorrect procedure in itself: at times, 
theory must "be reworked and retraced in order to advance. However, sympt­
omatic reading is only a rigorous, double-checking reading most suitable 
to periods of (or Parties in) theoretical stagnation or turmoil; it should 
not be generalized to the level of an absolute, scientific mode of 
reading. Any such generalization would mean condemning theory to a 
perpetual reflection on its own premises; a fate that would send Marxism 
round in circles. Certainly, critique, re-examination and theoretical 
reflection are, in certain conjunctures, vitally necessary but only 
inasmxichas they enable the further production of adouate theories of social 
developments. Like Kristeva's relfexive semiotics and Derrida's 
grammatology, Althusser's symptomatic readings or philosophical 
analyses threaten to be an infinite regression into insecure introspection 
and an obstacle to the rapid development of adequate knowledge of 
social developments.
Theoretical reflection is valuable when it produces more fruit­
ful general concepts than presently exist. General concepts are necessary 
if one is to develop any concepts of the particular. However it should 
never befcJgotten that the object of theoretical introspection and review 
is to provide general concepts that can be developed in the particular.
The production of general concepts in itself is not the ultimate end of 
theoretical review;.such a motive could only succeed in providing 
massive and intricate webs of generalities with no grasp on the particular. 
Such general theory would be abstract and one-sided with no concrete, 
objective character as a reflection of the movements of the real world. 5
55. And, for that matter, Alvin Gouldner's "reflexive sociology": see 
A.'/. Gouldner (l97l) op. cit.
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In short, the object of Marxism should not simply be to reach "the 
threshold of Marx's philosophy", a3 Althusser himself admits.^
Althusser's reading is indeed "guilty" in that its object is
to recognize "the infinite extent contained within its minute space: the
57extent of Marx's philosophy." In his view, "we are all seeking this 
58philosophy". Having found it, other 'readings' of Marx and Marxism 
will be possible. At this point, says Althusser, "before it is too late"^ 
we will be able to understand corrrctly "the reasons for this unreason".
By "unreason", Althusser refers to the ideological deformities of Marxism 
such as the "cult of the personality". Althusser, alarmingly, seem3 to 
assume that all the problems of global socialism stem from a crisis in 
Marxist theory and that continual philosophical re-readings will re­
solve that crisis. My position on this should be clear from what I have 
said already, but let me reiterate some basic positions:
(1) Any such crisis in theory does not of itself explain the 
problems of practice. Mo doubt, the problems of theory are connected
to the problems of practice: theoretical problems have been generated by 
certain movements of revolutionary practice and problems in practice 
have been generated by certain movements (or lack thereof) in theory.
One cannot be a Marxist and see theory as an Absolute Structure 
generating all the practical problems of the surface text of history.
This implication of Althusser's position relates to his adherence to 
structuralist concepts, particularly the implicit concept of the socially 
determining, but not socially determined, nature of theory.
(2) Continual philosophical re-reading of Marx and Marxism 
will not provide anything but a developed super-abstract philosophy.
What is needed is the development of appropriate general concepts and 
their particular counterparts in order that Marxism can provide adequate 
theoretical analysis of social developments presenting problems for 567*90
56. Althusser (1970) op. cit. p. 29-
57. Ibid. p. 3C.
53. Ibid.
59. Ibid. p. 34, fn. 14.
60. Ibid. p. 34.
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revolutionary socialist practice. A developed philosophy, in itself, 
does not provide even general concepts "because it is a "backward step 
into the abstract non-material basis of conceptualization as a whole. 
Philosophy simply generalizes the epistemologies of sciences - that is, 
it works on sciences - it does not actually produce a science.
Socialism certainly has its abstract, theoretical side but that side 
looks forward to the practical concrete side of socin.lism. It does 
indeed study the abstract basis of its theory (i.e. its epistemology) but 
it also studies its material basis (i.e. the conditions of social 
development). Now, it is certainly true that many Marxist works are 
undialectical and the restoration of the dialectic to Marxist theory 
is possibly the most urgent theoretical task today. Put that restoration 
must also be realized in the practice of theoretical analysis of 
particular social developments, not in the practice of concocting endless 
streams of general permutations made possible by the dialectical approach. 
Certainly dialectical philosophy is potentially "infinite", only waiting 
for philosophers to produce its extended "space". But strings of 
potential abstractions are irrelevant! They would simply be empty 
speculations on what could be. Rather more immediate is the employment 
of the dialectical principle in the development of necessary, new, 
general concepts which can then enable us to grasp faithfully the 
particular developments in the global social structure. Bialectical 
materialism is an approach which grasps social phenomena in their move­
ments and which was built on a rejection of metaphysical 'philosophies' 
pointed upwards towards the Heavens rather than downwards towards earth. 
Althusser's philosophical readings aimed at putting the dialectic back 
into dialectical materialism threaten to take the 'materialism' out, 
just as other forms of structuralism have taken the history out of 
history. After all,.if one has grasped Marx's critique of philosophy in 
his early works and the nature of materialist dialectics practised in 
the later works, one should put this comprehension into a theoretical 
practice of explaining the latest social developments rather than a 
practice of propounding a philosophy of Philosophy or ?n ideological 
theory of theory.
I would not like to leave this critical discussion of Althuss­
er's "lecture symptomale" without registering the fact that, in my viev;, 
Althusser's reading of Marx is very valuable. It has produced, or at 
least encouraged, a re-awakened interest in the question of ideologies.
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He, and his colleagues, have through their actual readings observed, 
albeit descriptively, the intervention of ideologies in Marxist theoty.
The central object of Althusser's work seems to be the role of 
ideology and it seems to me that, at the present stage of historical 
development, as in the past, the role of ideologies is a very important 
and decisive one. The development of the Marxist theory of ideology and 
particular ideologies, and their mode of intervention in the social 
formation at particular conjunctures, is therefore a vital task.
However, such a development is only effective and realized inasmuchas 
it can produce general concepts and concrete analyses which can be of 
use in actual political/ideological struggles. Concepts of 'philosophy', 
semiotics and significance which (a) do not specify in themselves the 
specific connections between ideology and the social structure and (b) 
remain at the level of generality will be of little value in practice.
It is interesting that Althusser's post-Reading Capital writings show 
some awareness of this point. In the Foreword to the Italian edition 
of Reading Capital, he talks of his conception of "philosophy" as 
"theoretical" and likely to "induce 'speculative' effects".^ In an inter­
view in 19^8, Althusser still maintains a concept of dialectical material­
ism a3 the "philosophy" of Marxism, but emphatically sees that "philosophy
as a necessary weapon of proletarian revolution, since it enables "the
62defence and development of theory". He seems to have moved to a position 
identical to the one expressed here: that theoretical development is an 
important thing and that 'reading adventures' represent a tendency to spec 
ulative thinking. Moreover, there seems to be more of a sense in this 
interview of the historically-specific nature of the need to defend and 
develop theory: there is less sense of the absolute nature of symptomatic 
reading. In short, Althusser himself seems to be looking forward to the 
relation between theory and practice rather than backward to the philo­
sophical practice of producing systems of super-abstract generalities. 612
61. Ibid. pp. 7>8.
62. See Althusser (l97l) P. 15-25*
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Althusser's actual readings of Marx are not just important 
for their sense of smell for ideology, they are also important because, 
in one way or another, they reassert the method of dialectical 
materialism as the mark that distinguishes Marxist theory from any kind 
of radical positivism, radical phenomenology or mechanical, economistic 
materialism. Very shortly, vie must turn to a dialectical materialist 
theory of reading ideologies but, before that, let us examine neo-structurali­
sm in the light of the three questions posed to the other modes of
. J , 63reading ideology.
Ideology-detection in nco-structuralism
The neo-structuralist problematic sees ideology a-s a closed 
discourse; one which makes unselfconscious assumptions and therefore 
lacks systematicity. 'Science' is predicated by the systematic!!--- of a 
. discourse. Scientific discourse is not closed at any point since it 
constitutes an infinite system of elements. Hence the neo-structuniist 
analyst can read ideology scientifically (or 'detect' it) by reading a 
discourse through the concepts of his ovm field of signification and 
identifying the closures and silences in the field of signification of the 
object-discourse. Consequently the neo-structuralist is looking for the 
'breaks' in the chain of significance in the discourse, its 'blind spots' 
and its 'gaps'.
In other words, the analyst's 'discourse' is juxtaposed against 
the 'discourse' of the object-text and the discourse that has weaknesses 
is deemed the ideological one. The object-discourse is said to be read 63
63. The questions outlined supra, p.86 , concerning the method of 
reading ideology, the conception of the presence of ideology, and 
the theoretical grounding of the reading method.
against the reading-discourse, or, as Derrida would have it, one text 
is inscribed within the lapses of another, and the text with lapses is 
the one with the ideology. For Kristeva, of course, the next thing to 
do would he to check hack on the 'winning' discourse to see if its 
infinite systematicity is real. With this mode of reading, of course, 
the field of discourse reading the text con he found to he ideological 
just as much as the text's discourse itself. In this sense there are 
no guarantees in this method that the discourse of the text is the one 
that is the object of reading; for if the 'reading field' or grid is found 
lacking, in comparison with the text's discourse, then it is the one 
with the ideological lapses and the one that is the object of the 
reading practice. In such an instance, we could say that it was the 
reading-discourse that had been read! Frequently, it will happen, 
of course, that lapses are found both in the reading-discourse and in 
the read-discourse. In that case both discourses are ideological and 
there is a frantic search for systematicity: this is reflected on the 
surface in the mind of the reader as a 'crisis in theory', or, perhaps, 
as 'an intriguing problem*.
This mode of reading ideology is an advance in two important 
ways. Firstly, there is the concept of the object-discourse as actively 
signifying in relation to the active field of signification of the 
reader. Secondly, there is the concept of the active nature of the 
reading-discourse in relation to the actively-signifying object-discourse. 
In other words, both the planes of 'the reading' and 'the read' are 
considered active. They are seen as active because the practice of the 
reading activates them. The reader operates his own field of signif­
icance in reading and by that act he also activates _a field of reading 
in the text. In short this concept of the reading process is a dialectical 
one: it posits a movement between the reading- and read-discourses. The 
reading-discourse is only constituted in the practice of reading the 
read-discourse and the read-discourse is only realised in the activity of 
the reading-discourse. The concept of the given, static structure of a 
text is abandoned and in its place is substituted the concept of the 
decentred structure created by an active reading. It is important to 
note that»in this dialectical conception of reading, the ideology of 
the read-discourse (if any) is not given to all-comers - it is produced,
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in the reading practice, by the work of a more systematic reading- 
discourse on a less systematic read-discourse.
Thus it is that ideology is detected by the production of 
closures, breaks and lapses in the read-discourse. These closures, 
breaks and lapses exist at both the visible level of explicit significance 
and the invisible level of implicit or absent significance. There are 
no guarantees that they exist in the text and can only be produced by 
a reading practice employing a more systematic, more scientific field 
of significance. This is the neo-structuralist theory and practice of 
reading ideology. Clearly it is a ’self-conscious' or 'reflexive' mode 
of reading, it not only reads (with its 'grid') but it also notes the 
differences in mechanism between itself and its object-discourse. This 
mode of reading thus involves both 'grid and 'symptomatic' reading.
It reads and then talks' about its reading. This is peculiar to all 
three protagonists of neo-structuralism discussed here. It was clearly 
expressed by Althusser in his explicit enunciation of the two modes of 
reading ('grid' and 'symptomatic') in Marx, but it is equally clear 
in Kristeva. The following passage illustrates her view of neo-struct­
uralist reading (in the form of "semiotics”) as a 'grid' reading which 
constantly questions its own structures
"For, ... if the raison d'etre of the semiotic enterprise from the time 
of the Stoics to the present day has always been to found scientific 
abstraction in posing the sian and in so doing allowing the constitution 
of science (including linguistic science) as systematisation and formal­
isation, semiotics is nov: ca.lled upon to question these foundations, the 
foundations of science (and of linguisties) and to work towards the con­
stitution of a theory of knowledge in which the project of linpuistics, 
duly questioned, will itself be integrated. In other words, having pro­
vided the xsitive foundations of metaphysics and/or science, semiotics 
nov;'offers itself as the area of the interrogation, analysis and critic­
ism of metaphysics and/or science that they may be refounded in a new 
theoretical gesture (of which fl.ll that may be said is that it is practised 
as a critique of metaphysics). ^
64. (1973) op. cit. p. 25.
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'Combined with a passage quoted earlier, this text can be seen as a per­
fect example of the ’philosophical* nature of the neo-structuralist read­
ing. This reading does not 'discover' the pre-given structure of a pre­
given text in classic empiricist style; rather, it claims to 'construct' 
a critique of the text, out of the rehtion between itself and the discourse 
of the text, and then examines the conditions of difference (the 
'breaks') betv/een the two discourses which enabled that critique to take 
place.
Bxrt does not this make the neeetructuralist reading simply a 
kind of reflexive or dialectical structuralism? After all, as in 
ordinary structuralism, the reader still reads the problematic of the 
text, its discourse, from the empirical absences or presences from the 
words of a book. It is interesting when listening to Althusserians 
talking about symptomatic reading, that they talk as if the book itself 
was empirically absent.^ '.'lilliams has noted this problem also in his 
brief discussion of Althusser's "lecture symptomale":
"But, in Althusserian theory, what 'lecture symptomale' is required to do 
is to locate the discrete subject and object in each problematic. The 
indexical reading of questions and answers does not allow this, at least 
v/ithout inaur~uratinp~ a mystery about the connection between what is 
absent ana what is present, that is the questions and answers which are 
a kind.of incomplete present image of the absent problematic.^
Indeed, there is a "mystery" in Althusser's thinking over this question 
of the empirical text, and, to my knowledge, the usual tactic in 657
65
65. Supra, p. 194, fn. 12.
66. See, for example, J. Taylor "I-Tarxism and Anthropology" Economy and 
Society 1:3 (1Q72) pp. 339-350, especially pp. 342,’349. See also F. Hindess 
and P. Q. Hirst Pre^carytalist modes of production (1975 London: Rout!edge 
and Kegan Paul;: "These concepts (of modes of production - C.S.) are 
abstract, their value is not limited by the analvsis of the concrete
As concepts they can have a theoretical function even if concrete conditions 
to which they are pertinent do not exist, have not existed and will not 
exist" (p. 321) As the authors note, because they do not analyse "concrete 
conditions" they cannot be accused automatically of speculation. However 
they do seem to ignore the issue of the relationshin of "concrete 
conditions" to the construction of their concepts, ‘do these concepts 'work' 
m  the analysis of "concrete conditions"? How important were historical 
analyses of -'concrete conditions" "or the construction of the concepts?
67. k. williams (,1974) op. cit. p. 49.
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Althusserian analysis is to floss over this problem of its status ( and 
existence) by an implicit assumption that the symptomatic render does not 
see the words etc. of the actual book in front of him. It appears almost 
as if the object-discourse is 'whisked in' from nouhere by the activation 
of the reading-discourse. This impression is reinforced by another onc- 
the impression that Althusser ignores statements (actually empirically/- 
present) in Capital which do not suit his purposes. How, should that 
be surprising to us after our analysis of structuralism? For, after all, 
do not structuralists see the actual words and sentences as mere 
manifestations of the 'deep structure'? From what we have seen already,
'pure' structuralism or semiology does not see the elements of the 
structure as anything but the 'playthings' of the relations of the 
system. As we have seen, for pure structuralism, the elements of a 
structure have no internal specificity, relative autonomy or history. 
Consequently, in a dialectical form of structuralism which emphasises 
reading as a practice and specifies a dialectic between the unconscious 
discourse of the reader and the unconscious discourse of the object we 
should expect to find that the object-discourse is defined entirely by 
the existence of the reading discourse, as its dialectical counterpart or 
'necessary condition of existence', and that the mediating material, 
the empirical book, is rendered almost totally immaterial.
Not only does neo-structualism tend to ignore the elements of 
the structure (or the'signifiers') like structuralism proper, but it 
commits a second structuralist crime in assuming (a) that the object-disc­
ourse is directly readable through the text without any other recourse 
and (b) that there is a centre to be decentred. The first assumption 
specifies, even if implicitly, that the analyst can read the words in 
their 'real' or 'true' meaning. Thus, in reality, neo-structuralism 
seem3 to engage in the structuralist practice of reading the Structure in 
its effects. Somehov;, despite all the talk of dislocation and mediation, 
the neo-structuralists must assume they know the meaning of the words in 
their normal use in order to discern the Structure of the text. The sec­
ond assumption connects to the first. The neo-structuralists assume 
the orthodox meaning of the discourse in order that they can'de-centre' 
it as the structure of the text. One clearly cannot 'de-centre' a 
structure unless one can read its presence. This assumption has implication
!
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- primarily, that there is a 'dominant ideology* ever-already-present in 
the discourse of a text. This implication may sound fine to the radical 
ear, hut the problem is that we are hack to the universal Absolute Source 
notion. Neo-structuralism does not question the assumption of a 
Dominant Ideology, which exists ever-present in the text like the 
"Universal Structure of the Human Mind" (Lévi-Strauss), rather, it 
displaces it by the procedure of an "active reading" which de-centre3 the 
Structure. In sum, the neo-structuralist conception specifying the 
structure-to-be-decentred contains within itself a structuralist denial 
of the movement, transience and social nature of ideologies; rather 
these ideologies form a static Structure with no specific origin (or 
condition of existence). Like structuralism proper, neo-structuralism 
whisks in its Absolute Source - only the difference is that this time 
the 'whisking in' is consciously done under the aegis of a dialectical, 
'active reading', performed by a systematic field of significance. In 
neo-structuralism, ironically, the Structure of Orthodoxy is set up by 
the concept of de-centring the Structure and, on their own admission, 
neo-structuralists create their 'opposition' whilst creating their own 
discursive svstem. The Dominant Ideology, thus, is as much a product 
of their fertile imaginations as is the Structure of the Human Mind; it 
remains a Metaphysical concept with no concrete, social or historical 
reference.
In conclusion, ideology-detection, in this problematic, i3 the 
effect of the difference in systematicity between two theoretical dis­
courses, brought into beinr by the practice of reading. The systematic 
discourse can detect the closures and breaks of the ideological discourse 
by juxtaposing itself with the other in the practice of reading. Natur­
ally enough, this problematic also produces a 'science'. The 'science' 
is constituted by the systematic discourse. In simple terms, then, 
science for neo-structuxalism is not a body of theory which explains the 
mediations between the real structure of things and their immediate 
form of appearance in social practice, but rather that field of signif­
icance v;hich most systematically connects itself or, if you like, that 
body of concepts which explains itself the best. Although questions of 
science must remain largely outside the scope of this discussion, one 
comment can be made.
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It seems to me that, although neo-structuralism carries a 
useful definition of science,- the problem of 'the data' remains.
It is fair to say that theoretical problematics produce their own ’data' 
and, consequently, that if they can make sense out of that data they 
are 'knowledges' or 'sciences'. But, this is to solve the question 
of science one-sidedly. If science is the "cognitive appropriation 
of the real" (Althusser) then scientificity must lie in the connexion 
between cognition and reality not simply in the field of cognition. 
Empiricism errs in locating the site of the problem of scientificity 
in the field of the 'real', but neo-structuralism (like phenomenology) 
seems to go to the other extreme by locating the problem in the sphere 
of 'cognition'. Neo-structuralism seems to have resolved the question 
of science at the level of theory rather than at the level of the 
connexion between theory and reality. Systematicity provides no 
guarantees, in my view, that the theory is a "cognitive appropriation 
of the real". Successful scientific theory may be systematic, 
however its condition of existence is not systematicity but rather that 
it explains the nature, mediation and movement of practical appearances 
and thus acts as the theoretical expression of concrete social relations.' 
As Marx said:
"Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of 
inauiry. The latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to 
analyse its different forms of development, to trace out their inner 
connexion. Only after this work is done, con the actual movement be 
adequately described. If this is clone successfully, if the life 'of the 
‘sub.ject-matter is ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as 
if vie had before us a mere a priori construction."^(Ky emphases - C.3.)
Just because a theory is systematic does not imply that it has explained, 
or reflected in the abstract, the concrete movement of appearances. For 
example, a systematic theory could occur which explains the internal 
structure of a social phenomenon at one point in time, yet, because of 689
68. See Marx The Poverty of Philosophy (1955) op. cit. p. 95.
69. Marx (1974) op. cit. p. 23. See also infra, p. 221, fn. 72.
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, auantitative changes in that phenomenon over the next period of time, it
70may change its quality or str.uctv.re. In consequence our systematic 
theory would no longer explain or faithfully reflect the internal struct­
ure of the phenomenon. Furthermore, this theory may not even have 
noticed the changes in the phenomenon because it was 30 "busy checking 
its own epistemological assumptions. As a result, it would he unaware 
that it had ceased to he the theory of the 'data', and a theory which is 
not the theory of some current thing or condition is only a general 
theory with no immediate relevance to social practice. The new ’data* 
would he available to the theorist with his systematic theory - yet, 
because he was so anxious to be systematic and non-ideolorical, he would 
not have made the ideological observations (of the surface changes) 
necessary to enable and stimulate the development of the old theory. In 
short, a scientific theory of social life must not only always check its 
own assumptions, it must also constantly keep abreast of changes in 
the phenomenon as they reflect themselves (albeit in complex, mediated 
fashion) in people's ideological impressions (either in the practices of 
everyday life or in research practice). Any science that concentrates on 
'systematicity', 'reflexivity' or'self-consciousness' alone is likely 
to become "theoreticist", speculative, metaphysical, abstract, idealist, 
old-fashioned, useless and impractical. In the same way, any science that 
only concentrates on recording new, apparent developments in the world is, 
on the other hand, likely to become empiricist, pragmatic, 'trendy', 
unsystematic, illogical, practical but partial, lacking in perspective and 
fragmented.
My final point on neo-structuralism concerns the fact that 
Althusser's version restricts itself to complex and systematic or theo­
retical discourse, whilst Kristeva and Derrida restrict their work to 
literary products rich in surplus meaning. It would seem that the 
concepts of neo-structuralism specify the need for it to provide discourse 
of substantial'depth'. Without this 'depth of meaning' or 'width of 
space' created by the theoretical or artistic discourse, neo-structuralism 70
70. See, for example, Marx on the quantitative changes that led to qualit­
ative changes in the very nature of the English mode of production.
See, especially, ibid, p.- 192.
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simply cannot work in practice. We should not he surprised that it 
restricts itself to advanced theoretical disciplines (Althusser), or 
literature (Kristeva and Derrida), film (hetz) or medical science 
(Foucault). Neo-structuralism, although its practitioners never admit 
it, needs data. Hov; ironic! The theory that dispensed with the concrete 
in favour of the Structure finds that it cannot work v.'ithout forms 
rich in substance! The real world has come back to haunt the formal 
skeletons of our structuralist metaphysicians! Just as Slater found 
that he had to use newspaper editorials thick with ideology in order to 
make the Structure of Bourgeois Ideology produce the connotations of 
news reports, s-o, too, the neo-structuralists require 'code-sheets' rich 
with repeated connotation to enable them to 'read off' the Structure.
One can only conclude that structuralism in all its forms is heavily 
reliant on its data, even though its practitioners deal with data simply 
as an effect of the Form. Structuralism grants the elements or 
substance of a structure no inner determinations and, paradoxically, this 
is ultimately reflected in its practitioners' search for 'rich' discourses 
to analyze. Structuralism needs 'texts' rich in ideological substance 
so that it can proceed with its abstract analysis of their forms without 
the social nature of this substance becoming problematic.
A mode of reading ideology which wishes to attain scientificity 
needs to theorize (a) the nature of ideology-in-gencral and (b) the 
specific nature of a particular ideology, before the reading takes place. 
The scientific identification of ideology, in other words, proceeds on 
the basis of elaborated concepts of ideology-in-general and of the 
specificity of a particular ideology. Neo-structuralist readings 
proceed on an inadequate concept of ideology-in-general. They presuppose 
that the weaknesses in the read-discourse, which they produce, are 
indicative of the presence of ideology-in-general: hence ideology-in­
general is imnlicitly defined as an unsystematic or 'closed' discourse. 
Such a definition fails to specify the social conditions for ideology 
and remains at the level of a description of ideology's effects. Further­
more, neo-structuralist readings proceed without a concept of the social 
and historical srecificity/materiality/objectivity of the particular 
ideology under examination. Hence they do not, within themselves, provide 
a theorized identification of an ideology with a definite social and
231
and historical specificity. All they can provide is an identification 
' of ideology-in-general within the specific form of appearance of a 
specific ideology. Their ’sightings' must as a result remain, in effect, 
spontaneous, subjective and ideological. As such they may have great 
political value, hut cannot claim scientific status. The inbuilt 
weakness of all forms of structuralism is their refusal to attend to 
the historicity, materiality and specificity of the substance of a 
discourse. Viewing content as a mere manifestation or effect of an 
'deep', general structure, they are unable in practice to identify the 
precise objectivity of that structure. All that is possible in their 
practice is the identification of the general form of a substantive 
discourse as an ideology; and, even then, as I have argued, such an 
identification remains questionable because of the problems with the 
definition of ideology implicit in the reading practice.
A note on the relation between Althusser’s structuralism and his 
reading of I'arx
It is not possible here to develop a full analysis of the 
effects of Althusser's neo-structuralism in his reading of Marx owing to 
the immensity of the task. However, given its importance for the. 
socialist movement and given its relevance to the comprehension of the 
Marxism in this project, I think 'a note' should be made on the question.
The main effect of Althusser's neo-structuralism lies in the 
question of the elements of the structure. So far I have only analyzed 
this question at a very general level. However, when we look at 
Althusser's reading of Harx, our critiqxies of the previous chapters 
begin to bite with sharp teeth. Neo-structuralism, as we have seen, 
writes the elements out of significant existence. Althusser's work 
feels the effects of that in several ways. Firstly, in his "lecture 
symptomale", as we have already noted, there is no discussion of the 
•objective' meaning of the words, that is, their connection with material 
social relations - that is assumed - and their structure is conrfcituted
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immediately and subjectively from them. Secondly, and more importantly, 
"the Structure of the social formation is said to constitute the 
individual human subject:
" ... tne real protagonists of history are the social relations of pro­
duction, political struggle and ideology, which are constituted by the 
place assigned to these protagonists in the complex structure of the 
social formation ... The biological men are only the supports or 
bearers of the guises (Charaktermasken) assigned to them by the structure 
of relations in the social formation.".,,
Here we see a classic example of structuralist; idealism and metaphysics: 
ideas or concepts make history whilst men only act out the role that is 
set for them by the concepts. Althusser makes the categories fight the 
battles of history in Heading Capital. We know what I*'arx wou d have c?-id:
"Economic categories are only the theoretical expressions, the abstract­
ions o' the social relations of production."
"The same men who establish their social relations in 
their material productivity, produce also principles, 
ies, in conformity with their social relations." (Mj
conformity with 
ideas and catcgor- 
emphases - C.3.)
"If we abstract thus from every subject all the alleged accidents, 
animate or inanimate, men or things, we are right in saying that in the 
final abstraction, the only substance left is the logical categories. 
Thus the metaphysicians who, in making these abstractions, think they 
are making analyses and who, the more they detach themselves from things 
imagine themselves to be getting all the nearer to the point of 
penetrating to their core - these metaphysicians in turn are right in 
saying that thing? here below are embroideries of which the logical 
categories constitute the canvas.
» ... the moment you present men as the actors and authors of their own 
historv, you arrive ... at the real starting point, because you have 
abandoned those eternal principles of which you spoke at the outset."
(My emphases - C.S.) 71234
71. B. Brevster in the Glossary of Reading Capital (1970) op. cit. p. 320
72. Both this end the above quote are from K. Marx The Poverty of Philosophy (1955) op. cit. p. 9 5.
7 3. Ibid. pp. 92, 93.
7 4. Ibid. p. IOC.
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M. Althusser, like H. Proudhon, has made ideas produce history, whilst, 
for Marx, men make history under the conditions in which they live. 
Althusser has failed-to grasp the interpenetration of the opposites, sub­
jective and objective, because of his structuralism. Men's forms of sub­
jectivity (consciousness) are determined by the social relations within 
which they act, yet the existence of these modes of consciousness i3 
purely 'formal' or abstract until they are realised in definite social 
practices, and in that process of realisation they re-create, or 
revolutionize, the social relations of production. Althusser can only 
•see the Structure, social relations (whether they be economic, political 
and ideological); men as authors are erased in favour of abstract 
categories which use men as 'actors' or 'agents'. Marx sees men as 
-"authors" as well as "agents". He holds a dialectical comprehension 
of the two aspects of human existence in social formations. The humanist 
<Marxists are one-sided in allowing men an authorship outside their role 
as agents of social relations, Althusserian Marxism, on the other hand, 
is equally one-sided in refusing to see the authorship involved in 
agencv. Both 'humanism' and 'anti-humanism' are non-dialectical positions. 
For Marx, social life involves the dialectical combination of the 
objectivity of ''matter' with the subjectivity of men. Hence authorship 
is always agency and agency is always authorship. Ideology is not simply 
ya »level" of the social formation but an aspect of human practice.
Althusser's neo-structuralism has thus led him to write men 
out of history in Reading Capital. Like all forms of structuralism, 
Althusserian Marxism- only leaves us with the skeletons of the Structure.
It is true that capitalism predicates men as "creatures" (Marx) of the 
.system, but men did create, and do daily recreate, that system themselves, 
not in the abstract but under the conditions of specific social practices. 
Without men's 'work' the capitalist system would collapse. Althusser's 
"supports" are vital to all social systems known to history as are the 
"supports" of a building' - he talks of "supports" as "agents", implying 
the absence of subjective determination. But forms of consciousness do 
determine the forms taken by material tilings and that includes the 
social relations of practice. Social relations of practice indeed 
determine forms of subjectivity, but only inasmuch as the subjects
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continue to reproduce those social relations. Althusser has reduced 
this highly material dialectic to the historical interplay of abstract 
forms, or (in Derrida’s terms) to a play of differences in a structure, 
and the historical materiality of the consciousness of the subject is 
denied the specific effectivitv which it has at every level of social 
practice in every epoch of human history.
Thirdly, the reduction of materiality involved in structuralism
effects itself in Althusser's discussion of the elements of the production
j_n Reading Capital. As an index of this effect, vie can point to the
omission of a detailed discussion of the internal specificity and
75structuring effect of the means of production in this passage. 'Althusser
* T 6points out that the means of production are "things" and not "structures",
but that is all. He makes no analysis of the structuring effect of these
things (v.'hich after all, do have internal structures) on the mode of
production. Given Marx’s various detailed analyses in Capital of the
nature and role of the means of production in different modes of
production, this is a surprising omission for a "rigorous reading” of
Capital to make; surprising, that is, unless we are aware of the
structuralism of Althusser's problematic.
75. (1970) op. cit. pp. 17C-131
76. Ibid. p. l8l.
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7 STItUCTUPiE AND IDEOLOGY : TIIE NECESSITY AND S P E C IF IC IT Y  OF THE 
CONNECTION
"It. i s ,  in r e a l i t y ,  much ea sier  to discover by a n alysis  the 
e a r th ly  core o f  the misty creations of r e l ig io n , than, conversely, i t  
i s  to develop from the actu al rela tio n s of l i f e  the corresponding: 
c e l e s t i a l i s e d  forms of those r e la tio n s .  The l a t t e r  method is  the only  
m a t e r i a l i s t i c ,  and therefore the only s c i e n t i f i c  one." 1
Introduction
I  now arrive a t  the daunting task of o u tlin in g  and r e fin in g  
the concepts fo r  an h i s t o r i c a l ,  m a te r ia lis t  theory of reading social  
id e o lo g ie s .  In  th is  chapter I  sh a ll  attempt to la y  some foundations 
by c l a r i f y i n g  the precise connection between s o c ia l  rela tio n s (or forms 
o f  co-operation) and forms of spontaneous consciousness or ideology.
As a consequence of th is  purpose, wo w il l  come across such old friends  
as economism, idealism , empiricism and stru ctu ralism , e s p e c ia l ly  as 
they appear within Marxist theory. I t  i s  v i t a l  to emphasize the 
d i a l e c t i c a l  connection o f  n e cessity  and s p e c i f i c i t y  between structure  
and forms of spontaneous consciousness. There aro three main dangers: 
s o c i o l o g i s t i c ,  i d e a l i s t i c  and econonistic interp retatio n s of th a t  
d i a l e c t i c a l  connection. S o c io lo g ic a l  readings tend to gloss the 
n e c e s s ity  and s p e c i f i c i t y  of the correspondence with vague concepts 
such as ’ in f lu e n c e ' ,  ' s u i t a b i l i t y ' ,  'co nven ien ce', 'vested in te r e s t '  
and 'c o r r e l a t i o n ' .  Idealism refuses to accept the interpenetration of  
stru ctu re  and ideology in  some areas of s o c ia l  p r a c tic e .  Economism 
only allows the structure of economic p ra ctice  the p r iv ile g e  o f  r e f l e c t ­
in g  id e o lo g ie s .  L e t  us begin, however, by looking a t  the empiricism o f
1 Marx (1974) o p .c i t .  p.352, f n .2 .
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the reading p ra ctice s  c r i t i c i s e d  in sectio n  two.
Empiricism in the reading of ideology
I t  was one thing fo r  S a in t—Pinion and Proudhon to observe
spontaneously th at poverty and misery appeared to be endemic to modern
Western economies. Cut i t  was another thing altogeth er when Marx
explained th at the inner lo g ic  of the c a p i t a l i s t  mode of production
n ecessita ted  the existence of poverty and misery on a national and,
e v e n tu a lly , on an in crea sin g ly  global s c a le .  Correspondingly, the
2
p o l i t i c a l  remedies of Saint-Simon and Proudhon, fa r  from undermining 
the c a p i t a l i s t  system, would in  f a c t  perpetuate i t ,  because they wore 
founded on p rin cip le s  i n t r i n s i c  to i t s  l o g i c .  The very heart of the 
c a p i t a l i s t  dynamic depends on the e l i t e -c o n t r o lle d  production of science  
and the exchange of products at th eir  va lu e.
S im ila r ly ,  i t  i s  one thing fo r  content analysts and s tr u c tu r a l­
i s t s  (of a l l  kinds) to observe spontaneously th at a te x t  contains  
id e o lo g y -in -p e n e ra l, but i t  i s  wholly another th ing to explain and 
i d e n t i f y ,  in  one and the same moment, the exact s p e c i f i c i t y  of the 
id eo lo gy in th a t t e x t .  J u s t  as the s c i e n t i f i c  i d e n t i f i c a t io n  of poverty  
and misery i s  dependent upon a theory of th eir  conditions of existence  
and appearance, so, to o, the s c i e n t i f i c  i d e n t i f i c a t io n  of an ideology  
jnust be based upon a theory of i t s  conditions of existence and appearance. 
This i s  not to imply th at we need science before we know what poverty  
and misery fe e l  l ik e .  However, i t  i s  to imply t h a t ,  without scie n ce ,  
poverty and misery can.be attrib u ted  by th eir  r ecip ie n ts  to the W ill of  
God, the Laws of Nature or the National In te r e s t  and hence become 
transformed into something other than what they r e a l l y  arc ( e .g .  eternal  
• fa c t s  o f  l i f e ' ,  'acceptable l iv in g  cond itions' or ' j u s t  rew ards').  
V/ithout i t s  s c i e n t i f i c  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  an ideology can be a ttr ib u te d  to  
•ind ivid u al b ia s '  or 'the s o c ia l  functions of an i n s t i t u t i o n ' ,  and so 
become converted into something e l s e ,  such as 'th e  expression o f  human 
uniqueness' or ' i n s t i t u t i o n a l  co rru p tio n '.
The reorganization of s o cie ty  by a s c i e n t i f i c  and C h r is t ia n  e l i t e  
and the enforced exchange of products a t  th e ir  v a lu e , r e s p e c tiv e ly .
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The problem i s  the ape-old one in  so c ia l  science o f  the 
danger of empiricism. What seems to happen i s  th at when a  phenomenon 
i s  observed spontaneously, the observer a ssociates i t  e t i o l o g i c a l l y  
with the circumstances in  which i t  appears.. For example, in dominant 
crim inology, research o f  an em p iricist kind has observed the co-existen ce  
o f  p o verty , criminal behaviour, broken fam ily t i e s  and delinquent  
ju v e n ile  pangs within working-class neighbourhoods. From th is  s ig h t in g ,  
cr im in o lo g ica l researchers have gone on to correlate  crime with poverty, 
broken homes, working cla ss  valu es, e t c . .  Rather than seeing a l l  those 
circumstances (including crime) as normal exigencies of l i f e  fo r  a 
c la s s  with a s p e c if ic  p o s itio n  within a p a r tic u la r  so cia l  structure  
(and, .th us, comprehending the connections between s o c ia l  structure and 
c la s s  c o n d itio n s ) ,  the th eo ry-less researchers mistook the appearances 
f o r  real essences and attempted to make them explain coch other.  
S i m i l a r l y ,  in p o l i t i c a l  economy, observers such as Balthus noted the 
c o n jo in t  appearance of poverty and 'surplus population' and proceeded 
to  e xp la in  poverty by the f a c t  of 'surplus p o p u la tio n ' .3 What the 
p o l i t i c a l  economists cannot grasp is  the f a c t  that poverty and a 
" r e l a t iv e  surplus population" of labourers are necessary con join t e f f e c t s  
o f  the accelerated accumulation of c a p i t a l ,  the essential inner mechan­
ism o f  c a p i t a l i s t  s o c i e t i e s .  Like dominant criminology, p o l i t i c a l  
economy lacks systematic theory and continues by confounding appearances 
with th e ir  inner stru ctu re. The ob ject of spontaneous v is io n  remains 
u n d iffe r e n tia te d  from the ob ject constructed in  theory: the hallmark of  
e m p ir ic is t  research.
U n t i l  a so cia l science learns that the outward appearances or 
impressions gained in s o c ia l  p ractice  are not id e n tic a l  with the inner 
essences o f  s o c ia l  str u ctu r e , i t  remains trapped within a v ic io u s  
c i r c l e .  The trap i s  se t  when appearances (A and B) are s t a t i s t i c a l l y  
co rre la te d  on the basis of the idea th at th e ir  regular coexistence  
proves th at A causes B. In such a research p r a c tic e ,  what in e v ita b ly  
emerges i s  the problem of 'the other v a r i a b l e s ' .  A c o r re la tio n  may bo 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  established but the researcher in  p r a ctice  can never
3* *; - ; ; x by th ? / bsoi ^ e °Ter-growth of the labouring p o p u la tio n ."
llarx (1974) o p . c i t . , p.594.
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a c t u a lly  prove to the s a t i s f a c t i o n  of others th at the va ria b les are 
c a u s a lly  and e x c lu s iv e ly  connected. Consequently, there are increasing  
c r ie s  fo r  improved s t a t i s t i c a l  technique iand a  tendency to lin k  
in creasin g numbers of 'V a ria b le s ' together. Eventu ally  a s it u a tio n  is  
reached where a l l  the co n jo in t appcarences of an apparent s e t t in g  are 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y  correlated in  a m u ltifa c to r ia l  a n a ly sis  and the researchers  
are presented with the problem of weighting th e ir  causal e f f i c a c y .  At 
t h i s  p o in t, i f  theory i s  not brought in from the co ld , the d is c ip lin e  
must go on to study weighting and sc a lin g  methods and the cry fo r  better  
techniques takes on a new form. A fter  th a t ,  the o r ig in a l problem of  
causation or explanation i s  a mere TToly G ra il  -  never to be captured, 
but always sanctioning the adventure of the quest. Research projects  
become valued in terms o f the tech n ical excellence of th e ir  methods and 
the researcher i s  judged by h is a b i l i t y  to provide an 'im aginative'  
d iscu ssio n  of the resu lts  of his applied technology. Good s t a t i s t i c a l  
techniques and a b u t t e r f ly  'im agination' become more important than 
system atic th eo rization  which describes and explains the emergence of  
the s o c ia l  mechanism producing the phenomenal appearances. In  th is  
p rocess, what gets l o s t  i s  the point th at s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  
co r re la tio n s  of appearances merely in d icate  th at th e ir  con join t e x i s t ­
ence i s  no coincidence and that the explanation of one of then w ill
4
probably be at le a s t  a p a r tia l  explanation of the other.
The p ra ctice  of em p iricist epistemology tends to push e tio lo g ­
i c a l  s o c ia l  science into a c u l-d e -s a c .  I t  seems to d iv e r t  a tte n tio n  
from the s p e c i f i c i t y  of a thing and d ir e c t  research towards i t s  forms 
o f  appearance. The p e c u lia r it y  of empiricism is  i t s  in siste n ce  on the 
transparency of the r e a l .  I t  thus e f f e c t i v e l y  l im it s  the development of  
theory; the precise r e a l i t y  of the real becomes overshadowed by the 
technology fo r  lin k in g i t s  appearances. Im p lic it  assumptions and ideas  
d i r e c t  th is  technology, but are rarely  confessed in  p u b lic .  In the 
reading of id e o lo g ie s , we observed these same e f f e c t s .  Content a n a ly s is ,  
sp ecu la tive  c r i t i c i s m , semiology and lecture symptomalo are a l l  p r a ctice s
i;o n S eo Dn « n ).J ' 7 iIle r  Szsi^M r i c i ,n  (1973 EnKle»ood C l i f f , :
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which fetishise an unexplicated technique. They are all characterized 
by the wooliness of their application and the repressed nature of their 
founding principles.
Spontaneously reading ideologies from their forms of appear­
ance is a practice likely to locate the source of an ideology in the 
immediate circumstances of its appearance in any particular setting. On 
the one hand, the humanistic readings of content analysis and speculative 
criticism tend to see an ideology as the expression of a human author's 
1 world-view', inculcated perhaps by 'professional socialization' or 
'political indoctrination'. On the other hand, the anti—humanist read­
ings of the structuralists and neo-structuralists tend to produce a view 
of an ideology as the consequence of the social function of the practice 
in which it is expressed. Thus, in readings of press reports, spontaneous 
readings of a humanist variety result in the ideology being blamed on 
the journalists, whereas those of an anti-humanist variety result in the 
ideology being attributed to the social function of the press. Both these 
tendencies have a similar weakness: they conflate the nature and orirrin 
of an ideology with the circumstances of its specific historical forms of 
appearance. Reading practices which attempt to read off the essence of 
an ideology from a specific form of its social existence (in a discourse 
or practice) are likely to lead to the regulur confusion of the condit­
ions of existence of a specific ideology with those of its appearance in 
a specific historical instance. The analysis of reading practices in 
the previous four chapters illustrates in full the validity of this pro­
position.
All the reading practices dealt with hitherto have, therefore, 
been fundamentally inadequate as nodes of identification of specific 
ideologies. In fact, it is arguable that they are not even sufficiently 
developed to be able to identify specific ideologies at all, and that 
they are merely methods for observing ideology in general. Content 
analysis presupposes that its practitioners can distinguish ideology from 
non-ideology, but, in itself, it is incapable of distinguishing one 5
5 . I shall ignore information theory in this section because it hns not 
developed a clear and definite practice of reading.
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ideology from another and can only count tho effects of idcology-in- 
generul as it forces denotative repetitions. Speculative criticism 
identifies ideology rather then specific ideologies because it is 
directed towards establishing the presence of a world-view behind any 
discourse. Pure structuralism is also concerned to detect tho presence 
of ideology in general; its concepts specify the all pervasive action of 
connotation and its practice attempts to demonstrate that. Nco-struct— 
uralism measures one thought-structure against another and the one 
found to contain the "lapses" is said to contain ideology; obviously, 
again, whatever the neo-structuralists say, this is a practice which 
logically can only locate ideology-in-general.
Unless the reader has a theory of the specific nature, or 
objectivity of an ideology, he cannot know what it is that he is looking 
for. This absence enables him to claim that ho lins discovered his 
intentional object and, thus, the success of the find conceals his 
ignorance of what he has found. It is insufficient for a reader to sny 
that he is looking for bourgeois, communist or consensus ideology and, 
then, when he has seen ideology-in-general in its effects, to argue that 
this general ideology is a bourgeois, communist or consensual form 
because its author is a bourgeois, communist or functionary, or because 
the discourse in which it is located serves revolutionary or reactionary 
ends. Yet, fundamentally, I thinlc that this is what all our examined 
reading practices have involved. In my view, the essential nature of an 
ideology is not determined by the fact that it appears in the practice or 
discourse of a committed communist, bourgeois or functionary or by the 
fact that this practice or discourse has objective conservative or 
revolutionary functions. To hold that view would be, for example, to 
grant socialism to all who claimed to be socialist. As Marx constantly 
told us, historical materialism does not understand men by relying on 
what they say about themselves - nor, I would add, can we understand their 
ideas simply by looking at the social functions of their practice. In 
my conception, historical materialism holds that it is the structure of 
the social practice from which an ideology originates that determines its 
essential form. T/hat happens to that ideology after its birth must not 
lend us into thinking that its essence derives from a human choice or tho 
social function of a practice. An ideology can take disparate forms in 
a diversity of practices, mediated by social structures such as bourgeois- 
proletariat, town-countryside and industry-agriculture. It may take the
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most unlikely shapes in the most unlikely places, but that parasitic 
polymorphism should not be allowed to conceal its elementary structure. 
Only with a theory of the social relations which predicate a specific 
form of consciousness can a reading practice be inaugurated which can 
determine (a) that a particular ideology does in fact appear in a 
particular social discourse (or practice) and (b) that the ideology in 
question has a specific form of appearance within that discourse (or 
practice). Only when these two specifications have been fulfilled can 
the analyst claim to know what he has found and begin to sttidy the 
historical process which resulted in the presence of that ideology, in 
that form, in that place.
D ia l e c t ic a l  materialism demands that things be grasped not 
only in  th eir  appearance in  s o c ia l  p r a ctice  but a ls o , and most import­
a n t l y ,  in  th eir  conditions of existence and forms of development. 
Consequently, no-one adopting a d i a l e c t i c a l  m a te r ia lis t  p o sitio n  can 
be s a t i s f i e d  with the p r a c tic e s  of reading ideology discussed in th is  
t e x t  so f a r .  Both the problematic o f  content and the problematic of  
form have been found to be ridden with weaknesses which, by and la rg e ,  
hinge on the f a c t  that th e ir  ob ject i s  an unspecified and general 
id eo lo gy. Thoir p ra ctices attempt to read id e o lo g y - in - it s —essence 
from the existence of s p e c i f i c  id eo lo gies in s p e c if ic  forms in s p e c if ic  
t e x t s .  Without any theory o f  the precise o b j e c t iv it y  ( i t s  nature as a 
thing) of an ideology, these reading p ra ctice s  must he thoroughly  
s u b je c tiv e . ¥hat i s  id e n t i f i e d ,  and how i t  i s  in terp reted , w i l l  be 
e n t ir e ly  dependent on the personal id eo lo gies of the reading s u b je c t .
The subjectivity of these modes of reading is not given by tho fact that 
human subjects practise them. Rather, it is tho lack of a theory of tho 
objectivity of an ideology which puts the onus of the reading work onto 
the ideologies of the reader. Because the reading subject carries no 
consciously elaborated theory of what he is looking for, his own 
spontaneous thoughts, values and political tendencies will specify the 
object of his enquiry for him. The weakness in the structure of the 
reading practice allows his own ideologies full rein and the reading of 
ideology becomes purely ideological.
V/e do not need the mystifying, complex language of structural­
ism or the magical numbers of content analysis in order to carry out a 
spontaneous reading of ideology in its forms of appearance. Anyone alive 
can do that. The only thing, from a Marxian standpoint, which separates
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subjective readings are their rigour and political allegiance. Tt is 
tempting to proclaim that a dialectical materialist reading abandons 
the problematics of form and content and develops a mode of reading 
ideology based on an explicit theory of each ideology's objectivity, 
ilovever this might mislead, for it is impossible to abandon spontan­
eous reading. Spontaneity is the immediate expression of subjectivity. 
It is the 'natural' and 'practical' mode of reading. One does not need 
a knowledge of the historical origins and specific nature of particular 
ideologies in order to read a newspaper. Marxism should not press for 
the abandonment of subjective reading - that theoretical error would 
lead to a Stalinist political drive to squash the spontaneous literary 
expression. Instead, Marxism should adopt a policy of political sensit­
ization. Subjective reading cannot be wished away but it can be devel­
oped. More widespread knowledge of the history, nature nnd functions of 
certain major ideologies would minimize political gullibility and guide 
the proletariat to more effective political choices.
Unlike ethnomethodology, Marxism is not content to sit back
with a malevolent complacency and watch the shared ideological rules of0
• common—sense ' being practised. Such a "neo-praxiology" rests on an
idealism of the structure: ideology is seen as the structure of praxis
end the latter's material base is lost in the elegance of the etimo—
7methodologist's committed subjectivity. Marxism is troubled by no such 
idealism and is fired by a desire for change. Thus, apart from working 
to supersede the practical social structures which act to deceive, 
Marxism should develop a knowledge of the history, structure and funct­
ions of particularly important ideologies in order to advance the 
political sensitivity of the people. In doing this it can abandon all 67
6. A term suggested by Garfinkel and Sudnow as an alternative to 
ethnomethodology. See II.Garfinkel "The origins of the term ethno- 
methodo lorry" in R.Turner (ed.) Tlthnonethodology (1974 Uarmondsworth: 
Penguin Books) pp.15—18.
7. See J.D. Douglas (ed.) Understanding Mverydav Life (1974 London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul) for the complete removal of reality outside 
the perception and II.Garfinkel Studies in Ethnomothodology (19G7 Engle­
wood Cliffs:Prentice Hall) where it has at least managed an underworld 
existence. What ethnomethodology lacks most is the concept of the connect­
ion between objective social relations and the subjective forms of con­
sciousness. That lack is, of course, no accident and part of its prob­
lematical denial of the objectivity of social relations.
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the term inological and tech n ical language of e x is t in g  su b je ctiv e  read­
in g s .  S u b je c t iv it y  needs no apology; nor does i t  need to be dressed up 
as ’ scie n ce *. The p r o le ta r ia t  has no need of the academic’ s j u s t i f i c a t ­
ions of his e xisten ce. But wliat i t  does need is  a heightened spontaneous 
consciousness, invigorated by the s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge o f the h is to r y  of  
s p e c i f i c  id eo lo gies based on open and e x p l i c i t  th eo rization  o f  the obj­
e c t i v i t y  o f  ideology within determinate so c ia l  r e la tio n s .
I t  seems to me that the lo g ic  of my argument and cr itiq u e  
demands a c a l l  for the recognition of the d is t in c tio n  between a subject­
iv e  mode of reading ( b a s ic n lly ,  a spontaneous one which has no elaborated  
theory of i t s  object) and an objective mode o f reading (one which has 
theorized i t s  o b je c t) .  I f  th is  d is t in c t io n  i s  v a l i d ,  the obvious 
im p lica tion  i s  th at in t e l l e c t u a l s  should stop tr y in g  to r a tio n a liz e  away 
t h e i r  own s u b je c t iv it y  and recognize i t s  e x iste n c e , i t s  nature and l i m i t s .  
A l l  the readers of ideology c r i t i c i z e d  in th is  work s u ffe r  from an 
i n a b i l i t y  to recognize the central role of th eir  own s u b j e c t iv it y  in  
t h e i r  reading p r a c tic e s ;  a c e n tr a lit y  produced by the empiricism of those 
p r a c t i c e s •
The everyday p r a ctice  of reading other people's discourse can 
be u s e f u lly  contrasted with the empiricism of the p ra ctice s  of the 
scholars d e a lt  with here. This contrast w ill  expose th at empiricism even 
more sta rk ly  than the th e o re tic a l  c r it ic is m s  made so f a r .  In  ordinary, 
p r a c t ic a l  s o c ia l  e x iste n ce, we are c o n tin u a lly  ’ reading’ other people's  
d isco u rse . I t  must happen a thousand times a day. What methods do we 
r o u tin e ly  use to e s t a b l i s h ,f o r  a l l  p r a c tic a l  purposes, the meaning the 
communicator i s  conveying? How do we discern ideology or forms of  
consciousness (or, as i t  would be known in  workaday parlance, ’ b i a s ’ , 
• p r e ju d ic e ',  ' s l a n t ' ,  ’ i n t e r e s t ' ,  ' i n t e n t io n ')  on a ro u tin e, p r a c tic a l  
b a s is ?  I t  is  obviously outside the scope of my an alysis  to answer th is  
question in  any depth, however I  would suggest th a t  there are ce rta in  
common techniques:
(1) The perception of r e p e titio n s  of statements, words or phrases.
(2) The perception of assumptions contained in ce rta in  statem ents,
-words or phrases.
( 3 ) The observation of in co n sisten cie s  within an argument or between the 
argument of one day and th a t of the next.
(4 ) The observation th a t  ce rta in  to p ics are never d e a lt  with in  tho
discourse.
( 5 ) The grasp of the general ' d r i f t '  of a system atic discourse or series  
o f d iscourses.
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R ep etitio n , assumption, in co n sisten cy, neglect and substance are a l l  road 
ro u tin e ly  as s ig n i f ic a n t  discursive phenomena. Tho perception o f  th eir  
existence leads us to make in terp retation s or readings of th a t  s i g n i f i c ­
ance; in terp retation s which are purely speculative and are often  recog­
nized as such. These readings take on a more c e r t a in , dogmatic chnractor  
when we can lin k  them to other fa c ts  r e la tin g  to the speaker or w riter ,  
e . g .  his jo b , h is  domestic r e la tio n s , his reputed character, h is  e x p l i c i t  
statements of his a ttitu d e  to l i f e ,  and so on.
The f a c t  i s  th at a l l  these techniques fo r  the a ttr ib u tio n  of  
s ig n ific a n c e  are used by the academic 'readers* c r i t i c i s e d  in th is  t e x t .  
Content an alysis  in i t s  pure form uses method ( l)  and in i t s  le s s  pure 
form i i  includes methods (2) and (5 ). Information theory, i f  i t  was 
operationalized in th is  f i e l d ,  would concentrate on method (2 ). Specul­
a tiv e  c r it ic is m  tends to focus on methods (1), (2) and (5 ), although in  
i t s  w ell—developed forms, such as l i t e r a r y  c r it ic i s m , a l l  the methods 
would be used. Structuralism  uses method ( l)  i m p l ic i t l y  and methods (2 ) 
and (g ) e x p l i c i t l y .  Neo-structuralism  again uses ( l )  im p l i c i t l y  but 
e x p l i c i t l y  employs the other four methods. In p assing, we can note th a t  
t h i s  comparison of use of everyday rending techniques in d icates the 
v a l i d i t y  of the n e o -s tr u c t u r a lis t  claim to engage in a h igh ly  "rigorous"  
reading p r a c tic e .
The empiricism of a l l  the reading p r a ctice s  d e a lt  with in th is  
work is  i l l u s t r a t e d  by th is  a n a ly s is .  P r a c t i c a l ,  everyday, spontaneous 
reading techniques are the very foundation of the academic reading  
p r a c tic e s  of the problematics of form and content. Ify conclusion t h a t ,  
e s s e n t i a l l y ,  the a lle c e d ly  s c i e n t i f i c  modes of reading ideology promul­
gated hitherto  are spontaneous and thoroughly su b jective seems w e ll-  
founded. Like everyday p r a ctice s  of reading id eology, they have remained 
content with the view th a t ideology i s  transparent in i t s  e f f e c t s .  Tho 
inadequacy of th e ir  theories of ideology prevents them from r is in g  above 
spontaneous reading to something more s c i e n t i f i c .
The e f f e c t  of th is  empiricism i s  th a t the p r a c tic e s  of id eo lo gy-  
d etection  discussed here a re , u lt im a t e ly ,  no more than spontaneous e f f o r t s  
in  the p o l i t i c a l  struggle fo r  id e o lo g ica l hegemony. I t  i s  worthwhile 
r e c a ll in g  th at orthodox content an alysis  originated in the service  of the 
United States government during a period of war (both hot and C o ld ) ,  th a t  
the speculative c r i t i c s  have often got clear p o l i t i c a l  aims ( fo r  example, 
Young was concerned to dem ystify deviance and to c l a r i f y  i t s  r e la tio n  to
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the power s tr u c tu r e ) , th a t Roland llarthes wanted to l ib e ra te  true mean­
ing from the myths of bourgeois id eo lo gy, and th a t Althusser desired to  
restore Marx to himself in order to rejuvenate the s o c i a l i s t  movement.
The lack of theory reduces those reading p ra ctice s  to the merely subj­
e c tiv e  and merely p o l i t i c a l  p ra ctice s  o f  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  a ctin g spontan­
eously in  the heat of the c la ss  war. I  do not wish to employ a reading 
p r a ctice  outside the context of c la ss  stru g g le ; however i t  i s  v i t a l  to  
develop a p r a ctice  which i s  of greater e ffe c tiv e n e s s  within th a t con text.
B a s i c a l l y ,  the p ra ctice  of id eo lo gy-detection  h ith erto  has 
involved one side beginning by claiming that the other side purveys 
ideology and then le g itim a tin g  that claim by l e g i s l a t i n g  (o v e rtly  or 
covertly) fo r  the s c i e n t i f i c i t y  of i t s  own reading. Content analysts  
back th e ir  claims to s c i e n t i f i c i t y  with s t a t i s t i c s ,  s t r u c t u r a lis t s  back 
th e ir s  with ta lk  of m agical, universal s tr u ctu r e s , and the neo-structur—• g
a l i s t s  point to the su p er-systcm a ticity  of th e ir  general concepts. To 
be f a i r  to the speculative c r i t i c s ,  many of them would not la y  claim to  
s c i e n t i f i c i t y .  However, I  suspect th a t  many of them would la y  claim to 
an extra s e n s i t i v i t y  and perceptiveness which adds a d i ffe r e n t  kind of  
legitim a cy to th e ir  readings. On the whole, the p ra ctice  of reading  
ideology in discursive m aterials has merely involved the blanket s p e c if­
ic a t io n  of an opposed viewpoint as id e o lo g ic a l .  Tho p r a ctice  so f a r ,  
th er e fo re , has been tho s it e  of an id e o lo g ica l struggle  over the r e a l .  
There has been l i t t l e  debate over the precise nature of 'the i d e o l o g i c a l ' :  
ideology has simply been id e n ti f ie d  in  i t s  d i ffe r e n c e ,  as tho version of  
'th e  truth' which d i f f e r s  from th at o f  the reader. I t  has been the pro­
claimed outcome of a clash between two d iffe r e n t  forms of spontaneous, 
p o l i t i c a l  consciousness.
What I  want to t r y  to develop i s  a reading of s p e c i f i c  ideolog­
ie s  which i s  f u l l y  informed by theory; a reading which knows what i t  i s  
looking f o r .  The reading of id eo lo gies cannot remain bogged down in  
empiricism because i t  i s  p o l i t i c a l l y  urgent to be able to trace the 
h is to r y  of s p e c i f i c  id e o lo g ie s .  S c i e n t i f i c  enquiry i s  d istin gu ish ed  8
8. I f  information th e o r is ts  were more a ctiv e  and numerous, they could 
support th e ir  alleged s c i e n t i f i c i t y  with the concepts of p h ysics and 
other 'n a tu r a l'  scie n ce s.
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from spontaneous c u r io s ity  by the f a c t  th at i t  involves theory. Science  
i s  founded upon th eo re tic a l work which constructs improved concepts, out 
o f previous theory, and upon the a b i l i t y  of those concepts to grasp more 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  the appearances of p r a c t i c e . '  The rending of id eo lo gies  
has been almost e n tir e ly  lacking in a th eo re tic a l base and i t s  im p lic it  
assumptions operated without check. Without th is  theory of the precise  
m a te r ia lity  or h is t o r ic a l  s p e c i f i c i t y  of an id eology, the work has not 
r isen  beyond the level of a slanging match. Ideology has been counter-  
posed in  general to science and the determination of s p e c if ic  ideologies  
has thus been elided as a f i e l d  of study. Throughout the present work, 
the impetus has been to fin d  out whether a theorized or s c i e n t i f i c  
reading of s p e c i f i c  id eo lo gies i s  p o s s ib le . I  have concluded th at i t  i s .
A cr itiq u e  of previous modes of rending has c l a r i f i e d  my own conceptions 
of forms of consciousness ns d i a l e c t i c a l  r e f le c tio n s  of forms of co-op­
era tio n  (or so cia l  r e la t io n s ) .  The key concept in the kind of theorized  
reading I  am advocating i s  obviously J/urx's concept of the structure/  
ideology connection. This i s  the concept which founds my b e l i e f  that we 
can produce an h is t o r ic a l  m a te r ia lis t  knowledge of s p e c if ic  id e o lo g ie s .
I  s h a ll  sh o rtly  turn to the task of developing, r e fin in g  and 
c l a r i f y i n g  th at concept. But, before th a t ,  I  must emphasize th a t  the 
s c i e n t i f i c i t y  of the reading p ra ctice  I  wish to develop i s  not guaranteed 
by internal cohesion or l e g i s l a t i v e  f i a t .  The s c i e n t i f i c  value of th at  
new p r a ctice  depends on i t s  a b i l i t y  to come to grips with the complex 
appearances of ideology under a v a r ie ty  of p r a c tic a l  circumstances. I t  
is  a mode of i d e n t i f i c a t io n  which is  in e x tr ic a b ly  linked to a theory o f  
id e o lo g ie s: i t s  s c i e n t i f i c  strength thus r e f l e c t s  the power of th at theory  
as an a b stra ct expression of real s o c ia l  determinations. In  sh o rt,  
u ltim a te ly  i t  i s  worthless unless i t  can make sense out o f  the conditional  
appearnnees of p r a c tic e .  I t  i s  not e m p ir icist  to r e a liz e  th a t  every 
theory must be a theory o f the conditional appearances of p r a c tic e :  
empiricism does not r e a liz e  the need fo r  theory. In c o n tr a s t , t h e o r e tic -  
ism does not r e a liz e  the need to explain the conditions of tho reg u la rly  
apparent. Our conclusion, th er e fo re , must be thnt the th e o r e tic a l  
formulations herein must be put into p ra ctice  in  research in  order to 
i l l u s t r a t e  th e ir  s c i e n t i f i c  v a lu e. Such d e ta ile d  research l i e s  outside  
the present work which remains a purely th e o r e tic a l  e xp lo ra tio n .
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S o cia l  r ela tio n s and forma of so cial consciouf.nnsB : the connection of  
n e cessity
In a l l  the modes of reading rejected here, ideology was taken 
to be obvious in i t s  m a nifestation s. livery reader assumed th a t he could 
see ideology immediately in  i t s  e f f e c t s .  The p o l i t i c a l  p o sitio ns taken 
a ft e r  the s ig h tin g  made reading methods such as content a n alysis  and 
symptomatic reading seem worlds apart. As we have seen, th e ir  only real  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  feature was the number of adopted commonsonso techniques 
of reading, or degree o f 'r ig o u r 1. However i t  i s  poor p ra ctice  to s ta r t  
th eo rizin g a ft e r  the data has been produced. Theory must come f i r s t  and 
guide the reading p r a c tic e :  the ration al id e n t i f i c a t io n  of s o c ia l  id eo l­
ogies must bo in tegra l to a developed theory of the so cia l nature of  
ideology which enables s p e c i f i c ,  e x p l i c i t  concepts of p a r tic u la r  id eol­
o g ie s .
In chapter two, I advocated the fundamental general proposition  
th a t id eo lo gies were in te g r a l to each and every form of s o c ia l  p r a c tic e .
I  argued th at Marx c le a r ly  believed th at ideology i t s e l f  emerges with 
the advancement of men's productive capacity  corresponding to the 
development o f  the co-operative appropriation of nature. He points out 
th a t men do not i n i t i a l l y  face nature with "conceptual needs" (Vagner), 
they begin by a c t iv e l y  appropriating nature. Out of th is  process of  
appropriation emerges s o c ia l  consciousness and i t s  forms:
"But on no account do men begin by 'stand ing in  th a t th e o re tic a l  re la tio n  
to the things of the external w orld '. They begin, l ik e  every animal, by 
e a tin g , drinking e t c . ,  hence not by 'stand ing' in  a r e la tio n  but by 
r e la tin g  themselves a c t i v e l y , taking hold of ce rta in  things in the exter­
nal world through a c tio n , and thus s a t i s f y i n g  th e ir  necd(s). (Therefore 
they begin with production). Through the r e p e titio n  of th is  process, the 
property of those th in g s , th e ir  property 'to  s a t i s f y  needs' i s  impressed 
upon th e ir  brains; men, l ik e  animals, also learn to d istin g u ish  'th eo ret­
i c a l l y '  from a l l  other things the external things which nerve for the 
s a t i s f a c t i o n  of th eir  needs. At a c e rta in  stage of ev o lu tio n , a ft e r  
th e ir  needs, and the a c t i v i t i e s  by which they are s a t i s f i e d ,  have, in  the 
meantime, increased and developed fu r th e r , they w il l  ch risten  these 
things l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  as a whole c l a s s ,  d istin gu ish ed  e m p ir ica lly  from 
the r e st of the external world . . .  But th is  l i n g u i s t i c  designation only  
expresses as an idea what repeated corroboration in  experience has already  
accomplished, namely th a t certain  external things serve men already l i v i n g
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in  a ce rta in  s o c ia l  connection ( th is  i s  a necessary presupposition on
account of language) fo r  the s a t i s f a c t i o n  of th e ir  n eed s."0»
Marx continues by repeating the basic th esis  on ideology which runs 
throughout his la te r  works: that tho forms of consciousness correspond 
to the forms of so cia l  co-operation within which men liv e  out th e ir  
l i v e s :
" . . .  since fo r  an in d iv id u a l,  the need for a professional t i t l e ,  or 
tho t i t l e  of a privy coxincillor, or fo r  a decoration, not to speak of 
such things as r i c e ,  maize or corn, or not to mention moat (which does 
not confront tho Hindus as the means of nourishment), is  only possible  
in  some quite d e fin ite  's o c i a l  o r g a n iz a tio n '." '
This t h e s i s ,  th at there i s  u d i a l e c t i c a l  r e la tio n  between so cia l  r e la t­
ions and forms of so c ia l  consciousness, i s ,  without doubt, the most 
important element in tho development of tho Marxian, or h i s t o r i c a l ,  
m a t e r ia l is t ,  an alysis  of s o c ia l  id e o lo g ie s . Tho s c i e n t i f i c  analysis of  
the so cia l  forms of consciousness begins with "tho actual rela tio n s of  
l i f e "  and develops from them a theory of tho s o c i a l l y  necessary id eo l­
o g ie s .  I t  is  important not to pass l i g h t l y  over Marx's basic proposit­
io n , l e s t  i t  be misunderstood, and so I  shall attempt to elaborate i t  
fu r th e r .
As I  argued e a r l i e r ,  the u n ity  of an ideology l i e s  in i t s  
p r a c t ic a l ’ connection, th at i s  to say, in i t s  stru ctu ra l p o sitio n  as an 
clement within a s p e c i f i c  s o c ia l  p r a c t ic e .  In other words, the form 
th a t thought-matter takes r e f l e c t s  tho sfractu re o f  a so cia l  p r a c tic e .  
Having a brain or a p r in tin g  press made no man into a f a s c i s t  or a 
l i b e r a l .  Forms of ideology are not a r b i t r a r i l y  created by the most 
powerful neural equipment of a 'g en iu s' or by tho powerful technology o f  
the mass media. The elements of a s o c ia l  p r a ctice  in themselves are 
incapable of producing s o c ia l  forms of consciousness. Tho l a t t e r  are 
shaped by the so c ia l  r e la tio n s  within which men e x i s t ,  by tho forms of 89
8 . K.Marx "Notes on Adolph Wagner" (1879-80) quoted in  T .Carver .Karl 
Marx: Texts on Method (1975 Oxford: B a s il  Blackw ell) p .lQ O .
9. ib id ,  p.205.
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co-operation. In turn, of course, once e sta b lish e d , a s o c ia l  ideology  
may govern the nature o f new so cia l r e la tio n s  between men and matter 
(the elements of p r a c t ic e ) ,  but, in the f i r s t  in stan ce, i t  must be 
in s is te d  that i t  is  not the bearers of consciousness or th e ir  means o f  
transm itting consciousness th at determine the shape of generalized  
id e o lo g ie s . Only the generalized (or s o c ia l)  rela tio ns between men 
over the means o f  p r a ctice  can do t h a t .
The great a r t i s t  or writer is  not great because he invents  
s o c ia l  id eo lo gies but because he can represent "the actual r ela tio n s of  
l i f e "  and the natural ob jects  of the earth in  a way th at i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t o ,  
or recognizable f o r ,  the bearorR of so c ia l  id e o lo g ie s . S o cia l  id eologies  
are not an individual product ju s t  because men witli nimble brains can 
manipulate ideas to s u i t  th e ir  so cia l in t e r e s t s .  S o cia l id eo lo gies are 
borne by individual men but th at f a c t  should not lead anyone to assume 
th a t i t  is  in d ivid u als  who create the so cia l forms of consciousness. 
C e r t a in ly ,  id io sy n c ra tic  ideologies may be held by in d iv id u a ls , but even 
th ere, I would argue, one must look to the so cia l  rela tio n s in  which 
such men have l iv e d ,  and do l i v e ,  in  order to understand why they possess 
such pecu liar  thoughts. S im ila r ly ,  groups or classes may express the 
same ideology in  r a d ic a lly  opposed ways, but th at does not mean th at  
these groups have consciously 'invented' p a r tic u la r  interp retatio n s of  
an 'o b je c t '  they can c o n tr o l.  An ideology can take contradictory forms 
vhere i t s  generating s o c ia l  r e la tio n  places men in classes with antagon­
i s t i c  material in t e r e s t s .  In  stun, general patterns of s o c ia l  conscious­
ness can only be explained by general patterns of so cial e x iste n c e .
The precise role o f  the elements o f  s o c ia l  p ra ctice  (men, raw 
m a te ria ls , instruments of production) in the determination o f  an ideology  
i s  th at they determine the content or substance of a form of conscious­
n ess. For example, the 'imagery' of a thought-form w ill  r e f l e c t  the 
m aterial s e t t i n g  of a s o c ia l  p r a c t ic e .  Thus, the so cia l  r e la tio n s  of  
economic production in ancient Egypt maintained the existence of a 
r e lig io u s  ideology within the consciousness of i t s  in h a b ita n ts . But i t  
was the f a c t  th a t  production was carried on around the rive r  K ile  th a t  
resu lted  in the s p e c if ic  representation (on pottery) of the E v i l  F p i r i t  
as a dangerous crocodile with large t e e th .  S im il a r l y ,  the s o c ia l  r e l a t ­
ions of c a p i t a l i s t  production in modern B r ita in  may sustain  the ideology  
of Freedom, hut i t  is  the m aterial circumstances o f  the main c la s s e s ,  
s p e c i f i c  elements within th a t s o c ia l  production process, which lend 
th a t id e o lo g ica l form i t s  p a r tic u la r  c la s s  substance at t h is  d e fin ite
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h is t o r ic a l  conjuncture. Fo, for the c a p i t a l i s t s  the motto is  ‘ Freedom 
from trade union disruption and s ta te  control of p r i c e s ' ,  fo r  trainee  
teach ers, i t  is  'Freedom from sta te  economy d riv e s ' and, fo r  the work­
ing c la s s  in the f a c t o r i e s ,  i t  is  'Freedom from unemployment'. S o c ia l  
r e la tio n s  merely r e f l e c t  the form o f an ideology, they do not determine 
the substance or imagery o f  th at form. We must look to the internal  
properties of the elements of a s o c ia l  p ra ctice  in order to understand 
the r e fle c te d  substantive characters of an id e o lo g ica l formation. 
A lto geth er, i t  is  necessary to say th at the t o t u l i t y  of a p a r tic u la r  
id e o lo g ic a l  instance r e f l e c t s  the t o t a l i t y  of the so cia l p ra ctice  gener­
a tin g  or maintaining i t .  I t  i s  a mistake to see both the form and content 
of consciousness as products of the forms of so cia l organization.
I t  is  an even greater error to reduce id eo lo g ica l forms to the r e f l e c t ­
ions of the structure of economic production on ly. A ll  established  
s o c ia l  p r a ctice s  can generate so cia l id e o lo g ie s .
As I  noted in chapter two, the concept of 'r e f l e c t i o n '  has not 
always been used in i t s  d i a l e c t i c a l  sense -  as a r e la tio n  of mutual 
interpenetration between opposites. In my experience, Marxists tend to 
reduce the concept to the more s o c i o l o g i c a l ,  one-sided notion of ' i n f l u ­
e n c e ' .  Thus, i t  is  common to hear ra d ica ls  ta lk in g  of the material 
in te r e s ts  of a cla ss  ' in f lu e n c in g ' i t s  'ch o ice' of id e o lo g ie s . The 
conception of ' in flu e n c e ' is  one which implies that the two related  
phenomena do not interpenetrate each other and th at one a f f e c t s  the other 
purely as an external fo r c e .  I t  is  ns i f  the force of o b ject A bumps 
a ga in st ob ject B and moves i t .  As such, I  would argue th a t the concept 
of 'in flu e n c e ' i s  an id e o lo g ic a l ,  everyday notion of causation. I t  
f a i l s  to capture the in te rlo ck in g  r e la tio n  envisaged in  Marx's term 
' r e f l e c t i o n ' .  Thus i t  i s  wrong to d ilu te  the concept of an ideology as 
a r e f le c t io n  of so cia l r e la tio n s  and to imply th at so cia l rela tio n s  
simply make X ideology 'a  good option' or 'a  convenient c h o ic e ' .  Marx's 
concept is  much more complex than t h a t .  The 'r e f l e c t i o n '  of so cia l  
r e la tio n s  in forms of consciousness e n t a ils  the l o g ic a l  n e cessity  o f  those 10
10. One might often fin d  th a t id io s y n c r a tic  id eo lo gie s  are generated in  
r e la tio n s  which are not s o c i a l ,  but is o la te d  forms of e x is te n c e .
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forms to the existence o f  the so cial p r a c tic e .  The p ra ctice  would he 
•impossible without them. They reinforce the s o c ia l  rela tio n s of that  
p r a c tic e  and are an a ctiv e  part of i t s  dynamic. An ideology within a 
man’ s brain is  a material fa c to r  in te g r a l to the so c ia l  j ira cticc  which 
generates i t .  Whether men l ik e  i t  or not, and whether they know i t  or 
n ot, a p a r tic u la r  s o c ia l  p ra ctice  involves p a r tic u la r  forms of thought, 
forms which r e f l e c t  and reproduce the structure of that p r a c tic e .  Only 
when th is  connection of iron n e c e s s ity , between forms of so c ia l  consc­
iousness and s o c ia l  r e la t io n s ,  is  grasped in theory can we even begin 
to comprehend in  p ra ctice  the precise nature of any ideology and i t s  
p a r tic u la r  forms of appearance within the d iffe r e n t  types of so cia l prac­
t i c e  of d i f f e r e n t  s-ocial c la s s e s .  I  sh a ll  now attempt to exemplify th is  
v i t a l  concept o f  the necessary existence of certain  ideologies within  
d e f in it e  s o c ia l  p r a c tic e s ,  a concept which w ill  enable us to determine 
the so cia l and h is t o r ic a l  s p e c i f i c i t y  and m a te r ia lity  of those id e o lo g ie s .
I  s h a ll  look a t the p ra ctice  of commodity exchange and oxitlino 
the s p e c if ic  ideologies necessary to i t s  stru ctu re. Marx enables us to 
provide th is  example through his discovery of the so cia l r ela tio n s as 
the heart of c a p i t a l i s t  economic p r a c tic e .  Ilis th eo retical o b je ct was 
the c a p i t a l i s t  economic formation rather than c a p i t a l i s t  id e o lo g ica l  
formations; however, we can build a knowledge of the l a t t e r  upon the 
foundation of Marx's discovery of the former. I t  is  worth noting that  
the Marxian an alysis  of s p e c if ic  ideologies begins with the so cial r e l a t ­
ions that r e f l e c t  them. H is to r ic a l  m aterialism , unlike stru ctu ralism ,  
does not attempt to deduce s o c ia l  r ela tio n s from so c ia l  id e o lo g ie s .
S o c ia l  consciousness can only be s p e cifie d  when we understand the modes 
o f co-operation. At the moment, th erefo re, the study of id eo lo gies is  
lim ited by the lack of subsequent development of Marx's an alysis  of  
s o c ia l  r e l a t io n s ,  c a p i t a l i s t  or otherwise. For now, the study of id e o l­
ogies must be o v e r -r e lia n t  upon Marx's work in  C a p i t a l .
In C a p i t a l , Marx demonstrates th at the production of ca p ita l on 
a regular b asis  involves the generalized c ir c u la tio n  of commodities, 
inclxiding labour-power. The nature of the m aterial circumstances which 
demand the exchange does not matter fo r  present purposes. Whether wo 
r e fe r  to tr ib e s  exchanging s a l t  fo r  t o o l s ,  or to wage-labourers exchanging 
th e ir  labour-power for money, makes no d iffe r e n c e . The exchange r e la t io n ,  
predicated by the p r e v a ilin g  material co n d itio n s, demands the existence  
of physical control and a consensual tr a n s fe r .  When th is  r e la tio n  is  
put into p r a ctice  on a regular so cia l  s c a l e . i t ' n o co ssa rily  produces
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ce rta in  s o c ia l  id eo lo g ie s:
(a) The ideology of ownership. To exchango poods a rann must p h y s ic a lly  
control or possess then, and th at possession must he recognized by the 
other p a rty. That i s ,  possession must be v n lid a te d . No exclinngo can 
tnke place on a regu lar, orderly basis without the p a r tie s ' mutual 
recognition of each o th e r's  v a lid  possession. J\s Marx puts i t :
"They must, thereforoj^m utually recognize in  each other the r ig h ts  of  
p rivate p r o p r ie to r s ."
Before commodity exchange began, control over produce was simply a physic­
al matter and s in c e , in  such s o c i e t i e s ,  produce is  communally shared 
there is  no n e cessity  fo r  people to recognize possession:
" . . .  there i s  no possession preceding the fiunily or master servant r e la t ­
ions . . .  One can imagine an individual savage an possessin^0somothing.
But in  th a t  case possession i s  not a ju d ic ia l  po ssessio n ."
The need for the notion of 'p ossession' would only a r is e ,  perhaps, where 
women wore ch a tte ls  and com petitively controlled by men; one would thus 
expect the concept of 'v a l i d  possession' to o rig in a te  in r e la tio n  to the 
control of women. 1 Whether the concept does a rise  as such or in the form 
o f kinship rules is  a matter outside my scope hero. What is  undoubtedly 
c le a r  is  th at when commodity exchnngc is  frequent the ideology of le g a l/  
v a lid  possession or ownership must emerge. Corresponding to the ideolog­
i c a l  formation of 'ownership' are the notions of 'r i g h t '  and 'p ro p e rty '.  
•Ownership' i s  the ' r i g h t ' to exclu sive  control over goods, which thus 
become the 1 property' of th e ir  owner. These are a l l  'p o s it i v e '  ideologies  
necessitated by the so cia l  r e la tio n  of exchange. B u t, of course, th at  
r e la tio n  also n e ce ssita te s  the 'n e g a tive ' ideology of ' i l l e g a l  possession' .  
Orderly, regular exchange cannot p o s s ib ly  continue i f  one party takes 123
11. (1974) o p . c i t . ,  p .8 8 .
12. Marx Grundrisse (1973) o p . c i t . ,  p.102.
13. Marx c le a r ly  thought th at the sexual d iv is io n  o f  labour was the f i r s t  
form of d iv isio n  of labour. "This la t e n t  slavery  . . .  i s  the f i r s t  p rop erty ."  
Marx and Engels (1970) o p . c i t . ,  p .5 2.
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possession of goods without consent. Thus 'ownership* and ' i l l e g a l  
possession' are simply two sides of the same p r a c t ic a l  co in .
(b) The ideology of the person. Surplus and s c a r c it y  force the 
exchange of commodities', Men are, th erefo re, brought together as rep­
resen tatives of the produce which must change p la c e s .  The exchange 
r e la tio n  forces men to a c t  on behalf of their commodities. Men act as 
p e r so n ific a tio n s  of the commodities. Commodities cannot go to market 
on th e ir  own; men must a c t  fo r  them and personify th eir  e xiste n ce.
Hence, the exchange of commodities demands that the p a rties recognize  
each other as the p e rso n ifica tio n s of the goods; they must recognize 
each other as persons. Consequently, the ideology of the person is  
born. Before exchange, commodities do not need to put on th is  human 
f a c e ,  they e x i s t  as themselves and are simply consumed as such. In  
c a p i t a l i s t  s o c i e t i e s ,  where commodity exchange is  so extensive and 
central a part of so cial l i f e ,  the f a c t  that men in  exchange are merely 
p e r so n ific a tio n s  of the commodities i s  often b r u ta lly  revealed. For 
example, i t  is  common in academic l i f e  fo r  a man to be thought of as 
h is book. In so many other walks of modern l i f e  men appear as the com­
modities they purvey, and th e ir  real 'p e r so n a lity ' is  annihilated by 
th e ir  impersonations of the commodity. In ca p ita lism , we are a l l  the 
dummies of the v e n tr ilo q u is t  commodity.
(c) The ideology of the co n tra ct. Exchange demands th at the p arties  
recognize th at each o th er's  ' w i l l '  resides within the commodities. Comm­
o d itie s  themselves have no motivations and the n e cessity  fo r  them to 
change places must be imputed to the minds of th e ir  'owners'. The 
owners must recognize each other as in ten tio nal a c to r s ,  as possessors 
with intentions and the exchange of commodities appears as a meeting of  
the p a r tic ip a n t s '  in te n tio n s , a consensus of minds. Thus, the ideology  
of the 1 c o n tr a c t ' i s  born. A 'c o n tr a c t '  i s  defined as a consensual 
meeting of minds, The exchange r e la tio n  n e cessa rily  begets th is  id eo lo gy,  
and what is  e s s e n t ia ll y  a product of material circumstances appears as
a 'consensus ad idem' (the le g a l  term), an agreement between owners. In  
c a p i t a l i s t  s o c i e t i e s ,  where commodities exchange hands a t  a rate of knots,  
the f a c t  th at an exchange is  an economic n e cessity  is  often a l l  too pain­
f u l l y  obvious and the necessary ideology of con tra ct often  wears very  
th in  indeed. One could argue th at only w riters of le g a l textbooks, lawyers 
and judges l i v e  within the ideology with any degree of unconsciousness,
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and even they, in th eir  le g a l p r a c t ic e ,  are often forced to recognise  
i t s  id e o lo g ic a l  nature as a f i c t i o  ju r is  «
I  have shown th a t the id eo lo gies of 'ownership', ' r i g h t ' ,  
'p r o p e r ty ' ,  'the p erso n ', ' i l l e g a l  possession' and 'c o n tr a c t '  are the 
necessary thought matters to a p a r ticu la r  form of co-operation, the 
r e la tio n  of commodity exchange. This i s  something th at ilarx discovered  
but did not eleborate on a great d e a l.  ¿11 these ideologies take on 
d i ff e r e n t  contents within d i ffe r e n t  forms of s o c ie t y ,  and within d i f f e r ­
ent forms of p r a c t ic e ,  and within d if f e r e n t  c la ss  con texts. A discussion  
o f th e ir  varian ts must be l e f t  to others. However a word on th eir  legal  
forms may be h e lp fu l .
Commodity exchange can e x i s t  as a s o c ia l  r e la tio n  prior to the 
establishment of the c a p i t a l i s t  mode of production, Whore i t  e x is ts  on 
any regular b a s is ,  i t s  necessary id eologies w il l  guide and, thereby,det­
ermine i t s  p r a c tic e .  At f i r s t ,  i t s  ideologies may only e x i s t  as princip­
le s  of behaviour or as customary law. However, as wo have seen in many 
p la c e s , and notably in ancient Rome, these ideologies may be cod ified by 
the p o l i t i c a l  rulers and given the backing of the dominant s o c ia l  power.
In th is  form, they have acted as the backbone of le g a l systems in many 
s o c ie t ie s  where commodity exchange is  prevalent. The la te r  adoption of 
Roman law in many c a p i t a l i s t  countries was enabled by the f a c t  that the 
s o c ia l  id eo lo gies necessary to generalized commodity exchange were already  
organized" into lega l codes. Once in s t it u t io n a liz e d  ns the formal tools  
o f le g a l  p r a c t ic e ,  these id eologies began a new l i f e .  The r e la tiv e  auto­
nomy of le g a l p ra ctice  meant that where these id eologies were formalized  
in  codes of law, they acquired a substantive h isto r y  of th eir  own, re­
lin q u ish in g  th e ir  merely formal h isto r y  as elements of ongoing commercial 
p r a c t ic e .  Their development in  law is  subject to the structure and c i r c ­
umstances of le g a l p r a c t ic e .  Analysts of modern ideology should not, 
th e r e fo re , expect the ideology in the law to correspond n eatly  with the 
current n e c e s s itie s  of economic p r a c t ic e .  On the other hand, to return  
to a point implied e a r l i e r ,  such analysts should not be surprised when 
the id e o lo g ie s ,  necessita ted  by a r e la tio n  which makes i t s  f u l l  so cia l  
appearance in c a p i t a l i s t  s o c i e t i e s ,  appear in  the lega l pronouncements or 
p o l i t i c a l  doctrines of t r ib a l  ch ie fs  or feudal lo r d s . As Marx con stan tly  
in s i s t e d ,  h is to r y  is  not the a b s tr a c t ,  l o g ic a l  movement of categories  
but the movement of real r e la tio n s  according to th e ir  own m aterial dia­
250
l e c t i c s .  F i n a l l y ,  in r e la tio n  to the question of deviance, -we have seen
above th at a deviance id eology, ' i l l e g a l  p o sse ssio n ',  is  a negative
id e o lo g ica l r e f le c t io n  of a so cia l  r e la tio n . Deviance is  not a q u a lity
of the a ct nor a q uality  of the label put upon i t  by interested actors —
i t  i s  an id eo lo g ica l q u a lity  of a s o c ia l  stru ctu re. Furthermore, as a
q u a lity  of a  s tru ctu re, i t  does not achieve i t s  f u l l  so cial and p o l i t i c a l
sta tu s as the general law of t h e f t  u n t i l  that structure reaches i t s  f u l l
14form of development in modern ca p ita lism . Deviance is  not e te r n a l, i t  
has an h is t o r ic a l  s p e c i f i c i t y  corresponding to the development of i t s  
corresponding so cial r e la tio n s .
Once born, these ideologies act as in tegra l elements within the 
economic p r a ctice  of commodity exchange and regulate i t s  e x iste n ce, But, 
and th is  is  important, the sane id eologies may become in te gra l parts of  
other so c ia l  p r a c tic e s .  As such, they may take on new forms o f appearance 
and serve d iffe r e n t  s o c ia l  fu n ctio n s. In c a p i t a l i s t  s o c i e t i e s ,  'owner­
ship ' surely f i l t e r s  through into most sociul p ra ctice s  and nearly  
everything becomes seen and treated as 'p rivate  p ro p erty'. 'C o ntra ct'  
ideology and the ideology of 'r i g h t '  have also had f u l l  and dynamic l iv e s  
w ithin the spheres of p o l i t i c s  and philosophy. I t  i s  outside my task to  
begin the an alysis  of new forms of appearance, now functions and new 
supporting r e la tio n s ,  but I  hope th at th is  present section of the work 
w i l l  in d icate  the d ire ctio n  which such an analysis might take. However, 
one point must be firm ly  secured; once so cial ideologies are e sta b lish e d ,  
t h e ir  displacement into new f i e l d s ,  e s p e c ia lly  v ia  the p o l i t i c a l  pract­
ic e s  of the powerful, e . g .  l e g i s l a t i o n  or revo lu tio n , may mean that they  
determine the form that s o c ia l  rela tio n s  within a new p r a ctice  may take.  
A lt e r n a t iv e ly ,  so cia l r e la tio n s  may be transformed and compromised, 
contradictory or d i f f e r e n t  ones established in th e ir  p la ce . I t  is  not 
the end of the matter when so cia l  structures produce various forms of  
s o c ia l  consciousness -  those forms may return in  new guises to haunt, 
maintain or transform the structures th at r e fle c te d  them. Despite the 14
14. See J . H a l l  T h e ft , law and s o c ie ty  (1952 Indianapolis : B o b b s-H e r rill) 
fo r  an account of the conditions under which ' i l l e g a l  possession' developed 
from a rule of land law to a f u l l  sta te  law of t l io f t - in —ge n e ra l.
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formulations o f  some M arxists, Marx believed th at s o c ia l  id eo lo gies were, 
a l b e i t  complexly, m aterial determinants of s o c ia l  phenomena -  includ ing  
the basic forms of co-operation themselves.
To s a y  that s o c ia l  r e la tio n s  (the structure of a p r a c tic e )  
n e cessita te  a p a r tic u la r  s o c ia l  ideology is  not to argue th at ideology  
i s  produced by abstract forms, a la  stru ctu ralism . Ideology i s  only pro­
duced when s o c ia l  r e la tio n s  are rea lized  in p r a c tic e . S o c ia l  ideologies  
only emerge within a generalized p r a c tic e ,  they have no ephemeral e x is t­
ence outside the life b lo o d  o f s o c ie t y .  Moreover, once an ideology has 
emerged, out of certain s o c ia l  r e la tio n s ,  those r ela tio n s are only re a l­
ized in  p r a ctice  under the guidance o f th at p a r tic u la r  id eo lo gy. S o cia l  
p r a c tic e s  involve forms o f  co-operation and of consciousness in  d e fin ite  
materinl s e t t i n g s .  Forms of co-operation are mere abstractions without 
forms of consciousness, men and materinl con d ition s. As Marx argued, 
antagonisms within a so cia l  structure are only seen by men within the 
f o rms of ideology corresponding to them; an a b stract structure never 
presents i t s e l f  d ir e c t ly  and concretely to men's v is io n . Structures in  
themselves are b lin d . I t  takes guide—dogs, conscious men, to lead them 
to th e ir  lo g i c a l  conclusions; guide-dogs, who are themselves blind to 
the s o c ia l  lo g ic  of th at ending. And, I  doubt i f  i t  i s  only in capitalism  
th a t  the blind lead the b lin d .
Economism and idealism in Marxist theory
Ify th e s is  th at id eologies are in tegra l and in e x trica b le  m aterial  
elements of a l l  so cia l p r a ctice s  has two major im p lica tio n s:
(1) There i s  no so cia l  p r a ctice  without i t s  own id eo lo gy. A ll  forms of  
s o c ia l  p ra ctice  contain id e o lo g ie s .  An economistic Marxism might argue 
th a t  a l l  id eo lo gies are derived from the mode of production, th a t i s ,  
from the structure o f  the dominant economic p r a c tic e .  Or, le s s  economist- 
i c a l l y ,  i t  might diminish the extent and impact of id eo lo gies generated
in  p o l i t i c a l  and i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r a c tic e .
(2) There is  no so cia l  ideology without a supporting p r a c t ic e .  A ll  
forms of s o c ia l  ideology arc produced in social p r a c t ic e s .  No so cia l id ­
eology is  the r e s u lt  of individ ual genius or in ven tion . An i d e a l i s t i c
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Marxism might argue that some id eo lo gies are the products o f  a spontan­
eous individual or cla ss c r e a t i v i t y .  In sop h isticated  form,' th is  arg­
ument might s ta te  that science is  a -r a d i c a ll y  d i f f e r e n t  form of  
consciousness to ideology and thus escapes p r a c t ic a l  determ inations, or 
th a t a c la ss  spontaneously arrives a t  a revolutionary consciousness of  
i t s e l f »
I t  might be in s tr u c tiv e  to examine b r i e f l y  the existence ( i f  
at a l l )  of economism and idealism  in the works of Gramsci, Althusser and 
Cornforth. This exercise should help to indicate further the precise  
nature of my own t h e s i s .
Gramsci can be accused with some .ju s t i f ic a t io n  of the sin  of  
id ealism . Ilis "philosophy of praxis" ( i . e . ,  Marxism) y ie ld s  a d i s t in c t ­
ion between " h i s t o r i c a l l y  organic id eo lo gies . . .  which are necessary to
a given structure" and "id eolo gies th a t are a r b itr a r y , r a t i o n a l i s t i c  or 
15• w ille d ’ " .  At f i r s t  gla n ce, then, firamsci seems to believe th at some 
forms of consciousness can be spontaneously and s u b je c tiv e ly  raised  
above and outside so cial r e la tio n s .  He undoubtedly appears to reverse 
liarx's p o sitio n  in C a p ital :
"My standpoint, from which the evolution of the economic formation of  
s o c ie t y  i s  viewed.as a process of natural h is t o r y , can less than any 
other make the individual responsible for r e la tio n s  whose creature he 
s o c i a l ^  remains, however much he may s u b je c tiv e ly  raise him self above 
then. " (my emphases - C . S . )
■ Whatever we may think on reading further passages in Gramsci, his d i s t ­
in c tio n  between s t r u c t u r a ll 3r necessary and a rb itra ry  id eologies j u s t i f i e s17the accusation of idealism and "spontaneism". I t  does seem th a t he is
p o s itin g  a purely su b jective  source fo r  some forms of consciousness.
This impression i s  anchored by two further passages. At one point he
18describes the "a rb itra ry  élucubrations of p a r tic u la r  in d iv id u a ls " .  An 15*78
15, A.Gramsci Prison Notebooks (1071 London: Lawrence and Wishart) pp. 
370,077.
10. (1974) o p . c i t . , p . 2 1 .
17. Poulantzas and Althusser use th is  term in  c r it ic i s m  of Gramsci. See 
N.Poulantzas P o l i t i c a l  Power and Nocini Classes (1073 London: Now L e f t  
Books) and Althusser and Balibar (1970) o p . c i t . .
18. (1971) o p . c i t . , p .376.
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élucubration can be defined as a profound .tr e a tis e  produced through 
intensive study and so Gramsci would seem to be attempting to disengage 
conceptual space fo r  ' s c i e n t i f i c  p r a c t i c e ' .  A second passage, support­
ing th is  in te r p r e ta tio n , sees Gramsci c r i t i c i z i n g  PlekhanoV fo r  arguing  
th a t the s o c ia l  origins of Marx's thought were s p e c if ia b le .  Gramsci 
argues th at Plekhanov has lapsed into "vulgar materialism" and that
Marx's "crea tive  and constructive a c t i v i t y "  l i f t e d  him above his " c u l t -  
19u r e " . lie proceeds by p ra isin g Labriola and c a l l s  for "the struggle
20fo r  an autonomous and superior c u ltu r e . " ‘”
Many times throughout his work, Gramsci can be road to say 
th a t absolute and unconditional spontaneous c r e a t i v i t y  i s  p o s s ib le .  I  
have merely mentioned some clear examples. Gramsci's apparent idealism  
however may well be purely the r e s u lt  of an admirable attempt to break 
away from économisa. Let us examine th is  p o s s i b i l i t y .
Gramsci i s  p e r fe c t ly  well aware of contradictions within s o c ia l
r e la tio n s  :
" A ll  hitherto e x is t in g  philosophies (philosophical systems) have been 
m anifestations of the intimate contradictions by which s o c ie ty  is  
la ce r a te d .
Thus he cannot be accused of ' f o r g e t t in g '  that such contradictions must 
generate contradictions within an ideology and th at revolutionary id eo l­
ogies must be explained by stru ctu ra l d is lo c a t io n . However, Gramsci sees 
the philosophy of praxis as one which grasps these contradictions and 
lo c a te s  the philosopher within them:
" . . .  even the philosophy of praxis i s  an expression of h is t o r ic a l  con­
t r a d ic t io n s ,  and indeed t h e ir  most complete, because most conscious, 
expression; t h is  means th a t i t  too i s  tied  to 'n e c e s s ity ' and not t o 0ç 
•freedom' which does not e x i s t  and, h i s t o r i c a l l y ,  cannot y e t e x i s t . " “ “ 1920
19. ib id ,  p.387.
20. ib id ,  p.388, (my emphases -  C . S . )
21. ib id ,  p.404. Compare th is  and. the follow ing passage (fn .2 2) with 
A lth u sse r's  notion th at ideology is  defined hy i t s  su b jectio n  to p r a c tic o -  
s o c ia l  fu n c tio n s , w h ilst  science ( i . e .  Marxism) is  a pure system of
concepts!
22. ib id ,  p.405.
260
Even the philosopher of p r a x is , the Marxist s c i e n t i s t ,  cannot escape 
from "the present f i e l d  of co n tra d ictio n s" . Bow i s n ' t  th is  a different,  
sto ry from th at of an i d e a l i s t ?  Gramsci sees even the sciences as 
r e fle c tio n s  of so cia l r e la tio n s .  Furthermore, there is  an intim ation  
in  the «hove passages th a t  not only economic r e la tio n s ,  but also r e l a t ­
ions of p o l i t i c a l  and i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r a c t ic e ,  determine the forms of  
s o c ia l  consciousness.
When Gramsci c r i t i c i s e s  Bukharin*s mechanistic id eas, he points  
out th at the leaders of the dominant classes sometimes make "m istakes". 
These mistakes are "errors" in terras of the stru ctu ral in te r e s ts  of the 
dominant c la s s e s .  At f i r s t  glance, th is  seems to convict Grarasci of  
id ealism . However, his point against Bukharin, however m isleadingly  
argued, i s  th at the l a t t e r  f a i le d  to grant r e la tiv e  autonomy to each 
s o c ia l  p r a c tic e :
" I t  i s  not s u f f i c i e n t l y  borne in mind th at many p o l i t i c a l  acts are due 
to internal n e ce s s itie s  of an organizational character; that i s ,  they 
are t ie d  to the need to give coherence to a p a rty , a group, a s o c ie t y ." '^
lie argues, in. th is  in sta n ce, th at p o l i t i c a l  p ra ctice  has i t s  own dynamic 
and material s e ttin g  which, themselves, determine the p o l i t i c a l  ideolog­
i e s ,  in s t it u t io n s  and a cts  of the dominant c la s s e s .  In another instance,  
Gramsci c r i t i c i s e s  Bukharin for tending to reduce flu c tu a tio n s  in
24p o l i t i c s  and ideology to immediate flu c tu a tio n s  of "the str u ctu r e " .
25lie contests th is  tendency, viewing i t  as "prim itive in fa n t i l is m " .  
U n fo rtu n ately , i t  i s  not u su a lly  c le a r  what Gramsci means by "the 
str u c tu r e " . My reading o f  the general argument convinces me th at "the 
stru ctu re" i s ,  for Grnmsci, the mode of production or economic base.
Thus Gramsci i s  here urguing for the r e la tiv e  autonomy of p o l i t i c a l  and 
i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r a c tic e s ,  Ilis e a r lie r  reference to "organic id eologies . . .  2345
23. i b i d . , p . 408.
24. i b i d ,  p.407.
25. ib id .
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necessary to a given structure" must thus be seen to refer  to those 
id eo lo gies necessitated by economic p r u c tic e . Therefore, we could 
f a i r l y  in te r p re t h is  "ideologies' th a t are a r b itr a r y , r a t i o n a l i s t i c  or 
'w i l l e d '"  to refer to the ideologies contained within p o l i t i c a l  and 
i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r a c tic e ,  whore of course the importance of s p e c i f i c ,  
systematized ideologies is  much greater than in economic p r a c tic e .
Given the general excellence of Gramsci's d iscu ssio n s, i t  seems p e r fe c t ly  
reasonable to make t h is  in te rp re ta tio n  of his apparently i d e a l i s t i c  
statements. In a period where mechanical, economistic Marxism ruled the 
r o o s t, Grarasci was attempting to sp e c ify  the r e la tiv e  autonomy of the 
Buperstructural p r a c tic e s .  I t  is  c e r ta in ly  true th at his s p e c ific a tio n s  
are extremely vague and misleading and that he never c le a r ly  formulates 
the conception of id eo lo gies elaborated here. However, I  think the 
concept of the importance of a l l  kinds of so cia l  ideology i s  one which 
in sp ires his work; although, at the same time, i t  is  equally tenable to 
argue that Gram sci's language does in d icate  a p o l i t i c a l - i n t e l l e c t u a l  
"spontaneism" on the part of the revolutionary in t e l l e c t u a l s  and masses.
Hy reading of Gramsci's i n s i g h t f u l ,  but often ambiguous, 
w ritin g can be given added support by reference to his discussion of  
Marx's cr itiq u e  of p o l i t i c a l  economy in C a p it a l . For him, th at critiq u e  
i s  enmeshed within the economic determinism endemic to Ricardian p o l i t ­
i c a l  economy. For Gramsci, Marx's analysis of the economic formation of  
ca p ita lism  does not provide the f u l 1 explanation of h is t o r ic a l  change, 
nor of the h is t o r ic a l  n e ce ssity  of revolutionary so cialism . Gramsci 
argues that"the true Marxian "h is to r ic a l-c o n c r e te "  conception of h isto r ­
i c a l  n e cessity  is  contained in a passage written prior to C a p ital :
"No so cia l  order ever perishes before a l l  the productive forces for which 
there is  room in i t  have developed, and new, hirrher rela tio n s of product­
ion never appear before the material conditions of th eir  existence have 
matured in the womb of the old s o c ie ty  i t s e l f .  Therefore mankind always 
sets  i t s e l f  only such tasks as i t  can solve; since locking at the matter 
more c l o s e l y ,  i t  w ill  always bo found th at the task i t s e l f  arises only 
vhen the material conditions for its solu tion  already e x i s t  or are at  
l e a s t  in the process of formation. "
(The passage underlined corresponds 
to the parts emphasized in Grarasci's argument) 26
26. Marx 1859 Preface in Marx end Engels (1973) o p .c i t . ,p ,1 8 2  .
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For Gramsci, Marx's p o s it io n ,  th ere fo re , vas t h a t ,  fo r  a thoroughgoing 
s o c ia l-s t r u c t u r a l  revolu tion , the m aterial conditions (matured contra­
d ic tio n s  between the s o c ia l  rela tio n s and the productive fo rces)  must 
e x i s t  and a ls o ,  corx*espondingly, the revolutionary classes must be 
c o l l e c t i v e l y  conscious of them in some way. Ffuch a cla ss consciousness 
forms
» . . .  a complex of convictionj^and b e l ie fs  which acts powerfully in the 
forms of 'popular b e l i e f s ' " .
One cannot, says Gramsci, separate the condition of a co lla p sin g  
economic formation from
" . . .  a c e rta in  level of c u ltu r e , by which we mean a complex o f  i n t e l l ­
ectu al acts and, as a product ami consequence of th ese, a certain  complex 
o f overriding passions and f e e l in g s ,  overriding in the sense,, th a t they  
have the power to lead men on to actio n 'a t  any p r i c e '" .  (ay emphases -  
C . S . )
I t  seems clear th at here Gramsci is  s tr e ssin g  the v i t a l  part played in  
the so cia l  fo in a tio n  (in  collapse or otherwise) by various types of 
superstruetural p r a c tic e ,  such as p o l i t i c a l  a g it a t io n ,  education, a r t ,  
lite r a tu r e ,p h ilo s o p h y . In an unconscious manner, Gramsci seems to say 
th a t  the combination of thoughts and emotions within the in t e r s t ic e s  of  
the various forms of in t e l le c t u a l  and p o l i t i c a l  p r a ctice  i s  a v i t a l  
aspect of s o c ie t y .  Hence, I  think th at he would support the main concept 
o f the present te x t  -  the in tegra l and important place of ideology in  
a l l  forms of s o c ia l  p r a c tic e .  More co n scio u sly , Gramsci refuses to 
accept th at h is t o r ic a l  n e c e s s ity  i s  simply a matter of the laws of econ­
omic p r a ctice  or of any a b stra ct man progressing towards absolute p e r fe c t­
io n . ihc d i a l e c t i c  of h is to r y  for  him (as hero,too) e n ta ils  the laws o f  
the superstructure as well as the laws of the stru ctu re. Gramsci r a t i f i e s  
my str e s s  on the m a te r ia lity ,  s p e c i f i c i t y  and importance of the so c ia l  278
27. Gramsci (1971) o p .c i t . ,p .4 1 3
28. i b i d . .
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"forms of consciousness" within which classes f i g h t  out economic, p o l i t ­
i c a l  and in t e l le c t u a l  antagonisms. This view seems to be one th at Marx 
always kept in mind. liven within the analysis of va lu e, the forms of  
consciousness were very, important fo r  Marx. For example, the value of
labour-power i s  dependent upon the value of the labourers' s o c i a l l y
29necessary means of subsistence. Thus, id eologies are e f f e c t iv e  in  
deciding what i s  " s o c i a l l y  necessary". S im ila r ly  the development of  
c la s s  s o l i d a r i t y  and resistance can d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t  the rate of surplus 
v a lu e , through the maintenance of wage le v e ls .  C apital seems to have led 
many to see id eologies as the in e rt a ttr ib u te s  of the "creatures" of the 
economic system and to ignore the m a te ria lity  and s p e c if ic it y  of ideolog­
ie s  which gives them a determinant role in any human so ciety  beyond the 
a b so lu tely  p r im itiv e . Ignoring the e f f e c t s  of ideology throughout the 
s o c ia l  formation tends to lead to an economistic structuralism  which 
sees the movement of h is to r y  as a d i a l e c t i c  of economic ca te go rie s . In  
my view, Grnmsci never ignored the e f f e c t s  of id eo lo gy, although his  
con cep tu alizatio n  of the so cia l  lo ca tio n  of ideology is  frequently  
ambiguous and misleading.
On my rending of Grnmsci, Althusser is  mistaken when he accuses
Gramsci of having flattened the superstruct\ire into the infrastructure in
30h is  th e o re tic a l  form ulations.' He sees Gramsci's work as th e o r e tic a lly  
sim ila r  to th at of the economistic Marxists whom Gramsci c r i t i c i s e s :
"In  other words, i f  these r e a l l y  are two d i s t i n c t  ways of id e n tify in g  the 
superstructure with the in fr a s tr u c tu r e , or consciousness with the economy 
— one which sees in consciousness and p o l i t i c s  only the economy; while 
the other imbues the economy with p o l i t i c s  and consciousness, there i s  
never more than one structure at work -  the structure of the problem­
a t i c  which, by redyeing one to the oth er, th e o r e t ic a l ly  id e n t i f i e s  the 
le v e ls  p r e se n t."
In  another passage, Althusser implies th at Grnmsci endows " p o l i t i c a l
32p r a c tic e  with the questions of philosophy and th eo ry".'  ^ lie la b els  th is  29301
29. See Marx (1974) o p .c i t . ,p ,1 6 8  on the "moral elements" in  the determ­
in a tio n  of the value of labour-power.
30. Althusser and Balibar (1970) o p . c i t . , p . 138.
31. i b i d . , p.138,139.
32. i b i d . , p . 138.
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tendency "spontnneism". In ray view, Gramsci separates out the d iffe r e n t  
le v e ls  o f  the so cia l  formation ( a lb e it  in an unsj'stematic and ambiguous 
way) and, th erefo re, his work is  th e o r e t ic a l ly  quite d i f f e r e n t  from the 
mechanical Marxism of such as Bukharin. Behind A lth u sse r's  c r i t i c i s m ,  I 
would suggest, l i e s  the f a c t  that Althusser views science as outside the 
superstructure."“1 Poulantzas, a ls o , seems to fdund his c r it ic is m  of  
Gramsci on th is  b a s is .  Both Althusser and Poulantzas accuse Granrsci of  
" h is to r ic is r a " , of co n fla tin g  the r e l a t i v e l y  autonomous structures and 
times of d i f f e r e n t  so cia l  p ractices within one contemporaneous h istory  
which moves with a lin ear flow . Now, indeed, h is t o r ic is n  Ps a grave 
error fo r  a Marxist to make, but th e ir  a ttr ib u tio n  of the sin  to Grnrasci's 
work does seem to hang by the thread of one s i n g l e ,  debatable premise: 
th a t  science is  not subject to the " h is t o r ic a l  con tradiction s" which, fo r  
Grarasci, plagued the "philosophy of p r a x is " .  One should note the high 
le v e l  of irony involved here: Althusser is  concerned to discover Marx's 
philosophy and thus save Marx from the ideologies which have enabled 
r ev isio n s of his work. Bis whole p r o je c t ,  th erefo re, is  based on the 
f a c t  th at Marxism, i t s e l f ,  is "la c e r n te d " by the e f f e c t s  of so cia l  contra­
d i c t i o n s .  A lth u sse r's  theory would thus seem to b e lie  the impetus of  
h is  work and s c i e n t i f i c  production would seem to be part of the super­
s tr u c tu r e .
Poulantzas puts the Althusserian case in  th is  way:
"This historicisra becomes clear in h is  treatment of the status of ideo­
l o g y ,  in  Grarasci's concept of the 'h i s t o r i c a l  b l o c ' .  This concept 
allows Gransci to think the unity of theory and p r a c tic e ,  the u n ity  of  
id eo lo gy, encompassing science ( 'o rga n ic i n t e l l e c t u n l s ')  and stru ctu re,  
i . e .  the u n ity  of a s o c ia l  formation in i t s  ensemble at a h i s t o r i c a l l y  
determined in s t a n t .  But th is  unity  is  p re cise ly  the expressive t o t a l i t y  
of the h i s t o r i c i s t  type, which co n fla te s  the id eo lo gica l and th eo re tica l  
i n s t a nces in the ensemble of the so c ia l  str u ctu r e . "  (my emphases -  C .R .
In summary form, Po\ilantzas tlms expresses A lth u sse r's  more prolonged 
d iscu ssio n  in  Rending C a p i t a l . I t  seems clear th a t Grarasci's alleged  
c o n fla tio n  of ideology v it h  science in  the p r a ctice  of the i n t e l l e c t u a l s  34
33. ibid.,p.133.
34. (1073) op.cit.,p,200
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i s  the burning issu e.
A lth u sse r’ s c r itiq u e  of Gramsci is  i t s e l f  (paradoxically)  
generoiis to the context ( h is t o r ic a l  and p r a c tic a l)  in  which Gramsci 
developed Marxist scien ce. The weight of his condemnation is  directed  
a t one clear th esis  in Gramsci’ s work: th at the science of Marxism is  
not a separate "th eo re tica l p r a ctice "  (A lth u sser's  concept) but an in t­
egral part of p o l i t i c a l  and in t e l l e c t u a l  p ractice  and th a t as an element 
in  superstructural p r a ctice  Marxist science i s  not absolutely  free but 
r e s t r ic t e d  by the "n ecessity"  of " h is t o r ic a l  co n tra d ictio n s" . Althusser  
complains th at Gramsci tr e a ts  science as i f  i t  were merely an ideology  
and th a t ,  once formed, science in f a c t  has n l i f e  of i t s  own disconnected  
from the "stru ctu re" of s o c i e t y .0 As we have seen, "structure" is  
Gramsci’ s term for the s o c ia l  r ela tio n s of economic p r a c tic e .  Thus i t  
i s  clear th at Althusser holds th at s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge i s  d iffe r e n t  to 
superstructural forms which fora a "bloc" (Gramsci's tern) with the 
stru ctu re:
"The reduction and id c n t i f  i cati on of the pecu liar h isto ry  of science to 
the h isto ry  of organic ideology and politico-econom ic h isto ry  u ltim a tely  
reduces science to h isto r y  as i t s  'e s s e n c e ' ."  30
In  sh o rt, fo r  A lth u sser, to conceptualize Marxist s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge 
as an in tegra l aspect of the so cia l str u c tu r e , w h ils t  maintaining i t s  
s c i e n t i f i c i t y ,  is  to produce a view of th a t science as a d ir e c t  express­
ion of real h is t o r y . In my view, the consequence does not n e cessa rily  
fo llo w  the premise and Althusser seems to want to say th at s c i e n t i f i c  
p r a c tic e  i s  a b so lu tely , rather than r e l a t i v e l y ,  autonomous.
I t  may seem odd th a t  Althusser describes Gramsci's conception
of science as e m p iricist  since i t  "reduces the (th e o r e tic a l)  o b ject of
37the science of h isto ry  to real h is t o r y " . '  One would have thought th at  
to produce a science th a t did grasp "real h isto r y"  in  i t s  inner mechan­
isms was an achievement, not a d is a s te r !  Althusser here exem plifies h is  
constant tendency to id ea lism . P u i l t  into h is theory is  a neo-stru ctu r­
a l i s t  notion of the pure in t e r n a l it y  of a systematic body of concepts 3567
35. (1970) o p . c i t . , p p . 131,133
36. i b i d . , p . 133.
37. i b i d . .
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( s c ie n c e ) .  Fer Althusser, s c i e n t i f i c  theory is  the theory „h ich  explains  
i t s  th e o re tic a l  o b je ct, and i t  is  " e m p ir ic is t” to attempt to r e la te  
theory to the appearances of r e a l i t y .  The concept of "empiricism" in  
A lth u sse r's  problematic is  so broad th at i t  can be applied to any 
attempt to r e la te  theory to data. Theory must keep to i t s e l f  and not 
d i r t y  i t s  hands with apparent r e a l i t y .  Thus the science of h isto r y  must 
not study "real h isto r y "!  What is  i t  supposed to study -  f a ls e  h i s t ­
ory, invented h isto ry  or the unreal h isto ry  of the Idea?
A lth u sse r's  idealism  in p rotectin g the p u rity  of science from 
the d i r t  of the so cia l formation requires him to provide a cradle in  
which his s a i n t l y  o ffs p r in g  can r e st in se c u r ity . That cradle must be 
the cradle of a_p r a c t ic e , fo r  the h isto r y  of s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge could 
not go on within a metaphysical vacuum. Thus a p ractice  i s  duly con­
stru cted : th eo re tica l p r a c t ic e .  Throughout A lth u sser's  work (and that . 
o f his followers ) ,  th is  p ra ctice  i s  defined as a process of transform­
a tio n  whereby s c i e n t i f i c  theory works upon id eo lo g ica l concepts and fa c ts  
from previous sciences to produce s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge. 3 9  This process 
takes place purely within knowledge. The means of production are 
s c i e n t i f i c  theories and th e ir  raw m aterials ore id e o lo g ie s . No mention 
i s  made of any human s c i e n t i s t  who operates the instruments of production 
nor of the s o c ia l  lo ca tio n  o f  th is  'p r a c t i c e ' .  L'ore im portantly, no 
mention i s  made of the s o c ia l  rela tio n s which structure th is  p r a c tic e ;  
su r e ly  th is  must co n stitu te  a t e r r i b l e ,  th eo retical error? Surely the 
s o c ia l  structure of s c i e n t i f i c  production, the so cial functions of science  
and the s o c ia l  ideologies in the s c i e n t i s t ' s  head would a l l  a f f e c t  the 
f i n a l  product and render it ,w it h o u t  doubt, only r e l a t iv e l y  autonomous of  
the so cia l  structure? I  am l e f t  with the impression that 'th e o r e tic a l  
p r a c t ic e '  is  merely a pure movement o f  ideas in a so cia l vacuum. I t  seems 
th a t the p u r ity  and in t e r n a l it y  of science in  A lth u sse r's  Marxism belongs 
with th is  apparent notion of the autonomous movement of id eas. Surely  
th is  i s  an idealism of the most b la ta n t kind? I t  seems th a t Althusser  
i s  p o s itin g  a d i a l e c t ic  within ideas iso la te d  from the f u l l  weight of  
s o c ia l  determinations.
38. S e c ,  
P ra ctice
39. Pec
for example, B.IIindess "M a te r ia lis t  Mathematics 
(Autumn 1971) 3/4 p.82.
e s p e c ia l ly  Althusser (1969) p p .182-193.
II Theoretical
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I t  i s  true th at Althusser, in  another part of Rending C a p i t a l , ' * 0 
did note th at Marx's th eo re tica l (levelopment was conditioned to n l im it ­
ed extent by h is  p r a c tic a l  experience-, in  the 1840s. He argues th a t  
Marx's jo u r n a l is t i c  experiences did intervene to lend him from th e o r e tic ­
al ideology to s c i e n t i f i c  theory. But, and Althusser emphasized t h i s ,
these experiences intervened in Marx's work only " in  the form of new
41thought o b je c ts ,  'id e a s ' and concepts". The only interventions in the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l  p ra ctice  of a so cia l  th e o r is t  are thoughts!? Marx would 
have something to sav about th a t ,  a ft e r  l iv in g  in poverty for twenty 
y e a r s , harassed by land lord s, beleaguered by v i s i t s  from 'r e v o lu t io n a r ie s ' ,  
b r u ta lly  c r i t i c i s e d  and ignored in turn by orthodox in t e l le c t u a ls  and 
jo u r n a l i s t s ,  hounded by the law, e t c . , e t c . .  I f  the production of science  
only took place in the mind, l i f e  would be easy for any budding thinker!
In  p a ssin g, i t  is  worth mentioning th a t i t  i s  not coincidental thnt 
Althusser and his follow ers often r e fe r  to Marx's "genius". I f  there arc 
no con strain ts upon converting ideology into science other than those in  
the b rain , the man who does produce a science must have an exceptional  
brain — he must bo a "gen iu s". Marx himself lends weight to th is  
conception of the necessary condition fo r  s c i e n t i f i c  production in  his  
frequent references to the cerebral d e fic ie n c ie s  of his opponents. Des­
p it e  t h a t ,  however, any notion of science as the pure product of a power­
f u l  i n t e l l e c t  must be rejected  as thoroughly id e o lo g ic a l .
• In sh o rt, Althusser has converted science into s c i e n t i f i c  
p r a c tic e  without sp e c ify in g  the so cia l conditions of th is  p r a c tic e .  The 
a b str a c t body of system atic concepts, which co n stitu te s  a scie n ce , becomes 
the organic body which guides and propels th e o r e tic a l  p r a c tic e .  Althusser  
e x tr a c ts  men from the process and su b stitu te s  concepts, which themselves 
transform ideology into s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge. In For Marx, Althusser  
him self seemed vaguely conscious of what he was doing:
"\7hat i s  the moment, the le v e l or the instance which corresponds to the 
moans o f  production, in the th e o re tic a l  p ra ctice  of science? I f  we 
a b str a c t from men in these means of production fo r  the time being . . . . "  4012
40. (1070) o p . c i t . , p . 6 0 .
41. ib id .
42. (19G9) o p . c i t . , p . 184. .
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And b o  the error w a s  f i r s t  made. Men were extracted "fo r  the time being"
. i , 43 •and never came back.
In my view, Althusser has not made out a cose fo r  a r e l a t i v e l y  
autonomous th eo re tica l p ra ctice  of scie n ce . lie has argued for a t o t a l l y  
autonomous, mental p ra ctice  of scie n ce , but th is  is  t o t a l l y  unacceptable.  
The production of id eas, s c i e n t i f i c  or otherwise, i s  part of the s t r u c t ­
ured s o c ia l  p r a ctice  of in t e l l e c t u a l s  and th at i s  a d e fin ite  instance  
within a s o c ia l  formation, with a d e fin ite  rela tio n sh ip  to economic and 
p o l i t i c a l  p r a c tic e .  Althusser has only made out a reasoned case for  his  
concept of the mechanism of the know ledge-effeet; he sees the l a t t e r  as 
the » fit«  between th e o re tic a l  concepts and th e ir  th eo retical o b je c t .
But, as I  have argued already, here and in chapter 6 , even that case i s  
weak because i t  plnces the solu tion  to the question of the "cognitive  
appropriation of the rea l"  t o t a l l y  within the f i e l d  of th e "c o g n itiv e " ,  
instead of w ithin the f i e l d  of the r e la tio n  of appropriation between the 
two. Science i s  not constituted in te r n a lly  within a so cia l  theory ju s t  
because d i f f e r e n t  so cial theories have d iffe r e n t  c r it e r i a  of proof.
Every so c ia l  theory must face up to the changing and conditional appear­
ances of r e a l i t y  i f  i t  wishes to a tta in  any s c i e n t i f i c  c r e d i b i l i t y  beyond 
the group of the f a i t h f u l  who are s a t i s f i e d  by the consistency of th eir  
thoughts.
In conclusion, Gramsci may well have made h i s t o r i c i s t  errors,  
but Althusser has not founded a strong case to prove th a t . C e rta in ly  I 
do not think Gramsci can be accused of economism or idealism , whereas 
A lth u s s e r 's  concept of science i s  thoroughly i d e a l i s t .  Science i s ,  
indeed, not the same as id eology. The l a t t e r  is  a p a r tia l  view of s o c ia l  
phenomena from the spontaneous standpoint of a p a r ticu la r  so cin l p r a c tic e .  
Science is  more than a mere part tr u th , i t  is  the f u l l  explanation of  
the d i f f e r e n t  appearances of things within d i f f e r e n t  so cia l  p r a c tic e s .  
Science explains the c o n d itio n a lity  of spontaneous impressions -  to 
put the argument in blunt form. Each science is  the most adequate a v a i l ­
able explanation of the conditions of existence of a p a r tic u la r  set of  
immediate appearances. B u t, j u s t  because ideology i s  spontaneous, 
p r a c t ic a l  consciousness and science i s  the product of ratio n a l d e lib e r a t -  43
4 3  The r e la tio n  between A lth u sser's  th e o r e tic a l  problematic and the 
o l i t i c s  of the French Communist Tarty i s  beyond the scope of th is  t h e s i s .  
For some c a u s tic  remarks, see J.Rancière "On the theory of ideology (the 
p o l i t i c s  of A lth u sse r)" Radical Philosophy ^1974) 7 pp.2-15.
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ion which explains the forms of th at p r a c tic a l  consciousness, ju s t  
because ideology and science are d i f f e r e n t ,  i t  does not mean th at they  
must be produced in fundamentally d i ffe r e n t  forms of p ra ctice  or th at  
they cannot c o - e x is t  within the same p r a c tic e .  Obviously i t  i s  true th a t  
to elaborate a science or to obtain the information to be explained by 
sc ie n c e , the ' s c i e n t i s t '  must have time. But th at time i s  only provided 
■ within the space of d e fin ite  so cia l  p ra ctices in s p e c if ic  material and 
s tr u ctu r a l conditions, conditions which r e f l e c t  various forms of spontan­
eous consciousness, id e o lo g ie s . The space to produce science is  not a 
p re-given conceptual f a c t  w aiting to be exp lo ited , i t  is  a hard, material 
f a c t  of so c ia l  l i f e  varying in extent and q u a lity  (economically, p o l i t i c ­
a l l y  and i d e o lo g ic a l l y ) .  Even Marx could not have accomplished so much, 
and, perhaps, in  such a manner, had he got his job as a railway clerk  
and provided h is beloved wife and children with the material conditions  
which he thought they deserved! S c i e n t i f i c  production and science are 
not as magical ond ephemeral as Althusser im plies. Botli have very con­
crete roots in the so cia l p ra ctices of everyday e xiste n ce. The important 
question to answer is  not: what produces the knowledge-effect within a 
scien ce? That is  easy -  the a b i l i t y  of i t s  concepts to explain the 
apparent changes and va ria tio n s within so cia l  phenomena. The key quest­
ions are: Why i s  science the p r iv ile g e  of certain  social cla sses  and not 
others? What is  the r e la tio n  between a s c i e n t i s t ' s  so cia l ideologies  
and the concepts of his d is c ip lin e  within the context of the practice  
whereby science is  produced? Bo ce rta in  ideologies accelerate the devel­
opment. of science? What are the p o l i t i c a l  circumstances determining the 
a b i l i t y  of the s c i e n t i s t  to purvey h is discoveries to a wide public? Why 
has 's c ie n c e ' l o s t  i t s  p r a c tic a l  roots and become a magical form, like  
money, d a zz lin g the masses with i t s  g l i t t e r i n g  powers?
So f a r  I  have evidenced the tendency to idealism in one M a rxist's  
a n a lv s is  of science and absolved another of economisra. In doing t h i s ,  
the th e s is  th a t ideology i s  an in te gra l element in a l l  s o c ia l  p ra ctices  
has hopefully  been developed. Further c l a r i f i c a t i o n  can be achieved by 
examining i l l u s t r a t io n s  of economism.
Althusser has lumped Gremsci together with the economistic 
Marxism of the Second International, yet his own work is not unambiguous
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in  th is  resp ect. V/e have already seen that Althusser tends to reduce 
*non-economic' ideologies to those "great themes" of bourgeois ideology  
a r is in g  within the c a p i t a l i s t  infrastructure.. The id e o lo g ica l s ta te  
apparatuses, are said to be steeped in the ideology of the r u lin g  c la s s  
and, th us, the "regional id eo lo gies" within those apparatuses succumb to  
i t s  power:
44
The concept of "regional id eo lo g ie s"  i s  promising (and ambiguous) but i t  
i s  b a s ic a l ly  undone by the f a c t  th at Althusser does not grant each "reg­
io n a l ideology" i t s  s p e c if ic  u n ity  as an clement within a structured  
p r a c t i c e .  The u n ity  of "regional id eo lo gies" i s  produced ex tern a lly  by 
the " r u lin g  ideology" generated in  the economy. Althusser f a i l s  to face  
up to the question of a contradiction between a "regional id eo lo gy",  
u n ifie d  in i t s  own p r a c t ic e ,  and the dominant ideologies in economic and 
p o l i t i c a l  p r a c t ic e .  The r e s u lt  i s  n defeat fo r  the regions and the omiss­
ion of c la s s  ideologies and c la ss  struggle  and an economistic model of  
the d i ffu s io n  o f  'r u lin g  id e o lo g y '.  That famous p o stscr ip t to the essay  
f a i l s  to rescue A lth u sser, i t  merely demonstrates his undoubtedly power­
f u l  a n a ly tic  r e f l e x i v i t y .
Maurice Corn fo rth 's  introductory work on d i a l e c t i c a l  materialism4 
provides us with another example of t h is  tendency of econoraism. Cornfortb,  
paraphrasing The Herman Idea lorry c l o s e l y ,  begins by vaguely lo c a tin g  
id eology within s p e c if ic  forms of s o c ia l  l i f e  and continues by tnllcinw 
about "the development of production". From the context of the passage, 
"the development of production" c l e a r l y  means the development o f  economic 
p r a c tic e  and no more. Given th is  d e fin it io n a l  p o in t ,  we can see his  
tendency to negate the autonomous stru ctu rin g ca p a city  o f  forms o f  super-  
s tr u c tu r a l  p r a c tic e :  45*
44. In chapter 2, supra.
45. Althusser (1971) op.cit.,p.1 5 0
4G. M.Cornforth Dialectical . M a w * » u  —  v . x .and Vishart). ( ' VolsO  (1974 London: Lawrence
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"Id e o lo g ic a l development i s ,  then, governed by the mater in i ,1 i 
o f  s o c ie t y  -  by the de.velop,ne „ t  o f  p r o d u c t ! « ,  ¡ f " t e  e1 „  ™  ” 7
production, and of classes and the c la s s  s t r u g g l e ." 47 ‘
Cornforth only q u a lif ie s  th is  p o sitio n  with two p o in ts: (a) the mode o f  
economic production i s  said to be determinant "in  the l a s t  a n a ly sis»48 
and (b) id eo lo gies must r e f l e c t  r e a l i t y  according to »the laws o f  lo g i c "  
and the experience of the people concerned.49 50What happens in the f i r s t  
a n a ly sis  thus seems to be th at the coherence and s e n s i b i l i t y  o f  the ideo­
logy fo r  i t s  bearers ( s o c ia l  cla sses) governs i t s  continued existence.  
Consequently, Cornforth»s economisra, and his s e n s i t i v i t y  to the problems 
i t  c r e a te s ,  lead him to the vngue p o sitio n  that id eologies are born in  
the economy but must make sense. I t  i s  of l i t t l e  consequence for the 
present discu ssion  th a t Cornforth c le a r ly  defines an ideology as "a
system atic view". Like Oramsci, I would r e je c t  the notion of an ideology50 -',%7
as a conceptual system and i n s i s t  on i t s  amorphous existence as thought-
matter linked to so cia l  r e la tio n s .
Cornforth, h im self, renounces what he c a l l s  "economic determin­
ism ", but his renunciation i s  based only on the weak proposition th at  
economic a c t i v i t y  is  not the sole determinant o f  s o c ia l  development.51 52
The only advance i s  made when he argues th at "economic determinism" f a i l s  
"to recognize th a t  in  ideology there takes place a process of the r e f l e c t ­
ion of the real world in men's ideas" and t h a t ,  consequently, i t  also  
f a i l s  to r e a liz e  th at an ideology must bo a " tr u th fu l  and coherent 
r e f l e c t i o n  of the real world". Like Gramsci, Cornforth seems to hold the 
view th a t "material f o r c e s '  ure the content and ideologies are the form"53 
o f  s o c ia l  l i f e .  This conception of id eo lo gies as the ephemeral "cemont" 54 
o f  a s o c ia l  structure is  a m isleading, oconomistic metaphor since i t  f a i l s
47. ibid..Vol.3yp.69.
48 h o t .  t h .  s im ila r it y  b e t.e e n  t h is  phrase nr<l A lth u sse r's  " ip  the l a s t  
in s ta n c e " .  Loth phrases, of course, derive from 4 . 4  ; n
faUG82 l0tt°r t0 m °Ch ^  1890: 86e lla r x and E«?elV(1973) o p ^ i t V "  ^
49. (1974) o p .c i t . ,p p .6 9 ,7 0 .
50. I  would reserve th at reference fo r  »theory«
51. (1974) o p . c i t . , p . 73.
52. ibid.
53. See Gramsci (1971) o p . c i t . , p.377.
54. Gramsci' s tern . The u g lin ess  of the phrase r e f l «  + 4 ,
economism -  the misty nothingness of id e o l0"-v nr, 1 .*  8 the te n s i° n in
e f f e c t s .  d l t s  r e a l ,  concrete
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to grasp the m a te ria lity  and, consequently, the e f f c c t i v i t y  of so cia l  
id e o lo g ie s . Thus, for Cornforth, id eo lo gies (in  c l a s s i c  orthodox Marx­
i s t  s ty le )  are the in su b stan tial mists produced by the (overheated?) 
economy which somehow make sense to people in p r a c t ic e .  They a re , bas­
i c a l l y ,  economic e f fe c t s  which mirror 'm aterial r e a l i t y '  and, th e r e fo re ,  
make sense. Despite his statements to the contrary, Cornforth has 
given economic practice the key r o le ,  in generating ideologies and 
rendering people receptive to them. The great s in  of economism i s  to 
n e g lec t the m a te ria lity  and consequent e f f e c t i v i t y  of so cial id e o lo g ie s .  
This i s  c lo s e ly  followed by i t s  n eglect of the id eo lo gies produced in  
superstructural p r a c tic e .  Any p o l i t i c s  based on economistic Marxism i s  
thus l i k e l y  to wait for "the lonely hour of the l a s t  instance" (which 
never comes, says Althusser) when the rate of p r o f i t  drops to zero, and 
to n e g le c t .th e  importance of various forms of s o c ia l  consciousness, 
e ith e r  in  r e s t r ic t in g  or a cce ler a tin g  the movement to so cia lism . I t s  
r e lia n c e  on the science of the Party could blind i t  to the material 
s ig n ific a n c e  of spontaneous consciousness.
I t  i s  clear th a t some Marxists have f a i le d  to grasp thoroughly
the im plications of Marx's concept of so cia l  id e o lo g ie s . A ll  s o c ia l
id e o lo g ie s  derive from s o c ia l  r ela tio n s and a l l  s o c ia l  r ela tio n s are
dependent on so cia l  id e o lo g ie s . This applies throughout the s o c ia l
t o t a l i t y ,  throughout the combination of so cia l  p r a c tic e s ,  a rtic u la te d  in
a structure-in-dom inance. The s o c ia l  stru ctu ral configuration involves
a complex configuration o f  so cia l  id e o lo g ie s ,  each with a m a te r ia lity ,  a
s p e c i f i c i t y  and an h is t o r ic a l  importance of i t s  own. A ll  ideologies
e x i s t  within p ra ctice  and a l l  p r a ctice s  are liv e d  within id e o lo g ie s .
«
The comb in a tio n  of so cia l p r a c tic e s ;  Poulantzas and The German Ideoloe-y
Nothing I  have said hitherto  has boon c lo s e ly  directed to the 
concept of ' s o c i a l i t y ' ,  the concept o f  so c ia l  p r a c t i c e - i n - i t s - s o c i u l — 
e x is te n c e . I  have merely outlined a b a s ic ,  general conception of the 
r e la t io n  of necessary r e f le c t io n  between structure and id eo lo gy. I  have 
not y e t provided any concept of the r e la tio n s  of co -cx iste n ce  between 
¿ A ffe r e n t p r a c tic e s ,  nor of the concept of the t o t a l i t y  of those r e la t­
io n s , the s o c ia l  stru ctu re. I t  is  necessary to in v e s t ig a te  the social
location of social practices because no social practice exists entirely 
on its own. This theoretical analysis will remind us of the principle 
that no social ideology can emerge without bearing the maries of the 
social context of its practices of origin. .
It is extremely tempting to define the concept of 'sociality1 
by means of strings of speculative abstractions which would specify the 
connections between practices in a definite social formation. 'He could 
begin with the concept of 'mode of production* and build a nice, neat 
system upon it involving concepts like 'dominant ideology', 'class power', 
'state practice', 'connections between ruling class and state'\ 'connect­
ions between intellectual and political practices'. It is worth making 
it explicit that the first drafts of this section involved the construct­
ion of such models. Of course, when this practice of 'construct-your- 
own-society—in—abstractions' occurs, the result in always a series of 
catastrophes:
(a) A neat system is created which probably corresponds to nothing ever 
seen in social life with its awkward facts, irregularities and changes.
(b) Every element becomes functional for the totality. Of course, any 
good Marxist talks of 'contradictions', but, when that Marxist goes 
model-building, those contradictions usually manage to servo teleologies 
assumed a priori.
(c) Strings of abstractions are layered together, and cemented with 
assumptions, yet without making them explain any historical material, 
there is no way of knowing whether any of these connections help us to 
understand our impressions of the real world or whether they are merely 
spe culative•
(d) Mode1-building involves choosing a real society on which the builder 
actuallv constructs his model. This choice usually means that a ’.ïestern 
capitalist society is chosen and the chronological cut-off point is al­
ways 'the present’. Hence the awkward problems of global development 
and historical unevenness are unconsciously but remorselessly elided.
The question of the sociality of social practice is deadly in
the temptation it presents to the theorist. It is so easy, as Talcott
55Parsons unconsciously demonstrated in The Social System, ‘ for the theor-
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ist to construct the universal concept of that sociality by creatine a 
model society of his own, based implicitly on his own real societv. 
Moreover, it is easy to avoid showing that this theoretical structure of 
concepts really does grasp (or reflect) that structure in some -way, and 
to escape the task of specifying the crucial dialectics which would 
account for the changes (past and future) within that society. Of course, 
the tendency I an describing is the tendency to structuralism. In the 
conservative structuralism of sociology, the unifying principle of the 
abstract social structure is 'order'. In the Marxist structuralisms, it 
is described as the 'unity of a social formation' or 'its 'articulation*. 
The net effect is the same; the structure of abstractions is destined to 
provide an 'explanation' of a pre-given assumption of unity in the soc­
ial formations. Consequently, an brder is created in the concepts,
without reference to the nature of any order in historical reality.
56Althusser's essay on ideology constitutes a good example of 
a Marxist structural-functionalism. Nowhere in that essay is the problem 
of social order or social unity presented as an historically specific 
problem with different forms in different epochs. Clearly Althusser is 
attempting to explain the problem of the immobilization of the working 
classes in Western societies since 1945. But he does not even describe 
the historical appearances of the problem in any detail, let alone 
specify in theory why ideological domination should be its answer. Tho 
result of the essay (apart from the postscript) is a model of capitalist
society as n perfectly ordered system unified by ruling class ideology.
57Kicos Poulantzas provides us with another good example. lie 
begins his analysis of "The Marxist conception of ideologies" by specify­
ing the problem:
"In order to reveal the particular political function of ideologies in 
the ense of hegemonic class domination .
Thus we see the classic procedure: the real societies dealt with in 
hypothetical manner are implicitly Western and capitalist, they are
56. "Ideology and ideological state apparatus*. drnl, • ■,57. (1975) op.cit., esp. pp.500-224. ------^  ’ GQlt V l t h  111 c h a p te r  2.
58. ibid.,p.206. Poulantzas defines ideology GS „ .
ensemble of representations,values and beliefs" ( ■£y^ ,1Volv coherent 
than the common view of ideology as a system of This is narrower
my position which takes every image or value t collCGPts»but broader than
Poulantzas• "ensemble" is,for me,a collection .T° an ideological structuren of Geological formations.
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assumed to be unified by the ideology nnd power of tho dominant classes,59 
and the 'revelation* is to be realised purely at the level of theory without 
any reference to history. Poulantzas proceeds by defining (in vague terms) 
ideology as a reflection of social relations and moves on to tho problem of 
tho "specific unity" between the structure of ideology nnd tho dominant class90 
Having posed an historical question in an ahistorical manner,he is likely to * 
fall into the trap of structuralist functionalism and very shortly lie does:
"As opposed to science,ideology has the precise function of hiding the real 
contradictions ... Ideology,which slides into every level of the social 
structure,has the particular function of cohesion.
By thus making ideology's "imaginary but "relatively coherent discourse" the
cover for real antagonisms,Poulantzas grants ideology a general system-function
unrelated to any class or epoch. In utilising this abstract a-priorism,
Pou lantzas, in  c l a s s ic  s ty le ,b e g in s  to resolve the concrete nnd current problem
of the pervasiveness of dominant ideology in Tiuropean,capitalist societies,
without even mapping the historical contours of that problem. Ideology also
had a social function for Gramsci,as "cement",but for him that function
was historically and geographically located in tho role of tho intellectuals
in the development and consolidation of bourgeois power in Italy in the
latter half of the nineteenth,and early twentieth,century. For the abstract
Poulantzas (only a few years after Hay 1968),ideologies are fundamentally
related to "human experience",in -that they always reconstitute lived relations
on an imaginary,false piano. This basic, fact,ho says,is not reducible to
02"the problematic of alienation and false consciousness". Cut does ideology
always conceal ? Poulantzas himself had earlier implied that this is not
always the case,when he argued that "spontaneous" working class ideologies
favouring reformism etc. were the effect of the dominant,bourgeois and
notit-bourgeois ideologies. He had actually posed the problem of "the
permanent possibility of contamination of working class ideologies" (my
emphasis)f clearly implying that "real" working class ideology was radical
or revolutionary. He is obviously aware of Marx's view that contradictory
64social relations reflect contradictory ideologies. Ilis vacillation between 
the ahistorical probbm of ideology's system-function nnd the historicity of 
its class functions has led Poulantzas to see tho functions of bourgeois 
ideology as the functions of all ideology.
59. Poulantzas rejects the view that social unity can bo cemented purely by 
idcologyja view,he says,held by Gramsci and Lukács. See ibid. pp.137-141.
GO. ibid.,p«207.
Gl. ibid. 63. ibid.,pp. 205,206.
G2! ibid. 64. See Marx (1974) pp. 224,225.
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Poulantzas proceeds to outline the nature of ideology's cohesive 
function within social formations. Ideology is said to act an a unifier
by reflecting the real structural unity and reconstituting it on an
G5imaginary plune. In the movement of his analysis 'ideology' has now 
mysteriously become "dominant ideology” - a predictable enough change:
"Hence* the dominant ideology of a social formation encompasses the 'tot­
ality' of this formation not because it constitutes the 'class conscious­
ness ' of a historico-social subject, but because it reflects (with those 
biases of inversion and mystification which are specific to it) the 
index of articulation of the instances which specifies the unity of this 
formation." ^
Ideology is layered like cement throughout the social struct\iro and thus 
reflects the inequality of power ("the index of articulation of tho 
instances") within that structure. Consequently, dominant ideology is 
seen by Poulantzas as the ideology of tho dominant class. Dominnnt ideo­
logy is no different from ideology-in-general - it mystifies and ensures 
order — but because it is the ideology of the dominant clnss, it ensures 
the domination and elevation of that class. From here the conclusion is
obvious: because the bourgeoisie are dominant in the clans struggle, they
G 7are able to subordinate the dominated classes to their ideology. All­
owances are made for the dominant ideology to incorporate features from 
"ideologies other than that of the dominant class",e.g. petit-bourgeois 
ideologies, but, otherwise, the model is very similar to Althusser's in 
both form and content. Economic domination mechanically and nhistoricn.1 ly 
predicates political and ideological domination.
A unity, 'cemented' in ideology, id established for tho social 
formation, a unity founded on class power. It is worth quoting Ilarx in 
full, in order to show how Poulantzas has hardly advanced at all from tho 
general propositions in The German Ideolovv:
05. (1913) op.cit.,pp.208,209. This formulation is more sophisticated 
than, but, nevertheless, very similar to Cornforth's anlysin.
00. ibid, p.209.
G7. ibid..
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"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.c. 
the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same 
time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the moans of 
material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over 
the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, tho 
ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. 
The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the domin­
ant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped 
as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class tho ruling 
one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. Tho individuals composing 
the l-uling class possess among other things consciousness and therefore 
think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the 
extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in 
its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as prod­
ucers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of tho ideas 
of their age: thus their ideas are tho ruling ideas of tho epoch." *
This can be compared with the account of Poulantzas* discussion abovo 
and with his conclusion:
"To conclude: the concept of hegemony as applied to tho domination under 
hegemonic class leadership in capitalist formations here covers tho 
above-mentioned specific characteristics of the dominant class ideology, 
by means of which a class or a fraction manages to present itself as 
incarnating the general interest of the people-nation and thereby to 
condition the dominated classes to a specific political acceptance of its 
domination." ^
What is objectionable is not so much Poulantzas* lack of advance 
over the. polemical assertions in Tho Gorman Tdeoloev, as the fact that 
those assertions aro-wovon into an abstract functionalist model of tho 
unity of capitalist societies. It is certainly true that tho statements 
The German Ideology are well capable of founding an abstract model of 
a closed social system. Ilowever that is not a good justification for 
such a model, particularly since The Herman Ideology is a text at a 
crucial conjuncture in Marx’s intellect\ml history. Marx cloorly spec­
ified in Capital the contradictions within the capitalist mode of pro­
duction which would generate revolutionary ideologies and, ultimately,
G8
G9
Marx and Engels (1970) op.cit.,pp.G4-G5. 
(1073) op.cit.,p.221.
278
political struggle between tho classes which would bring capitalism down.
Hut also, in Capital, Marx specified contradictions within classes and 
within the social structure as a whole which make the picture in Tho 
German Ideology seem fairly crude and polemical. Foulantzas is clearly 
aware of tho role of social contradictions, but he does not build them 
fully into his analysis. By making the unity of a social formation an 
ahistorical object in his analysis, Poulnntzas elides tho transitory, 
historical nature of any real unity, its specific conditions of existence 
and its specific forms. An analysis of ahistorical unity must, if it in 
logical, and Poulantzas is, produce a theory of the eternal unity of a 
society. Interestingly enough, Marx himself, in the very section of Tho 
German Ideology which Poulantzas seems to rely on no heavily, outlines 
the potential dangers in the analysis of ideologies. I shall now turn to 
that section.
It is necessary again to quote extensively from Marx:
•'If now in considering tho course of history wo detach the ideas of the 
ruling class fron the ruling class itself and attribute to them an indep­
endent existence, if we confine ourselves to saying that these or those 
ideas wore dominant at a given time, without bothering ourselves about 
the conditions of production and the producers of these ideas, if we thus 
ignore the individuals and world conditions which are tho source of the 
ideas, wo can say, for instance, that durincr tho time that tho aristocracy 
vas dominant, the concepts honour, loyalty, etc. were dominant, during 
the dominance of the bourgeoisie tho concepts freedom, equality,etc."
It is almost as if Marx is warning himself not to carry his own polemic 
too far. I read this passage to say the following: If in our analysis 
we simply say that bourgeois ideas are dominant when the bourgeoisie is 
the dominant class, we are in danger of detaching those ideas from their 
generative and supportive,social relations,and,hence,from tlvoir conditions 
of change. Always,ideologies must be examined in relation to the social struc­
tures which sustain their presence in the minds of social classos.
Otherwise,if we hold to an historiography which assumes a series of 
societies united under the.sway of particular dominant ideologies, wo
70. Marx and Engels (1970) op.cit.,p.G5
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«will necessarily come up against the phenomenon that increasingly
abstract ideas hold sway, i.e. ideas which increasingly take on the
71form of universality".
Poulantzas seems to be in this danger when ho argues the case 
for "juridico-political"ideology as the dominant sector of bourgeois 
dominant ideology:
"It is precisely by this specific masking of class domination that the 
juridico—political ideology best fulfils its particxilar cohesive role, 
which accrues to the ideological in the C!.!P and capitalist formations.
In short, everything occurs here as if the region of ideology which is 
the best placed to hide the real index of determination and dominance 
of the structure is also in the best place to cement the cohesion of 
social relations by reconstituting their unity on an imaginary plane."
Thus the "cohesion of social relations" in the capitalist social form­
ation is always cemented by a particular region of bourgeois ideology, 
according to Poulantzas. He bases his argument for the dominant posit­
ion of "juridico—political" ideology on the basis of n mere appearance 
or impression. ' lie is very able in constructing an abstract case for 
its domination but there is no historical analysis of the relations which show 
its truth for capitalist societies. ):y ’impression* is that, in some 
periods, ideologies from the economic region are dominant and that, in 
others, "religious" or political ideologies may ensurc"cohcsion". Sim­
ilarly, I have obtained the ’impression’ that the situation varied 
sharply from one capitalist society to another. Is American capitalism 
after Watergate united on the "imaginary plnnc" by juridico-political 
ideology? Is not capitalism in countries of the Third World unifiod 
ideologically by nationalist ideology?
To continue with Marx’s precautionary tale:
"Once the ruling ideas have been separated from the ruling i n d i v i d u a l s  
and, above all, from the relationships which result from a given stage 
of the mode of production, and in this way the conclusion has been 
reached that history is always under the sway of ideas, it is v e r y  easy 
to abstract from these various ideas "the idea", the notion, etc. as the
7 1 .  i b i d . .
72. (1073) op.cit.,p.215.
7 3 . i b i d ,  p.213: "It i s  apparent that ... ".
280
dominant force in history, and thus to understand all those separate 
ideas and concepts as "forms of self-determination" on the part of the 
concept developing in history." 71
By narking off "juridico-political" ideologies as characteristically 
dominant in bourgeois society, Poulantzas abstracted them from an hist­
orically determinate stage in a society's development and made them tho 
permanent condition of social order/unity in all capitalist societies.
It is true that Poulantzas does not assert the general determination of 
The Idea or locate Man as the motor of history. However ho does undoubt­
edly make the "juridico-political" ideology tho condition of unity in 
capitalist societies and thus renders ideology as tho eternal lynchpin 
of capitalist history. The class rule of the bourgeoisie is thus seen 
to be impossible without the function of dominant ideology, dominated by 
tho "juridico-political" region. This condition is anchored by Poulant— 
zas through the concept of the "political impact of tho dominant ideology" 
in establishing the "legitimacy" of bourgeois domination:
"The dominance of this ideology is shown by the fact that tho dominated 
classes live their conditions of political existence through the forms of 
dominant political discourse: this moans that often they live ovon thoir 
revolt against the domination of the system within the frame of reference 
of the" dominant legitimacy. Those remarks are of great importance sinco 
they not only indicate tho possibility of a lack of a 'class conscious­
ness' in the dominated classes, but they imply even that these classes' 
•own' political ideology is often modelled on tho discourse of tho domin­
ant legitimacy." 74 5
Tie are left with the impression that the bourgeoisie only survivesbocausc 
the dominant ideology has legitimated their existence.
It seems that Poulantzas is generalizing his impressions of tho 
situation in modern, European, capitalist societies into an abstract 
model of capitalist unity. This trap, which, it seems to mo, he lias 
fallen into completely, is one prepared by his theoretical method of 
attempting to build models without explicitly referring them to specific
74. (1970) op.cit.,p.GG.
7 5. (1973) op.cit.,p.223
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historical situations. Instead of trying; to explain „ocial „„„ hiBtoi.lc_ 
al appearances by abstractions which Grasp the real movement of lifc in 
that period, Poulantzas, in classic, Althusserian,neo-structuralist fash­
ion, has brushed aside 'data', as •ideological., and tried to construct 
a theoretical model without keeping the subject, society, in mind as the 
presupposition of his theoretical method. Like Althusser, ho seems to 
solve the 'knowledge-effect' problem purely within the realm of theory 
and refuses, therefore, to link his concepts with the appearances of 
reality. As a result, reality intrudes unconsciously through the back 
door of Poulantzas' discourse and ideological impressions proceed to act­
ivate and substantiate his discourse historically. With or without his 
consent, his discourse is thus given a definite historical character, a 
character at odds with the nature of his concepts.
?G In the final product Poulantzas has proved "the hegemony of the
spirit" by rendering ideological legitimacy tho nexus of bourgeois
domination. He achieved this by the well-known three tricks mentioned in
77The German Ideology:
(1 ) The separation of the ideas from their material conditions and the 
recognition of the rule of ideas. Poulantzas did this by abstracting 
'ideologies' and inserting them into an aliistorical model.
(2) The ordering of this rule of ideas; demonstrating a"connoction among 
the successive ruling ideas". Poulantzas does this hut in a Marxian 
fashion. He makes the regional ideology of the 'j u r i d i c o - p o litical• tho 
most dominant ideology of all, because of the nature of tho "solf-dotorm- 
ining" .Structure of tho social f o r m a t i o n .  This .Structure, tho concept
of capitalism's synchronic articulation, iR devoid of any concrete hist­
orical reference.
(3) The removal of the mystical appearance of thi3 "self-determining 
concept" by changing it into a person "or, to appear thoroughly material­
istic, into a series of persons, who represent the 'concept' in history". 
Poulantzas removes the mystery of the apparent magic of the "self-determ­
ining structure", the Structure of capitalist society, by changing it into 
tho dominant class. This class have political and ideological power,
given by the Structure, and create tho permanency of tho Structuro: thus 
that Structuro is self-determining.
7 0 .  M a r x 's  p h r a s e :  (1D70) o p . c i t . , p . G 7 .  
7 7 .  i b i d .
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The combinations of social practices cannot bo determined o\it- 
sjule their historically determinate forms and contexts. This is a simple 
point, but it is easily overlooked. Too often, theorists generalize 
determinate historical situations into permanent universals. In Y/estern 
social theory this tendency has involved theorists such as Poulantzas and 
Parsons abstracting their own historical social structures into eternal 
models with a consequent neglect of such complicated irregularities ns 
divisions within classes, non-class ideologies, nnd the situation in 
societies of the Third T'orld. One must admit that roulantzas is even more 
guilty of this than Parsons who, at least, attempts to build his impress­
ions of prior kinds of society and different forms of capitalism into his 
abstract monolith.
The whole question of the articulation of social practices can­
not be solved without explicit reference to the historical data of pract­
ice. 'Sociality1 cannot bo defined abstractly on the basis of one partic— 
tilnr apparent articulation. Certainly it is necessary to have a concept 
of 'sociality* but wo do not need an empiricist one. The 'sociality' or 
'nrticulntion' of social practices is simply the historically determinate 
combination of practices. That is all we need say. This simple definition 
is enough to register the Marxian theses that (a) every social practice 
must not only be understood in terms of inner determinations but also in 
terras of determination by other practices, nnd that (b) these determinat­
ion«, 0re "historically specific. In my view, these theses are implicit in 
Marx's statement that:
"The fact is, therefore, that definite individuals who are productively 
active in a definite way enter into these definite social and political 
relations. Empirical observation must in each separate instance bring 
out empirically, and without any mystification and speculation, tho7g 
connection of the social and political structure with production."
Marxism does not generalize conditional, phenomenal appearances into un­
conditional, conceptual tower-blocks. It carefully establishes the nature 
of those social appearances and attempts to understand the social relat­
ions which produce and condition them. It never forgets the fact that
78. ibid.,p.46
things only appear historically in a specific manner, within definite 
social relationships.
In conclusion, it is wrong to attempt to build abstract models 
which specify a particular dominant ideology or the effect of practice A 
on the ideology oi' practice B. The determinations of the necessary social 
forms of consciousness and of the dominant ideology are historical matters 
since societies only exist in movement. Therefore, the correct task is 
to understand the dialectics of social practice which exist and combine 
at particular moments to reflect particular social ideologies. The 
study of the determinations of social ideologies must bo an historical 
and materialist one which begins with the social relations of life (and 
their peculiar dialectics) and develops from them the corresponding ideo­
logical forms of those relations. It is a study which must bo careful 
not to lapse into economise:, idealism, empiricism and structuralism.
¿¿84
8 IDEOLOGY, SUPERSTRUCTURE AND CLAPS
"Yet these people ("the vulger-marxists of the Second International" - 
C.S.) fall straight into anarcho-syndicalist 'transcendental underest­
imation* of ideology when they are told that intellectunl struggle in the 
ideological field cannot be replaced or eliminated by the social movement 
of the proletariat alone, or by its social and political movements comb­
ined. Even today most Marxist theoreticians conceive of the efficacy 
of so-called intellectual phenomena in a purely negative, abstract and 
undialectical sense, when they should o.nalyse this domain of social real­
ity within the materialist and scientific method moulded by Marx and 
Engels. Intellectual life should bo conceived in union with social and 
political life, and social being and becoming (in the widest sense, as 
economics, politics or law) should be studied in union with social cons­
ciousness in its many different manifestations, ns n real yet also ideal 
(or 'ideological') component of the historical process in general. Instead, 
all consciousness is approached with totally abstract and basically meta­
physical dualism, and declared to be n reflection of the one really 
concrete and material development process, on which it is completely dep­
endent (even^if relatively independent, still dependent in the last 
instance)."
Introduction
Continuing our journey towards a Marxian rending of social ideo­
logies, we find conceptual obstacles which must be removed. Ideology is 
integral to all social practices; hut, what are the main forms of social 
practice“? And what exactly are the 'social relations' which structure 
practices? Marxism is not explicit enough on the types of social practic­
es and the nature of social relations. Too often, what should be a complex 
analysis iE reduced to bnse/superstructure, bourgeois/prolotariat dimens­
ions, or to streams of etceteras following a list of examples of super- 
structural practice. In this chapter I shall try to specify a clear con­
cept of the superstructural practices and thus, by definition, of the 
social superstructure. On top of this, I ahall attempt to indicate my
1. K. Korsch Marxism and Philosophy (1970 London: New Left hooks) p.71.
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conception of the two-dimensional complexity of social relations specif­
ied by llnrx. In passing, I shall define some basic concepts such ns 
'dominant ideology', 'social institution', 'class', 'class conflict' and 
'class struggle'. And, finally, i shall illustrate how the principles 
of the Marxian readinrr, developed throughout the text, might work in prac­
tice.
At the centre of this revisitation of some well-established 
Marxist concepts lies a feeling that really the dialectic has often been 
taken out of them. Althusser is right to try to restore dialectical mat­
erialism to Marxism: without it, Marx's work can be portrayed as a mere 
determinism of the most one-sided kind. For example, the social divisions 
arising out of co-operation are so often reduced to class divisions. This 
reduction is entirely alien to Marx. In Capital, for example, it is tot­
ally clear throughout that problems arise out of the co-operative form 
itself which will live on long after the class divisions have been removed. 
I have, consequently, tried to construct definitions of the concepts on a 
properly dialectical basis.
By now it is crystal—clear that the analysis of social ideolog­
ies begins with the analysis of social relations. Therefore, this 
chapter is required to clarify the nature of social relations, their com­
mon forms and the kinds of practice in which they exist. It thus constit­
utes a further rejection of economism and a further establishment of the 
many_sided, social materiality of ideology. Moreover, it is a chapter 
which will hopefully give some indication of the immeasurable complexity 
of the social nnture and appearance of ideology. My conception of the 
litcrallv fantastic difficulty of this field of investigation can be ill­
ustrated by a passage from Peter -Vorsley:
"Thus industrial studies have shown how people import social relations 
from the outside world into the factory, crossing the 'permeable' membrane 
between work and non-work: such imports include racist beliefs, ideals of 
class-solidarity, of orientation towards privatised instrumentalism. But 
the language of 'export' and 'import' is insufficiently dialectical to 
catch the interpenetration that occvirs ...
2 . P.M. ï ï o r s l e y
(1074) 8:1 p . 12.
''The state of theory and the status of theory" Sociology
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Worsley has grasped tho inter-connectedness of discrete practices which, 
once one allows them their necessary and integral social ideologies, 
produces an ideological fusion which seems impossible to disentangle.
Men, as V/orsley puts it, are not abstractions, they carry several "ident­
ities" from several forms of practice. My critiques have made it clear 
that Althusserian Marxism is a neo-structuralism,.h fact that has prev­
ented Althusserians from grasping the reality and autonomy of the' elem­
ents of structures. The structuralist conception of structuration removes 
the autonomy of the elements or functions. Althusser may have given 
practices relative autonomy as elements of tho social formation but lie 
failed to grant men relative autonomy as elements of practice. Ilis sub­
sequent loss in this field has been the concept of the locatedncss of 
social ideologies. The latter exists in men’s brains and they are thus 
carried from their original practical homes into a wide variety of other 
social practices. Consequently, no simple, class model of tho distribut­
ion of social ideologies can be posited.
Complexity and difficulty, however, are no reason to give up 
tho analysis of social ideologies. This chapter represents an attempt to 
move towards a theoretical sophistication which can address the problem 
of their entanglement and fusion in social practices and artefacts. I 
think that the task of extricating the ideological elements combined in 
a discourse or practice may ultimately be possible; even though, at pres­
ent, it seems surrounded with problems. If there is a point where scien­
tific analysis can go no further with the question of ideologies, and if 
we discover that ideologies cannot be determined with the precision of 
natural science, then Marx will he right. 1 Mut it is essential that wo 
find out exactly whore the linos of demarcation are to be drawn.
So far, I have outlined theoretical principles for the identif­
ication of social ideologies; this chapter will hopefully sharpen and 
develop these principles. On the whole, the .journey seems to be making 
progress, however it must be admitted that a precise technique of ident­
ification is not yet developed. I shall merely make some indications at 
the end of the chapter, in order to point tho way forward for empirical
3 See 1859 Preface in Marx and Engels (1973) op.cit
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analysis. I make no apologies for the lack of a specified, technical 
instrument; that rill come later and, when it does, it rill he based on 
the explicit theory developed here rather than spontaneous assumptions. 
The task of elaboratili!! the theory has delayed the construction of tech­
nical procedures, but this elaboration is difficult and necessarily ex­
tensive because of the conflicts and neglect within Marxism over the 
question of consciousness. Moreover, it was vital to place a dialectical 
concept of ideologies (as reflections of social relations) at the heart, 
of the Marxian thrust in this field. In this concept we now have the 
theoretical basis for an explanation of the exact forms taken by consc­
iousness in specific social practices. Unlike the phenomonologists, I 
have developed a theory which will enable us to explain and identify 
social ideologies: we now have the bases for a theory of 'culture'. Inst­
ead of relapsing into an agnostic and empiricist practice of describing 
the rules of conmonsense, I have developed concepts which will found 
rational attempts to discover the practical histories of those rules and 
to identify their appearance in particular practical situations. Peter 
Uorsley again supplies the appropriate text:
"They (the phenomenologists) arc not interested in sonata form, but in 
the interpretations of scores produced by different groups of players.
Yet every bit as much as formal sociolory, the societal production of 
whut is 'taken for granted' by 'members' is also taken for granted in t h i s  
kind of sociology. Hence it cannot account for the content of what is 
found in practical situations, i.c., it has no theory of culture. b’or has 
it anv theory of social structure as a societal phenomenon. ' -Social' struc­
ture is treated as the sum of structured exchanges between interacting 
participants. How this mutual ordering and fitting of interactions derives 
from, depends upon, and incorporates understandings whose provenance lies 
quite outside the situation of use is left unexamined.
The phenomenologists are important because they emphasize the 
integral place of ideology in social practice, but have failed to theorize 
the origins, development and location of specific ideologies in any 
adequate fashion. I hope that I have made some advance in the attempt to 
contextualize these ideologies in a fully social structural manner. This 
chapter continues to explore the necessary theoretical constituents of 
that attempt and is a vital step in moving from the most general princip­
les to the more particular concepts required for technical operationaliz­
ation.
4 (1974) op.cit.,p,13
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The cell-forms of superstructural practico
I have argued that we cannot construct abstract models of hist­
orically determinate articulations of the infrastructure with the super­
structure. but, can \re not specify, in the abstract, the only logically 
possible general types of superstructural practice? bo not certoin 
phenomena exist, even if only in embryo form, ns a necessary concomitant 
of any economic practice? Does not economic practice in itself generate 
material forms, other than economic products, which can, at a later 
stage of development, be transformed from elements of economic life into 
the objects (end-products) of new social practices? Given that economic 
practice is a necessary historical requirement for the development of 
the human race, surely we can, through the analysis of that practico in 
itself, in its simplest form, deduce the material forms which can possib­
ly form the objects of superstructural practice and thus establish in 
principle the only possible {renerai types of supcrstructurnl practice0 
If we can do this, then we can specify the general catetrories of practice 
with which to analyse the specific articulations of the social totality. 
Via this abstract analysis, we will be able to determine the material 
forms within economic practice itself which will be capable of acting ns 
the objects of non-ecor.omic practices, when the historical emergence of 
co-operation (or sociality—in-itself) creates the material conditions for 
the development of human labour in non-economic directions.
It might be objected that T have already argued that the neces­
sary articulation of economic practice with the social superstructure 
cannot be specified ahistorically and that, therefore, the proposed anal­
ysis would contradict this. That objection, however, is mistaken. Indeed, 
given that an economy exists historically within a social totality of 
practices, it would be methodologically unsound to attempt to determine 
its precise articulation with the non-econonic without reference to hist­
orical evidence. Vhat I an supposing, however, is a primeval economy of 
a non-co-operative nature, an economy without a superstructure. I am 
supposing, with Marx, that production (and immediate consumption) is the 
first historical act and that, therefore, we can deduce its necessary 
material forms even before they begin to exist as objects of specific so­
cial practices. In other words, the premise is that the most primitive 
economic formation involves material phenomena which can subsequently 
form the basis of superstructural practices.
¿¿89
A science of history does, indeed, refuse to construct abstract, 
metaphysical histories.' However, that science does not stand still. It 
does not allow itself to drift into an empiricism of the superstructure 
just because it has so.far been unable to conceptualize, with any real 
clarity, the general conception of that phenomenon. Any developing 
science requires the construction of now categories out of the established 
categories through logical inference. Marxism is no exception. In its 
case, we require that the categories for the analysis of the superstruct­
ure be derived from Marx's established conception of economic practice.
’fhy begin with economic practice—in—itself, in its pro—social existence? 
Because our interest lies in discerning the general categories for analy­
sing the specific, non—economic, practical conditions of existence of a 
dominant economic practice in a given historical instance nnd, therefore, 
we must grasp, in theory, the inner structure of economic practice in 
itself, in order to determine the general forms of those conditions; that 
is, unless we posit these general forms ns developments from a source 
outside historical production such as the Essence of Man or the (ill of 
God. Marxism is a theoretical science of history: as such it is neither 
an empiricism nor an idealism. Theoretical concepts must be constructed 
in order to be able to realize the full potential within that science.
This process of investigation within theorj’ may seem irrelevant to some, 
but it is as vital a part of Marxian science as the process of carefully 
collecting and establishing the conditional appearances (data) of history 
which the theoretical categories must appropriate. It is to be remembered 
that Marx, himself, was not only a voracious and careful collector of data 
(e.g«» on Russian agriculture), but also very precise in his formulation 
of theoretical categories.
I shall attempt to determine the cell-forms of superstructural 
practice embryonic within economic practice itself. This analysis is an 
abstract, artificial one from an Althusserian perspective since it pre­
supposes an era when men's practice was pre-social and purely economic. 
Althusser would not accept that presupposition. He argues that the econ­
omy is determinant "in the last instance" and that "the last instance" 
never comes, and never came in the past either. For him, "the structxire 
is always the co-presence of all its elements and their relations of
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dominance and subordination". lie is rifrht, of course, when the totality 
of practices has become a social structure, but wrong for the primeval 
period of non-social, instinctive practice. If that period existed, and
it seems that it did, then the following analysis is abstract but not 
artificial.
"The value-form, whose fully developed shape is the money-form, is very 
elementary and simple. Nevertheless, the human mind has for more than 
2,0C0 years sought in vain to get to the bottom of it, whilst on the 
other hand, to the successful analysis of much more composite and complex 
forms, there has been at least an approximation. Why? because the body, 
ns an organic whole, is more easy of study than are the colls of that body. 
In the analysis of economic forms, moreover, neither microscopes nor chem­
ical rengents are of use. The force of abstraction must replace both.
13ut in bourgeois society the commodity-form-of the product of labour — 
or the value-form of the commodity - is the economic cell-form. To the 
superficial observer, the analysis of these forms seems to turn upon 
minutiae. It does in fact deal with minutiae, but they are of the same 
order as those dealt with in microscopic anatomy. " 0
It could be said that the "organic wholes" of complex social 
superstructures have been subjected to greater theoretical approximation 
than have thc"cell-forms" of superstructural practice. Just ns Marx 
isolated the cell form of value as the end-product of economic practice, 5*
5 . Althusser and Falibar (1970) op.cit.,p.319 (Glossary). Compare Marx 
and Engels (1970) op.cit. ,p.51: ""'here there exists n relationship, it 
exists for me: the animal does not enter into "relations" with anything, 
it does not enter into any relation at all. For the animal, its relation 
to others docs not exist ns n relation." and Marx (1974) op.cit.,p.173: 
"Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Mature 
participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and 
controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature. He opposes 
himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and 
legs, heads and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appro­
priate Nature's productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus 
acting on the external world and charging it, he nt the same time changes 
h-is own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and conools then to 
act in obedience to his sway. re are not now dea.ljng with those primitive 
i~nstinc~tivo forms of labour that remind us of the mere a.nimal."
(3^ Marx (1974) op.cit. ,p. 19. (iny emphases C.S.)
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and determined its inner mechanism in Capital, it is incumbent upon 
modern Marxism to isolate the cell-forms of suporstructural practice and 
determine their inner mechanisms. This is no easy task. However, to 
determine the fully social nature of any human practice at a given hist­
orical conjuncture, I would ariruo that it is necessary to understand the 
lavs of movement of necessary non—economic practices. Without understan­
ding value, it is impossible to understand the dialectic of an economic 
practice, Marx could never have explained tho mechanism of the capital­
ist economic formation without discovering tho lavs of value. Similarly, 
it is impossible to understand the dialectics of supcrstructural practices 
without discovering their cell-forms. This section is a small step in 
that direction.
Tho question to herein with is: what are tho necessary, logical 
conditions of existence of economic practice—in-itself?
Economic practice, in Marx's concept, emerges ns a thing-in—it—
7self as the appropriation of nature's properties by men. Mon, Marx says, 
do not begin with conscious needs, as Political Economy lias tended to 
assume. They begin by eating and drinking, that is, they begin with pro­
duction, tho first historical act. At this stage of history, labour is 
instinctive and animal. It is thus the appropriate epoch in which to 
analyze economic practice-in-itself, in its non-social form.
Economic practice-in-itself, wo can say, is constituted by two 
elements and the relation betveen them:
1 . Mature
2. Men
3. Appropriation.
The inner structure of economic practice is, therefore, tho appropriation 
of nature by men in order to satisfy needs (at first instinctive,later 
social).
Economic practice is not a static, once-and-for-all thing. It 
must constantly be repeated to ensure men's survival. Under the process 
of repetition, economic practice develops its forms. And here is the 
crux of the matter. ’»That is it that is intrinsic to economic practice
in Carver (1975) op.cit.,p.90.7. See Marx's Notes on -Tapnor,
that can possibly bo developed? The thins: that is intrinsic to that 
practice is the relation between men and nature and, therefore, the mat­
erial forms necessarily developed out of economic life lie within that 
relation. I shall now .examine this relation of appropriation.
There are two logically necessary moments of the relation of 
appropriation:
1. The determinations of nature on men, through appropriation.
2. The determinations of men upon natxire, through appropriation,
1 The first necessary moment of repented economic practice involves the 
effects of the appropriation of nature on non. These effects are noceits- 
ary consequences of repeated appropriation which, in turn, become part of 
future practice.
(n) Ouantitativo effects. This may not seem important but it should < 
not be forgotten. The effect on men in quantitative terms is increased 
population. Given men’s reproductive capacity and inclination, and given 
a supply of food and shelter, they nmst reproduce themselves*
Increased population has its qualitative aspect - quantitative changes 
at a given point pass over into qualitative changes (Marx and Hegel) - 
the increased numbers enable a new productive capacity, co-operation.
The existence of increased population is a prerequisite for tho develop­
ment of co-operation or social practice.
(b) Qualitative effect. The repeated appropriation of nature produces 
changes of quality or form in the human organism. These changes arc of 
two kinds. Firstly, men develop physical capabilities, or power, which 
enables them, with the use of material implements, to control nature.
Power is a real, material phenomenon which takes definite forms, corres­
ponding to the level of development of men's appropriation of nature. 
Secondly, appropriation not only develops the forms of physical pover, it 
develops forms within men's brains - forms of consciousness or ideologies.
"Through the repetition of this process (production - C.S.), the prop­
erty of these things, their property 'to satisfy needs', is impressed 
upon their brains;"8
8. Marx, ibid, p.190
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Impressions are created within men's brains of the properties of natural 
objects, in terras of their ability to satisfy biological necessity. Pen 
develop the mental capacity to mark objects as satisfactory or unsatis­
factory. These material, spontaneous impressions of the external world 
constitute simple ideologies.
These new material forms, the forms of power and ideology, 
contained in embryo within pre-social economic practice, are not only 
inextricably and purely part of economic practice, at this stage, but 
they are also completely interconnected. Power is advanced with the est­
ablishment of accurate or workable impressions. It becomes a directed, 
rather than random, energy. Ideology directs, and helps to generate the 
power—forms. On the other hand, new forms of consciousness are a product 
of emerging power. The range of ideology's variation and the utility of 
its impressions depend on appropriations enabled by power.
2 The second necessary moment of repeated economic practice involves the 
effects of men's appropriation upon nature. Those effects are again nec­
essary consequences of repeated appropriation and become part of future 
appropriati ons.
(n) Quantitative effects. Again this effect may seem unimportant but 
its existence must be observed — its importance may only become fully 
clear in subsequent historical analysis. Quantitatively, the effect of 
appropriation upon nature is the conversion of increasing amounts of nat­
ural matter into products (produced utilities or use—values). Combined 
with increase in population, the increase in produce provides the material 
basis for the development of a social division of labour and a surplus 
produce. The increase in produce involves changes of quality: it enables 
more and more men to convert more and more nature into more and more use- 
values.
(t>) Qualitative effect. Nature is transformed from an external matter 
into forms of matter internal to human practice. It is converted into 
use-values or produced utilities - objects which satisfy human wants of 
some sort or another. Not only is nature transformed into quantities of 
produced utilities for consumption, but also into means of further pro­
duction, e.g. tools. Increased power and developed forms of consciousness 
enable men to use nature itself to jiroduce use—values. In other words, 
as appropriation is repeated, there emerges a distinction between products 
some are directly consumed, others become means of production.
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It should ho clear that the tv.o sets of effects of economic 
appropriation are not separate but interlinked dialectically ■within 
economic practice (at this staple-of history). On one side, the emergence 
of power, ideology and increased population stimulate and enable the dev­
elopment of increased produce, nev.r row materials and new instruments of 
production. On the other hand, the emergence of increased produce, now 
raw materials and new instruments of production stimulate and fxirther the 
development of power, ideology and increased population.
To return to our main question: what material phenomena lie in 
embryo form within economic practice-in—itself which can form the object 
of qualitatively different forms of social practice? The answers to the 
question can be seen more easily if, at the expense of some precision, we 
diagrammatize our conclusions, thus:
The necessary 
material cons­
equences of 
economic pract-
j re-i ~i tself.
Increased population cannot itself form the object of a new 
practice. Of course, the practice which takes people as its object is 
sexual reproduction. The ’necessaries’ in this instance are people them­
selves. A practice which employs nature’s properties to produce life's
necessaries■is an economic practice. Sexual reproduction is,therefore, nn
qeconomic practice in this pre-social era.
The means of production and new forms o.f use-value,also,can only 
be the objects of new economic practices. Obviously,some might argue,means 
of production are not consumables and,therefore,they are not "necessaries 
of life". But -what constitutes the "necessaries of life" is not a 
static group of utilities. Human needs and requirements develop along with
9. During the pre-socini period in question, sexual behaviour, I assume, 
is purely for reproductive purposes. After the emergence of society, 
non-reproductive purposes may arise, of course, hut then the object of 
sexual behaviour is no longer the production of increased population and, 
therefore, is irrelevant, to my argument. Pcx for 'pleasure' is not a 
necessary consequence of economic practice-in-itself.
Pan A BBUOritT AT 10 N NATURE
r.ualitativo Bower and ideology Differentiated 
products. Beans 
of production.
puantitative Increases population Increased products
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the productivo force« and, thus, an increasingly differentiated range of 
utilities are required, involving: increasingly developed r.ioan« of prod­
uction. A use-value produced th.roup;li the human transformation of natural 
properties is a product of economic practice. Similarly, increased 
produce can also clearly only form the object of new economic practices. 
Necessary produce oven in increased quantity is still an.economic object, 
a product of the human transformation of natural mutter.
V'hat is left? Power and ideology. These are the new material 
forms, developed in economic practice itself, which can constitute the 
objects of qualitatively different practices. The deliberate construction 
of forms of power and the elaboration of social forms of consciousness 
(or social ideologies) are the only possible types of superstructural 
practice which can emerge out of the development of economic practice.
I shall discuss the nature of these practices in a moment. Firstly, it 
is necessary to register the fact that the power form and the ideology 
form are the only things (or matters) produced in economic practice it­
self which can possibly form the chosen end-products of non-oconoraic or 
superstructural practices. They are the material forms which thus 
characterize the generic typos of superstructural practice. They are the 
cell-forms of superstructural practice, embryonic within economic pract— 
icc-in-itself. The development of social history hitherto is the history 
of the development of the form;? of power and the forms of social consc­
iousness on the foundation of various modes of production, and the field 
of social dialectics is thus constituted by directed human practices 
which produce forms of value, power and consciousness.
To specify the historical developments of the forms of poVer 
and consciousness is a task oven more gigantic than that begun by i.’arx 
when he examined the development of the value-form. Some basic remarks 
may, however, be useful. The emergence of co-operation or social exist­
ence is based upon the internal development of economic practice itself. 
Increased population and produce, the development of means of production 
and the development of forms of power and ideology, all these things 
enabled the historical arrival of social co-ordination. As soon as soc­
ial life arrives, the forms of consciousness and power become the 
objects of superstructural practices.
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At first, ideology is only "conscious instinct" 0 and power is 
only the capacity of the body and the ability to employ primitive implem­
ents. but with the emergence of co-opcr£ttion, and circumstances of inc­
reased need, the forms of ideology and power advance at a pace. both 
develop their means of articulation: language and implements. Language 
emerges out of the grunting of the primeval men, enabling tho expansion 
of consciousness through communication, and implements are carved, out of 
matter to enable body-power to expand its range of achievements. Nature’s 
impressions on the brain become "designated in ideas", and, transformed 
from mere stimuli to thoughts or mental matter expressed in language.
" ... men do not only deal with such things practically as the moons^f 
satisfying their needs, but also ... they designate them in ideas."
Language, as Marx says, is simply "practical consciousness"; it is tho 
social instrument adopted by tho forms of consciousness when communication 
between men becomes an aspect of economic appropriation. Implements or 
tools, at first, are simply extensions of bodily organs, e.g. the hand; 
it is only later that they lose that form and adopt a radically independ­
ent character in the machine.
Once language and tools have cone into some kind of developed 
existence, power and ideology have their first objective forms and can 
thus become the objects (and means) of new, social practices. Thus in 
the earliest societies, those of the hunters for instance, we can see the 
first examples of superstructural practice. The production of necessities 
is not always successful in this period of history and some natural mat­
ters resist men's control. Men develop practical l-novl^d^e (literally, 
useful impressions of the properties of a thing) of matters under their 
power, but, with regard to thinjrs outside their power, they develop 
mythologies. 'Practical knowledge' is simple enough a concept (but very 
important nevertheless) and refers to impressions from practice which
can be put to effective use in future practice; however, the concept of
12mythologies needs further comment. The property of objects to remain
IQ. c.ro C W J G ) ~-y.. r \ V.. f>. 5"f.
11. Marx, in Carver (1075) op.cit.,p.191.
12. Schmidt confuses the distinction between practical knowledge and 
mythologies by distinguishing mythologies from ideologies. He fails to 
see that practical knowledge and mythologies are just two instances of 
ideology. Nee A. Schmidt Tho concept of nature in Marx (1971 I,ondon:Now 
Left books) p.141.
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outside men's power is seen as the manifestation of a superhuman external 
force - a spirit. For example, the sun, rainbows, wild animals, the 
stars and sky, menstrual blood, and fire all became the focus of myths. 
They were all seen as representations of a spirit. Similarly, men's own. 
lives were very much beyond their control, and consciousness and power 
were themselves seen as the manifestation of a spirit. Various superstr­
uctura! practices called rites of passage were consequently developed to 
mark the arrival and departure of thin spirit. It seems men attributed 
their own consciousness and power to the objects beyond their control.
In other words, a problematic reality was "designated in ideas" which had 
already been established. Human life itself was already problematic and 
presented itself spontaneously as the embodiment of a spirit. Now inst­
ances of uncontrollable nature were seen in the only image available: the 
embodiment of spirit. In short, an idea was abstracted from one referent 
and related to another. I suggest that this is the nature of all mythol­
ogy - it is composed of abstracted ideas (c.g. religion or political 
propaganda) which designate the uncontrollable. It is important to note 
the abstracted nature of this form of consciousness. Perhaps controvers­
ially, I would argue that we can see all later sciences as combinations 
of abstracted thought and practical knowledge, and, therefore, that even 
the very thought—natter at the heart of n science reflects social practice 
because abstracted thoughts and practical intelligence are always firmly 
grounded within its forms. It was only through ccntxiries of practical 
development that these two forms of ideology developed to a level where 
their combination was capable of founding sciences. Only when practical 
intelligence is highly advanced and when the logical abstractions of sys­
tematic mythology begin to lose their religious shells can science emerge.
The social development of the two forms of ideology is the precondition
14of the emergence of science. The latter is no mystical 'invention' but 
a natural progression in the social history of forms of consciousness.
13. See C.S. Coon Tin; hunting peonies(1970 Harmondswortli: Penguin Books) 
ch.13»
1 4. Only two basic forms are possible - the practicalrand the mythical 
- and they reflect the power or impotence of men in controlling natural 
objects. Although scientific thought is a form of consciousness it is a 
form which has superseded the two basic, ideological or spontaneous forms 
(practical intelligence and mythology). Thus science is a higher level of 
thought,but has pro.ctical roots (a) in the specific practices which produce 
it and (b) in that it emerges out of the combination of the two forms of 
ideology which closely reflect the structure of mundane social practice.
In precisely this sense, science is a higher form of ideology, which always 
bears the birthmarks of its conditions of origin.
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This history is directly related to the development of men's power over 
nature. The more' material substance came under men's control, the less 
the social extent of magic and religion:
"All mythology overcomes, and masters, and shapes the forces of nature 
in and through the imagination: _ it disappears therefore when real mast­
ery over those forces begins." 15
Enveloping religious or toteraistic mythologies, the early 
superstructural practices, such as rites of passage, act as necessary 
conditions of existence of a limited stage of development of economic 
life. Those practices produce social forms of consciousness as their 
objects; they are instrumental in socializing the ideologies of a people. 
That is, through these sujierstructural practices, ideologies reflecting 
social relations became concretized and institutionalized as the ideolog­
ies of the society. The socialization of ideologies in suporstructural 
practice thus provides a second, social source of ideological materials. 
After existence has become social, men receive impressions not only from 
practical appropriation but also from the institutions for the expression 
oí social ideologies. From this point on, men's brains are not simply 
full of the impressions and ideas generated in their own individual prac­
tice, they are also full of the impressions and ideas expressed in the
1Gsocial practices of the superstructure. There is a constant tension 
in the history of ideologies between these practical sources. Personal 
experience and socially legitimated ideologies have rarely been happy 
bedfellows.
There are two points to insist on here: (a) At no point, in my 
conception, does the brain become anything more than a brilliant material 
computer. It can choose but never create its received impressions or 
ideas. Only the structxire of social practice can create the forms of soc­
ial consciousness. Certainly, the brain can resolve contradictions within 
itself (e.g. between practical impressions and abstractions), but its
15. Marx A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859), 
quoted in chmiclt (1971) op.cit.',p. ldl.
1G. This clash between an individual's situational experience and the 
socialized ideologies of his society has not normally been captured with­
in the concepts of Marxian or phenomenological analysis.
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resolutions are never framed within forms of consciousness outside the 
corajilex realms of social relations. The brain does not invent new forms 
of consciousness - it only receives and manipulates them. At first, 
this may seem absurd, because men have produced all kinds of brilliant 
discoveries apparently 'out of the blue'. However, I would emphasize 
that social relations are complex and therefore that 'inputs' to the 
brain are complex; and, moreover, that the brain is not only a well-pro­
grammed mechanism but also a mechanism with historically increasing 
powers of manipulation, developed in increasingly complex social circum­
stances. My contention, on these assumptions, is that even unexpected 
scientific discoveries and highly idiosyncratic personal ideologies are 
based on the complex programme of forms of social consciousness establi­
shed in men's brains, and on the increasingly powerful capacity of those 
brains to resolve problems set within the parameters of that programme.
(b) One should not reduce the process of ideology formation to a sonsxious 
materialism, at least,once existence has achieved social form. Hen do 
not possess empty brains waiting for new imprints from materials confron­
ted in practice. The ongoing development of practical impressions, abs­
tract mythologies and sciences means that the brain (always) contains 
already a thought-framework in which to file and manipulate now impress­
ions and ideas. In contemporary sociological language, men, as social 
beings, (always) alrendyhnve taken—for—granted assumptions with which 
they encode the appearances of the world of their practice. New impress­
ions and ideas o.re not necessarily allowed unconditional entry by the 
extant mental set. The consequences of this fact have not often resonated 
through the formulations of Marxist theory. ’Vhat is important, in my view, 
is that the complex subjectivity of each individual is a determinate 
material element in nil forms of social practice. Men are never the 
simple playthings of structures of practice. They carry specific forms 
of consciousness - ideas and impressions - which will play a part in 
the process whereby the elements of a practice affect its structure or 
social relations. Moreover, the ideologies reflected by the social rel­
ations of a practice do not enter men's brains as water enters an empty 
vessel. Pro—existing ideologies, carried by the agents of practice, will 
confront the necessary ideologies of that practice, and will not necess­
arily reinforce its structure. It cannot be emphasized too much that
300
subjectivity is a determinate, material force in all practices and must 
be seen as vital to any practical process. To reduce society to the play 
of structures is to produce a structuralism which losen the complexity 
involved in considering the effects of subjectivity (a material element 
of practice) on the structure of a practice. On the other hand, to 
take modes of subjectivity out of the structure of social practice is to 
produce a humanism which abandons structural determinations. Always, and 
this applies to both the above points, we should remember that the form­
ation of ideologies is inextricably part of practical processes carried 
out within historically determinate social relations and material circ­
umstances.
Power, also, becomes the specific object of social practice 
once co-operation is established. Marx notes that:
"Linguet is probably right, when in his 'Théorie des Lois Civilles', lie 
declares hunting to be the first form of co—operation, and man—hunting 
(war) one of the earliest forms of hunting." .
.r
The establishment of social power by men over other men,using the material
instruments produced in economic life, is the second tjpie of superfïtruct—
ural practice arising under the conditions of co-operative existence.
New forms of power are sought through territorial aggression, and old
forms are institutionalized often in the shape of ritualR for settling
19quarrels over adultery. Given that the sexual division of labour exists 
as a 'technical' aspect of class divisions (if only at first), and given 
the low level of productivity, the early conflicts of power (or political 
relations) often seem to take the form of physical feuds over women and 
territory. The institutionalized resolution of social power conflicts 
represents the socialization of a people's collective political muscle. 
Whatever forms the early political institutions took, it seems clear that 
they served primarily to maintain peace and to direct economic production. 
They crystallized the existing collective, social power of the people in 
new social practices. From this point on, social power was not simply a 
matter of individual strength developed in appropriation but also a social
17. See the description of the structuralist concept of material functions 
on p.124, supra.
18. (1974) op.cit.,p.316, fn.2.
19. See Coon (197G) op.cit.,ch.11,
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natter of combined capacities institutionalized and concretized in the 
form of rituals, chiefs and armies. A dialectic thus arose between the 
power of the individuals and the- power of the social polity - a dialectic 
which favoured the individual loss and less a s society’s productive tech­
nology became more and more advanced. Fîuch progress corresponds to the 
increased material power of the political leadership of a society.
In this text, power is not as vital a concern as ideology. 
However two final comments must be made. Firstly, social poi/er never 
becomes anything else other than the combiaied energy of a people, what­
ever complex forms it takes during later periods. "Whatever direction it 
takes, however divided it is, and whatever form it is institutionalized 
in, social power is always the combined energy of the people.
"The social power, i.e. the multiplied productive force, which arises 
through the co-operation of different individuals as it is determined hy 
the division of labour, appears to those individuals, since their co-op­
eration is not voluntary but has come about naturally, not ns their own 
united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin 
and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus cannot control, 
which on the contrary passes through n peculiar series of phases and 
stages independent of the will and the action of man, nny even being the 
prime governor of these." 20
With the emergence of society, wo have seen that the forms of 
pover and consciousness, originating and continuing within economic prac­
tice, are established as the moans and objects of new social practices.
It is necessary now to give these two generic types of superstructurnl 
practice formal definitions and titles.
Political practice
This can be defined as the transformation of institutionalized 
forms of social nower into new forms through the exercise of individual
20« Marx and Tîngelc (1970) op.cit.,p.54
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or collective power in a direction defined within the forint of conscious-
ness (ideologies) of that individnnl or group. Althusser's definition
°1of 'political practice' limits it to revolutionary struggle.“ Poulant­
zas saw the object of political practice as
" ... the 'present moment' (as Lenin said), i.e. the nodal point where 
the contradictions of the various levels of a formation are condensed in 
tlié complex relations governed by over-determination and by their disloc­
ation and uneven development. This present moment is therefore a conjun­
cture , the strategic point where the various contradictions fuse in so 
far as they reflect the articulation specifying a structure in dominance."
Thus, for Ikmlnntzas, in capitalist societies, the state is the site of 
"the present moment". T7hy it must always ho so is never made clear, al­
though it is clear that Poulantzas is trying to reconcile two contradict­
ory Leninist theses (that the object of politics is the present moment 
and that the state must he the first target of proletarian insurgency).
The net effect, in ray view, is that Poulantzas' general concept of polit­
ical practice is far too restrictive. It would exclude all political 
practices not directed at the immediate capture of state power. Much a 
definition of the political, in my experience, is entirely typical of a 
male, European, orthodox Marxist and implicitly defines struggles revolv­
ing around sexual, racial and national oppression as. non-political. "In 
the last instance", it is, indeed, vital to capture state power to create 
the possibility of social revolution. Put that docs not guarantee that 
revolution will take place. Poulantzas, along with many Marxists, seems 
to neglect the fact that the object of politics is ideologically defined. 
Given the wide variety of social contradictions, power struggles will 
take a variety of forms before and after revolution. Moreover, the very 
exercise of seized state power will he guided by the prevailing forms of 
revolutionary consciousness:
" ... the fate of the revolution (and with it the fate of mankind) will 
depend on the ideological maturity of the proletariat i.e. on its class 
consciousness."
21. Althusser and Italibar (1970) op, cit. ,p.3l6 (Glossary).
22. Poulantzas (1973) op.cit.,p.41.
23. G. Lukács History and Glass Consciousness (1971 London:Merlin Press) 
p .70.
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Poulantzas and Althusser tend to forget that the objects of all practices 
are erected in ideology beforehand ; the political is no exception. Their 
definitions, limited a priori to- revolutionary practice, even limit the 
latter to the organized struggle of the proletariat against the state 
machine. The only way that their definitions can include the politics of 
gender, regional government, morality, race,etc. is by defining the state 
very widely, which, of course, Althusser docs.
On the premises outlined here, political practice includes any 
practice which has ns its object existing institutions and structures of 
social power. Its purposes aro defined in ideology, and its material 
instruments are those available to a group at n given level of development 
of the forces and relations of production. It is one of the two general 
types of superstructural practice. Probably its most important, dominant 
class forms within modern capitalism aro tho practices of legislation, 
armed repression and propaganda-dissemination carried out by the execut­
ives and agents of the state. As an outcome of co-operative economic 
production, political practice is thus a vital element in any society 
hitherto and its concept is therefore essential for tho analysis of tho 
historical articulation of social practices. An analysis which ignores 
tho level of political practice cannot claim to be an examination of the 
social totality.
Regarding the study of social ideologies, there are four spec­
ific implications of political practice:
(1) Specific ideologies will emerge within specific forms of political 
practice, which will reflect the structure of those forms.
(2) Ideologies produced in other forms of practice mn.y be adopted in pol­
itical practice and take corresponding political forms.
(3) Ideologies produced in political practices may be adopted within 
other social practices and take economic or intellectual forms.
(d) All ideologies must be considered for their potential hearing on the 
divisions and balance of power within a society.
Intellectual practice
This can be defined as the transformation of social ideologies 
(social forms of consciousness) into new forms through the expression,
004
via definite notorial means, of an individual or ^roup's thoughts, for 
purposes defined in his or their ideologies.
f)./J
Althusser's "ideological practice"“' is a slightly different 
concept. lie defines it as "the transformation of one relation to the 
lived world into a new relation hy ideological struggle.""' To my mind, 
this definition is too restrictive as a general formulation. Tt seems 
to imply a conscious fight against opposing ideologies and, thus, to be 
equivalent to the practice of perpetrating political propaganda. Int­
ellectual practice, on my premises, must include all practices specific­
ally and exclusively aimed at communicating thought. These practices are 
not necessarily part of power struggles, and, in themselves, merely pro­
cesses of communication, ranging from conversation and speech—;.inIcing to 
news-gathering and book—writing. They are specific forms of production 
and must not be confused with 'cultural practice', which today is a 
common term conflating both the forms of intellectual production and the 
forms of unproductive consumption (such as Y?anE behaviour* and listening 
to music).
Althusser distinguishes scientific practice as a qualitatively 
different form of practice. As I argued earlier, this stems from a 
faulty analysis. Scientific knowledge is produced in intellectual pract­
ice because science is ultimately a social form of consciousness and 
intellectual practice is aimed at the transformation of socinl forms of 
consciousness. Science can only emerge from intellectual work; the latter 
can also mystify or destroy it. Intellectual practice can express 
practical knowledge or abstract mythologies (or theoretical ideology). 
However, after a certain level of social development, it can also produce 
scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge is, originally, a profound 
combination of abstraction (where its religious aspect has disappeared) 
and practical knowledge, and, ns such, a new form of consciousness devel­
oped out of ideology. Thus, in agreement with Althusser, I would maintain 
the qualitative difference of science - but, in disagreement with him 
I would say that we can do that within the category of 'intellectual 
practice' and do not need to set up another jiractico.
24. The concept used hitherto in the present text.
25. .c-ee Althusser and Balibar (1970) op.cit. ,p.31G (Glossary).
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The social practice which produces scientific knowledge is not 
a purely cerebral, private one. liy definition of intellectual practice 
includes the social means of externalizing or expressing theories and 
ideas and implies that, within a given social context, there ere certain 
economic, political and intellectual conditions which determine the 
ability to externalise mental produce. In class societies, the social 
aspect of externalization is mainly (but not exclusively) structured by 
class. Thus the dominant mode of social externalization involves forms 
of technology, power and communication which are available to and approved 
by the dominant class. For example, no matter how scientific a theory is, 
if its producer cannot articulate it because of its political unacceptab— 
ility, because of his inability to find a publisher due to the unprofit­
able nature of his work, or because he cannot write or speak in the 
accepted fashion, then it will not ho externalised socially and remain an 
individual, private product. Similarly, no matter how manifestly illog­
ical a theory is, if its producer has money at his disposal and/or polit­
ical backing and if it is expressed in dominant' communicationnl forms, 
then it can be externalised in a fully social manner. Externalization of 
intellectual prodiice is a social matter and, in a class society, it refl­
ects the class structure and the consequent material wealth, political 
power ar.d communicational means available to the constituent classes and 
groups.
It is also vital to note that scientific conceptions are born 
out of historical conjunctures of theoretical ideologies and practical 
intelligence. Scientific theories are not pre-given; they must he const— - 
ructed through the discovery of the weaknesses in prior theoretical ideo­
logies in the light of practical impressions. Kor are they eternal 
truths - subsequent investigations often find them to be partial con­
ceptions, sometimes to the point of being primitive. Sciences then are 
products of a form of intellectual practice - the form which is con­
cerned to investigate the voracity of prior systematic theories in the 
light of practical knowledge, They emerge out of the combination of the 
two forms of ideology, as higher forms of consciousness. Scientific 
discoveries themselves, that is, are ultimately grounded in practice. The 
forms of thought constituting n specific scientific theory are only poss­
ible under definite historical, structural and material conditions.
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Tliis last» point» is an important one because it» counters the 
view that science is purely cerebral. Scientific thought does not simply 
emerge out of theoretical ideology through n pure dialectic of ideas. It 
must be constructed in intellectual practice by a human being working 
within definite social relation?; and under specific material conditions.
The intellectual social practices in which thought is produced rany pro­
vide the right conditions for the solution to a problem that has remained 
unsolved through many epochs. Of course, the reverse is also often true. 
For example, an intellectual working within an established .scientific 
field may be unable to advance any further because the general forms of 
consciousness reflected in his brain and the material circumstance»? of 
his work do not allow the solution. The structure-consciousness connect­
ion also accounts for the fact that a great physicist, for exnmple, might 
solve complex scientific problems one after another and yet his spontan­
eous social conceptions may be more primitive than tho.se of the lowest 
manual worker. Once a particular intellectual practice has developed a 
framework of thought, it may well, of course, become entrenched within 
that practice and thus have a relatively autonomous dialectic of its own. 
This fact may conceal its practical, social ba.se. Not for one moment am 
I suggesting that it is necessarily economic social relations alone 
which provide the conditions or obstacles for the development of theoret­
ical systems. Nor am I suggesting that it is only social structure which 
underpins the development of the theoretical consciousness — material 
conditions, such as the availability of ideas, practical knowledge, time, 
money and space, are often crucial. The crucial point is that science, 
just as much as simple ideology, is dependent upon the practical circum­
stances of its production and development. 'There the two forms of con­
sciousness differ is simply, and crucially, upon ’the knowledge-effect1, 
a phenomenon to which Althusser addressed.himself• If ’the knowledge- 
effect’ is to be comprehended in its social specificity, however, we must 
begin analy.ses which escape the theoreticism of the neo-structuralist 
problematic.
On the premises outlined here, intellectual practice includes 
any practice which has as its object existing social forms of consciouness. 
It.s purposes are ideologically defined and its material instruments (lang­
uage, laboratory equipment, pens, paper, television and radio, for example)
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arc those available at a {riven level of productive development and at a 
given societal location. It is the second general form of siiperstruct- 
ural practice. Possibly its most important dominant class forms in mod­
ern capitalism are television, scientific research, newspapers and books.
As an outcome of co-operative economic life, intellectual practice is a 
vital element in any known society and thus its concept is essential for 
the analysis of the historical articulation of social practices. '
Regarding the study of social ideologies, there are several 
distinct conclusions to be drawn from this elaboration of the concept of 
intellectual practice:
(1) Specific ideologies will emerge within intellecUial practices which 
will reflect the social relations of those practices.
(2) Ideologies produced within economic and political practice may bo 
adopted within intellectual practice and take intellectual forms.
(3) Ideologies produced within intellectual practice nay be ndopted with­
in the other social practices and take on economic or political forms.
Before I continue further, it is necessary to define economic 
practice formally: the transformation of new materials into new forms 
through the use of human and material properties for what are ideologic­
ally defined ns the necessaries of life (or means of subsistence). Like 
the superstructure! practices, it is a determinate process in definite 
material conditions with specific raw materials, instruments of production, 
and end-product.
Hitherto, all societies have been constituted by a combination 
of distinct economic, political and intellectual practices. Those com­
binations have taken specific historical forms and cannot be described 
abstractly. "e are now concerned with the three categories of social 
practice which will enable rigorous historical analysis. Two final comm­
ents are necessary on this point. Firstly, each general form of practice 
conditions the nature of the other two. Thus the movement of economic 
practice predicates certain necessary political and intellectual forms, 
intellectual practice conditions certain economic and political effects 
and politico! practice affects economic and intellectual practice. The 
forms of social practice are all effective and exist co-detcrrainately in 
the social totality. Secondly, the three practices are distinct b\vt they 
often exist within one another in a given empirical instance. For example,
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to produce national news, in capitalism, it is necessary to run n 
newspaper company without going bankrupt. Thus there is a co-existence 
of intellectual and economic practice in the news production process. 
Similarly, conversations with co-workers in a factory is an intellectual 
practice within an economic one. Many examples could bo given. The 
point, however, is clear and simple. ’.Then considering any one empirical 
practice, it should not be assumed that it falls neatly into any one gen­
eral category. In historical research, the categories will often need to 
be combined to fully comprehend u given situation.
Social divisions and class formation
All social practices are carried out within specific social re­
lations. Therefore, the nature of 'social relations' is crucial to the 
theory of ideology, because the social forms of consciousness reflect the 
relations of social practices. It is thus necessary to examine briefly 
the concept of 'social relations'.
Marx and Engels have said that, hitherto, history has been a 
Jong sequence of class struggles. Marxists have often taken this premise 
too narrowly and ignored the social divisions that cut across class bound­
aries. A 'class' has been defined as a group of people with a particular 
relation to the means of production of socially necessary goods and hist­
orical analysis has attempted to explain and describe the superstructural 
effects of class divisions. Political imperatives and a desire for ox- 
positional simplicity have operated to produce a view that the main diff­
erences in social ideology are given by the economic divisions between 
people.
Social ideologies, of course, do reflect the relations between 
classes. Social relations are relations between classes over the material 
means of social practice. However, that is only one side of the coin, a 
side based on the class nature of social relations. Marxists, and social 
scientists in general, who stop at this point will produce a view of
°Gclasses as football teams with ideological numberplates on thoir backs.4'
metaphor. See Poulantzas (197C) o p . c i t . , p . 2 0 2 .26. Poulantzas'
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Poulantzas criticises Lukács on this score. However he himself does not 
get much further than the concept of class ideologies. ITo mentions 
class fractions - that is all. Indeed, the reverse problem is fully 
applicable to Poulantzas: for him, all ideologies appear to have class 
number—pintes on their backs. Poulantzns, too, seems to be fxilly caught 
within the vice—like grip of the class-ideology connection.
Jacques Rar.ciere has reminded us that the technical and social
27divi sions of labour are jointly articulated. However, he has not spec­
ified the consequences of that correct Marxian thesis for the theory of 
ideology. He pointed out to Althusser that the university is not only 
based on a technical division of labour between lecturers and students, 
but also on a social division of labour between the ruling educating class 
and the educated classes, and that this doxiblo moment of the division of 
labour in educational practice is always jointly articulated. Thus, Ran- 
cierc objected to the form that the teacher—taught relationship took 
within the bourgeois university.
Ranciere is, of course, absolutely right. Marx very clearly
sees the double articulation of the division of labour, in technical and
28social forms, as a conjoint existence.“ The division of labour in the 
capitalist factory reflects the division of lnbour as a whole, and vice 
versa. Many Marxists have mechanically identified class and consciousness, 
resulting in a simplistic conception where all ideologies are class-based 
and all classes have different ideologies. They have forgotten that class 
relations only exist within technical relations and that social relations 
are thus two-sided. Hearing in mind that social structures are doubly 
articulated, we must illustrate the possible complexity of the distribut­
ion and differentiation of social ideologies. I shall take the Y/estcrn 
capitalist mode of production as ray example, since Marx has done the work 
for us here in some depth.
If we examine the social division of labour in the capitalist 
social formation, we must map its forms on two jointly articulated axes: 
the technical divisions and the class divisions. Each axis has its own
27. (1974) op.cit.
28. See (1974) op.cit., esp. pp.331-339
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field of articulation, which means that, again, the two divisions arc 
articulated on two conjoint fields.
The technical axis
The substantive divisions on this axis are the divisions between 
teachers, dockers, carpenters, politicians, financiers, general labourers, 
housewives, fitters, scientists, technical workers and so on. These 
divisions take general forms such as industrial, financial, agricultural, 
political, intellectual, etc.; or, mental versus manual labour. Such 
general forms can be summarized as expressions of a general division > 
between productive (productive of socially necessary means of subsistence) 
and unproductive labour. The field of articulation of this technical 
division of labour is the socio—geographical one. Thus we can say that 
this axis is mapped on the field: town-countryside.
The class axis
The substantive divisions here are well known; for example, cap­
italists, proletarians, petit-bourgeoisie. However, from a reading of 
Capital, and on the grounds that this present analysis is an analysis of 
the total social division of labour, I would suggest that there are also 
intellectual and political classes. liarx mentions the concept of "the
ideological classes" to refer to "such as government officials, priests
29lawyers and soldiers etc.".“ I would suggest that his examples are 
slightly confusing because his concept of the "ideological classes" is 
not well—developed. Given that the class axis ranges over all types of 
practice (i.e. economic, political and intellectual), I think that his 
examples of the "ideological classes" include groups which are really 
instances of the political classes. llarx does not use the concept of 
political classes but T would provisionally sxibmit that it is a useful 
one. Examples of the intellectual classes would include priests, lawyers« 
teachers, writers, journalists, artists and scientists. The political 
classes would include politicians, judges, administrators, trade union 
leaders, soldiers and policemen. Both these classes are groups of people 
whose activities, in the spheres of intellectual and political practice, 
are not directly productive of surplus value. They are defined by their 
locations in the structures of intellectual and political practice as
29. i b i d . , p . 4 2 0 .
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these locations relate to the circulation of capital and labour-power.
The substantive class divisions in capitalist society can be 
summarized in formal terms by the general division: labour which is pro­
ductive of surplus value/labour unproductive of surplus value. The 
field of articulation of the class division of labour is a socio-pract- 
ical one: this axis is mapped on the field of differences between the 
production, distribution and consumption of all social products.
The current movements ol~ the .joint articulation oi' those two axes.
The two axes of the social division of labour in capitalism 
are conjointly articulated, but this .joint articulation is not a static 
one. It exists in process. Currently the process takes three aspects. 
Firstly, on the substantive level, the movement is towards increased class 
polarization (involving increased proletarianization of the 'middle1 
classes) and towards increased technical specialization (increased tech­
nical division of labour). Secondly, on the formal level, the movement 
is towards increased amounts of labour which is unproductive of surplus 
value and towards increased 1intellectuolization' of labour. Thirdly,
on the level of the field of articulation, the movement is towards incr-
30eased xirbnnization and increased consumption.
Manifestations of the double articulation
On the technical axis, there are many examples of ideological 
differences reflecting this fact of the double articulation of the div­
ision of labour. At the substantive level, there may be class divisions 
within technical groups. Thus, the people working within a factory are 
all members of the same productive process, yet their relation to capital 
differentiates them there and then. Puch relations between owners of 
capital, agents of capital and victims of capital, generate fundamental 
differences in ideology. The same idea can take entirely different forms 
within each of these classes. Similarly, within the technical field 
of news-production is mapped a definite class axis reflected in the 
different backgrounds of editors, journalists and print-setters. These 
class divisions may produce class ideologies which complicate and cut 
across any shared ideologies due to joint co-operation in the same tech­
nical process. On the formal level, ideological differences may arise
30. I t  i s  to be remembered th a t th is  'tren d '  
d i f f e r e n t  for capitalism  in the Third ’Yorld. analysis might look quite
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between groups of productive and unproductive labourers. Although, tech­
nically, both groups may produce the same thing, they are structurally 
divided by their production or non-production of surplus value. This 
division or relation may be reflected in opjjosing ideologies. Thus the 
company chemist and the chemistry lecturer may both produce the same 
substance, yet their structural difference (and its effects in terms of 
income, housing,etc.) may produce quite different social ideologies. : 
Similarly, on the basis that a housewife is an unproductive labourer (in 
the Marxist sense) and her husband is productive (of surplus value), there 
nay arise sharp ideological differences in some situations (e.g. a strike). 
Finally, on the level of the field of articulation, it is possible to 
see production/distribution/consumption divisions mapped on the field 
city/town/countryside. For example, in a seaside town with a rural hint­
erland, there are structural divisions between those who produce there 
(e.g. farm owners, labourers), those who consume there (e.g. holidaymakers), 
those who distribute commodities there (o.g. shopkeepers) and -those who 
produce for the holidaymakers (e.g. hoteliers). These relations may be 
reflected in differences in ideology which may cut across ideologies 
shared by common residence, differences further complicated by the class 
divisions within each of these groups.
On the class axis, double articulation means that technical 
relations within or between classes can be reflected in ideological diff­
erences which are not available to analysis which limits consciousness to 
class boundaries. Thus, the technical divisions between the financial 
and industrial bourgeoisie cut across their shared class position and can 
generate ideological conflict. Technical differences between skilled and 
unskilled labourers, supervisors and workers, executive politicians and 
back-benchers, headmaster and junior teachers, and professors and junior 
lecturers produce concrete effects which are often the material basis of 
an ideological difference. Differences in detail function within a class, 
in some situations, may be explosive contradictions which set a class 
against itself in political and intellectual practice. Class and class 
consciousness are by no means synonymous. Until technical divisions 
within the ".'e stern working class have been reduced through developed auto­
mation, and until their political concrétisation in trade unions has
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been removed, there -seems little hope of a united class, conscious of 
itself. Similarly, on the formal level, the fact that both labourers 
and capitalist share in the same, surplus-value producing process may gen­
erate a shared ideology which blurs reflected differences in class ideol­
ogy and contrasts with the social ideologies of capitalism's unproductive 
classes. On the level of the field of articulation, town/countrysido 
divisions may separate people in the same class and produce differences 
in (for example) political ideology. For example, agricultural labourers 
in ïïestern societies of the twentieth century, have boon politically more 
passive and ideologically more reactionary than urban factory workers.
At the same time, the fact that all people are involved in a national net­
work of production, consumption and distribution practices may generate 
nationalist or patriotic ideologies which neutralize class ideologies. 
Patriotism or nationalism is often amusingly dealt with by Marxists. If 
it occurs in the Third V/orld, then it is soon ns proletarian class consc­
iousness, but when it occurs in Ihiropean countries it is seen ns the con­
sciousness of the bourgeoisie implanted in the heads of the uneducated 
masses. In my view, if production is organized on a national scale then 
national and nationalist ideologies are inevitable. Internationalism 
only begins to arrive with the mature development of international social 
relations of production.
A cursory glance at this double articulation of the social div­
ision of .labour within "'estern capitalist society indicates the naivety 
of posing class relations as the only basis of divisions between people 
in that hind of society. Obviously, the 'technical' relations are also 
operative. All these technical relations generate similarities and diff­
erences in social ideology, which do not necessarily fit neatly with class 
boundaries. Relations between men and women, city—dwellers and country 
people, producers and consumers, intellectuals and manual labourers, one 
detail labourer ar-d another, etc. are all active structures which reflect 
contradictory ideologies. Of course, it must be remembered that the two 
axes are never separate and the above-mentioned technical relations are 
only articulated in class-specific forms. On the other hand, it must 
also bo remembered that class relations are only articulated in technical 
forms. Classes are not abstract collective subjects riding through hist­
ory in a vacuum, they are groups of people engaged in specific practical
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processes. Marxism has tended to reduce the division of labour to class 
antagonisms, thus going to the opposite extreme from Durkheiraians who 
reduce it to occupational differences. In advanced capitalist societies, 
imperial wealth has meant a highly differentiated division of labour 
involving both complex class formations and complex technical formations. 
For such societies, no simple class or occupational model could be adequ­
ate to found an analysis of their ideological formations. Above all, we 
should never forget that the general map of social relations is constantly 
in movement and that the complicated field of ideological differences 
will reflect these trends.
If we remember that class relations arc only mapped out in 
technical terms on a definite geographical field of social labour, we may 
be able to attain the degree of specificity and sophistication required 
for a satisfactory analysis of the increasingly complex forms of social 
consciousness. Moreover, such a stance provides us with the valid theor­
etical concepts for understanding the existence of antagonistic structural 
relations between people in societies where class divisions are being 
abolished. Thus, in China, there are still antagonistic social relations 
in the economy outside any existing class relations, c.g. between intell­
ectuals and labourers, peasants and factory-workers, townspeople and 
country-folk. Al'so, in the field of social relations within suporstruct- 
ural practices, there are definite political relations between Marty 
members and non—Party members. All these social relations generate ideo­
logies and, without the simplistic class-consciousness connection, we are 
in a position to begin to understand the sharp variations in forms of 
ideology in sucli societies. Focial structures are the basis of ideologies 
and they are doubly articulated on a technical and a class level. Until 
a stage of society is reached where class relations have disappeared and 
itechnical1 relations have been relegated to the divisions within the 
daily round of all people, there are bound to ho sharp divisions within 
the social forms of consciousness.
Utopianism, in the current analysis of social ideologies, in
mv view, is largely the consequence of defining ideologies simply ns "the 
J 31site of class struggles", and failing to see the mesh of technical and
31. Callinicos's phrase. Pee A. Cnllinicos Althussnr»«, u .London:Pluto Press) ,p.lOO. ¿itnussor's Ifarrism (1970
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class structures which reflects a complex field of ideological differences. 
Callinicos's critique of Althusser provides a (rood example of the tendency 
to view ideologies one-sidedly as the site of class struggle. Ho argues, 
crudely, that, in class societies, ideology is:
" ... essentially a means by which the ruling class maintains its position 
by obscuring the conditions of exploitation and oppression at the heart 
of society. The working class’s need for such nn ideology does nqt. exist, 
since its interests lie in the abolition of all class society."
Consequently, he must attribute the continued existence of ideology (in 
general) in the U.S.R.R. to the alleged fact that it is not ’really soc­
ialist’ but rather-a form of 'bureaucratic state capitalism'. His histor- 
icism requires him to tend to view all socinlist societies as problem—froe 
utopias and, where there exists political totalitarianism or mystifying 
mythologies, he is forced to deny any socialism at the economic level.
In this way the problem of ideologies and ideological conflict in social­
ist society is brushed under the carpet. The key reason for this simplist­
ic approach and its political effects is the one—dimensional concept of 
the class-ideology connection. Its inevitable consequence is the view 
that ideology will naturally disappear as such with the abolition of 
class relations. From the analysis above, T think it is clear that such a 
view is theoretically wrong. If we take 1'arx seriously, and view the 
forms of social consciousness as reflections of social relations, it is 
obvious that no simple class model of ideology is permissible, "any soc­
ial divisions apart from class must disappear before mystificatory ideol­
ogies can vanish.
In political terms, the double articulation of tho division of 
labour, in capitalist societies, has produced several notable ideological 
effects; effects which considerably hamper the emergence of a politically 
united, class-conscious proletariat. For example, there are technical 
divisions within the ’.Vestern working classes which have engendered a vnr- 
ietv of sharply opposed ideologies, e.g. those ideological divisions over 
wage differentials, modes of consumption and political action. Divisions
32. i b i d . , p . 90
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at work between ’youth' and 'adults', produce different ideologies of 
consumption and consequent 'political' conflict. The street gang may 
be 'doing nothing' whilst the parents prefer to watch the television at 
hone: a difference that nay only be soluble through the exercise of par­
ental or state power. Divisions between the sexes in the labour process 
have resulted in a percentage of female wage-labourers and intellectuals 
blaming men, implicitly or explicitly, for various practical problems 
of female existence under capitalism. Similarly, divisions between 
intellectuals and wage-labourers are reflected in workers' ideological 
opposition to the Left politics of student "layabouts". Relations betw­
een the races over matters of employment, housing and schools have prod­
uced a great deal of racist ideology throughout the working classes. 
Militants can ignore these structural ideological divisions, which cut 
across class and class consciousness, if they wish - Imt at their peril. 
Nor is it any use blaming the existence of non-socialist ideologies, in 
the brains of the proletariat, upon the media of mass communications.
The news editors did not invent the social relations which generate and 
sustain these ideologies, even though they may usually purvey materials 
which do little to contradict them. Moreover, there is some truth in 
the journalists' argument that 'they can always switch the T.V. off. 
Although the media ¿0 produce the consumers they require, it is also true 
that the social conditions of capitalist society generate both the media 
and the consumers required for a happy interconnection. Workers do not 
watch T.Y. all night just because they are ideologically 'hooked' by its 
products, hut also because they are tired, bored, unsatisfied, poor, 
lacking in the education required to find books interesting, lacking .. 
decent social facilities to go out, and isolated within their nuclear 
families.
Callinicos thinks that Althxisser's work implies a politics
which sees the intellectual institutions as the first target of rovolut—
03ionary struggle rather than the "smashing of the capitalist state".
He describes this as "reformism". I doubt if Althusser would have sugg­
ested this. He merely proposed that the key "ideological apparatuses"
30 i b i d . , p » 105
317
in modern capitalism were the schools. Certainly, to obtain socialism, 
the capitalist state must be destroyed. But the destruction of that 
state will not be achieved until socialists develop strategies which take 
into account the depth of the divisions,both structural and 
ideological,which fragment working classes already deterred by Stalin­
ism* Even if a section of the present British working class arose and 
•smashed' the British capitalist state, I doubt if the society it const­
ructed would share any more than the economic means of production. Un­
fortunately for political militants, social relations in modern capitalism 
are very complicated and generate a mesh of complex ideologies which have 
a firm practical grip. Without the advancement of the decline of British 
capitalism and the, consequent simplification of the technical division 
of labour, corresponding to an increase in the political awareness of the 
working class, there can be little value in simplistic slogans. Ideol­
ogy is a vital element of any social formation and its importance 1ms 
never been so pronounced as today. The socialist movement must reject 
economistic adventurism and dedicate itself to work that is aware of the 
depth and complexity of ideologies predicated by the current configurat­
ion of capitalist social relations. The plurality of differences in 
social ideology in modern, capitalist Britain, corresponding to the com­
plex class formation and highly differentiated technical division of 
labour, is such as to transform pleas for a united, revolutionary class 
into simple slogans with no grip on the complex structures of practical 
reality. Moreover, this transformation is probably not just an objective 
effect, but one which is also subjectively realized in the minds of many 
workers as 'the utopianism of marginal sects'. In the current Western 
situation, class pluralism is real, and political ideologies which assume 
united classes must, therefore, appear as fanciful and unreal. The plur­
alism in class structure and class ideology may be declining but, for 
the moment at least, it must be recognised as a fact and political strat­
egy must be moulded accordingly.
34
34 See (1971) op.cit.,pp.145-149
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Dominant ideology, class struggle and tho social totality
It has been presupposed throughout tlie above analysis that the
most general dialectic in class societies in the dialectic between social
unity and class struggle and that this dialectic operates in concrete
05 SBforms in all three modes of social practice.1 To say, ns Itanciere does,' 
that Marxism does not concern itself with "social cohesion" in one-sided. 
Social totalities based on class divisions move through an interaction 
between class struggle and social unity (in their various practical forms). 
Thus it is important to talk about "institutions" as well as "contradict­
ions". The institutions of economic, political and intellectual life 
can bo seen as 'monuments' reflecting the social dialectic between conf­
lict and unity. These monuments are the social buttle scars of tho 
struggle between classes in the different spheres of practice.
Class 'conflict', a concept referring to purely structural ant­
agonisms within social practices, and class 'struggle', a concept referring 
to conscious, actually fought battles, are features of all social practices 
■within class societies. Social institutions, such as the state, therefore, 
should not just be seen as simple manifestations of economic contradict­
ions, but also of political and intellectual antagonisms. Like revolutions, 
they are fully social effects of a fully social, class war. In research, 
Marxists have spent some time attempting to demonstrate the role of social 
institutions, such as the state, the church and tho press, in creating 
forms of social unity. Cuch analyses have often tended to take on abstract 
structuralist-functionalist forms since they have ignored tho other side 
of the coin, which is that these social institutions have arisen out of 
the ashes of class conflict and class struggle. Only when both sides of 
the analysis are put together will we get an historical picture of the 
movement of social totalities. Doth sides will only meet if wo begin with 
determinate social relations and move forward through history, rather than 
beginning with institutional effects and working backwards to their social
functions• 05
05. I use 'class' in this section to include technical
groups united by their detail function in the .¡r n iTrouPs» *-®.
This simplifies the discussion, although I reco«- • c lvi>cion of labour, 
questions raised by the lust section have not ]' that 11 indicates that
interesting that in Capital Marx uses 'class' °°n . ly roRolved. It is
double sense. " 13any times in exactly this
30. (1974) op.cit.,pp.2,3.
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Class struggles are fought out over the matters of wealth,
power and ideas; none of these struggles should be overlooked. T3nch 
social practice has its own law of movement and thus liistoricist attempts 
to render practices contemporaneous should be rejected. However two 
theses of Lenin should be remembered. Firstly, the destruction of class 
society is impossible without the political dicatatorship of the prolet­
ariat. Class differences within ideas and the economy cannot disappear 
unless the class,whose object is a classless society, establishes itself 
in the seat of social power peculiar to the society it overthrows. Tims, 
a proletarian revolution against a capitalist totality must seize the 
state institutions before all else. Of course, as Lukács noted, if the 
revolutionary class is not wielding socialist ideology, then that seizure 
may be the first step towards establishing a new form of class society. 
Secondly, there are occasional collisions between the relatively autono­
mous moments of the social totality which produce an historical conjunct­
ure of a revolutionary nature. For reasons peculiar to themselves and to 
their structural interconnection, each type of social practice may coll­
apse into disarray, leaving space for social revolution. The full devel­
opment of every single social practice is not vital, in the Marxist con­
ception, for a social revolution to bo possible. However, as Marx pointed 
out, people only set themselves problems that they can solve. Thus the 
conditions (economic, political and intellectual),inherited by the revol­
utionary class in such a situation, may not correspond to the ideal 
conditions for the creation of true communism (in Marx's conception).
The short-term effect, as in the U.S.S.U., may be a socialist economy with 
non-socialist political and ideological structures: a condition vitally 
affected by inherited economic and political circumstances, but also by 
the social forms of consciousness that were bound up with the emergent 
Russian communism. Fuch societies must undergo further political and 
intellectual ('cultural') revolutions before socialist development can 
advance on the right track. On the other hand, of course, their economic 
socialism may be destroyed because of thoir non-socialist politics and 
ideologies. Intellectual practice is a vital part of 'premature' social­
ist societies - just as much as it is in declining capitalist societies.
I
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17e arrive now at the hoary old question of 'the dominant ideol­
ogy’. It seems to me that the controversies amongst modern Parxists over 
the consequences of dominant ideology are too often underpinned by n lack 
of its concept. It is therefore necessary to define a concept of 'domin­
ant ideology1 in terms of the arguments advanced so far in this text. 
Firstly, we should talk of 'dominant ideologies'. Definitions in the 
singular assume a coherent body of ideas manipulated by the ruling class: 
this is n wholly unFarxist assumption. Ideology does not usually exist 
in systematic theories but in mobile mists reflecting constant develop­
ments in social relations. Moreover, it is the unconscious reflection of 
structure ard not the chosen symbol of a creative, asocial subject.
Ouite simply, the dominant ideologies are those ideologies reflected bv 
dominant social relations. These relations in all societies are the 
relations of economic practice (the mode of production). Thus in capit­
alism the dominant ideology is composed of forms sucli as Equality, Prcp- 
ertv, Liberty, Right and Pelf-Interest; forms all reflected by the key 
economic relation of exchange. ‘ However, as we have said all along, 
the forms of consciotisness take their contents from the elements of soc­
ial practices and their internal structures. Consequently, although the 
specificityof the capitalist epoch is reflected in the general ideologies 
of Proaerty, Freedom etc., these ideologies take particxilar contents vdth­
in specific classes engaged in specific practices in definite social 
structural locations. Thus, for example, one dominant ideology,for the 
capitalist class,takes the shape of'freedom from workers' or state inter­
ference with the production of profits' etc., whilst in proletarian terms, 
that same dominant ideology takes the shape of 'the right to work' and 
'freedom from exploitation*. These examples are very basic and the more 
obscure, yet equally extensive forms adopted by the dominant ideologies 
(for example, the role of Property and Self-Interest in academic and lay 
philosophy) need to be determined, since without them the concept of 
•dominant ideologies' loses its bite. The varied appearances of dominant 
ideologies throughout the dark corridors and dusty niches of the social
3 7 ,  See Marx (1974) o p . c i t .  ,p . l 7 2 .
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formation need to bo specified before the concept can regain a sharp, 
political value - but, when recovered, that value will bo more profound 
and critical than before. Previous conceptions of'dominant ideology', as 
the ideology of the bourgeoisie or as the ideology of a particular non­
economic practice, have had immediate attraction, not least because of 
their simplicity, but they lacked depth and accuracy. The concept prop­
osed here will hopefully remedy that.
Finally, there is the question of the 'society-effect' investig­
ated by Althusser. Sociologists have frequently located social unity 
within the cement of ideology and, as we have seen, Foxilantzas did much
J J g
the same. Althusser, in his essay on the Ideological State Apparatuses," 
steeped all men in 'the ideology of the ruling class' and thus immobilized 
the society, until the profit rate dropped to nothing. In Reading Cnpit- 
al, Althusser locates the mechanism of the 'society-effect' in the mode 
of production - the capitalist mode of production is thus said to be 
the mechanism which produces the existence of a society.'" If Althusser 
is arguing that v,hat primarily differentiates types of society is their 
modes of economic production, then he is undoubtedly correct. But if he 
is proposing that social unity is established in the mode of production,! 
would disagree. Social unity is the result of a particular combination 
of economic, political and intellectual practices. Health, power and 
ideas are all important in the establishmont of socinl cohesion; as they 
are in the creation of class conflict.
Reading ideologies - a now direction
The basic premise running throughout this work has been that 
the historical, materialist reading of ideologies must begin with histor­
ically determinate social relations. Historical specificityand structural
38. See ch.2,supra.
39. Althusser and Balibar (1970) op.cit., see pp.G4-G8
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determination have been the axioms. From social relations, between defin­
ite material elements of particular practices at a definite historical 
moment, we can discover the essential nature of an ideological formation. 
From this historical beginning, re can move to the precise forms of exis­
tence of an ideology displaced into other social practices.
~ Just as value presents itself as an intrinsic quality of the 
commodity which embodies it, so too an ideology appears as an intrinsic 
quality of the individual carrying: it. All too often, the analysis of 
forms of consciousness has failed to separate ideology from its condition­
al appearances. For example, journalists who are active in the dissem­
ination of pro—status quo ideologies are often seen by the Loft to be cons­
cious agents of the bourgeoisie. An ideology, a form of consciousness, 
thus presents itself as a chosen attribute of an individual (a 'prejudice') 
or group (a shared 'norm') rather than what it really is, a reflection of 
a social relation. A social relation between men over the material means 
of practice thus takes on the character of an objective attribute of an 
individual subject.
As I have argued throughout, the mechanism which gives any form 
of consciousness its appearance as an objective attribute of individual 
subjects is social practice. Like value, an ideology is a result of a 
human labour-process under certain material conditions and, again like 
value, it appears as separate from that process. !Vhnt is for the labourer
a thing in movement appears, in the final product as a fixed quality with-
40out motion.
It is necessary to break through this ideology of ideology and 
reach the fact that ideology is always in motion, ns an element of a hum­
an practice reflecting the social relations under which that practice is 
carried out. Ideology is integral to all social practices and thus it is 
located throughout the social formation. Any ideology is a product of 
social relations and at the same time it reproduces those relations in 
practice. The specificity of any ideology is, therefore, only recoverable 
on the basis of a knowledge of its generative social relation. Specific 
ideologies are a necessary element of a human practice; without them that 40
40. Paraphrasing 1’arx (1974) op.cit. ,p.l7G.
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practice cannot continue on a regular basis. Determined and yet determin­
ing, men's ideologies constitute an integral part of the material condit­
ions which they inherit from tho dead hand of history.
The 1'arxist rending of a specific idcolofy in a specific disc­
ourse must begin with the social relation that "rants the ideology its 
specificity. That is the first methodological principle. Problems immed­
iately arise: '/Inch social relation? Fast or present? Tho first quest­
ion is easily answered by saying that the researcher must follow his nose 
until ho has found the relation which necessitates tho ideology. Tho 
second question is more difficult. Normally, one would expect a living 
ideology to reflect a living social relation; however, it is perfectly 
possible for an ideology to survive its relation of origin within a now 
relation, the relation of adoption. One principle is clear here: no 
active ideology exists without a necessitating social relation. Of course, 
a 'dead' ideology can bo 'preserved' in books, films etc. - but oven 
there, it would take a 'live' social relation to reactivate it.
All scientific analysis, as Farx noted, begins "post festum" 
with the "results" of a "process of development" at hand. As I have 
maintained throughout, we must not confuse the present appearances with 
tho process of development. The apparent form of an ideology, such as 
»political demonstrations' may not be the essential form developed through­
out history. This alorts us to a third methodological principle which is 
not to forget that current appearances may conceal altogether different 
processes.
Of course, the problem is that an ideology rarely reside» in its 
'practice of origin' alone, more often (especially if that practice is 
economic), it will also live within other prencticos. The worker does not 
only produce and consume, ho engages in thought and poliiical activity. 
Ideologies born in productive practice will he displaced into non-product­
ive practices such as sport, child-rearing, trade unions, politics, and 
so on. Clearly it is useful to continue by talking of 'practice of origin' 
and 'adopted practice'. This analytic distinction should help us to 
clarify a way forward since it indicates the historicity of structural 
configurations and anchors the emphasis on process. 41
41. ibid.p.80»
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It is important to resistor tho fact that the displacement of 
an ideology is not something that happens hy magic; it is a structural 
process carried out by people. Magical categories, supposing the self­
acting omniscience of abstract structures, must give v;av to the categor­
ies of historical materialism which recognize the materiality of subjec­
tivity and its elemental nature in all social practices. Subjectivity, 
and the degree of variation in an individual's daily practices must 
guarantee that some ideologies will travel far and wide. ’There people 
can vary their activities, to any reasonable degree, we can expect tho 
entangled fusion of ideologies, relating to different technical functions 
and class opportunities. In Victorian llritain, one would expect tho 
class—consciousness connection to be much more rigid because tho working 
classes lived in conditions which limited the variety of their practices 
and which involved the prolonged centrality of economic practice. On tho 
other hand, in a declining, post— Imperio.l Groat Dritain , still enjoying 
the benefits of previous exploitation, tho class-consciousness connection 
is quite flexible. Conditions permit more variety of activity and the 
working day, for many, lias shortened. The social practices available for 
each person arc, in any class society, limited primarily by the material 
conditions of existence of each class. Thus, the analysis of ideology- 
displacement processes requires a structural analysis of tho total soc­
iety - something that is distinctly overdue in Marxist analysis.
So, an ideology may bo displaced. It is crucial to consider 
tho possible consequences of displacement. Tho first principle of this 
tvpe of analysis is that every practice contains its own necessary ideol­
ogies and, therefore, there may arise a contradiction between the adopted 
ideology and the 'resident' ideology. All other things being equal, the 
continued activity of the 'resident' social relation must neutralize or 
destroy the adopted ideology for the individual. Such a process of anni­
hilation however may leave, as residues, the images or content of tho 
adopted ideology: these may live on within tho resident ideology thus 
bearing a new form. This is an example of how a form can be separated 
from a content - a possibility alien to structuralist analysis of ideo­
logies. Other things, however, are not always equal. Because of tho 
relations between the adopting practice and other social practices, the
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adopted contradictory ideology may be maintained. In such a case, a 
contradiction will exist between the ideologies within the adopting prac­
tice. This contradiction may bo resolved in that it forces changes in 
the social relations structuring that practice - thus producing a cont­
radiction between the resident ideology and the structure of the practice. 
(Such a situation must bo 'impossible' for the subject caught within it).
As regards the content of an adopted ideology, contrary to a resident 
ideology, it may undergo some change, reflecting the material elements of 
its new home, or it may force changes within the content or imagory of 
the resident ideology. The material and structural circumstances produc­
ing the acceptance of an ideology contrary to a person's practical exper­
ience needs historical investigation.
There may, of course, bo a situation of non—contradiction. In 
this instance, the resident and the adopted ideologies can happily talco 
on new contents and become, like gases, thoroughly mixed in an expanded 
form, S’udì a situation may produce a condensation of images and an ideo­
logy of some strength and flexibility. It is also feasible that only the 
form of an ideology (its inner structure) may be displaced, leaving its 
contents (or images) behind. This possibility is a case of form-displace­
ment whereby a thought-structure is displaced without its images. Such a 
case is an instance of abstracted modes of thought. In this situation, 
an adopted form can talee on new substance from the material elements of 
the adopting practice. Is form-displacement characteristic of the work 
of theorists or scientists? On the other hand, it is also feasible in 
theory that only the substance of an ideology may be adopted - a case 
of adopted imagery. Is this content-displacement characteristic of art­
istic or journalistic work? Art seems to acquire its nature from the 
combination of images bearing several forms of thought. This situation, 
again, is a possibility unthinkable in structural ism: a situation where a 
significant function may bo displaced without its structure because of its 
significance for another social practice.
Ideologies may not only be displaced into existing practices 
however. They may act as structuring elements in the constitution of a 
new, hitherto non-existent practice. In such a case, there is the very 
real possibility of an ideology founding social relations. Given, however, 
that all practices within a social formation must interact, the relations
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of consiste'ncy/contradiction with other social practices will affect the 
development of the nevf practice. Net." practices may thus be crushed or 
bent out of shape; or, if the circumstances arc ripe, they may live and 
flourish. But, in general, it is important to register this possibility 
of ideology structuring a new practice. New practices do not simply 
emerge in forms demanded by social structural determinations: they must 
be created by men carrying determinate forms of consciousness, specific 
social ideologies.
Thus, we can conclude that it is a methodological principle in 
the historical materialist reading of ideologies that a displaced ideol­
ogy must be considered in its complex relation with the relatively auto­
nomous structuring capacity of the adopting practice and its integral 
ideologies.
Now, it is clearly not going to bo easy to follow the histor­
ical movement of an ideology when it is regularly displaced from practice 
to practice. But there is no apparent reason why the science of ideolog­
ies should be easy. It is simply clear that methodological problems of 
profound complexity exist within this field. For example, if we consider 
the apparent ideology of 'political demonstrations', existing in nows 
reports, with all its condensed, constituent structures and images, wo 
might hypothesize that it is a determinate form of a key political ideol­
ogy of all ruling classes - 'resistance to authority, or power, is a 
bad, futile, unnecessary, misguided thing'. This ideology may perhaps bo 
characteristic of all societies based on economic social relations of 
domination or exploitation. But how does such an ideology become active 
in news reporting? Is the ideology displaced into news reporting through the 
practical entry of the dominant economic and political classes and their 
offspring into newspaper companies? But today not all editors and journal­
ists are sons and daughters of capitalists and statesmen and ruling class 
ideologues; many journalists come from petit-bourgeois and working class 
backgrounds. Perhaps, the examination of media dissemination of ideology, 
with its effects on the brains of the consumers, requires us to assume 
that the journalists themselves lmvc already been 'well socialized'? 
NiHihand points to the fact that, in capitalist societies, many forms of 
mass media are profit-making enterprises themselves and thus their owners 
and top executives tend to suppress ideologies which run contrary to the
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ideological principles of capitalist production. lie argues that, apart
from this financial interest, these men arc often committed conservatives
anyway and that their interests and political ideologies "seep downwards"
to structure, restrictively, the imagery and ideology of the products.
Ko doubt those arguments are valid, but they do not, in themselves account
for the specificity of ideologies in the media. The arguments merely
explain the non-existence of generally radical ideologies and the existence
of generally conservative or liberal ideologies: they do not explain the
existence of specific conservative (or radical) ideologies within media
products. Likewise, Miliband’s statements about the ’influence’ of
advertisers, in dictating policies, and of governments, in obtaining
favourable access, are probably true hut limited. Comments ho could have
made, on the need of commercial media to sell their produce to a wide,
yet (given competition) shrinking, market, and the structuring effect this
43
has,in terms of which stories are left in and which are left out, would 
have suffered from similar defects.
It is not difficult to locate the institutions of mass communic­
ation in the total structure of social practices or to describe the expr­
essed political ideologies of the proprietors and senior executives. Nor 
is it too difficult to discover the economic relations within media inst­
itutions. The difficult thing is to identify the specificity of the 
ideologies embodied in media products. One thing is certain and that is: 
the final specificity of any ideology and its substantive imagery in news 
reports is not given by the practices of origin of that ideology. That 
final specificity is only achieved in the structure of news production at a 
particular historical moment in a definite social context.
Ideologies are elements in all practical processes and disappear 
in the final product of the practice. Any scientific analysis begins 
"post festun". The science of ideologies must explain and identify the 
place of specific ideologies in the concrete result, the product of the 423
42
42. See R. Miliband The state in cnnitalist society (1970 London:Ouartet 
Books).
43. During ny 1973 semiological analysis of 1 month's national press, 
there were 5 reports of 'political demonstrations' in the Daily Mirror 
and G in the fun, compared to 32 in the Guardian and 43 in the Times. 'tIio 
former papers had circulations in 1972 of 4,289,233 and 2,025,532 whilst 
the figures for the latter two were 341,075 and 345,016 respectively.
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practice which is
I
" ... the concentration of many determinations, lienee unity of the 
diverse." 44
It must abstract the determinant moments of the processes of development,
examine then, and, finally, resynthesize them into a unity "which approp-
45rintes the concrete, reproduces it as a concrete in the mind." In this 
way, the nature and effects of specific ideologies resting within specif­
ic practices can be determined. I began this work with the press reports
of 'political demonstrations': "the point of departure in reality and
4 Ghence the point of departure for observation and conception". I cont­
inued by attempting to develop some of the abstract categories which 
would enable a full historical synthesis of moments concretized in those 
reports. That synthesis has not yet been achieved; however, in the foll­
owing pages, I shall try to lay down the methodological principles necess­
ary for its realization. The nub of this attempt must bo a further 
examination of the concept of 'ideological formation'.
Firstly, it should be clear that an ideological formation is 
different from a theoretical formation. The latter is a systematized 
composition of ideological formations and abstracted thought-forms. An 
ideological formation is a practical impression or collection of practical 
impressions. How is it constituted? Through the practice of observation. 
What is observation? I would suggest that we can only really comprehend 
observation if we distinguish its two separate moments. At this point, 
the available terminology seems less than adequate, however, it can bo 
improved by subsequent analysis. I submit that observation has two con­
joint moments: physical and social. On the physical level, a living 
being uses his eyes and sees physical substances. On the social level, 
we must say that an agent of a social practice, through the grid of spec­
ific social ideologies, sees objects with determinate social forms of 
appearance and that this vision is conducted within particular social 
relations. These two moments are crucially different but doubly articul-
44. Marx (1973) op.cit.p.101.
45. ibid..
46. ibid..
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atcd in an inextricable conjunction. The relation between subject and 
object is thus inconceivable outside its specific social location.
What is it then that is actually observed? For any given social 
situation, the answer must, be that the observer secs the social forms of 
appearance of a tiling which are visible through his ideological grid. An 
ideological formation, therefore, in a practical impression constituted 
by the manifest forms of a thing, as seen through the filter of determin­
ate social ideologies. The observer does not see the thing-in-itself but 
only the thing-in-its-social-appearance. But, no social being is ideol­
ogically tabula rasa and, so, the only manifestations actually observed 
are those visible through the grid of his social ideologies. On the other 
hand, it is untrue to say that the observer only sees what is already in 
his consciousness: the Ilusserlian "intentional object". ITc does not 
invent the thing—to—be—seen, it exists outside of his vision. The appear­
ances of a thing are visible to anyone with eyes, they are external to 
the observer. This does not mean that he sees all there is to be seen, 
but that the forms of appearance of the thing only impress themselves on 
his brain if they are visible through the spectacles of his ideology. To 
summarize, a thing is only impressed on an observer's brain through the 
double mediation of his ideological grid and its own social 1charakter- 
masken'. The subject-object relation is real therefore, but the object 
does not present itself directly to the subject and the subject does not 
■view the. object with a pure vision.
Practical impressions or ideological formations are thus the 
ideologically filtered appearances of material reality. They are the 
product of a practice of vision, conducted by a being employing determin­
ate biological and ideological means, vhose raw materials are the social 
manifestations of a particular thing; a practice structured by determinate 
social relations. This theory opposes one-sided conceptions which think 
of the product of observation either as the creative results of the 
•interpretative' vision (phenomenology) or as the true nature of the 
observed thing (empiricist epistemology). Ideological formations are 
neither the invented falsehoods of imaginative subjects nor the hard truths 
of transparent realities. Rather, they are the products of an historical 
conjuncture between an ideologically structured vision and a socially 
disguised object.
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It should be obvious that the key distinction in ny conception
of ideological formations is that between ideological formations ar.d
forms of appearance. One of the typicnl assumptions in tho conceptions
of ideology of many Marxists is that the forms of appearance of a thing
are received directly, and are not filtered through the grid of an •
47observer's social ideologies. Such an assumption loads to the mechan­
ical notion of 'reflection'. For, if one assumes that tho observer is 
tabula rasa, the social relations and conditions within which ho acts at 
any given moment must directly produce his current thoughts. Unless one 
remembers to include the materiality and specificity of subjectivity 
within the theory of ideology, an over-crude picture will result. Such 
a picture excludes.the possibility of contradictions between displaced 
ideologies and those reflected by tho social relations of the moment.
These contradictions, in ray view, ought to form the central focus of tho 
developing Marxist science of ideologies. To begin to understand these 
conflicts is to begin to arrive at the neat of all current issues involv­
ing ideology.
It is true that Marx argues that social phenomena present them­
selves in particular forms, but this should rot be interpreted to mean 
that the observer sees al1 these forms or that he can never see through 
them. If that was tho case then tho Marxian theory of ideology would 
preclude a theory of revolution and would constitute a theory of closed 
normative orders. Fuch a Marxism results in a political strategy which 
is based on the reed to change social relations in order to 'demystify' 
consciousness, and which is thus plagued by the problem that men with 
'mystified' minds do not wish to change social relations. It often 
occurs to me that, rather than investigating tho reasons for the working 
class's inability to recognize capitalist exploitation, research should 
he directed to tho reasons for the fact that recognition of that exploit­
ation does not necessarily lead to insurrection, or for tho fact that 
contradictions exist within working class consciousness. Much Marxist 
theorizing tends to 'oversocialize' the working class and thus loses a 
grasp on the complex connections between ideologies and social relations.
47. Soo for example J. Mcphan "The theory of ideology inTapital '" 
Yt.P.C.M, G (1974) ,pp.98-123. Mephan merely hints at the mediation of the 
observer's ideologies in the observation of forms of nppeurance.
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For example, John Mephaa hints that the conservative nature of the 
consciousness of the Fiiglish working class is over determined, that it is 
an effect of a condensation of ideologies (from everyday economic pract­
ice, from the mass media and from the success of the unions in entering
\ 48the institutions of power;.
Overdotermination in itself is an important possibility to he 
investigated, as is contradiction between displaced and resident ideolog­
ies. IPwever I think it is necessary to open our minds to the possibility 
that the working classes can often see through the mystifying appearances 
of bourgeois society and yet do not wish to take state power. I think 
that this 'possibility* is actually more of a fact than is commonly 
thought. A lot of water has flowed under the bridge since Marx wrote 
Cr.pi tal. Class struggles at home and socialist revolutions abroad have 
frequently shredded the masks and disguises of ’7estern bourgeois societ­
ies, the development of education has forced new questions and the cont­
inuation of profits hp.s brought new and more commodities. Vi’hat is now 
at stake in the theory of ideology is why so many people are aware of 
economic exploitation (and/or political domination, and/or cultural heg­
emony) and yet still say n.7e can't do anythin?: about it' or 'there's no 
point'. The structures of bourgeois society contain contradictions 
which have produoed opposing sets of ideologies, notably those revolving 
around class divisions. Radical ideologies, and inherited pre-bourgeois 
ideologies, may be just as operative, in the readings of forms of appear­
ance, as those ideologies which reflect and reproduce the structures of 
bourgeois society. Hence, it is vital to maintain a clear, theoretical 
distinction between the observer's subjective grid and the object’s 
forms of appearance. They are by no means the same thing, as Marxists 
tend to assume.
Marx's Capita.l tends to divert our attention from the subject's 
ideologies to the forms of appearance of the thing. That is hardly 
Marx's fault, nor is it any weakness in his theory. He demonstrated 
that bourgeois social relations appear in disguised form and implied that
48. ibid. pp.117,118
this fact is vital to the comprehension of their social invisibility.
His to.sk -was to investigate the economic formations of capitalist society? 
so he inevitably and simuligneously developed a theory of their forms of 
appearance because the latter were his starting point in reality (espec­
ially, ns they were described, or transformed into theory, in bourgeois 
political economy). Marx did not need to consider the ways people reaci 
those forms of appearance because his object was the economy—in—itself.
My task is to investigate the emergence of specific ideological formations 
and so I need to do more than consider the forms of appearance of real 
phenomena. Because an ideological formation is established in a person's 
brain through the mediation of his ideologies, I must take the latter 
into account. The ideologies which act as the receiving filter are vital 
to the constitution of our theoretical object.
There is no time here to engage in a full historical analysis of 
the conditions of emergence of any ideological formation. However, from 
the discussion above, it is now clear that we can only comprehend the
practical impression (or ideological formation) by thinking of it as a
49product of a practice of observation. The value of this somewhat 
obvious basic premise will, hopefully, soon become clear. Observation is 
a practice, like any other, and has a definite structure. It is not 
simply a physical process, or automatic mechanism, with no social content. 
Observation has its 'labourer', raw materials and instruments of product­
ion, all being interconnected by definite social relations at a specific 
historical juncture.
(a) The observer. As a social being, he not only has physiological 
capacities, hut also thinks and sees within the terms of social ideologies. 
These ideologies structure his sensual capacities, just ns much as his 
sensual capacities determine his ability to carry ideologies.
(b) The instruments of observation . Often those will be constituted 
purely within the observer himself by his senses. But, of course, there 
are also external means which enable him to observe e.g. microscopes, 
money to enable him to travel, political access to situations,etc.
49. For the moment, I shall ignore mythologies. This is possible because they 
are merely abstracted thought-forms; that is, they are developments from 
existing ideological formations. Mythologies are founded on thought- 
forms which arc abstracted from their practical homes and applied to 
uncontrollable realities,
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(c) The raí? material. This is constituted in the i>racticc of observation 
by the objects observed, reality as it manifests itself socially in 
certain structtiral, material and historical circumstances.
(d) The social relations. Observation, or vision, is a structured prac­
tice} it is only conducted within definite social relations. These 
relations must be understood strictly within the terms of the Marxian 
conception of social practice. Thus, there are 'technical' relations 
between the observer and social reality which limit the scope and quality 
of his vision (e.g. the ability to observe a large street procession from 
a given physical location). There are also 'class' relations. These are 
the connections of appropriation between the observer and social reality 
which constitute his membership of a definite class within a given mode 
of production.
It is not easy to think the concept of class appropriations of 
social reality in relation to the practice of observation; it appears 
quite different from the question of class appropriation of value, the 
social form of economic practice. First of all it is vital to distinguish 
the class relations of observation from class ideologies. The latter are 
versions of an ideology held by people at one class polo of its reflected 
social relation. Class relations of observation, however, are objective 
connections of social appropriation between an observer and social reality. 
This concept involves the question: what direct social function do obser­
ved impressions serve for a given observer? Class relations in (say) food 
production serve to reproduce and augment the capital of the owners of . 
the means of food production; they constitute those owners ns a class.
The field of study I am raising here concerns the direct social functions 
of the class relations of observation. It does not concern us with the 
technical quality of particular camera angles or spectator positions, but 
with the question of the objective, social purpose of that vision.
I shall fill out these remarks shortly, xising the example of 
journalism; however, for the moment, I must finish this discussion of the 
social relations of observation by registering the fact that those social 
relations must themselves necessitate specific social ideologies. In
50. 1 shall abbreviate such 'reality' in future to 'social reality»
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other words., not only does an observer see social reality through the
extant social ideologies of his mind, but, also, his very relation to the
observed reality in the practices of obscrvnwion will, necessarily,
reflect ideologies which will be effective in mediating the impression of
social reality on his brain. Observation is,thus, a very complex social
practice. Even sophisticated analyses within subjectivist sociology have
left unnoticed the question of the social relations of observation and
51the effect of their reflected ideologies on vision, Such analyses have 
pointed to the effect of pro-observational ideologies on the subject's 
interpretation of reality, but they have been unable (ns far as I know) 
to unearth the concept of 'observational ideologies', the thought—forms 
necessitated by specific, practical, social relations of observation. 
Through the conception of observation as a practice, I have produced a 
distinction between pro—observational and observational categories and the 
(implicit) concept of their conjoint effectivity in socially structuring 
the product of observation practice. Armed with this theoretical develop­
ment, wo can rro on to examine the specificity of vision in given practical 
contexts without reducing it to a function of the received 'normative 
order' or 'ruling class ideology'. At present, however, my task is to 
exemplify the concept of observation as a social practice, and to specify 
the moments of an ideological formation. For this purpose, 1 shall use 
the practice of news reporting in the capitalist press.
• As social beings with their own particular biographies, people 
who become news reporters (the 'labourers') bring various social ideolog­
ies to the job, both at the point of entry and in the course of doing that 
job. Experiences at home, in prior work, in education, and in politics 
will he effective to one deftree or another in structuring their general 
observational perspectives. The other characteristics of the reporter's 
labour-power relates to his biological or sensual capacities. It is 
perhaps worth noting here that his observation-senses are probably sharp­
ened through their constant employment in his work.
The reporter's instruments of production include not only the 
obvious things such as telephones, pencils, notepads, expenses, etc., hut 
also less tangible things such as 'goodwill', 'contacts', and official
51. For example, IT. Garfinkbl (10G7) op.cit..
access. His 'raw material1 is social reality, the manifestations of 
social life. Reporters do not usually imagine the substance of their 
reports, the latter are accounts of some thing as it appears in particular 
local and historical contexts.
Social relations, I have already argued, can be seen to exist 
in a technical and a class mode. The technical relations of reporting: 
social reality are of little concern to us here. Problems of physical 
observation, photographic angles, etc., arc not, in themselves, crucial; 
although it is very necessary to note that these technical relations are 
conjointly articulated with the class relations of observation, and that, 
therefore, their content is not simply determined by the lavs of nature 
but also by (in tills case) the lavs of news-appropriation. '"hat I have 
called ’the class relations' (the inadequate terminology becomes manifest 
here) is constituted in this case by the fact that, for the reporter, rep­
ortable social reality serves as a commodity. f'uito literally, it lias 
'nevs-value'; it can bo exchanged for money on the information market.
The reporter 'works up' a set of social appearances (as he sees them) into 
a value—laden utility, n nevs report. That report is developed, polished 
and finished in the newsrooms of his company before finally being sold as 
part of the final product, the daily newspaper. In capitalist societies, 
the observation practice of nevs reporting is a moment in the production 
of newspapers for exchange and, consequently, news is reported for exch­
ange rather than use. Tlio basic question for newsmen must always bet will 
the story maintain or increase circulation, will it sell? In such circ­
umstances, the question of the accuracy, depth, and context of the inform­
ation must always bo secondary.
A3 an agent of capitalist news production, the news-reporter
must deal with social reality as a miner deals with coal. For any man in
such a position, social reality must, of necessity, serve as a commodity,
(in this case, a commodity which becomes part of a.larger commodity).It
must act as an exchangeable utility. .Iny journalist knows that this is
true; if the story does not attract the readers’ money, it will never reach
5the presses. This is an objective fact in a capitalist newspaper company.
52. Certainly, 'news’ in all societies must by definition bo 'interesting' 
But only in capitalist societies does one class define what is 'interesting 
and then sell it to the other classes. I doubt (provisionally) whether 
this is true of transitional socialist societies where the relation between 
producer and consumer is political rather than economic.
Thus, the relation hetween the reporter and social reality is that he 
must observe those bits of it which will servo ns exchangeable news.
This class relation between the reporter ar.d social reality is 
crucial to the internal dynamic of the news production units. There is 
no need here to dwell on the effects of competition between capitalist 
newspapers on stich matters as printing technology, journalists' invasion 
of privacy, and so on. Nor is there room to develop an analysis of what 
pieces of social reality are typically attended to ns 'newsworthy'. All 
I want to bring out now is the point that this social relation between 
reporter and social reality necessarily reflects a particular ideology. 
That ideology is the ideology of 'news-value'. To report news for the 
capitalist press, the journalist requires a conception of what constit­
utes exchangeable news. 7/ith repetition, this conception is sharpened
and becomes clearer. It is operative, therefore, in the observation—
53practice of news reporting.'' Which social realities penetrate the rep­
orter's brain, and the way they are received, are issues determined, 
partly, by this ideology of news—value.
The ideology of news—value is not operative outside other, more 
general, social ideologies carried in the reporter's brain. It is prob­
ably right to say that usually the two are thoroughly interpenetrated.
In the case of the journalist who regularly produces exchangeable news 
written in terms alien to his own ideologies, I suspect that he must live 
under considerable psychological strain.
Why can I call this relation to social reality a 'class' relat­
ion with any degree of sensibility, whilst still finding the term inade­
quate? It is because the relation is based upon class divisions within 
the social production of national news. News reporters only have to view 
reality in terms of exchangeable news when they are working in a system 
where the means of production and distribution of national nows are 
privately owned by one class,' When news is not capital it need not be
53. Previous sociological approaches, whether Weberian or ethnomethodol- 
ogical, have failed to grasp the central significance of the relation 
between agent -of capital and commodity in generating the conception of 
news-value. They have rendered the latter in a way which did not clearly 
connect it with any particular social relations. See llalloran ct al., 
(1970) op.cit., and 0. Tuchman "Waking news by doing work", A.J.S. (1073) 
70:1, pp.110-131.
54. The working class newspapers of this country once had sizeable circ­
ulations. These were smashed by the bourgeoisie in the 1830s and 40n, 
through the application oi a tnxj see P. Hollis The pauper press
( 1970 London : O xford U . P . ) .
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exchangeable and can toko much wider and more profound forms. It is not 
a central point of my argument that news must be interpreted and defined 
ideologically, in capitalist societies, by the owners of the means of 
news production, but, rather, that news is defined by the process of cap­
ital expansion within which it exists. News mu3t sell and that is the 
definite imperative. The process is more crucial than the ideas of its 
beneficiaries, the owners. It is this process which requires news to be 
exchangeable for the money of the news-consumers. The appropriation of 
social reality in terras of its nows value is thus a social relation which 
can only exist in class societies; it is a class relation. In socialist 
societies of the future, national and international news stories will not 
need to be exchangeable before they are reported and published. The pop­
ular press of the future will not need to ignore topics which today are 
under-reported because they do not sell. News could be defined, in wider 
terras and interpreted in n variety of ways, directly (not by proxy as 
today) by both its producers and its consumers. When the fetters of the 
capitalist relations of production are taker, off mass news dissemination, 
there need be no economic limits to tho variety and depth of news reports. 
Not only could n wide variety of issues be dealt with, but they could 
receive their full historical context and their concrete social implicat­
ions. News could-cease to be ahistorical snippets of uncontextualized, 
social processes and become a fully social piece of information.1  ^ Where 
it is produced for exchange within a system of class divisions, nows must 
remain a shrivelled piece of information, and social reality must remain 
unreported unless it can bo packaged and sold as a daily novelty.
In short, tho clnss relations of nows production do not in 
themselves involve the subjectivity or ideologies of the newspaper owners, 
but rather the objective relations between nows reporters and social 
reality. It is in this sense that the social relations under which obser­
vation takes place are crucial to understanding that observation is a 
social practice. It is these social relations which reflect definite
55. Need I say that, for variotis reasons, the press of the existing 
socialist societies seems to have as limited a range of coverage and 
width of ideological expression as tho existing capitalist press.
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observational ideologies that combine with pro-observational ideologies, 
in, the brains of their agents,'to form definite observational 'grids' or 
'perspectives'.
I have tlius exemplified the conception of observation as e. 
social practice. Vfe can h o t  return to the nature of the products of 
observation: ideological formations. I have argued that the impressions 
we receive in social practice (ideological formations) are the ideologic­
ally filtered appearances of material reality, they are the forms of 
appearance visible to and interpreted by our spontaneous perception. They
are the effects of a conjunctxire of structural vision and disguised real —
5 Gity. They are, moreover, not the same thing as ideologies. The latter 
are the forms of consciousness which structure vision. Ideological form­
ations are the products of observation, carried out under definite social 
relations, which are composed by combinations of ideologies and social 
appearances, in the manner suggested above. They are constituted by 
selected (or'fi1terod1) appearances and 'interpretations', they are ideo­
logically structured impressions. Ideological formations are doubly 
the effect of the social structures of daily practice. Firstly, the ideo­
logies colouring the subject's vision are reflections of social relations 
and, secondly, the forms of appearance of a thing are necessitated by its 
structure and its position within social relations. Practical, social 
structures thus determine both the field of vision and the field of the 
visi blc. . Those determinations are separate, of course, and probably take 
quite different forms, hut nevertheless, generally, it is still true that 
social relations condition both vision and visibility.
’»?hat are the consequences of this conception of ideological 
formations for the reading of ideologies? They arc quite fundamental.
Host centrally, it is now- clear that there are no rational grounds for 
attempting to extract an ideology from an ideological formation unless 
one has a theory of
(a) the specificity of that ideology;
(h) the specificity of the forms of appearance of the observed thing.
5G. Earlier on, I may have implied this, hut, now that the conception has 
been developed, it is clear that they are distinct phenomena.
Unless the analyst can identify both components, he could not possibly 
claim to have found the ideologies in a discourse. For instance, conc­
erning my 1973 reading, how did I know when I read these cuttings that 
my classifications of• id»o1 r rr- were not classifications of the forms 
of nuponrarce of political protest in the particular historical context 
of March/April 1973? To put the point at its strongest) how can I leg­
itimately argue that the ideological structure "militants' demonstrat­
ions are outbursts of futile, mindless militancy leading to trouble" is 
indeed such a thing, and not merely a form of appearance of political 
protest in the 1970s? Does not the kind and frequency of demonstrations 
staged by the various Left groups give the impression that they are 
merely a mindless ritual? As such, of course, their stated motives bec­
ome questionable by the press and the Left is open to daily ridicule and 
criticism. It is clearly beyond my scope to explain why political prot­
ests should present, themselves in disguised, misleading forms. That is 
a matter for detailed historical analysis of the development of politic­
al protest and orthodox politics since the war. All I want to register 
here is that the social forms of appearance of material reality and the 
social forms of consciousness are matters which are distinct but 
inextricably interwoven in the substance of an ideological formation,and 
that, therefore, a spontaneous reading of a discourse will have no theor­
etical categories or methodological instruments with which to separate 
these elements. An ideological formation is the concentration of two 
determinations, a "unity of the diverse" (Farx). '.'/hen it finnlly appears 
in words (or pictures) within a discourse its constituents have disappea­
red in the product. As elements in observation practice, the ideologies 
of the observer and the observed manifestations of reality fuse and meld 
into the final concentration ,just as rod and green paint mix and vanish 
in a concentration of.brown.
In the light of this analysis, the practices of semiology and 
content analysis seem to he very, very wrong. As regards semiology, how 
can one invent any abstract principles for separating the myth from its 
reference? Unless one knows the historical specificity of both ideology 
and appearance, any attempt to define these tilings must be abstract. As 
we saw earlier, of course, seniologists cannot do their readings without 
effective assumptions about the historical nature of both ideology and
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appearance.' Without these assumptions, they could not possibly even 
herein to separate ideolorry from forms of appearance. Unfortunately, oven 
as they stand, their efforts to describe ideologies are weak because they 
have r o  clear concept of the social reality of the referent appearance. 
Consequently, an analysed text is reduced to the status of a myth-contain­
er and its relation to social reality is ignored. Such an ignorance, in 
the case of literary criticism, must necessarily result in an absence of 
'sociological1 understanding of a novel's appeal and artistic quality, and, 
in the case of newspaper criticism, it must lead to a myopic vindictiveness 
towards journalists. As regards content analysis, it also fails to under­
stand the conjuncture of ideology and appearance as the basis of discoxirse. 
Counting certain words or column inches can tell the analyst nothing: about 
the nature of any ideologies or appearances embodied in the discourse.
Even less than semiology, content analysis makes no rigorous attempt to 
separate ideological form from the substance of social appearance. In 
short, any spontaneous reading must, bv definition, loch the categories 
and instruments necessary to separate out the diverse elements concentrated 
and unified in the ideological formations expressed in a discourse. Nor 
have spontaneous readings any sure means of comprehending the fact that 
pre_observational ideologies and social appearances conjoin in a particular 
way, which expresses the 'work' of definite observational ideologies, ref­
lecting the social relations under which observation took place.
The present work has developed sore of the concepts necessary 
to a Marxist theory of i d e o l o g y  and to a rational reading of the presence 
of specific social ideologies within discursive products. I have developed 
a clear theory of reading ideologies. 17e need to know the specificity of 
the particular ideology as a necessity of a particular social relation, 
the specificity of the social manifestations observed and the social relat­
ions of observation; then we can start separating the forms of consciousness 
from their contents in a specific discourse. This required knowledge, in 
short, is a knowledge of the social practice of observation which produces
the ideological formation; that practice is the mechanism which determines
57the nature of its produce. To understand why ideologies appear to us as
57. It is important to remember that the appearances of reality under 
observation are an integral part of the practice, as its 'raw materials'.
341
they do in definite discourses re need to understand the node of product­
ion in which they are 'immediately active.
All social phenomena are the products of specific social pract­
ices carried out under, definite social relations. To understand why 
particular ideologies exist at all, re need to find the social relations 
(the 'nodes of production1) which necessitate them in an ongoing social 
practice. In the instance of the press reports of political protest, 
therefore, ny earlier readings rere spontaneous, and useless as scientific 
work because I too]: the form (the ideologies) away frora the content (the 
appearances) arbitrarily and failed to separate the tro on rational 
grounds. Each of those press reports should nor be seen as a composition 
of ideological formations and, to determine the presence of dominant 
ideologies of particular classes rithin them, one rould need to know the 
following:
1. The nature of the dominant social relations, i.e. what Marxists 
usually call The Mode of Production.
2. The specific ideologies necessarily reflected by those relations.
3. The different, class versions of those ideologies reflecting the 
different positions of the classes within the relevant social relations.
4. The specific social relations of observation involved in news report­
ing and their necessary ideologies.
5. The extent and nature of the presence of dominant, class ideologies 
in the heads of tho various groups of news producers (i.e. reporters, 
sub-editors, editors, proprietors)»
C. The nature of the news production process, especially the power rel­
ations involved between the different classes engaged in that process.
7. The inner structure and forms of appearance of tho reported reality. 
Given these knowledges, we could then go on to discern the presence of 
specific ideologies (both pro-observational and observational) within those 
press reports.
If tliese preliminary investigations seem to show that reading 
ideology in a scientific manner is an extremely complex and arduous 
practice, that is no illusion. The task of understanding and identifying 
the nature of social ideologies has been long neglected and heavily 
glossed. This is an underdeveloped area of social science research and I 
make no apologies for indicating the immense difficulty ef the tasks ahead.
34a
Scientific knowledges of particular social ideologies and their forms of 
appearance ere a long way off. I would like to think that I have clarif­
ied the theoretical grounds upon.which they can be produced.
Two things should finally he clear. One is that the effect of 
particular class relations of observation nicy be that certain •events’ 
may be ignored by the capitalist press. I think this nay bo the main 
reason why political protest and militancy is,today, systematically under­
reported in the popular newspapers. The necessity to produce news for 
exchange may act a? a mode of censorship of far greater effect than the 
class ideologies of the proprietors or journalists. In connection with 
this point, we can also note that when political opposition of an illeg­
itimate nature is finally reported, it will be seen through the spectacles 
of the class ideologies of the newsmen. In short, calls for the bettor 
sociological education of newsmen are not entirely hopeless, hut it would 
be much more important to fight for the complete socialization of the 
means of news production in order to remove the adverse effects of capit­
alist social relations in the dissemination of important, daily information. 
Secondly, on my analysis, we do rot need any false distinctions between 
words with given, shared meanings and words with various ’subcultural’ 
meanings. Each ideolory has its own vocabulary and discour e is merely 
the embodiment of ideological impression:'. Thus the concept of language 
as ’tongue' (e.g. English) is valid, but of limited significance in the 
reading of ideologies. These readings and their objects take place 
within a specific tongue and so, given a theory of its specificity and a 
theory of the reported forms of appearance, any idoology is immediately 
readable from its text. ’Denotation’ and ’connotation’ arc inextricably 
interwoven in the vocabularies of any given ideology. Language, like 
tine, is a social structural phenomenon with definite rhythms, relations 
and elements peculiar to determinate ideological and structural contexts, 
y/e do not need the concepts of ’true* and ’false’ meaning, introduced by 
Barthes, since all meaning belongs to the forms of consciousness and 
social realities that give it existence in specific, practical contexts. 
Each ideology has its own language and, therefore, a theory of that idool­
ogy is, at the very same time, a theory of its language.
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9 , WHITHER DEVIANCE ?
Introduction
I have outlined some basic theoretical principles for an hist­
orical materialist analysis of social ideologies. In the course of this 
disexission, I have defined the concept of the ideological formation — 
an impression formed in a subject's brain through the ideological inter­
pretation of particular social appearances in a practice of observation 
under definite social relationships. Earlier I had argued that Hirst had 
produced the concept of deviance as a "practico-social ideology" and that, 
as such, deviance was an ideological formation. Hirst had produced the 
concept but not realized, or developed, its position within tho Marxist 
problematic. I have attempted to show that Marxian analysis does involve 
a concept of ideological formation. Deviance is a specific type of ideolog­
ical formation and this theoretical exploration can be concluded with the 
development of the concepts of that specificity.
Negative ideologies and social censures
In chapter one, I concluded that probably the greatest source 
of theoretical confusion within the sociology of deviance was the confl­
ation of the question of behaviour with that of ideology. I drew the 
distinction between behaviour and ideology in order to separate 'deviance' 
and 'behaviour' from their marriage in tho questionable, sociological 
concept of 'deviant behaviour'. I was attempting to indicate that dev­
iance itself was an ideological matter and that there was nothing intrin­
sically 'deviant' in the behaviour. Of course, it should not be implied
*
from this that 'behaviour' is a Marxian concept. Marxism thinlcs in terms 
•of social practices, as human activities carried out under certain social
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relations in particular material circumstances. No human 'behaviour* 
exists outside specific social relations, forms of consciousness, and 
material conditions. Thus, the break with existing sociologies of dev­
iance can be reformulated: sociology lias failed in theory to separate 
questions of ideology from questions of social practice. Beclcer cert­
ainly conceived of deviance as an ideological label but even he failed 
to theorize adequately the connections and differences between the label 
end the practice labelled. Outsiders leaves one with a feeling that 
labels are arbitrarily applied and that, eventually, the labelled practice 
becomes defined by its own agents in terms of the label. Ultimately, 
for Becker, deviance was an outcome of empirical interactions between 
rule-makers and rule-breakers. And, therefore, he lost the social struc­
tural connections between the ideology of the rules and the practices of 
the 'deviants'.
What kind of ideologies constitute the phenomenon of deviance 
as an ideological formation? Ideologies which specify the unaccoptabilitv 
or offensiveness of particular things, ideologies or practices. We can 
call such forms of consciousness: negative ideologies. An ideological 
formation, we may remember, is also composed of social appearances (obser­
ved under particular material conditions and social relations). Usually 
the appearances constituting an ideological formation of deviance are 
those of a particular social practice. The practices whose manifestations 
constitute part of an ideological formation of deviance can bo termed: 
censured practices. These are practices that have been subject to social 
disapproval or repression. The practices which employ, as part of their 
inherent structure, the negative ideologies of a society or community can 
be called: the censuring practices. The specific, structurally context­
ualized product which results from the initial application of a negative 
ideology to a particular social practice, either in the form of words or 
force, is an ideological formation. This ideological formation is comp­
osed of the relevant negative ideologies and the manifestations of the 
censured practice; it is a practical impression produced by an observer
1. See H. Becker Outsiders (1963 Now YorkjFrce Press),p.14; “Deviance is 
not a quality that lies in the behaviour itself, but in the interaction 
between the person who commits an act and those who respond to it.".
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filtering definite social realities through definite negative ideologies. 
Until now, this ideological formation has been termed (somewhat unhappily; 
a ’deviance*. I shall in future refer to it as a censure. This term 
captures the practical,' contextualised conjunction of ideologies and 
appearances much better than the terra 'deviance'. Once a practico has 
been censured, there exists within the minds of people in the society (or 
community) a definite social, ideological phenomenon: the censure. This 
-censure is the locally and historically specific social form of appearance 
of a particular negative ideology. As such,naturally,the censure 
conceals, to later observers, the operative, negative ideologies ,and the 
appearance of the social practice to which they referred in the process 
of censure. One other great weakness in the existing sociologies of dev­
iance is the lack of a theoretical distinction between a negative idool—
- ogy and a censure. This distinction is so important since it encapsulates 
both the wider, social relations and the specific, contextualized forms 
which their reflected ideologies take in the course of censuring practice. 
Becker’s type of analysis tends to concentrate on specific contexts of 
censuring practice and loses sight of macro—structural considerations. 
Interactionism, in the field of deviance, must focus on the censure, thus 
neglecting structurally necessary, negative ideologies and the structural 
preconditions of censured practices.
The concepts just outlined are those which more adequately map 
the field of study than those of existing sociologies which tend to con­
fuse some issues and ignore others. I shall say more about them in the 
following pages; however, it is vital to make some general observations 
on the concept of censure. This concept supersedes that of 'deviance'.
It is the concept of the specific form of appearance of a negative ideol- 
. ogy, just as profit is a form of appearance of stirplus value. It is a 
concept which refers to. the localized, historical substance of a particular 
negative form of consciousness. Any one censure is the outcome of a part­
icular censuring practice.which, under definite social relationships, 
censures another social practice. It is in this sense that deviance is 
•an historically specific ideological formation. It is important to note 
that a censured practice is not directly proscribed as such within a neg­
ative ideology. The latter is merely a general form of consciousness.
A censured practice is one which has actually been censured in specific 
historical circumstances. It is too easy to think of a censured pract­
ice as one which is abstractly antagonistic to a negative ideology. As 
research in the sociology of deviance hus shown, it is too easy to conf­
late abstract and practical negation: what is forbidden in theory is not 
necessarily forbidden in practice. Instituted, social practices of rep­
ression and censure do not necessarily employ negative ideologies in 
their most developed forms. They have their own movement and conditions, 
reflecting class divisions of wealth, power and ideology, which give 
negative ideologies specific forms of use and substance as practical 
censures.
I would suggest that future research in this field should be 
■historical and should focus on explanations of the conditions of emerg­
ence, the development and the social functions of (a) specific negative 
ideologies, (b) particular institutions and practices of repression and 
censure, (c) particular censures and (d) specific censured practices.
Some general remarks on the nature of these directions will now follow.
Like all forms of consciousness, negative ideologies are nec­
essary reflections of determinate, social relations and act ns integral 
elements of their practices of origin. We saw earlier how the social 
relation of commodity exchange , if it was to exist as a regular ^or 
social) relation, necessitated various positive ideologies, such as pro­
perty and contract. However, that same relation also necessitated a neg­
ative ideology: the ideology negating the non-consensual appropriation 
of another's property. Negative ideologies are also necessary outcomes 
of social relations, bach negative ideology, to put it descriptively,
-is the converse side of a positive ideology: where there is to be a 
'contract1 there can bo no 'theft'. In this sense, one can think of 
negative ideologies as the counterparts of positive ideologies - where 
there is a positive ideology there must, at least in theory, bo a corr­
esponding negative ideology. This fact, that positive rules exist beside 
negative rules, has been mistakenly identified by sociologists. They 
have often argued that deviance functions to maintain the territories of 
the normative order. For example, Albert K. Cohen states:
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"In censuring another's deviance, we are by implication contrasting him 
to ourselves and rewarding one another for our superior merit. A cert­
ain amount of controlled deviance, then, may provide an anchor or refer­
ence point against which conformity can ho measured, make conformity 
meritorious rather than commonplace, enhance the sense of community 
amongst the conforming members of the group, and in general contribute 
to the satisfyingness of life in the group." “
Thus, in structural-functionalist sociology, at least, a degree of dev- 
. iance becomes a 'system-function' which clarifies and sustains virtue.
This function is alleged to bo a character of all human societies. Con­
sequently, a characteristic of social relations is converted into a char­
acteristic of all social systems. It is not the case, in my view, that 
'we* require 'deviants' to shore up our 'virtue', but rather that tho 
positivity of the ideology of 'virtue' corresponds to the negativity of 
the ideology of 'evil': both gain their substance from the same historical 
relations. Every positive has its negative and ideology is no exception. 
-'Property' requires 'theft': that is not a general systems-need but a 
necessary correspondence of ideologies reflecting the social relation of 
commodity exchange.
It goes without saying that an ideology exists simultaneously 
in its practice of origin in both its positive and negative modos. How­
ever, this is not to say that these two modes cannot be separated through 
their discrete displacement in other social practices. For example, the 
law of contract and the law. of theft have relatively autonomous histories 
today, institutionalized in the distinct practices of the civil and crim­
inal law.
Negative ideologies are fundamentally integral to determinate 
social practices and, therefore, they have a materiality and historical 
specificity which should not ho generalized into a universal 'law' or a 
• systems—need’. Such ideologies are historically specific in nature, 
development and function. Certainly, some negative ideologies, such as 
that proscribing the taking of another's life, may ho common to all known 
societies, but that fact should not blind xis to tho radically different
2. A.K. Cohen Deviance and social control (1966 Englewood Cliffs Prent­
ice-Hall),p. 10» I only found out that Cohen used the term 'censuring' 
after I had decided to use the terra 'censure'. His usage illustrates the 
problems of the sociology of deviance.
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practical forms those ideologies take, as censures, within different 
kinds of society. This loads us on to the question of censured practices, 
which can be best dealt with next.
An interesting and valuable illustration of how Marxists might 
analyse the emergence of new social practices, which subsequently receive 
censure, is provided by an article by Phil Cohen. There is no space to 
discuss the weaknesses of his analysis, but it can bo said that Cohen 
correctly emphasizes that the emergence of social practices can only be 
properly understood when the researcher has grasped the variety of struct­
ures and ideologies operative in a specific locality during a particular 
period. His analysis stands opposed to purely general explanations of 
totally specific, localized phenomena. Moreover, it stresses the need to 
understand the social ideologies at work as well as the social relations. 
Cohen would- reject any kind of one-sided, economic determinism, whilst at 
the sane tine placing the structures of social practice at the basis of 
his work. For Cohen, new social practices are products of a localized 
combination of economic, political and ideological structures during a 
particular noment of history. New practices are neither economic 'effects', 
nor ideological 'choices', nor activities 'forced' by power relations.
They aro a complex combination of all these three things. The type of 
vorlc done by such as Cohen could he the starting point of Marxist analyses 
.of the emergence of social practices which subsequently become censured.
Having said this, our break with existing sociologies of deviance 
has sharpened. Even the most radical sociological approaches beliovod 
that 'deviant behaviours' were a theoretically valid group. Classifying 
censured practices as a coherent group of practices is the basis on which 
sociology sought general explanations of deviant behaviour. Their task 
had been to look for the common etiological features of diverse deviant 
behaviour. Thus some stressed the deviants' poor socialization, others 
pointed to deviants' shared internalization of censures,and others saw all 
deviance as purposive reaction to inhuman social conditions. It is sign­
ificant that all the characteristics allegedly unifying deviant behaviours
(1972) ~°1t .-B> " - - i,-C" U " r a l C° n f H c t  coM-mnitT" V .P .C .S .
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as a category are, in my terms, features unrelated to the essential nat­
ure of deviance itself. Instead, they arj simply potential features of 
censured practices and are not in any way features of a censure. People 
engaged in censured practice may well have failed to understand the 
censure, they may have thoroughly internalized it, or they may reject it 
altogether. Whichever is the case in any one instance, it tells us noth­
ing about the censure, its social origins and functions.
What is common to all hitherto sociological analyses of deviance
is the implicit view that deviant behaviour emerged, on a regular basis,
because the deviant chose it to happen. Thus Taylor, Walton and Young
are entirely in line with Parsons and Becker when they say that "most
4deviant behaviour is a quality of the act". For all these diverse writ­
ers, deviance is motivated action. This is true despite the fact that 
Parsons seems to frown \ipon the motives of the deviants and that Becker 
seems to overstress the 'push’ of the labelling interaction. But why 
should the rationality, or motivated nature, of any 'deviant behaviour' 
tell us anything about the nature of deviance? The fact that nil sociul 
practices involve purposive human actions as part of their total nature 
is a fact of human existence and is not particularly informative about 
social censures. Hitherto, in this strict sense, sociology has.said 
practically nothing, in terms of general theory, about the historical 
materiality of specific social censures. It has failed to sepnrato the 
causes of specific social practices from the causes of specific negative, 
social ideologies and censures. By viewing 'deviant behaviour' as a 
coherent category of analysis, it has devoted its empirical research to 
the discovery of common causes of that 'behaviour'. Precisely because of 
this it is doomed to eternal failure. Censured practices are not a coher­
ent group with anything in common other than (a) the fact that they have 
been censured in some way and (b) the fact that they share the general 
features of any social practice. There is nothing within this group to 
be 'discovered1 which will tell us anything about the general nature of 
'deviance', or, for that matter, about the general nature of censures or 
negative ideologies! Their nature as social practices is eternal and their 
nature as victims of censure is historically specific; there is thus simply
4 . (1973) op.cit.,p.147
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nothing common to them that cun found a general theory of social deviance.
If one -wants to understand the secret of social censures, it is necessary 
not to focus on the shared characteristics of censured practices; the 
latter focus will merely produce information, about social practice-in­
general and about the general effects of censures on social practice.
•What is really necessary is to study the structural determinations of,and 
connections hetween, negative ideologies and censured practices in spec­
ific historical and local situations.
When one examines the sociology of deviance in the light of tho 
concepts developed here the idea that 'deviance' exists ultimately because 
people regularly chose to do it seems somewhat primitive and absurdly 
simplistic. For a long time, Marxists have rejected the idea that things 
exist simply because people want them to. Sociology has rarely got the 
message.and, whilst Marxists have underscored the importance of ideologies, 
sociologists have overplayed then. In this particular field (of 'deviance') 
it should now be clear that the historical analysis of any particular 
practice cannot tell us anything about tho general nature of social censure. 
All it can do, and this is its proper purpose, is to provide information 
on the objective dangers that the practice posed to the classes controlling 
the agencies of control and censure, and on its forms of appearance, which 
were a part basis of the ideological comprehension of that practice 
by the censuring classes. Knowledge of the historically contextualized 
•growth and functions of specific social practices can only partly enable 
us to understand their historical problematic!ty. If we wish to understand 
the full nature of that fact, we also need to know about relevant negative 
ideologies and their class forms, objective class interests, and the nat­
ure of any existing social censures. If wo wish to know something about 
•the general nature of censure, then we must first develop a theory of its 
specificity. That I have done here and found that it is a type of ideol­
ogical formation. The sociology of deviant behaviour always lacked a 
rigorous concept of its theoretical object. That is why it lies in ruins, 
and why the new criminologists could not get beyond it, without rethinking 
that object.
Every particular instance where a practice is censured is a dis­
crete, historical event. That must be obvious. Equally clearly, within 
specific modes of production, there will be some common features of censured 
practices. For example, in capitalism, they will often objectively threaten
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>the material basis of the bourgeoisie. But that tells us nothing about 
censured practices in general, it merely indicates their historical 
specificity. One thing is vital: we must not look to any common features 
of the censured practices of an epoch in order to find out the nature of 
that epoch's negative ideologies. The latter search requires an analysis 
of the specific social relations that generate those negative ideologies.
The third new direction of study concerns the emergence of 
social censures. A social censure is the specific form of appearance of 
a negative ideology. It is an ideological formation: a unity of ideol­
ogy and appearance. That unity is moulded in the fire of an historical 
conjuncture between a negative ideology and a social practice. To look 
for that unity within the negative ideology alone would be to proceed 
metaphysically since that ideology (or form of consciousness) only finds 
its specific contents within the context of specific, historical pract­
ices which employ it (the censuring practices). To hold the concrete 
phenomenon as a reflection of an abstract structure, without dealing with 
the mediations of that structure's substance in a given social context, 
would be a typically structuralist venture. Social censures are, indeed, 
embodied negative ideologies, but the specificity of the substance of 
the ideology in question can only be understood against the historical 
background of previous embodiments. Thus, if we examined the fifteenth 
century Erglish lav of 'theft' (to give it its modern, developed term) 
in a metaphysical manner we would 'explain' its specific forms (for 
example, the laws against trespass) as manifestations of the negative 
ideology disapproving non-consensual appropriation of commodities. This 
would not be full but partial explanation, and partial description. It 
would not explain why the negative ideology took that specific content. 
To do this we would need to look at the historical conditions of feudal 
production, such as the significance of land and the struggles between 
landowners. Social censures contain social realities as well as negat­
ive ideologies; both of these being intimately connected with the 
structures of social practice of a particular code of production. 
Censures are rich with the history of their period. Similarly, to look
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for the unity of a social censure within the censxired practice alone 
would he equally mistaken. Such an approach could only present an 
account of that practice and its objective relations with other pract­
ices. It would be unable to explain the ideological composition of 
the applied censure. For example, it would ho forced to argue that 
the practice of non-conrensual appropriation of floods in bailment, 
which led to the change in 1473 of the English law of theft, was the 
cause of the new law (a form of social censure) becauso it posed an 
objective danger to the interests of the increasingly powerful bourg- 
eoisie. Such an argument cannot appreciate the specific, ideolog­
ical manner in which the bourgeoisie censured that practice in The 
Carrier's Case. It would be unable, moreover, to describe the shift
in legal censures because, of itself, it does not take into account0
the existing censures and their inadequacy for the new problem.
Social censures have ideological foundations and, thus, the invest­
igation of censure-emorgence must observe their existence and the 
extant forms of that existence. Objective relations and conflicts 
are played out in the realms of ideology.
Analysis must not elide the historical specificity of cen­
sures. They are constituted at definite moments in history when one 
practice collides with another and is dealt with in terms of the pre­
vailing negative ideologies as they exist concretely in particular 
substantive forms. The origins of social censures cannot be separated 
-from historical class conflicts and their corresponding forms of con­
sciousness. Censures are the outcomes of collisions between classes
7-as they are resolved in ideology. The objective forms of appearance 
of the censured practice impress themselves in the mould of an exist­
ing class ideology and the extant censures of that class are thus 
developed and modified. Apart from its historical specificity, a soc- 
-ial censure has a definite materiality. It exists as a real phenomenon 567
5. See J. Hall (1952) op.cit. for an account of this type.
6. Hall actually does take this into account, but does not explain why 
the shift occurs within the sphere of a particular negative ideology.
7. I am using class liore in the wider sense defined earlier: see p. 
3l8,fn.35.
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with real effects; as all thieves of goods in transport found out to 
their cost after The Carriers Case. Analysis of social censures must, 
therefore, examine the effects of the censure on its object practice.
The investigation of these effects is the central topic in the import­
ant question of the social functions of censure in the history of 
class struggles.
Regarding the institutions anil practices embodying social 
censures, it should first bo noted that a censure need not be adopted 
by the political practices of class domination. It could exist, simply, 
as an ideological formation within the minds of the classes or commun­
ities in question as an active feature of mundane social practico. As 
such, it could exist as an 'informal1 sanction. In conventional lang­
uage, its prohibited practices would be deviant but not criminal. If 
social practice maintains the existence of the censure (ns an informal 
ideological formation ) over a period of time, it could take on the 
appearance of a 'custom' or 'tradition'. As a 'custom', it can later 
be seen as an 'eternal law', or a 'belief sanctioned by the "universal 
consent of mankind" (liarx). The fact that it is a product of a conjun­
cture of class practices,or conflicts involving specific material cond­
itions and ideologies,becomes lost to view and disappears in the product. 
It becomes a feature of folk-lore or the collective consciousness of a 
class, community or ever, a whole society. For example, I think it is 
true to say that the censure and execution of peasant women in the four­
teenth and seventeenth centuries was an outcome of class conflict, 
dealt with in terms of the religious/demonic ideologies of the day. The 
context of that censure of 'witchcraft' has been lost to view and the 
censure subsequently took on a life of its own, even surpassing the 
abolition of the witchcraft laws. The ideological formation of witch­
craft still exists today in collective ideology and operates in a 
number of ways far removed from its generative historical context. ’7o 
should always remember that, if an ideological formation lives on, it 
exists as a material reality and can be manipulated or resurrected for 
radically different contexts from the context of its generation. This 
is, of course, also true of censures which are made into laws. In my 
view, what is particularly interesting here is the questions what social 
relationships maintain an ideological formation that has outlived its
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practical context? It is too often said that a 'belief' exists because* g
it is 'traditional' - but what keeps it alive? 'Witchcraft', for
example, is maintained today by the entertainments industries in films 
and books. The question of the displacement and sustenance of ideolog­
ies and ideological formations, is, indeed, an interesting one.
A social censure can, of course, be adopted in the political 
•practices of repression and propaganda by the dominant classes. Its 
-most significant form here, perhaps, is its embodiment as law. The 
need to impress a particular censure on the practico of subordinate 
classes may require the development of the moans of political power. 
Clearly, the development of the state and extensive legal codos in cap­
italist societies is the most central historical change hero. Y/hen it is 
embodied in the practices of political domination, a censure remains an 
ideological formation but it takes different material forms in the shape 
of trial and punishment. The end of a gun is the bloody end of the 
apparently dry, abstract concept of negative ideology.
As a legal enactment, a social censure often reveals its hist- 
•orical specificity when social changes render it ineffective or inappro­
priate. Always it stands as a monument to the class conflicts and ideo­
logies from which it emerged. Laws are no magical, 'right reason', 
expressed through legal codes. They are historical signposts, products 
of class conflicts fought out within definite forms of consciousness. 
Lawyers merely paint the signs, they do not make them. The making of a 
law, however, is, of course, a different process to tho conjunctural 
production of a social censure. Legislation is a process subject to the 
»circumstances of exercise of dominant, political power. Whereas a cens­
ure cculd emerge outside the political institutions, a law only exists 
within their territory. The conversion of a censure into a law is a 
•process with its own peculiar, ¡»olitical circumstances. Research has 
enlightened the nature of this process, but all too often it is focussed 
on the empirical interactions involved in legal reform and loses sight 
-of macro-social features, the classes and ideologies involved in struggle
8. Chambliss's account of the develonmeni
poet on this point. II0 says that tho lavs r e m a i n W  BU”“ 
but does rot say exactly why they lived on. y/a •? (,orn,l»t" for a time 
utionalizntion in unrcpealod laws? Sen w t r i 8 , , their ins tit-
unalysi., of of Social IVoblcTf 190°)''T T 0  )° vfgfgft.
-One tiling must be stressed here: it is not negative ideologies that are 
transformed into laws but their concrete, historical forms of appearance 
- social censures. No law exists before the censure has emerged: just 
as no censure can exist before a negative ideology. Negative ideologies 
are general forms of consciousness and only materialize in shapes fash­
ioned by the conjunctural conflict producing the social censure* They 
can achieve their fullest development in a definite, material sense.
For example, the ideology against non-consonsual appropriation has now 
got a more or less ful1,concrete form in European legal codes on theft. 
These codes, however, are scarred with the marks of historical confl­
icts and development, as well as the marks of bourgeois control of leg­
islation.
Whether a social censure exists as a law or as a customary 
belief, if if is sustained for long onourrh the censured practico can 
come to be seen as an eternal evil, and the censuring practices can 
appear as the neutral media of universal virtue. The l e g i t i m a c y  of a 
censure, whatever its conditions of existence, reduces the agents of the 
censured practice to agents of the dovil, or pathology, and elevates the 
agents of censuring practice to representatives of God, truth, sanity 
and civilization. Hence, to raise the question of the historical spec­
ificity of social censures is, in itself, to criticise the cosmologies 
of legitimacy.
Radical sociologies of devianco have questioned the universal­
ity of laws and 'moralities' and rnisod the issue of tlio 'interests' of 
their beneficiaries. But they have never reached the root of the matter 
in empirical research because of the deficiency of their theoretical 
instruments of production. All too often a law or moral prescription 
-has been simplistically reduced to an effect of objective class condit­
ions. The ideological dimension is frequently dealt with inadequately. 
Structure has not been given its extensive significance because the 
ideologies which it reflects have not been properly understood and taken 
,into account. To my mind, an analysis of social censure has a radical, 
political edge when it can demonstrate the connections between social 
structures, classes, and the ideologies which are the basis of censures, 
laws and punishments. Such an analysis does indeed, as Ilirst argued, 
•submerge the sociology of deviance into the general co n o rn s of Marxist 
theory. Contrary to Hirst, however, that submergence has been achiev­
ed here through the theoretical supersession of the concept of dovianco.
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Latent concepts of Marxian analysis have been brought forward which 
collapse deviancy theory by analysis and not by legislative fiat. The 
study of deviance is now the Marxian analysis of the connections between 
the structures of social practice, social classes and forms of conscious­
ness, an analysis guided by a need to understand the significance of 
social censures for the development of the socialist movement and of 
socialist societies,
Rarelj" have radical sociologists of deviance grasped social 
ideologies and their forms of appearance in their complex, historical 
specificity. Spontaneous readings of them, ns they appear in particular 
practices or discourses, have been carried out and they have been of 
value in various political struggles. But their lack of theoretical 
guidance or rigour has left these sociologies in a state of oxhaustion 
after initial gains. Too often, the ’sectional' nature of a censure has 
been pointed out, only to be followed by a ronanticisation of the cens­
ured practice, as if it was innately liberative or political because the 
rulers crushed it as criminal and degenerate. Similarly, the historicity 
of a censure has sometimes been observed, only to be followed by n dec­
laration that it will inevitably disappear under socialism. Real prob­
lems vithin socialist societies of today have consequently been neglected. 
The practice of 'prostitution' may disappear quickly in Vietnam but I 
doubt if the censure against it will; and would it bo a good thing if : 
it did? The 'new criminologists' replaced the "artificially segregated 
specifics" (Taylor, Walton and Young) of dominant criminology, but only 
with vague talk about the "fully social" nature of 'crimo' and 'doviance'. 
New "specifics" are required, in the wny of theoretical categories deal­
ing with ideology, the key concept for the questions asked by Marxists 
about the nature of 'crime' and 'deviance'. I hope that this present 
analysis has developed some of the necessary categories, with sufficient 
precision, to open up the questions of the ideological constitution, 
repression and masking of class conflict for Marxian analysis. If class 
conflict presented itself to view ns it really was then our interest 
would be redundant. However, class antagonisms are lived out in complox, 
localized and mystificatory ideological forms. Stripping the mystical 
•veils from class conflict is a political practice which must have rigorous 
theoretical assistance.
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The ¡problematics of 'deviance' have been supplanted by a Marx­
ian problematic whose particular focus of enquiry is mapped by the conc­
epts of negative ideology, social censure, censuring practice and censured
practices. All these phenomena are to bo understood in their historical,g
material and structural contexts.1 Only when such historical modes of 
investigation are instigated can we go on to study the maintenance and 
development of negative ideologies and their contextualized censures and, 
thus, the varying social functions they perform. For example, in relat­
ion to theft law , without a knowledge of the origins of the negative 
ideology proscribing non-consensual appropriation, the legal forms it 
took before 1473, the social relations and material conditions which pre­
dicated that ideology and its legal forms, the relations and conditions 
which left many people without immediate means of obtaining subsistence 
and without any alternative to non-consensual appropriation, the increased 
amount of trade involving the long-distance carriage of goods, the throat 
that non-consensual appropriation of goods by bailment agents presented 
to men of commerce, the fact that it was wool that was stolen, the fact 
that the wool trade was central to the emergence of the English bourgeois­
ie of whom the King was a leading member, the fact that the stolen wool 
belonged to a merchant whose trade was desired by the Crown, and the fact 
that the Crown had great influence over the courts - without this theor­
etically grasped knowledge of the structure and conditions of the histor­
ical conjuncture, we would be unable to understand why the law was trans­
formed in The Carriers Case in a particular manner and, thus, how the 
■ideological censure of non-consensual appropriation took on an extended 
social form of great historical significance.
The maintenance and development of negative ideologies
Negative ideologies, like all ideologies, can be born within
one practice yet developed within another. Thus, the ideological negate
ion of non-consensual appropriation of property is born within commodity
exchange yet its development can be formalized within the political prac-
tices of legislators and judges. Similarly, it can obtain an informal
9. Although I am not familiar with it •? * ----- T---- -----------------
in Albion's Fatal Tree (1975 London-Alien f rV lance thot et i
and ITuntors (1975 London:Allen Lane),have produced'* i*f*TI.10c,Pson»ln Hil™ 
that demanded here,in that they seem to nalni • historical work close to
separation b e t n o e n  n a t i v e  i d c o W  ' illicitly) the vita!practices* e°ioCT,c e n s u s , c c n s u r i n E p r a c t i c e  and censured
development within the communicationnl practices of a people. The dis­
placement of an ideology into a multitude of social practices raises the 
question: vhat are the main modes of maintenance end development of an 
ideology?
Ideologies can he maintained in a variety of receptive social 
-practices. That is a first principle. However, a second principle is 
that an ideology can exist in contradiction to its adopting social prnct- 
•ices and thus be expelled. It would seen that today the general ideology 
against non-consensual appropriation of commodities does not match with 
the spontaneous experience of many people in capitalist societies and, so, 
does not act as a determinant of their practice. V/here an ideology does 
gell with the experiences of a people, in a variety of social practices, 
it will act as a widespread determinant. In such an instance, no social 
problem arises. However, if that ideology is important, because it re­
inforces fundamental social relations, yet still does not wield a wide 
sphere of influence, then a social problem does exist, especially for 
those groups who benefit most from those relations. For example, if the 
negative ideology of theft is important in a capitalist society it will 
not prevent people, from various classes, from appropriating •property' 
without consent. For various reasons, pertaining to their lifo condit­
ions, the dominant classes might find this to bo a great, practical prob­
lem. Similarly, if the negative ideology disfavouring non-Parliamcntary 
political practice is ineffective, specific social classes or groups 
might be presented with threats to their conditions of existence.
Although, in the first instance, the widespread adoption-of a 
negetive ideology in social practice is the strongest basis for its main-ifim/MCd 
and development, there often arises the need to reinforce that ideology.
An important ideology which flags in its social potency can bo raised 
with the backing of power or with sustenance from repetition in the mass 
media. Therefore, on the whole, there arc two types of practice which 
act to maintain and develop consequential negative ideologies on a social 
-basis: the practices of mass communication and of legislation.
l!ass communications can reinforce an ideology that in some sect­
ors of the social totality is losing its resonance. The success of daily 
rehearsals of that ideology depends on many circumstances and the question 
cannot be dealt with here. However the first principle is always that an
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ideology nrust exist within a practice, and therefore, the receptivoness 
of the media's consumers depends fundamentally on their practical cond­
itions of existence. For example, one might speculate that, in modern 
Britain, many -workers may be aware that they' are exploited economically 
and politically yet maintain classically conservative attitudes, richly 
sustained by the mass media, because their current experience in pract­
ice is, on the whole, not an uncomfortable one. The important issue is: 
•which class/group version of an ideology is purveyed by those who oper­
ate the means of mass communication? Ideologies only exist in forms 
corresponding to the social division of labour and so, if a dominant 
class form of certain ideologies is disseminated on a daily basis, these 
ideologies may atta-in a semblance of universality or impartiality whilst 
still retaining their class character. The ideological component of the 
produce of the mass media may be so consistently one-sided that many re­
ceivers may be reluctant to believe the experience of their own practice 
- especially if they live isolated from the 'ideological realism' sus­
tained within the collective, economic and political organizations of 
their class. Obviously, class, sexual, racial and other bases within 
media ideologies are only discernible on the basis of a theory of the 
specificity of those ideologies as reflections of specific social relat­
ions. But, apart from this, to begin to understand the maintenance and 
development of specific ideologies, in definite class versions, by the 
mass connrunication institutions, it is necessary to study the processes 
of historical development, whereby the means of mass communication be­
came concentrated and centralised in the hands of some classes at the 
expense of others, and the processes of everday life which make those 
class ideologies acceptable to the subordinate classes.
Legislation provides the bodyguard of power to protect a wealc- 
•ening ideology. Law hitherto has been the formal or institutional expr­
ession of ideology by the agencies of dominant class power. Embodied in 
• law, an ideology carries the weight of sanctions, the potential exercise 
of social power. The possibility of being the object of socially inst­
ituted force can sustain a subject's obedience to the ideology - even 
if only by default. ’Vhere ideas fail, force can ensure the appropriate 
practice. Having said that, no amount of force could maintain an ideol­
ogy that has been widely abandoned by the people because of its lack of
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significance in their everyday practice. Even a reinforced ideology 
crust have some degree of practical •grip* on the minds of a people if 
the reinforcement is to have any effect. Hence there is an important 
connection of function-betveen the legal agencies and the agencies of 
mass communication. They are both in the business (inter alia) of dir­
ecting and producing a social consciousness threatened by class conflicts.
In short, an ideology can be sustained outside its practice of 
origin through the practices of mass communication and law. Within these 
practices it will take on new forms reflecting their inner structure and 
social location. It can thus be maintained and developed in an extensive 
manner. One question must be raised at this point: what happens if the 
social relations necessitating a specific ideology disappear? From what 
I have said already, two things are clear. Firstly, there is no firm 
social basis for this ideology. It lives on borrowed time in an artif­
icial world. Secondly, that artificial existence within conmunioptional 
and legal practices is nevertheless a reality and the ideology could 
continue to be effective, although it would increasingly appear to be 
old-fashioned' or 'absurd'. From this, we may conjecture that such a dis­
placed ideology with no lifeblood in social structure would eventually be 
transformed through the existence of new social relations, which generate 
new ideologies. However, that transformation may be a slow process, and, 
unless social relations of communication and legislation were also trans­
formed, great social problems could arise. On the whole, the main point 
to remember is that researchers should not expect a ready made one-to- 
one correspondence between an ideology and its practice of origin. His- 
•placement moans that, like the proverbial cat, an ideology may have nine 
lives. Each of these lives may have its own logic and subsistence.
Having mentioned the legal process, a word is necessary on the 
concept of 'crime'. After Paul Hirst's critique, many devinney theorists 
have wanted to retain1crime' but have not easily conceptualized it in 
Marxist terms. On the present analysis, 'crime' should be used to refer 
•to a social censure institutionalized as law by dominant political pract­
ice (i.e. the work of legislators, politicians and judges). 'Crime' 
could not refer to a form of practice; such a reference would be ridden 
with problems. For example, would the many practices which technically 
(or formally, infringed legal requirements, be classed as 'criminal1
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even -when they vere rarely suppressed by the lav enforcement agencies?
I would suggest that what is predominantly seen as 'criminal' in a soc­
iety is only partly a reflection of the institutionalization of social 
censures within penal codes, and is partly a reflection of the practices 
of those charged with the enforcement of those censures. Thus, today, 
breaches of the Factories Acts are rarely seen as criminal practices 
and rarely repressed as such. 'Crime' is a social and legal censure, an 
•ideological formation in lav, not a 'behaviour'. Thus its concept must 
reflect that fact.
How then can we think the apparent phenomenon of 'organized 
crime'? I would suggest that this is simply a form of economic practice 
proscribed by the criminal law and its agents of enforcement. If we 
want to study practices which consciously infringe the criminal lav, vc 
arc concerned not so much with 'criminal behaviour' as with specific 
social practices with definite economic, political or ideological purposes 
which infringe the criminal lav. The latter fact is not central in a 
Marxian analysis to understanding the origins of these practices. In 
dominant criminology, of course, it was a vital fact* one that diverted the 
study of the origins of these practices into the ideological cul-de-sac 
of 'criminogenic factors'. Ilowcvor, I would add that, equally obviously, 
the fact that a practice is known to infringe the law (or widely held 
•norm' for that matter) is important in determining the developed forms 
of the practice. Elements of an actor's consciousness are always doterm—
-ing moments of any social practice.
'Criminal behaviour', like 'deviant behaviour' is an inadequate 
theoretical category for Marxian analysis. It conflates a number of 
practices which have nothing in common hut the features of all social 
.practice and the fact that they have been legally censured. One can 
certainly rationally study the effects of legal censure upon particular 
social practices; just as one can show that all legally censured social 
practices involve definite 'purposes', raw materials, instruments of pro­
duction, classes of people and social relations. Hut, to search for the 
•origins of criminal activity by conflating all legally censured social 
practices into one category of 'crime' is to search for the non-existent.. 
Each practice which has been legally censured has its own historical, 
•structural and material conditions of emergence and existence. Thus, if 
we want to study 'crime', we must examine the historical emergence of the 
relevant social censure and its legal institutionalization. If we want
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to study practices currently censured in law as •criminal', we are in 
the business of investigation of specific social practices andra there­
fore, we must take each one separately and examine its own peculiar, 
local and historical specificity.
Deviancy theorists have constantly stressed that the study of 
•crime' is important. I would rephrase it. The study of the origins 
and functions of legalized censures is important because it contributes 
to an understanding of class struggle and class domination. The study 
of the origins and functions of particular censured social practices is 
important because it contributes to an understanding of the weaknesses 
and inequalities within social systems. If you like, these fields of 
study are comparable (although moro precisely defined) to the extant stud­
ies of criminal law and criminal behaviour. Comparable, but not similar: 
they are tied to different political practices and defined in sharply 
different ways.
The direction of future research
The field of Marxian analysis outlined here must make the foll­
owing topics items of empirical, historical research:
1. The determination of the essential nature of a negative ideology, 
reflected by particular social relations, and its constituent content 
corresponding to its existence within particular social practices.
2. The identification of specific adopted forms of that ideology, when 
it is displaced into other social practices.
3. The study of the social divisions arising out of a particular econ­
omic formation and their corresponding effects within political and 
intellectual practice.
4. The identification of particular class versions of a negative ideology.
5. The study of economic, political and ideological structures and con­
ditions which promote particular censured practices.
3C3
6. The examination of the objective threat posed by censured practices 
to' specific social classes or groups.
7. The investigation of the conditions surrounding an historical con­
juncture which produces a social censure.
8. The study of the part played by the continuation of that censure in 
concealing the historical specificity of negative ideologies.
9. The critique of social 'sciences’ whoso work mystifies the histor­
ical and structural origins of negative ideologies.
10. -The analysis of changes in social structure which siistain or remove 
the foundation of existing.negative ideologies.
11. The analysis of changes in the form of displaced negative ideologies 
effected by changes in their adopting practices.
12. The investigation of the success of practices of mass communication 
and law-creation in sustaining negative ideologies and social censures.
13. The historical analysis of the economic, political and intellectual 
functions' of negative ideologies and social censures, especially in rel­
ation to class struggles and conflict.
14. The determination of different class readings of ideologies in dis­
courses, especially mass-produced ones.
All these topics must be pursued with an emphasis on the hist­
orical specificity of negative ideologies and their material existence 
as reflections of contradictory relations between social classes and 
groups over the means of social practice. It is in this dialectical, 
materialist sense that the study of negative ideologies and their social 
functions is fundamentally an integral part of the study of social devel­
opment. In conventional sociological terms, the sociology of deviance is
3G4
part of development studies’ and must be realized as such in practice.
Y/hat appears as 'deviance' must be comprehended through the perspective * 
of a thoroufrhly historical materialism. Negative ideologies are integ­
ral to all processes of social development and crucial in some. Prev­
ious investigation in the sociology of deviance have rarely obtained a 
firm grasp of the economic and political contexts,and functions,of neg­
ative ideology - just as students of development have rarely managed 
an explicit grasp of the ideological moments of economic and political 
change. The real basis of 'deviance', the social relations which nec­
essitate negative ideologies and create class conflict, has eluded 
sociology and it has never been theoretically possible to insert 'dev­
iance' into its right place within the analysis of class societies.
That place has now been thoroughly conceptualized from basic, Marxian 
principles.
One might agree with Paul Hirst that many practices censured as 
'criminal' or 'deviant' are in no way revolutionary, political practices. 
However, ideology is important, as an integral part of all societies. 
Ideology, in general, is a vital element in any social practice and thus 
its negative forms are equally vital. The general analysis of ideolog­
ies is not an esoteric, academic hobby with no implications for political 
practice. Y'hat has preceded us in this text may at times have appeared 
as very inconsequential, abstract critique and exposition. However, I 
myself, have no doubt that the issue of ideology is becoming one of the 
utmost practical importance for Marxist political practice, and that 
historical research based on a developed theory of ideology can only help 
such practice.
Too often, Marxist militants have reduced the issue of ideology 
to a question of the ability of the ruling classes to 'imprint' their 
ideologies upon people's brains. Consequently, most of the world's pop­
ulation have been relegated, in political dogma, to a state of 'false 
consciousness'. The practical nature of ideology, is rarely understood. 
Militants often seem incapable of grasping the fact that ideologies have 
-an extended' existence in people's practices because they reflect, or 
resonate, the social relations in which those people live. They seem to 
prefer to believe that people freely choose the ideologies which guide 
their practice. Certainly, the startling power of Marxist theory is such 
as to induce the belief that those who cannot agree with it must bo mad,
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bad or indoctrinated. However, the conceptual substance of that theory 
should remind those militants that forms of social consciousness corr­
espond to forms of social structure, and that ideologies are thus firmly 
rooted within the structures of everyday practice. It is to this pro­
foundly practical aspect of ideology that Marxist theory must turn its 
attention. Perhaps now more than ever, it is daily becoming more obv­
ious that the production and conservation of socialist revolutions 
hinges upon the practical resonance of class ideologies as well as upon 
the developments in economic and political practice. Marxist theory 
must grasp the profound significance of the structure-consciousness conn­
ection that Marx constantly forewarned us would determine the process of 
future social development:
« ... mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve ... ".10
10 . Marx, 1859 Preface, in Marx and Engels (1973) op.cit.,p.182
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